The Sociology of Terrorism

People, Places and Processes

Stephen Vertigans

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415572668
• eBook ISBN: 9781135145781
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Social Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This is the first terrorism textbook based on sociological research. It adopts an innovative framework that draws together historical and modern, local and global, and social processes for a range of individuals, groups and societies. Individual behaviour and dispositions are embedded within these broader relationships and activities, allowing a more holistic account of terrorism to emerge. In addition, the shifting forms of identification and interwoven attitudes to political violence are discussed in order to explain the emergence, continuation, and end of 'terrorist' careers.

The book draws on examples from across the discursive spectrum, including religious, 'red' and 'black' racialist, nationalist, and trans-national. It also spans territories as diverse as Chechnya, Germany, Italy, Japan, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, South America, the UK, and the US.

1 A sociological approach to terrorism

People, places and processes

Definitions

There is seemingly a convention for books about terrorism to include a lengthy, often turgid, discussion concerning definitions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist.’ I am not one to challenge customs but cannot really engender much enthusiasm for the debate because ultimately I do not possess the linguistic ability, conflict resolution techniques or patience to provide universally acceptable definitions. This leads to what Brannan, Esler and Strindberg (2001: 11) described as a ‘perverse situation where a great number of scholars are studying a phenomenon, the essence of which they have (by now) simply agreed to disagree about.’ The concept is hugely controversial and definitions are sensitive to location, periods of history, power, shifting perceptions of morality, international relations, military hardware and how these interact with the person, institution, government or international agency who is defining.¹ I will try to restrict this discussion specifically to the reasoning behind the inclusion of my definitions while pointing the reader, who has thus far managed to avoid the semantics of terrorism, to Schmid's (1984) seminal study and most decent textbooks.

Using the word ‘terrorist’ is even more value laden, immediately bringing forth the image of the caricature with shifty eyes, evil expressions and physical deformities. When taken into consideration alongside the definition of terrorism, there is a danger that I am simply reinforcing the over concentration upon the acts of terror and their emotive outcomes, rather than the processes within and beyond that are the primary aim of this book. Hence, I have serious misgivings about definitions, but obviously have to apply terms that are understandable and which enable the reader to appreciate what and who is being discussed. New terms would not eradicate all the problems because I would still be establishing parameters that would imply certain values and impressions. Therefore, lacking the imagination to develop different terms that will be universally both meaningful and acceptable, I am sticking with terrorism and terrorists. I was tempted to include quotation marks to indicate my unease with the words but the sections quickly became typographically cluttered. Consequently, alongside aesthetics, my caveat is the reiteration that the terms are social constructions that are formulated within long-term processes. As such, I intend to apply the detached stance and am describing terrorism as it is conceived; I am not seeking to pass moral, political or ethical judgement.

For the purposes of this book I am defining terrorism as ‘the targeted and intentional use of violence for political purposes through actions that can range in intended impact from intimidation to loss of life’. Examples from pro-life, animal liberation, eco terror or narco terror groups are not included because they do not adopt violence in order to assume political power and this is one of the main criteria for incorporation within this book. Nor am I including individual terrorists such as the American Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski. Government and irregular combatants such as guerrillas could be included but are not in this book on the grounds of expediency. In essence I want to concentrate upon ‘terrorism from below’ and groups that are predominantly associated with this form of political violence before possibly extending the focus outwards and upwards in subsequent publications. Although this definition replicates the tendency to concentrate upon the act and describe the tactic, this book is very much about exploring the processes that contribute to attacks and the end of the act. The ‘terrorist’ is ‘someone who actively and deliberately engages in activities that contribute towards acts of terrorism.’ This includes individuals whose roles range from bomb maker to maker of accompanying bombast. To reiterate, these definitions are flawed and are not designed to attain the unattainable within studies of terrorism, namely universal agreement and thereby eternal acclaim. My ambition is rather modest, merely to inform the reader that this is what and who I think I am talking about.

Social scientific review of terrorism

One convention that I am more enthusiastic about for this book is a critical review of academic explanations for terrorism and individual participation. Such a review helps to introduce ideas, events and experiences that will be accommodated across the remainder of the book. Critical analysis also enables me to distance myself at the onset from some of the less ‘helpful’ contributions. This chapter concludes with an attempt to intertwine the divisive concepts of emotions and rationality which crosscut many of the following contributions.

Popular explanations such as brainwashing, cultural factors, frustrationaggression, identity crisis, mental illness, narcissism, political exclusion and oppression, rational choice, poverty and relative deprivation all feature prominently within studies of terrorism. These accounts provide differing degrees of illumination although some share the tendency noted amongst research into cults and sects that ‘the public, media, policy-makers and even academics accept irrationality as an explanation for behaviour that is new, strange, and (apparently or actually) dangerous’ (Iannacone 2004). By selecting pertinent emotive and rational aspects, this chapter is designed to overcome such partiality and to provide the basis for understanding contemporary factors behind the emergence of terror groups.

Psychological contributions within academic disciplines have been considerable. Psychologists such as Bandura (2004), Bjørgo (2005), Crenshaw (1981, 1992, 1998), Horgan (2005, 2009), Reich (1998), Silke (2003) and Taylor and Quayle (1994)² have illuminated individual factors that contribute to political violence. Nevertheless, academic enquiry continues into what is psychologically wrong with individuals and/or the social agencies that they are exposed to. The mental well-being of suicide bombers, in particular, has been the subject of considerable speculation. For instance, Juergensmeyer (2003) associates Islamic suicide bombers with sexual repression, the symbolism of the explosion and the sexual attractions of 72 virgins following martyrdom. The Palestinian bombers according to Volkan (2001) have disturbed personal identities and are targeted by recruiters who are looking out for individuals with these profiles. Salib (2003) and Rosenberger (2003) argue that these bombers may be suffering from shared or paranoid delusions. For Lachkar (2002) they have a borderline personality disorder, dominated by shame. Piven (2002: 128) exemplifies the broader perception when declaring, ‘I have termed [terror behaviour] psychotic because such a dearth of empathy and such malignant rage, alongside such distorted paranoid displacements constitute a massive deformation and reality testing.’ If these vulnerable individuals did not have enough to worry about then they need to concern themselves about their reported susceptibility to brainwashing by unscrupulous leaders, religious teachers, militant families and on-line groomers. Parallels can be drawn with prevailing opinion regarding recruitment processes into cults (Barker 1984, Dawson 2006, 2010). Other morally ‘distasteful’ individuals such as perpetrators of domestic violence are also explained through reference to flawed victim and aggressor psychologies. Just like terrorism studies, the emphasis is upon sick individuals rather than social processes; yet as Price (2005) explains this is often unfounded.

With an extensive array of publications depicting terrorists as mentally flawed, it could be expected that there is considerable supporting evidence. There is not. On the contrary, McCauley (2002) concludes that the majority of studies committed to psychological evaluations of terrorism found little support for psychological disorders. Similarly the ‘brainwashing’ argument also lacks credible evidence. Arguing that particular terrorists went to a madrassa, met a certain ideologue or were born into an infamous fascistic family does not explain why they and not other students, peers and family members joined nor why some individuals subsequently leave. In fact, studies have shown that many terrorists originated outwith brainwashing centres. Sageman's (2008) exploration of jihadists is illustrative in documenting how the vast majority grew up within secular environments.³ Socialisation is hugely important (and Chapter Five elaborates upon this), introducing individuals to ideas, behaviour and people and contributing to shifting levels of restraint and collective identification. Yet socialisation is fundamentally different from brainwashing.

The question then arises, why does the impression of the weak, manipulated or ‘crazy’ terrorist continue to resonate within academic and public spheres despite the lack of evidence? McCauley (2002) helps to answer this when explaining how in some ways it is easier to understand terrorism if terrorists are considered to be psychologically abnormal, devoid of moral feeling and empathy. This places the blame upon the individual (or devious recruiters in instances of brainwashing) rather than social processes, and means that the actions can be dismissed as the outcomes of the irrational, rather than considering the possibility that the actions and accompanying rhetoric may have some validity. Just as with accounts of recruitment into cults, there is a tendency to draw upon these types of explanation for behaviour that challenges the prevailing opinion. Within psychology there are indicators of mental illness, low self-esteem, authoritarianism⁴ and vulnerability within some terrorists which increase vulnerability to the appeal of charismatic leaders, discourse and group dynamics.

Despite the inapplicability of these characteristics to explain general processes of terrorism, there are examples when psychological weaknesses are instrumental in people becoming terrorists. And although mental illness is not as widespread within new recruits as it is portrayed, Horgan (2005: 6) points to ‘the processes whereby members become brutalized and more committed as a result of membership and increased psychological commitment to the group.’ Accordingly, engagement within terror groups can be hugely stressful, heavily laden with risk. Individuals are required to overcome ontological insecurities as they confront internalised taboos over killing and the threat of being killed. In other words the mental well-being of members may deteriorate during the terrorists’ careers; an observation which becomes more noticeable when members disengage. Of greater relevance is the emphasis placed within psychology on feelings such as anger, revenge and humiliation which I argue below need to be incorporated within a sociological approach.

Although there is a long-standing tendency⁵ to associate terrorism with mental instability and illness psychologists, such as those listed earlier, have generally been at the critical forefront of challenges to popular perceptions. Having initially been sidetracked by the pursuit of a terrorist personality, the realisation that such a personality does not exist has freed some psychologists to produce some of the most groundbreaking and influential studies. These have been instrumental in highlighting unexceptional qualities of terrorists or, as Crenshaw (1981: 390) mentioned, ‘the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality’ and the considered rationality of their approach. Terrorists need to reflect, delay gratification, control emotion, restrain behaviour and often undertake largely mundane activities (Crenshaw 1981, 1998); characteristics that do not accord with prevailing popular opinion. Perhaps unsurprisingly terrorists also tend to consider themselves to be normal.⁶ At a pragmatic level there is considerable support for such claims. Groups could not operate effectively if members were dysfunctional; their behaviour would be inconsistent, unreliable and such individuals would be likely to arouse suspicion and threaten security, secrecy and hinder operations. Some of the aspects identified within these studies, in particular, social learning, affective ties, group dynamics and collective identification, are explored throughout this book and consequently are not explicitly explored in this chapter. At this juncture Taylor and Horgan's (2006: 586) critical analysis of the field is of particularly pertinent relevance. They argue that terrorism has been ‘characterised as a psychological state of some kind disconnected from context and history; this necessarily leads to a focused attempt to identify unique and/or personal qualities.’ Examples of these are discussed below. Instead of focusing upon terrorism as a state, Taylor and Horgan (ibid.) propose that involvement should be considered as a ‘process variable such as the changing context that the individual operates in, and also the relationships between events and the individual as they affect behaviour.’ In so doing, they position psychological factors within the complex relationship between political context, organisational framework and the individual. When expounding upon the approach to be developed within this book I argue that social processes are integral to understanding terrorism.

Individual events and experiences are often put forward to explain the motivation of terrorists. This is a perspective that is promoted not least by terrorists and their families. Thus they will point to particular salient events or policies, the death of a friend, the arrest of a family member, the destruction of property, witnessed killing of a child, the rising threat of a rival group or army, national hypocrisy and international injustice. In turn these incidents are responsible for a variety of emotions including resentment, anger and indignation which fuels a desire for revenge or retaliation. There is often an element of self-serving about these accounts. If groups are to justify the nature of their activities to themselves and to attract broader support they are portrayed as defensive, reacting to threats and challenges, defending the community, symbols, culture or religion from attack. Sageman (2008) also points out that even if the (former) terrorists are completely honest with researchers they are inclined to consider their activities positively and make associations with altruistic motivations. Moreover their interpretations and understanding of the actions will change over time, influenced by multiple factors including the outcome of attacks and ultimate success or otherwise of the group. This is not to say that these accounts are inherently flawed. Crenshaw (1998: 227) comments that although these recollections ‘may be self-serving, that does not mean that they are not also, in some significant way, revealing.’ And of course, individual accounts cannot be assumed to be representative of other members and still leave unanswered the generic questions, namely why is it that only a relatively few people are sufficiently inspired to join or form groups from the masses who have shared the reported experiences?

Emphasis upon individual factors is particularly noticeable within studies of female engagement. Conversely, women terrorists are often invisible within academic explorations. When their roles are acknowledged, personal or domestic issues are introduced within sociologically tinged studies in order to differentiate motivations behind the involvement of women compared to men. Victor (2004) for instance, considers that Palestinian female suicide bombers have been more reluctant to join groups and tend to do so for personal reasons. These include episodes of loss and imprisonment of family members and friends, humiliation, shame and dishonour. Similar feelings have also been expressed by men. Yet within nationalist struggles in Chechnya, the Palestinian territories and Sri Lanka, it is often only female terrorists who are widely reported to have experienced, and be motivated by, personal trauma (Nacos 2005, Speckhard 2008, Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2006).⁷ Male involvement is associated with religious and nationalist factors. Certainly women have been influenced by personal motivations but these are often accommodated alongside discursive reasoning (Cunningham 2003, Jacques and Taylor 2008). Moreover, although influential studies such as Sageman (2004) explain that many people join groups through their own initiative which recruiters respond to, this acknowledgement has yet to cross the gender divide. The previously prevailing perception of individuals becoming terrorists through coercion and exploitation is often now concentrated upon females who are reported to be more inclined to be manipulated by (male) recruiters (McKay 2005, Ness 2005, Victor 2004); an observation which hints at unscrupulous terrorist leaders and female weakness and vulnerability.⁸ Yet studies of female terrorists such as the ‘Black Widows’ in Chechnya indicate that many women are self-starters and only formally become involved within the wider movement when requesting resources and training with which to undertake attacks (Speckhard 2008, Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006).

The more widespread sociological neglect of female violence and tendency to over-concentrate upon male violence has contributed to the invisibility of females and reliance upon stereotypes within academic studies. Hence academics are ill prepared to explain incidents and patterns such as female perpetrated acts of domestic violence (Kelly 1991). As Gentry (2004) and Sjoberg and Gentry (2007, 2008) comment, the portrayals of female terrorists reflect the public narratives of women who commit acts of violence more generally. Speckhard (2008: 1029) argues that amongst Western audiences ‘ there is a great deal of denial about the violent and militant capability of women. … Likewise there tends to be a denial that women can be and are often as violent as men.’ Consequently ‘it seems there are only a very limited number of instances in which society can understand a woman being violent’ (MacDonald 1991: xvii). The instances include fighting off a sexual attacker, mothers defending her children and some sporting activities (Whaley-Eager 2008). Beyond these instances, ‘women's violence falls outside of these ideal-typical understandings of what it means to be a woman’ that emphasise nurturing, sensitivity and domesticity (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 2). The act of violence therefore is for Keitner (2002) a ‘double transgression’ both against the law and gender stereotypes. This has meant that if women are not associated with violence then there are limited conceptual frameworks that can be applied to help understand the behaviour, and the impact of female terror attacks upon the intended audience is considerably greater than the equivalent acts by men.

When female terrorists do become prominent⁹ the distance between their behaviour and normative expectations is often explained in two principle ways which rely upon clichés and exaggerate the psychological traits identified above. The first is through reference to individual defects; their mental weakness, vulnerability and experiences of being traumatised because they have been raped by rival groups¹⁰ or through the death of family members of friends.¹¹ The second, which builds upon the weaknesses, is because violence is inherently ‘male,’ women who commit acts of political violence must be acting like men,¹² and as such are reported as having high levels of testosterone and/or are lesbians,¹³ are being manipulated by men or only become involved through their romantic commitment or infatuation with male lovers.¹⁴ In other words, women are considered to only become involved if they are psychologically or sexually deviant, men want them to participate and women are powerless to prevent their engagement in violence. Yet numerous studies have shown that women, with no identified forms of mental illness, have proactively joined a variety of discursive and nationalist groups. Despite this, media and academic narrative remains rooted in the old clichés that also incorporate women's physical characteristics which are often the defining features within reports and not their discursive consciousness.¹⁵ In one indi-cative example raised by Nacos (2005: 438), ETA's Idoia Lopez Riano, who was charged with 23 assassinations, was described by The Times in London as having ‘the looks of a Mediterranean film star’ and ‘is one of the few women who manages to look good even in a police shot.’ Sexualised images tend to diminish the member's credibility and influence, further reinforcing the distinction between male and female members. Conversely the constructed sexuality of female leaders such as the Weather Underground's Bernardine Dohrn is applied by Taylor (2000: 300) to explain how control was maintained over male members by ‘keeping her blouse unbuttoned and breasts exposed during strategy meetings.’ Dohrn's leadership and those of equivalent females in similar groups is interwoven with physical characteristics and sexuality. Hence the Japanese Red Army's Fusako Shigenobu is described as ‘lustful’ and ‘sexually promiscuous’¹⁶ and Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Esslin from the German Red Army Faction are the ‘bandit queen’ and ‘blond bombshell.’ For Nacos (2005...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• The Sociology of Terrorism
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: The absent friend: Sociology, missing from action
• 1 A sociological approach to terrorism: People, places and processes
• 2 History: The legacy of political violence
• 3 Habitus: Terrorism and violent dispositions
• 4 Becoming a ‘terrorist’: Processes into groups
• 5 Group dynamics: Trusting terrorists, secrets and ties
• 6 Actions, tactics and targets: Emotions and rationale behind terror attacks
• 7 The End Game: Stopping and leaving terrorism
• 8 Conclusion: From beginning to end
• Glossary
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index