Introduction
This paper is about my approach to discourse analysis (Gee, 2005, 2007). It is also about the question: What makes discourse analysis â critical discourse analysisâ?
At the outset, I want to make a distinction that is important from a linguistic point of view: a distinction between utterance-type meaning and utterance-token meaning (Levinson, 2000). Any word, phrase, or structure has a general range of possible meanings, what we might call its meaning range. This is its utterance-type meaning. For example, the word âcatâ has to do, broadly, with the felines, and the (syntactic) structure âsubject of a sentenceâ has to do, broadly, with naming a âtopicâ in the sense of âwhat is being talked about.â
However, words and phrases take on much more specific meanings in actual contexts of use. These are utterance-token meanings or what I will call âsituated meaning.â Thus, in a situation where we say something like âThe worldâs big cats are all endangered,â âcatâ means things like lions and tigers; in a situation where we are discussing mythology and say something like âThe cat was a sacred symbol to the ancient Egyptians,â âcatâ means real and pictured cats as symbols; and in a situation where we are discussing breakable decorative objects on our mantel and say something like âThe cat broke,â âcatâ means a statue of cat.
Subjects of sentences are always âtopic-likeâ (this is their utterance-type meaning); in different situations of use, subjects take on a range of more specific meanings. In a debate, if I say âThe constitution only protects the rich,â the subject of the sentence (âthe constitutionâ) is an entity about which a claim is being made; if a friend of yours has just arrived and I usher her in saying âMaryâs here,â the subject of the sentence (âMaryâ) is a center of interest or attention; and in a situation where I am commiserating with a friend and say something like âYou really got cheated by that guy,â the subject of the sentence (âyouâ) is a center of empathy (signaled also by the fact that the normal subject of the active version of the sentenceââThat guy really cheated youââhas been âdemotedâ from subject position through use of the âget-passiveâ).
The Utterance-Type Meaning Task
Discourse analysis of any type, whether critical or not, can undertake one or both of two tasks, one related to utterance-type (general) meaning and one related to situated meaning. One task, then, is what we can call the utterance-type meaning task. This task involves the study of correlations between form and function in language at the level of utterance-type meanings (general meanings). âFormâ here means things like morphemes, words, phrases, or other syntactic structures (e.g., the subject position of a sentence). âFunctionâ means meaning or the communicative purpose a form carries out.
The other task is what we can call the utterance-token meaning or situated meaning task. This task involves the study of correlations between form and function in language at the level of utterance-token meanings. Essentially, this task involves discovering the situation-specific or situated meanings of forms used in specific contexts of use.
Failing to distinguish between these two tasks can be dangerous, since very different issues of validity for discourse analysis come up with each of these tasks, as we will see below. Let me start with an example of the utterance-type meaning task. Specific forms in a language are prototypically used as tools to carry out certain communicative functions (that is, to express certain meanings). For example, consider the sentence labeled (1) below (adapted from Gagnon, 1987, p. 65):
- Though the Whig and Tory parties were both narrowly confined to the privileged classes, they represented different factions and tendencies.
This sentence is made up of two clauses, an independent (or main) clause (âthey represented different factions and tendenciesâ) and a dependent clause (âThough the Whig and Tory parties were both narrowly confined to the privileged classesâ). These are statements about form. An independent clause has as one of its functions (at the utterance-type level) that it expresses an assertion; that is, it expresses a claim that the speaker/writer is making. A dependent clause has as one of its functions that it expresses information that is not asserted, but, rather, assumed or taken-for-granted. These are statements about function (meaning).
Normally (that is, technically speaking, in the âunmarkedâ case), in English, dependent clauses follow independent clauses. Thus, the sentence (1) above might more normally appear as: âThe Whig and Tory parties represented different factions, though they were both narrowly confined to the privileged classes.â In (1) the dependent clause has been fronted (placed in front of the whole sentence). This is a statement about form. Such fronting has as one of its functions that the information in the clause is thematized (Halliday, 1994), that is, the information is treated as a launching-off point or thematically important context from which to consider the claim in the following dependent clause. This is a statement about function.
To sum up, in respect to form-functioning mapping at the utterance-type level, we can say that sentence (1) renders its dependent clause (âThough the Whig and Tory parties were both narrowly confined to the privileged classesâ) a taken-for-granted, assumed, unargued for (i.e., unasserted), though important (thematized) context from which to consider the main claim in the independent clause (âthey represented different factions and tendenciesâ). The dependent clause is, we might say, a concession. Other historians might prefer to make this concession the main asserted point and, thus, would use a different grammar, perhaps saying something like: âThough they represented different factions and tendencies, the Whig and Tory parties were both narrowly confined to the privileged classes.â
At a fundamental level, all types of discourse analysis involve claims (however tacitly they may be acknowledged) about form-function matching at the utterance-type level. This is so because, if one is making claims about a piece of language, even at a much more situated and contextualized level (which we will see in a moment), but these claims violate what we know about how form and function are related to each other in language at the utterance-type level, then these claims are quite suspect, unless there is evidence that the speaker or writer is trying to violate these sorts of basic grammatical relationships in the language (e.g., in poetry).
As I have already said, the meanings with which forms are correlated at the utterance-type level are rather general (meanings like âassertion,â âtakenfor-granted information,â âcontrast,â etc.). In reality, they represent only the meaning potential or meaning range of a form or structure, as we have said. The more specific or situated meanings that a form carries in a given context of use must be figured out by an engagement with our next task, the utterance-token or situated meaning task.
The Situated Meaning Task
A second task that any form of discourse analysis, critical or otherwise, can undertake is what I called above the utterance-token or situated meaning task. For simplicityâs sake, I will now just call this âthe situated meaning task.â When we actually utter or write a sentence it has a situated meaning (Gee, 2004, 2005). Situated meanings arise because particular language forms take on specific or situated meanings in specific different contexts of use.
Consider the word âcoffeeâ as a very simple example of how situated meaning differs from utterance-type meaning. âCoffeeâ is an arbitrary form (other languages use different sounding words for coffee) that correlates with meanings having to do with the substance coffee (this is its meaning potential). At a more specific level, however, we have to use context to determine what the word means in any situated way. In one context, âcoffeeâ may mean a brown liquid (âThe coffee spilled, go get a mopâ); in another one it may mean grains of a certain sort (âThe coffee spilled, go get a broomâ); in another it may mean containers (âThe coffee spilled, stack it againâ); and it can mean other things in other contexts, such as berries of a certain sort, a certain flavor, or a skin color. We can even use the word with a novel situated meaning, as in âYou give me a coffee highâ or âBig Coffee is as bad as Big Oil as corporate actors.â
To see a further example of situated meanings at work, consider sentence (1) again (âThough the Whig and Tory parties were both narrowly confined to the privileged classes, they represented different factionsâ). We said above that an independent clause represents an assertion (a claim that something is true). But this general form-function correlation can mean different specific things in actual contexts of use, and can, indeed, even be mitigated or undercut altogether.
For example, in one context, say between two like-minded historians, the claim that the Whig and Tory parties represented different factions may just be taken as a reminder of a âfactâ they both agree on. On the other hand, between two quite diverse historians, the same claim may be taken as a challenge (despite YOUR claim that shared class interests mean no real difference in political parties, the Whig and Tory parties in 17th-century England were really different). And, of course, on stage as part of a drama, the claim about the Whig and Tory parties is not even a ârealâ assertion, but a âpretendâ one.
Furthermore, the words âprivileged,â âcontending,â and âfactionsâ will take on different specific meanings in different contexts. For example, in one context, âprivilegedâ might mean ârich,â while in another context it might mean âeducatedâ or âculturedâ or âpolitically connectedâ or âborn into a family with high statusâ or some combination of the above or something else altogether.
To analyze Gagnonâs sentence or his whole text, or any part of it, at the level of situated meaningsâthat is, in order to carry out the situated meaning taskâwould require a close study of some of the relevant contexts within which that text is placed and which it, in turn, helps to create. This might mean inspecting the parts of Gagnonâs text that precede or follow a part of the text we want to analyze. It might mean inspecting other texts related to Gagnonâs. It might mean studying debates among different types of historians and debates about educational standards and policy (since Gagnonâs text was meant to argue for a view about what history ought to be taught in schools). It might mean studying these debates historically across time and in terms of the actual situations Gagnon and his text were caught up in (e.g., debates about new school history standards in Massachusetts, a state where Gagnon once helped write a version of the standards). It might mean many other things, as well. Obviously, there is no space in a chapter of this scope to develop such an analysis.
The issue of validity for analyses of situated meaning is quite different than the issue of validity for analyses of utterance-type meanings. We saw above that the issue of validity for analyses of utterance-type meanings basically comes down to choosing and defending a particular grammatical theory of how form and function relate in language at the level of utterance-type meanings, as well as, of course, offering correct grammatical and semantic descriptions of oneâs data. On the other hand, the issue of validity for analyses of situated meaning is much harder. In fact, it involves a very deep problem known as âthe frame problemâ (Gee, 2005).
The Frame Problem
The frame problem is this: Any aspect of context can affect the meaning of an (oral or written) utterance. Context, however, is indefinitely large, ranging from local matters like the positioning of bodies and eye gaze, through peopleâs beliefs, to historical, institutional, and cultural settings. No matter how much of the context we have considered in offering an interpretation of an utterance, there is always the possibility of considering other and additional aspects of the context, and these new considerations may change how we interpret the utterance. Where do we cut off consideration of context? How can we be sure any interpretation is âright,â if considering further aspects of the context might well change that interpretation?
Let me give an example of a case where changing how much of the context of an utterance we consider changes significantly the interpretation we give to that utterance. Take a claim like âMany children die in Africa before they are five years old because they get infectious diseases like malaria.â What is the appropriate amount of context within which to assess this claim? We could consider just medical facts, a narrow context. And in the context the claim seems unexceptional.
But widen the context and consider the wider context described below:
Malaria, an infectious disease, is one of the most severe public health problems worldwide. It is a leading cause of death and disease in many developing countries, where young children and pregnant women are the groups most affected. Worldwide, one death in three is from an infectious or communicable disease. However, almost all these deaths occur in the non-industrialized world. Health inequality effects not just how people live, but often dictates how and at what age they die. [see http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/impact/index.htm and http://ucatlas.ucsc.edu/cause.php]
This context would seem to say that so many children in Africa die early not because of infectious diseases but because of poverty and economic underdevelopment. While this widening of the context does not necessarily render the claim âMany children die in Africa before they are five years old because they get infectious diseases like malariaâ false, it, at least, suggests that a narrow construal of âbecauseâ here (limiting it to physical and medical causes) effaces the workings of poverty and economics.
The frame problem is both a problem and a tool. It is a problem because our discourse analytic interpretations (just like peopleâs everyday interpretations of language) are always vulnerable to changing as we widen the context within which we interpret a piece of language. It is a tool because we can use itâwidening the contextâto see what informatio...