Democracy as Public Deliberation

Maurizio d'Entreves

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138522145
• eBook ISBN: 9781351522878
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Democracy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

One of the most remarkable developments in the last twenty years has been the revival of the idea of deliberative democracy. Set against aggregative models of democracy derived from economics, such as the theory of rational choice, the idea of deliberative democracy, or decision-making based on public deliberations among free and equal citizens, represents a highly significant development in democratic theory. Exploring this development, this book provides a fresh and original perspective on a theme at the center of current debates in democratic theory and practice.

The essays collected in this volume offer a series of powerful arguments in support of the view that fair and equal treatment of groups is best defended on the basis of a theory of public deliberation. Such a theory has both a normative and institutional dimension. It provides a framework for the normative justification of state policies toward socially or culturally disadvantaged groups, and suggests several institutional mechanisms, such as deliberative forums and citizen's juries, where the voices of disadvantaged groups can be articulated under fair conditions and become effective in shaping' public policy. Democracy as Public Deliberation reminds us that the issue of democracy is not simply one of top-down management and control, but bottom-up considerations that are often located in ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. The great virtue of this volume is to identify statist systems that claim to be democratic, but only in terms of the dominant culture.

Democracy as Public Deliberation indicates that democracy often comes in small packages--and in that very fact, it tests the actual ambitions and standards of the macro-state. This is an especially powerful volume for those interested in the strengths and weaknesses of third world structures.

1

Introduction: democracy as public deliberation

Maurizio Passerin D’entrèves

One of the most remarkable developments in the last twenty years has been the revival of the idea of deliberative democracy. Set against the previous dominance of aggregative models of democracy derived from economics and the theory of rational choice, the idea of deliberative democracy, or decision making based on public deliberation among free and equal citizens, represents a highly significant development in democratic theory.¹ This development, as a number of commentators have noted, is best viewed as a revival of earlier conceptions of democratic citizenship, rather than as a modern innovation. The idea of deliberative democracy and its practical implementation/ Elster notes, ‘are as old as democracy itself. Both came into being in Athens in the fifth century B.C.’² A crucial statement supporting this view may be found in Pericles’ Funeral Oration, where he praises the Athenians for the high value they placed on political deliberation: ‘instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all’.³

With the re-emergence of democratic government at the time of the American and French revolutions, the nature and function of political deliberation, now located in representative assemblies, became a crucial element of democratic legitimacy. Edmund Burke, in his speech to the electors of Bristol, argued that: ‘Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests . . . but ... a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole,- where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.’⁴ In the nineteenth century John Stuart Mill was one of the most well known advocates of ‘government by discussion,’ chiefly on the grounds that it would correct false judgments and thereby reduce cognitive deficits.⁵ Among contemporary thinkers, both Rawls and Habermas have defended a deliberative or discursive model of politics, the former by specifying the criteria of public reason that citizens and public officials ought to observe in dealing with constitutional issues or matters of basic justice, the latter by developing a procedural conception of democracy based on formal and informal processes of public deliberation.⁶

The idea of deliberative democracy can thus be seen to emerge from a long and rich history of debates about the best way to secure democratic self-governance. But what are the main features of a deliberative model of politics? There are some variations among the leading defenders of this model. Elster conceives deliberative democracy as decision making by discussion among free and equal citizens. For him ‘political choice, to be legitimate, must be the outcome of deliberation about ends among free, equal, and rational agents.’⁷ Bohman and Rehg claim that ‘deliberative democracy refers to the idea that legitimate lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of citizens . . . it presents an ideal of political autonomy based on the practical reasoning of citizens’.⁸ Joshua Cohen maintains that deliberative democracy is ‘an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members’, and where ‘the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among citizens’.⁹ Democratic politics, according to Cohen, involves ‘public deliberation focused on the common good, requires some form of manifest equality among citizens, and shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute to the formation of a public conception of the common good’.¹⁰

But is the idea of deliberative democracy feasible or even desirable under current conditions, characterized by a high level of social complexity and a high degree of cultural pluralism? As Bohman and Rehg note:

given the complex issues that confront contemporary societies, is an intelligent, broad-based participation possible? In societies as culturally diverse as our own, is it reasonable to expect deliberating citizens to converge on rational solutions to political problems? Does deliberation actually overcome or only exacerbate the more undesirable features of majority rule?¹¹

The essays collected in this volume, the majority of which were presented at a conference held at Manchester University in March 1999 under the auspices of the Manchester Centre for Political Thought, seek to provide an answer to these questions. They are arranged in two parts, the first focusing on the normative aspects of public deliberation, the second on the institutional mechanisms required to realize the normative ideals of deliberative democracy. They range from detailed assessments of the key normative arguments for deliberative democracy (Chapters 2-5) to an empirical investigation of the relation between deliberation and decision making (Chapter 6), an analysis of the institutions of deliberative democracy (Chapter 7), a case study of the role of public deliberation in the adjudication of deep religious and cultural conflicts (Chapter 8) and a defence of deliberative politics as the best institutional framework for rectifying social disadvantages (Chapter 9). Taken together, they offer a series of powerful arguments in support of deliberative democracy as a normatively robust and institutionally feasible model of politics for societies characterized by deep inequalities, growing cultural pluralism and increasing social complexity.

Normative perspectives

In Chapter 2 Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves offers an overview of the main justificatory strategies employed by contemporary philosophers to ground the legitimacy of political institutions. He argues that the justice and legitimacy of democratic institutions are best defended on the basis of a normative theory of public deliberation. Such a theory, he maintains, is superior to the two main normative models of justification that appeal to the ideal of neutrality (Rawls, Larmore, Nagel) or to the ideal of perfectionism (Raz, Galston, Kymlicka).

The question of legitimacy has become particularly acute in societies characterized by the fact of pluralism. Pluralism refers to the existence of a variety of competing and often irreconcilable conceptions of the good life held by individuals and groups in contemporary Western societies. Although pluralism is not a uniquely modern phenomenon, it has assumed greater political salience in societies composed of a number of distinct cultural groups claiming recognition of their collective identities. The type of recognition claimed by such groups, based on their ethnic, religious, gender or linguistic identity, represents a challenge to the standard liberal model of justification, which restricts itself to the recognition of the equal worth of individuals considered independently of their group affiliations. D’Entrèves examines three responses to this challenge: the first centred on the value of neutrality, the second on the value of autonomy or diversity, the third on the value of dialogue or deliberation.

Rawls is the best-known advocate of the model of neutrality, along with Charles Larmore and Thomas Nagel. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, the aim is to find a basis of agreement that is neutral with respect to competing conceptions of the good life, whether individual or collective. This aim is achieved by the creation of an overlapping consensus among the variety of reasonable comprehensive doctrines embodying different conceptions of the good. The strength of this model lies in the acknowledgement of the fact of pluralism, seen as both inevitable and ineliminable, and in the effort to find a basis of agreement that is least controversial, since it is restricted to constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice. The weakness of this model lies in the strong distinction between public and non-public aspects of identity and the difficulty of defining a non-contestable notion of the ‘reasonable’. The model assumes that individuals, in order to achieve an overlapping consensus on constitutional essentials, are able to set aside their personal or non-public conception of the good from the public conception of justice. For many individuals whose personal conception of the good is inextricably tied to the collective conception of the good of their group, this separation of private and public aspects of their identity is difficult to sustain. In effect, the only individuals likely to achieve an overlapping consensus are those for whom the separation of public and private aspects of identity is least troublesome, namely liberal individuals. Secondly, the very notion of what is ‘reasonable’ remains controversial, since the meaning of the word varies in accordance with the different conceptions of the good held by various individuals and groups living in contemporary multicultural societies. Thus, contrary to Rawls’s hope, reasonableness remains a contested and contestable notion.

Faced with these shortcomings of the neutrality model, some political philosophers have opted for a different model of justification, one based on perfectionist ideals, such as autonomy or diversity. They start by acknowledging the controversial, that is, non-neutral character of liberal principles of justice and of the conception of the self that underlies them, and go on to defend liberal principles by arguing for their superiority with respect to available alternatives. This strategy has been advocated, among others, by Joseph Raz, William Galston and Will Kymlicka. Joseph Raz, for example, has argued that a liberal state should protect and foster all those forms of life that encourage autonomy. He believes that autonomy is a precondition of human well-being, since the value of an individual’s life is enhanced if it is freely chosen from a range of available options. He also thinks that membership of a community is conducive to human well-being, because it determines the horizon of one’s opportunities and helps to shape one’s identity. The liberal state is to be particularly valued because, by securing certain rights to individuals and groups, it makes available a range of valuable options that will permit every person or group to pursue their conception of the good, and thus secures the condition for human well-being. A similar argument has been put forward by Kymlicka in his liberal defence of group rights, which stresses the value of cultural membership and a secure cultural context for individual well-being. Other authors, such as Galston, have advocated the superiority of liberal principles by an appeal to the value of diversity, rather than autonomy. The liberal state accommodates diversity better than its rivals, since in its public principles, institutions and practices it affords maximum feasible space for individual and group differences to flourish, constrained only by the requirements of liberal social unity. The strength of this perfectionist model of justification is that it engages in a substantive debate with the critics of liberalism and argues for the superiority of the liberal conception of the good vis-à-vis its possible competitors. The weakness of the model, on the other hand, stems partly from its strength: it may allow for greater debate about competing conceptions of the good life in the public-political domain, but it will ultimately favour those individuals and groups whose conceptions of the good or of well-being are predisposed towards the value of autonomy or diversity. The perfectionist model may be a better way of defending liberal principles and institutions but is no less controversial or contestable than the model of neutrality. The aim of inclusiveness, of being able to accommodate the largest feasible range of competing and irreconcilable conceptions of the good, seems, in the end, unattainable on either model. But is this aim actually attainable? D’Entrèves argues that the model of public deliberation is more inclusive than either the model of neutrality or that of perfectionism, but points out that such inclusiveness is a matter of degree. No model can achieve complete inclusiveness. There will always be tragic conflicts and tragic choices. But that should not stop us in our search for models of greater inclusiveness that will lessen the scope for tragic conflicts. The deliberative or dialogic model, he suggests, may provide a greater degree of inclusion than either the neutrality or the perfectionist model.

D’Entrèves explores some of the main arguments in defence of the deliberative model of justification. Among the arguments examined are those advanced by Charles Taylor, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Joshua Cohen, Jürgen Habermas and James Fishkin. Taylor has defended a dialogic model of justification based on the recognition of the uniqueness of collective identities. He calls this model the ‘politics of difference’ to distinguish it from the standard liberal model, which he terms the ‘politics of equal dignity’. The example Taylor cites in defence of the politics of difference is that of the French-speaking community of Quebec. They should be granted special rights and immunities so as to be able to preserve their unique collective identity, and to maintain their cherished cultural distinctness from the majority of English-speaking Canada. Taylor’s model of the politics of recognition is neither neutral nor perfectionist: it rests on the presumption of equal worth of cultures, and is dialogic, in so far as it promotes cross-cultural exchange among different groups and collectivities.

A similar stress on dialogue and deliberation characterizes the position of Gutmann and Thompson. They argue that controversial moral issues should not be excluded from public debate but should become the topic of collective deliberation. Public deliberation must satisfy certain procedural standards (such as reciprocity, publicity and accountability) and be based on the idea of mutual respect.

An even stronger defence of deliberative democracy as the best institutional mechanism for the adjudication of conflicting moral and political perspectives is provided by Joshua Cohen. By deliberative democracy he means an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members and where political debate is organized around alternative conceptions of the public good. The idea is not to suppress difference but to allow differences about competing conceptions of the public good to be debated in common deliberative fora that ensure the greatest degree of fairness to all participants. To this end Cohen sketches an ideal deliberative procedure that captures the notion of justification through public argument among equal citizens, and serves in turn as a model for deliberative institutions. The relevance of such a normative theory of deliberation is that it articulates the conditions under which a fair debate among competing collective identities and conflicting conceptions of the good can be conducted. The most sophisticated theoretical account of a deliberative model of democracy is provided by Jürgen Habermas. Like Cohen, Habermas offers a characterization of an ideal deliberative procedure whose normative validity rests on a set of demanding pragmatic presuppositions. In contrast to Cohen, however, Habermas does not think that such an ideal deliberative procedure could be applied to society as a whole or to the entirety of its institutions. Rather, he conceives the ideal deliberative procedure as the core structure in a separate, constitutionally organized political system. For this reason Habermas advocates a two-track model of deliberative politics, according to which deliberative procedures operating in the formal decision-making domains of legislative and judicial activity are supplemented by informal processes of opinion formation taking place in the public sphere. Deliberative procedures in formal decision-making domains shape the processes of collective will formation with a view to the co-operative solution of practical questions, while informal opinion formation processes are geared to the identification and thematization of problems emerging from lifeworld experience. The two-track model of deliberative politics put forward by Habermas depends, therefore, on the successful interplay of democratically institutionalized will formation and informal opinion formation.

The chapter closes with an assessment of Fishkin’s model of democratic deliberation. Fishkin’s contribution focuses on the kinds of institutions required for the ideal of deliberative democracy to be realized in large-scale and technologically advanced societies. Such institutions must embody both political equality and deliberation. His institutional proposal centred around deliberative opinion polls embodies political equality, since everyone has an equal chance of being represented in the national sample of participants, and deliberation, since a selected group of citizens is immersed for an extended period of time in intensive, face-to-face debate. The advantage of a deliberative opinion poll over non-deliberative forms of polling is that it enables a representative sample of citizens to acquire an adequate level of information on a given issue, to listen to the contrasting opinions and perspectives of experts, and to test their own views and opinions through a process of common debate and discussion. Only after such an extended period of deliberation are the members of the sample ‘polled’, that is, asked to give their considered judgement on a given issue. By operating in a framework characterized by political equality, participation and non-tyranny, a collective process of deliberation occurs in which the group has a reasonable chance to form its collective, considered judgements on topics of public concern.

The theories of public deliberation put forward by Fishkin, Habermas, Cohen and Gutmann, together with Taylor’s dialogic model of recognition, should be seen as providing the broad outlines of a model of normative justification that is more inclusive than the two alternatives based on the values of neutrality or perfectionism. Whether the emphasis is on the recognition of collective identities (Taylor), the adjudication of moral conflict (Gutmann), public reasoning on the common good (Cohen), formal and informal modes of collective opinion and will formation (Habermas) or the evaluation of issues of public concern (Fishkin), they all stress the importance of dialogue and deliberation for a more inclusive and just form of liberal society.

In Chapter 3 Maeve Cooke examines the merits of the main arguments commonly advanced in support of the deliberative conception of democracy. These arguments focus on (1) the educative power of the process of public deliberation, (2) the community-generating power of the process of public deliberation, (3) the fairness of the procedure of public deliberation, (4) the epistemic quality of the outcomes of public deliberation and (5) the congruence of the ideal of politics articulated by deliberative democracy with ‘who we are’. She argues that, although most of these arguments express valid intuitions, the first four are insufficient as they stand and require help from the fifth argument if they are to be fully convincing.

The first argument holds that deliberative democracy should be advocated primarily because of the beneficial educative effects it has on citizens. John Stuart Mill and Hannah Arendt are often cited as proponents of the educative view: both see participation in public affairs as good in itself, and both believe that political participation improves the moral and intellectual qualities of individuals. Cooke maintains that the educative argument is insufficient as a justification of deliberative democracy for at least three reasons. The first can be seen by posing the question: what is it about deliberation - as opposed to participation - that produces beneficial educative effects on individuals? If the argument in favour of deliberation is to work it has to show that public deliberation produces beneficial educative effects that are superior to the benefits resulting from non-deliberative participation in public affairs. The problem here is that there is no uncontroversial standpoint from which such superiority may be measured. The second reason is that the beneficial effects of public deliberation cannot be the point of the deliberative ideal of democracy: such beneficial effects can accrue only if the individuals concerned take part in deliberation for other reasons. Thus the educative effects of public deliberation are at best side effects and cannot be the main point of, or provide the sole justification for, such deliberation. Finally, the educative argument is insufficient for a third reason, for it leaves open the question of what counts as improving the moral and intellectual qualities of individuals. In order for it to work, the educative argument has to presuppose the availability of some independent standard for evaluating the individual’s moral and intellectual development. For that reas...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• The contributors
• 1 Introduction: democracy as public deliberation
• Part I Normative perspectives
• Part II Institutional perspectives
• Index