NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AS A DISTINCT DISCIPLINE
Neuropsychology is a bridging discipline that draws on material from neurology, cognitive psychology, and even psychiatry. However, its principal aim is to try to understand the operation of psychological processes in relation to brain structures and systems. It is the oldest branch of scientific psychology and it retains a degree of distinctiveness that distinguishes it from other related areas. It has, for example, historically relied on small N or even single-case study designs, a tradition that continues to this day. Like cognitive neuroscience (see preface to this edition) it embraces the concept of converging operations (in which research findings from different sources and even different levels of inquiry are âusedâ to inform a particular debate). But unlike cognitive neuroscience, we should expect some fairly direct reference to human behaviour, and also unlike cognitive neuroscience, the brain itself may seem quite marginalised from the debate. Brain structures barely merit mention in Ellis and Youngâs classic text Human cognitive neuropsychology (1996), for example. (See also Coltheart, 2001, whose ideas are summarised later in this chapter.)
The term âneuropsychologyâ was used as a subtitle in Donald Hebbâs influential book The organisation of behaviour: A neuropsychological theory, published in 1949, although the term itself was not defined. With the demise of behaviourism (terms in bold type in the text indicate that the term is included in the Glossary section at the end of the book) and renewed interest in cognitive processes in the 1950s and 1960s, the term appeared with increasing frequency, although its definition remained vague and it was used in different senses by different people. Although, as you will see, researchers had been interested in the effects of brain damage and disease on behaviour for many years, it was arguably some time after behaviourismâs fall from grace that neuropsychology came to develop a distinct identity within psychology, and its parameters were further clarified by the publication of the first edition of Kolb and Whishawâs Fundamentals of human neuropsychology and Lezakâs Neuropsychological assessment in 1980 and 1983 respectively.
It would be misleading for us to suggest that, following its protracted birth, neuropsychology has emerged as an entirely unified discipline. In reality there remain different emphases among practitioners and researchers, which broadly divide into two domains: those of clinical and cognitive neuropsychology. At the risk of oversimplifying the distinction, the former tends to focus on the effects of brain damage/disease on psychological processes such as memory, language, and attention, and often has a clinical remit for assessment and even treatment. Conversely, the latter tries to understand impairments to psychological processes in terms of disruptions to the information-processing elements involved. In other words, the clinical approach goes from the damaged brain to psychological dysfunction and its remediation, whereas the cognitive approach goes from psychological dysfunction to hypothetical models about the individual stages of information processing that could explain such dysfunctions, which may (or may not) then be âmappedâ onto various brain regions. This division has led to quite heated debates among neuropsychologists about, for instance, the merits/short-comings of single-case versus group research designs, and the extent to which cases of localised brain damage can ever definitively be used as evidence in support of functional localisation. (We take up each of these points in the following chapters. However, see the special issue of the journal Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2004, vol 21, for a flavour of the arguments.)
Incidentally, a glimpse at the chapter titles in this book might suggest to the reader that we too have chosen to take a cognitive approach to neuropsychology. However, this is not the case, and it is our hope that you will see that both approaches have much to offer in our quest to understand the relationship(s) between psychological processes and brain functioning. Besides, the ever-increasing use of in-vivo imaging techniques has inevitably blurred this distinction, chiefly because they provide the researcher with the opportunity to observe brain activity in healthy individuals as they undertake some sort of cognitive or other psychological challenge, arguably permitting a more direct (i.e., less inferential) link between structure and function.
THE ORIGINS OF THE BRAIN HYPOTHESIS
We know from historical records from the Middle East (e.g., the Edwin Smith Surgical Papyrus, found in Luxor, Egypt, in 1862) that the importance of the brain as a âbehaviour control centreâ (henceforth referred to as the brain hypothesis) was first considered at least 5000 years ago, although the predominant view then, and for many centuries thereafter, was that the heart was the organ of thinking and other mental processes. The ancient Greeks debated the relative merits of heart and brain, and Aristotle, noting that the brain was relatively cool in comparison with the heart, came down in support of the heart as the seat of mental processes, arguing that the brainâs principal role was to cool blood. Hippocrates and Plato, on the other hand, both had some understanding of brain structure, and attributed various aspects of behaviour to it: Hippocrates, for example, warned against probing a wound in the brain in case it might lead to paralysis in the opposite side of the body.
In first-century (ad) Rome, the physician Galen spent some time working as a surgeon to gladiators and became all too well aware of the effects that brain damage could have on behaviour. The âheart hypothesisâ was fundamentally undermined by Galenâs descriptions of his clinical observations: he showed that sensory nerves project to the brain rather than the heart, and he also knew that physical distortion of the brain could affect movement whereas similar manipulation of the heart could not.
For reasons that are never entirely clear, the knowledge and understanding of these early writers was lost or forgotten for the next 1500 years or so of European history. Those with any interest in the brain concentrated on attempts to find the location of the soul. Their search focused on easily identifiable brain structures including the pineal gland and the corpus callosum, structures that today are known to be involved in the control of bodily rhythms and communication between the two sides of the brain respectively.
LOCALISATION OF FUNCTION
The renewed interest in rationalism and science that accompanied the Renaissance in Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries prompted scientists of the day to revisit the brain and to try to establish the functions of particular brain structures. Because a lot of brain tissue appears relatively undifferentiated to the naked eye, these researchers also concentrated their efforts on the same easily identified structures as the earlier âsoul-searchersâ. They explored, for example, the functions of the fluid cavities of the brain (the ventricles), the pineal and pituitary glands, and corpus callosum. However, their ideas about the functions of these structures were usually well wide of the mark: Descartes (1664), for example, mistakenly argued that the pineal gland was the point of convergence of bodily sensory inputs giving rise to a non-physical sense of awarenessâthus encapsulating the key idea of the mindâbody problem, although it should, perhaps, have been more aptly described as the mindâbrain (or even the brainâmind) problem! To reiterate, the pineal gland is today regarded as an entirely soul-less endocrine gland involved in the control of bodily rhythms.
Nevertheless, implicit in this early work was the core idea of localisation of functionâthat different regions of the brain are involved in specific and separate aspects of (psychological) functioning. This idea later intrigued both Gall, the
Austrian physician, and his student Spurzheim, whose work represents the starting point of what we might call the modern era of brainâbehaviour research. It should be noted at the outset that Gall and Spurzheim, like modern-day neuropsychologists, were more interested in localisation of function within the cerebral cortex (the outer surface of the brain), with its characteristic bumps (gyri) and folds (sulci), than in the subcortical structures mentioned earlier. Gall (1785â 1828) readily accepted that the brain rather than the heart was the control centre for mental function and, with Spurzheim, made several important discoveries about the anatomy of the brain, its connections with the spinal cord, and its ability to control muscles that have stood the test of time. For example, Gall was the first person to distinguish between grey and white matter (neuron cell bodies and their bundled axons respectively) in the brain, and also described the first case of aphasia (impaired language production) associated with frontal damage resulting from a fencing injury.
THE RISE AND FALL OF PHRENOLO...