Terrorism Versus Democracy

The Liberal State Response

Paul Wilkinson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• eBook ISBN: 9781136835452
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the terrorist networks that operate globally and analyses the long-term future of terrorism and terrorist-backed insurgencies.

Terrorism remains a serious problem for the international community. The global picture does not indicate that the 'war on terror', which President George W. Bush declared in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, has been won. On the other hand it would be incorrect to assume that Al Qaeda, its affiliates and other jihadi groups have won their so-called 'holy war' against the Coalition against Terrorism formed after 9/11.

This new edition gives more attention to the political and strategic impact of modern transnational terrorism, the need for maximum international cooperation by law-abiding states to counter not only direct threats to the safety and security of their own citizens but also to preserve international peace and security through strengthening counter-proliferation and cooperative threat reduction (CTR).

This book is essential reading for undergraduate and postgraduate students of terrorism studies, political science and international relations, as well as for policy makers and journalists.

1 Terrorism, insurgency and asymmetrical conflict

Introduction to the concept of terrorism

A great deal of unnecessary confusion has been created as a result of the mass media, politicians and others using the term terrorism as a synonym for political violence in general. Others seek to ban the word terrorism on the spurious grounds that most of those who use terrorism as a weapon prefer to be called ‘freedom fighters’, ‘holy warriors’ or ‘revolutionaries’, depending on the cause they profess to be fighting for. Some so-called ‘post-modernists’ reject the concept of terrorism on the grounds that it is purely ‘subjective’, implying that there are no independent objective verifiable criteria to enable us to distinguish terrorism from other forms of activity. The public would be justifiably puzzled if lawyers and criminologists ceased to use terms such as ‘murder’, ‘serial murder’, and ‘war crime’ and ‘genocide’ simply because those who perpetrate such crimes regard these terms as pejorative.

As for identifying objective criteria for identifying terrorist activity, common sense indicates that the general public in most countries in the world can recognise terrorism when they see campaigns of bombings, suicide bombings, shooting attacks, hostage-takings, hijackings and threats of such actions, especially when so many of these actions are deliberately aimed at civilians.

Terrorism can be conceptually and empirically distinguished from other modes of violence and conflict by the following characteristics:

It is premeditated and designed to create a climate of extreme fear;

It is directed at a wider target than the immediate victims;

It inherently involves attacks on random or symbolic targets, including civilians;

It is considered by the society in which it occurs as ‘extra-normal’, that is in the literal sense that it violates the norms regulating disputes, protest and dissent; and

It is used primarily, though not exclusively, to influence the political behaviour of governments, communities or specific social groups.

It is true that in the burgeoning of modern international terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s many efforts to obtain international agreements and conventions on the prevention and suppression of terrorist crimes were stymied by governments which, for their own political and ideological reasons, wished to block such measures by claiming that there was no internationally accepted definition of terrorism. Since then almost all the major democracies have developed national anti-terrorist legislation and many individuals have been convicted of terrorist offences. We have also seen a considerable amount of international law on terrorist offences developed before and since 9/11. Moreover, in October 2004 the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1566 which defines terrorism and declares that in no circumstances can terrorist acts be condoned or excused for political or ideological reasons:

Criminal acts, including [those] against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.

(unscS/RES/1566[2004])

It is true that we may have to wait some time before we see a UN General Assembly definition. However, governmental and inter-governmental conferences on problems of terrorism no longer waste days in definitional issues: they have made genuine progress in improving cooperation against terrorism, and those who dismiss all the national and international efforts to develop a legal regime to deal with various aspects of terrorism as nugatory are simply wrong. The legal framework to deal with terrorist crimes is far from perfect and very difficult to apply effectively because the more sophisticated and dangerous groups have become more skilled at evading detection, but despite this there have been some major successes in bringing terrorists to justice (e.g. Ramzi Youssef, Shoko Asahara, Abdullah Ocalan, Abimael Guzman, Carlos the Jackal). Terrorism is not simply a label; it is a concept that has proved indispensable in legal and social sciences to deal with a complex global phenomenon.

The key statutory definition of terrorism in the UK legislation is contained in the Terrorism Act (2000):

(1) In this Act ‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action where:

(a) the action falls within subsection (2),

(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:

(a) involves serious violence against a person,

(b) involves serious damage to property,

(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,

(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

(Terrorism Act 2000, Part 1, (1) – (3))

The US Government has employed the definition contained in US Code Title 22 Section 2656f (d) since 1983 as follows:

The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

The term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

The term ‘terrorist group’ means any group practicing, or that has significant sub-groups that practice, international terrorism.

(US Code Title 22 Section 2656f (d))

Typology, with historical and current examples

Terrorism is an activity or a ‘weapon-system’ as Brian Jenkins has termed it, which has been used by an enormous variety of non-state groups, regimes and governments. (Historically the use of terror by regimes has been infinitely more lethal than that of non-state groups, because, by definition, regimes/governments are likely to have control of far greater supplies of weapons and manpower to implement their policies of terror in the course of internal repression or foreign conquest.)

However, in an operative democracy the major threat of terror is posed by non-state movements or groups seeking to destroy or undermine democratic governments and to impose their own agenda by coercive intimidation.

Another basic division is between international terrorism, which involves the citizens of jurisdictions of more than one country, and domestic terrorism, which is confined within the borders of a single state and involves no foreign citizens or property. This distinction is useful for statistical purposes, but we should bear in mind that almost all protracted domestic terrorist campaigns targeting a specific state develop an important international dimension through their creation of an overseas support network aimed at raising finance, recruits, weapons and other resources for their colleagues leading the struggle against their chosen ‘enemy’, state authorities and security forces.

One useful way of categorising non-state terrorist movements or groups is by their political motivation: ethnonationalist groups, for example ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Fatherland and Liberty), which continued its bombing campaign despite numerous captures of its top echelon by the Spanish and French authorities and a short-lived ceasefire declared in March 2006 that ended with ETA’s attack on Madrid Airport in December 2006, killing two Ecuadorean immigrants; ideological groups, for example the Red Brigade which waged a campaign against the Italian Republic in the 1970s and 1980s with the aim of creating a neo-communist socio-economic system and state; religio-political groups, for example Hamas, which aims to create an Islamic Republic of Palestine and ultimately to dismantle the state of Israel; single-issue groups, such as animal rights extremists linked to ALF (Animal Liberation Front), aim to change one aspect of government policy and social behaviour rather than to remodel the political and socio-economic order as a whole. While most members of the animal welfare movement are committed to restricting themselves to non-violent protest, extreme militants are prepared to engage in arson and bomb attacks on the premises of commercial firms they wish to target and to engage in threats, and in some cases attacks, on people they describe as animal ‘abusers’. It should be borne in mind that campaigns by animal rights extremists against specific firms and projects such as the Cambridge animal laboratory have caused industry research labs to lose millions of pounds.

The damage and disruption caused by violent single-issue groups should not be underestimated, but so far, at least in the UK, they have not succeeded in killing anyone.

One distinction worth adding to our typology is that between potentially corrigible terrorism – where there is a real possibility of finding a political/diplomatic pathway out of the conflict by addressing its underlying causes, thus very probably reducing if not ending the terrorist violence spawned by the conflict – and incorrigible terrorism. In the latter case the movement/group has such absolutist and maximalist aims, and poses such a major threat to the lives and wellbeing of civilian communities, that the only recourse is to use all possible measures to suppress the group before it can wreak more mayhem.

In order to begin to understand the implications of recent changes in the nature of international terrorism, it is essential to grasp the major differences between the new terrorism of the Al Qaeda network of networks and more traditional terrorist groups such as ETA and FARC. Al Qaeda is not simply another group like ETA but under a different label. ETA has certainly committed hundreds of brutal killings; however, unlike Al Qaeda, ETA did not explicitly adopt a policy of mass killing as an integral part of its strategy. As Brian Jenkins so aptly observed, terrorists in the 1970s and 1980s wanted ‘a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead’ (1975: 4).

By contrast Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, issued a ‘Fatwa’ on 23 February 1998, which announced the setting up of a World Islamic Front for Jihad and declared that ‘it is the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens – civilian or military, and their allies – everywhere’. The brutal language of this ‘Fatwa’ is one way in which the sheer ruthlessness and lethality of this movement is reflected. Their track record of brutal mass-killing in New York, Washington, Kenya, Bali, Casablanca, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and many other places is proof positive of their remorseless use of mass terror.

Moreover, whereas ETA and other more traditional groups have limited their aims to bringing about radical change in one particular state or region, Al Qaeda has an uncompromising/absolutist commitment to changing the entire international system. The Al Qaeda movement aims to expel the US and other ‘infidels’ from the Middle East and from Muslim lands generally. They also want to topple Muslim regimes/governments which they accuse of betraying the ‘true Islam’ and collaboration with the US and its allies. Ultimately their aim is to establish a pan-Islamist Caliphate uniting all Muslims. These aims may appear grandiose in the extreme, but we need to bear in mind that bin Laden and his followers fanatically believe that they will prevail in their Jihad because Allah is on their side.

A major difference between the new terrorism of the Al Qaeda network and more traditional groups is precisely its global network of networks, including affiliates, cells and support. These networks provide the movement with a presence and a capacity to act in at least 90 countries. It is the most widely dispersed non-state terrorist network ever seen and this is what gives the movement ‘global reach’.

‘Traditional’ terrorist movements generally confine themselves to mounting attacks in one country or region, though in some cases they do develop sophisticated overseas support networks to obtain finance, weapons, recruits, safe havens and the opportunity to enlist wider support for their cause.

In a later chapter, I will assess Al Qaeda’s current strategy, modus operandi, targets and tactics and ask to what extent the war on terrorism can be judged successful in its efforts to crush Al Qaeda.

Assessing the effectiveness and strategic impact of terrorism

Some terrorists appear to believe that terrorism will always ‘work’ for them in the end, by intimidating their opponents into submitting to the terrorists’ ‘demands’. In reality the history of modern terrorism campaigns shows that terrorism as a major weapon has only very rarely succeeded in achieving a terrorist group’s strategic goals. The clear exception to this in recent history occurred in the period of anti-colonial struggles against the British and French after the Second World War, for example in ending British Mandate control in Palestine, ending British control of Cyprus and Aden, and in ending French rule in Algeria (Horne 1977).¹ However, there were special factors militating in favour of the rebels in all these cases; the public and the government of the colonial power had no real desire to occupy these countries or to sacrifice the lives of young soldiers and colonial police, or to expend their scarce resources, already severely denuded after six years of world war. The anti-colonial movements also had the inestimable advantage of large-scale sympathy among their own population, and the colonial authorities faced a wall of silence when they sought intelligence among the public. But, in the postcolonial period, there is not a single case of a terrorist movement seizing control in any country. Indeed the use of terrorism as a weapon by insurgents has backfired and alienated the indigenous population.

There are two other major factors to be considered here. First, historically terrorism has mainly been used as an auxiliary weapon in a conflict involving a much wider repertoire. Second, it should be remembered that the use of terror as a weapon of control by dictatorships has been generally much, much more effective than the use of terror as a weapon of insurgency, mainly because dictatorial regimes generally have more ruthless and powerful domestic agencies of repression with which to suppress any incipient opposition.

However, there is a key difference between terrorists gaining all their strategic goals and terrorists having a strategic impact on macro-political and strategic events and developments. With careful timing and skilful planning terrorists can certainly have a strategic impact on international relations and politics from time to time. There were some clear examples of strategic impact in the 1980s and 1990s:

• The 1983 truck bombing of the US marines while they were in barracks in Lebanon compelled President Reagan and his administration to pull all US troops out of the multi-national force, and thus sent the message to active or potential terrorists (e.g. bin Laden at that time) that the US could be intimidated into making changes in its foreign policy through the use of terrorism.

Other examples of terrorist attacks having a major strategic impact are:

• In the 1990s the use of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians helped to undermine the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

• Mass hostage-taking by Chechen terrorists in 1996 compelled the Russian government to make major concessions to the Chechen leadership.

• The 9/11 suicide hijacking attacks by Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon had a colossal effect not only on US foreign and security policy and public opinion. They had a major influence on international relations, the US and international economy and on the patterns of conflict in the Middle East.

If terrorism rarely gains strategic goals for its perpetrators, why does it remain such a popular mode of struggle for so many groups around the world?

Even when leaders of terrorist groups recognise the fact that they are very unlikely to win their strategic goals, they may be persuaded that the potential tactical benefits to be gained by using terrorism are so attractive that terrorism is a weapon they cannot afford to discard:

• It can help weaken the enemy by a campaign of attrition.

• It is a useful way of inflicting hatred and vengeance on a hated enemy.

• It can be used as a means of provoking government security forces into over-reaction, thus driving up support for the insurgents.

• If they can mount spectacular or particularly damaging attacks they will get huge publicity.

• They may gain release of imprisoned terrorists.

• They may get huge cash ransoms.

• Another key factor is that terrorism is a low-cost, potentially high-yield and relatively low-risk method of struggle for the perpetrators.

I have argued that it is grossly misleading to treat terrorism as a synonym for insurgency, guerrilla warfare or political violence in general. It can be objectively defined as a special method of armed struggle, or in Brian Jenkins’s term a ‘weapons system’, which can be used either on its own, or, as is more often the case historically, as part of a wider repertoire of armed struggle. Hence, just as it is possible to engage in acts of terrorism without mounting a full-scale insurgency, so it is possible to wage an effective insurgency by relying on a combination of guerrilla and conventional warfare, and eschewing the weapon of terror. Terrorist campaigns inherently involve deliberate attacks on civilian targets and are therefore analogous to war crimes. Nor is it the case that the weapons of terror are used solely by substate perpetrators. Throughout history it has been regimes and their agents of...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Glossary of terrorist groups
• Introduction to the third edition
• 1. Terrorism, insurgency and asymmetrical conflict: introduction to the concept of terrorism
• 2. The emergence of modern terrorism: liberal democracies and the emergence of modern terrorism
• 3. Origins and key characteristics of Al Qaeda
• 4. Terrorist-backed insurgencies
• 5. Politics, diplomacy and peace processes: pathways out of terrorism?
• 6. Law-enforcement, criminal justice and the liberal state
• 7. The role of the military in combating terrorism
• 8. Hostage-taking, sieges and problems of response
• 9. Aviation security
• 10. The media and terrorism
• 11. International cooperation against terrorism: the evolution of international cooperation
• 12. The future of terrorism
• 13. Conclusion: towards a response to terrorism based on democratic principles and respect for human rights
• Notes
• Bibliography and further reading
• Index