I
The sciences of operations research, cybernetics, information theory, game theory, and systems engineeringāto name only the most important onesādeveloped in the last two decades, share common approaches and overlap in many ways. This is no surprise if we think about their origin. They all are children of World War II. It started with the enrollment of scientists to solve the novel organizational and technological problems of modern warfare, which exceeded the competence of the military and engineers. The development of radar, the support and supply of continental battlefields and the planning of strategies created planning and decision problems that could not be solved with a sufficiently high guarantee of success using conventional techniques. The results of this scientific cooperation are not only new technologiesāfor example technologies of communication, data processing, or astronauticsābut these first efforts also led to new, independent sciences that not only find increasingly āpeacefulā applications but also have become important and necessary tools in planning, politics and development. In the USA, for example, there are today tens of thousands of scientists engaged in these new fields and several hundreds of millions of dollars are spent every year in the promotion and, especially, the application of these technologies.
The commonalities of the named disciplines may be explained by the situation that gave rise to them: they were invented for situations with a pressing need for action in which the scientist acted not only as consultant in the traditional way, but became a co-responsible decision maker. There are several motivations for this:
⢠Too much is at stake: the costs of failure are so high that it is well worth the cost of using the very best means to justify2 oneās decisions, or even to develop new methods to do so (e.g. in problems of defense strategies, development of third world countries, projects of atomic technologies and space travel).
⢠The problem cannot be solved by conventional means: it is too large and too complex (e.g. the space program).
⢠One seeks more rational and cheaper ways (e.g. automation).
⢠One seeks to shield a system against catastrophes caused by inadequacies and mistakes (e.g. a defense system against Herostratos and randomness, an economy against crisis).
⢠One wants to know which goals reasonably to pursue; one realizes that the political and ideological goals are too coarse and too pat to yield instructions for concrete and far-reaching decisions: historical philosophical programs less and less provide practicable norms for political decisions (e.g. development planning or defense policies).
In addition there is the conviction that, in view of these difficulties, the scientific methods are useful and promising. This assumption is inherent in the age of āscientification,ā even though it smacks of a positivist philosophy: science that claims objectivity in the name of a last authority is dangerously close to an uninhibited belief in progress. The justification of the scientification can be inferred from its effects: the scientific method, especially that of the natural sciences, has become the most effective tool for shaping reality:
The scientific method is the modern equivalent of Spinozaās program to investigate the world āmore geometrico.ā
The new tendency towards an āengaged scienceā has, however, not been without consequences for science and its ideology. The classic ideal of science gave it a single task: to gain knowledge (Erkenntnisse), for only new knowledge signifies progress in an absolute sense and it therefore becomes desirable āfor its own sake.ā The applicability of this knowledge is not a problem for the sciences; it will show itself. Science forms its own reality; it is an autonomous province separate from the āextra scientificā world.
This ideal has proven quite effective. The institution of science as a generator of āinnovationā isolated from the vagaries of events has become an important element of modern social systems.
The new disciplines to be discussed here, however, represent a type of science that does not fit the classical program:
⢠Knowledge is no longer sought for its own sakeāwithout any consideration of its later usesābut in view of concrete tasks;
⢠Its results should be to generate recommendations for action;
⢠The scientist is an active participant in planning and decision-making.
The decision-making process thus becomes itself an object for scientific investigation. One could doubt whether such an activity deserves to be called a science. If one does it anyway, this means a revision of the concept of science that makes the traditional ideal an extreme case. The basis of such a theory of science cannot simply be an epistemology, because knowledge is only one component of action. Neither can a linguistic theory of science (sprachanlytische Wissenschaftstheorie) fulfill that role. What would be required here as a foundation is a theory of action (Handlungslehre), which recognizes knowledge as a presupposition for action. A science in this broader sense, however, would lose many of its hitherto typical characteristics:
The above expressed apprehension of a camouflaged positivism is invalidatedāor at least moderatedāby such a concept of science. If the institution of science abandons its apodictic claim to objectivity and if it accepts that it, including its goals and values, is subject to historical change and the play of forces, it loses the character of a patent ideology and of a rigid, absolute authority.