Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy

Steven W. Hook, Christopher M. Jones, Steven W. Hook, Christopher M. Jones

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9780415800952
• eBook ISBN: 9781135967345
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

No nation has maintained such an immense stature in world politics as the United States has since the Cold War's end. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, prompting the global war on terrorism and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, along with American economic and "soft power" primacy, there has been increased interest in and scrutiny of American foreign policy. The Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy brings together leading experts in the field to examine current trends in the way scholars study the history and theories of American conduct in the world, analysis of state and non-state actors and their tools in conducting policy, and the dynamics of a variety of pressing transnational challenges facing the United States.

This volume provides a systematic overview of all aspects of American foreign policy and drives the agenda for further, cutting edge research. Contributors bring analytic depth and breadth to both the ways in which this subject is approached and the substance of policy formulation and process. The Handbook is an invaluable resource to students, researchers, scholars, and journalists trying to make sense of the broader debates in international relations.

Part I Research Traditions and Historical Experience

1 The Study of American Foreign Policy

Margaret G. Hermann

DOI: 10.4324/9780203878637-2

An analysis of scholarship on American foreign policy presents a study in contrasts revolving around a set of questions that remain both historically significant and contemporarily relevant despite two centuries of discussion. Consider: (1) Is American foreign policy characterized by continuity or change? (2) Who is in charge of making U.S. foreign policy? (3) What is the “correct” approach for the country to take to the world? (4) What are the appropriate instruments of statecraft? (5) How should American foreign policy be studied? This chapter will examine these core questions and the contrasts found in the literature. Its focus is on indicating the nature of the discourse surrounding these issues and the optional answers to these questions that have been posed. The authors encourage readers to continue to seek answers as they peruse the rest of this handbook and to consider their own positions regarding these queries, what scholars who are expert in these domains propose, and the suggestions for further research that are generated.

What is Foreign Policy?

But before delving deeper into the contrasts inherent in the American foreign policy literature, let us first define foreign policy. Just what is foreign policy? Interestingly, while an appropriate starting point, this question is not asked very often in the literature for several reasons. For example, when studying a particular case such as the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, the focus of attention is on one situation and its accompanying decision-making process. Both reader and analyst know what is being studied; there is no need to define foreign policy. Moreover, say the analyst wants to explore U.S. use of force, attention is directed to considering what is counted as a use of force. Does sending in military advisers or threatening to bomb constitute a use of force or must there be troop movements on the ground in enemy territory to count? Once again, there is little need to define what foreign policy is, we know what we are trying to explain. However, what if we want to understand how the foreign policies of two or more administrations are similar or different from one another; or we want to compare U.S. foreign policy in response to crises such as 9/11, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the downing of the U.S. plane on China’s Hainan Island; or we want to contrast American foreign policy during and after the Cold War? For such comparisons we need to consider what we mean by “foreign policy.”

One oft-used definition of foreign policy in the American politics literature is that it involves “the goals that the nation’s officials seek to attain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or instruments used to pursue them” (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008: 17). In other words, foreign policy involves goals, values/norms, and the means for their representation and achievement. Foreign policy links aspirations to actions as “decreed or promulgated by those in power” (Carlsnaes 1986: 60)—those with the authority to commit the resources of the government. In effect, foreign policy is a guide for action declared by an authoritative source that makes certain behaviors more probable and other behaviors less probable, narrowing the range of actions that are likely to be viewed as appropriate in response to a particular situation. Indeed, policies are considered to exist when they are explicitly stated and recognized by officials as such—“by being spoken, stated intentions and plans [gain] some degree of normative force in their own right” (Onuf 2001: 77–78).

To recapitulate, policy is viewed as a guide or plan of action centered around a set of goals or objectives that are enunciated by those with the authority to commit the resources of the U.S. government; as such, policy provides a rule for interpreting what is happening as well as for delimiting the range of actions that appear feasible for achieving a particular goal and representing a set of values in the current context. Policy becomes foreign in orientation when it is directed toward entities outside one’s borders or jurisdiction or, as noted above, when it is focused on goals and objectives that “the nation’s officials seek to attain abroad.” Some examples of U.S. foreign policy actions that reflect this definition are containment, the “enlargement and engagement” focus of the Clinton administration, and the guides for intervention often referred to as the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines.

Continuity vs. Change in U.S. Foreign Policy

Opinion and scholarship seem to differ with regard to how consistent American foreign policy is and has been across time. Some scholars have argued that there is consistency in American foreign policy—that U.S. foreign policy is both reflective of and contributes to the exceptionalism inherent in American history (e.g., Smith 1994; Huntington 2004). Originating most tangibly with de Tocqueville’s (1835)observations, American exceptionalism is represented in the notion that the United States inherited a “special spiritual and political destiny”—that the [United States] is a shining beacon of liberty to the rest of the world. The argument goes that American exceptionalism remains a dominant component of American national identity and by extension is promoted through its foreign policy, embracing as it does the language of the nation’s founding documents: liberty, democracy, and independence (Huntington 1993).

Others have viewed U.S. foreign policy as reflective of turning points in its history, defining these junctures as “paradigm shifts” or critical transformations in the “strategic culture” (see Kupchan 1994). Such seismic shifts in policy—for example, the abandonment of continental isolationism inherent in early U.S. foreign policy upon entering World War I or the application of deterrence after dropping the atom bomb in 1945—are used by scholars to explain policy trends. Indeed, many textbooks favor this historical shift approach in organizing their narratives regarding American foreign policy.

More recently, scholars have moved to view consistencies and shifts in U.S. foreign policy as related to changes in presidential administrations (e.g., Greenstein 2000; Inderfurth and Johnson 2004; Melanson 2005). Since most U.S. presidents have promulgated some sort of foreign policy “doctrine,” it becomes possible to examine where there is continuity or change comparatively by examining presidential administrations over time. These differences are often reflected in the comments of presidents and their advisors as well. Consider the following: “The ultimate test of our foreign policy is how well our actions measure up to our ideals … Freedom is America’s purpose” (Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 1998). “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me” (President Abraham Lincoln 1864). “Decisions are made by people, and they make them based on what they know of the world and how they understand it” (Vice President George H.W. Bush 1987).

At issue here is whether U.S. foreign policy is built around a set of values—“freedom from the dictates of others, commercial advantage, and promotion of American ideas and ideals” (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008: 29)—or whether it is based on notions of power and national interests. These represent dueling visions about what constitute the goals, norms, and means that are the focus of American foreign policy. They also bring with them different philosophies regarding human nature and how important the situation and context should be in determining policy. And they represent the ongoing debate among presidents, policy makers, pundits, and scholars on the importance of idealism versus realism as the basis for U.S. foreign policy (e.g., Kissinger 1994; Holsti 1995; Johnson 2007).

For idealists, foreign policy has a consistency to it. The foundation of idealism in American foreign policy originates in Jeffersonian rhetoric but is probably most identified with Wilsonian internationalism. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been linked to humanitarian intervention. In this philosophical tradition, U.S. foreign policy is based on principles, preferably related to freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Idealism is often linked with American exceptionalism and the extension of American values in and through international institutions. There is a certain inflexibility as to what can constitute foreign policy.

For realists, in contrast, foreign policy is more context dependent; it is focused on national interests and relative power vis-à-vis other countries in the world and these can change. Foreign policy is focused on security and economic well-being; use of force and war become viable options when either of these tangibles is threatened. According to this philosophical view, international relations are anarchic at heart, managing conflict and competition is critical to survival as a country. There are, indeed, critical junctures.

Could it be, as some have proposed, that in U.S. foreign policy idealism is used to justify policy that is based on what a president views as important behavior for purposes of addressing national interests (see, e.g., Hoffmann 1972; Lepgold and McKeown 1995)? American ideals become the justification for policy demanded by national interests. Or, as others have argued, does U.S. foreign policy represent a blend of idealism and realism with events and presidents determining the proportions of each emphasized in and with the policy (e.g., Herring 1995; Kane 2003; McCartney 2004). Thus, at times, an either-or choice is made, at other times the blend emphasizes idealism, and at still other times realism becomes the dominant ingredient in the blend. Or, as Kissinger (2000) has observed, American foreign policy tilts back and forth between idealism and realism based on the generation currently dominating the halls of power and the critical life experiences that have shaped their views of the world be they World War II, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, the 1990s, or the post-9/11 era. Or, is it, as Kupchan (1994) has suggested, that American foreign policy gets caught up at certain points in time in a particular view of how its national interests and values intersect and a strategic culture forms that transcends presidential administrations and changes in the international system? Like with the U.S. “war on terror,” a particular way of viewing and dealing with events takes shape and becomes ingrained among both the political elite and the mass public.

Who Is in Charge of Foreign Policy?

Intent on ensuring checks and balances among the various parts of the U.S. government, the founding fathers built in a tension between the presidency and the Congress when it comes to making foreign policy. The president is the commander-in-chief, the chief negotiator, and the chief diplomat but the Congress makes laws, must ratify treaties, and appropriates funds. The focus is on shared responsibility and an “invitation to struggle” (Corwin 1948). And, as Melanson (2005: 6) has observed, the pendulum often shifts regarding “presidential-congressional understandings about the respective tasks” each is to perform. These shifts have led to terms such as the “imperial presidency” and the “imperial Congress” as each stakes out a claim for “being in charge.” Lindsay (2004) has proposed that it is during times of peace and as U.S.-sponsored conflicts wind down that Congress becomes more active in foreign affairs; it is in times of conflict and war that Congress appears to “rally round the flag” and become more deferential to the executive. The presence of a foreign policy crisis and of a threat to national security seems to tilt the relationship more toward presidential leadership—there is a contraction of authority to the top and those most politically accountable. But without such a crisis—and sometimes in response to the sense of loss of power during these times—Congress works to reassert itself. Consider how Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon viewed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as providing congressional carte blanche authority for their conduct of the Vietnam War only to see Congress pass the War Powers Resolution to reduce the power of the president once that war ended.

Two interesting literatures have arisen examining this procedural relationship between president and Congress and how the behavior of each affects not only the political fortunes of the other but the nature of U.S. foreign policy as well. The first centers on the conditions under which presidents will assert their authority and use foreign policy to counter vulnerability or low standing domestically. The second focuses on the role of Congress in framing the foreign policy agenda for presidents.

Some have called presidents’ use of foreign policy as a means to deal with problems domestically the “gamble for resurrection in the eyes of the voters” (Downs and Rocke 1994; Smith 1996). And the literature (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1985; James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Richards et al. 1993; DeRouen 1995) has reported a diversionary use of force internationally in response to a decline in public approval at home. This reaction has been described in terms of “policy availability” (e.g., Miller 1995; Gelpi 1997; Brule 2006)—the use of foreign policy as a substitute when other avenues are closed to the president. Consider Brule’s (2008) study examining relations between the president and Congress in decisions to use force. He argues that an uncooperative Congress can compel “the president to look beyond the domestic arena for opportunities to demonstrate his competence” (Brule 2008: 353). At such times, a president turns to foreign policy—that place where constitutionally he has a greater capacity to act without congressional approval. Brule contends, and finds, that presidents do, indeed, initiate disputes internationally when Congress is generally being unsupportive of their policies. In effect, he reports a higher likelihood of the initiation of a dispute when the president’s success in Congress is minimal. Others have found that U.S. interventions are less successful when there is a lack of consensus between the president and Congress on what is being done (e.g., Peceny 1995; Hermann and Kegley 1998).

The same appears to be the case for foreign policy of a more positive or cooperative tone as well. Consider, for example, the fact that President Bill Clinton traveled abroad the most during 1998—the same year that the Monica Lewinsky scandal broke at home—and that Nixon engaged in the most foreign travel of his presidency during 1974 at the height of the Watergate scandal (Berthoud and Brady 2001). As President Ronald Reagan’s staffers admitted regarding one of his trips to Europe, “because the polls were showing a drop in the president’s popularity, which made him vulnerable in Washington, we decided that conferring on location with European heads of state would be good for his image as a leader” (Kernell ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table Of Contents
• Preface
• List of Contributors
• Part I: Research Traditions and Historical Experience
• Part II: Theoretical Perspectives
• Part III: State Actors
• Part IV: Non-State Actors
• Part V: Policy Instruments
• Part VI: Transnational Challenges
• Index