Affect and Creativity

the Role of Affect and Play in the Creative Process

Sandra Walker Russ

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9780805809862
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134765737
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Mental Health in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Much work has been done on cognitive processes and creativity, but there is another half to the picture of creativity -- the affect half. This book addresses that other half by synthesizing the information that exists about affect and creativity and presenting a new model of the role of affect in the creative process. Current information comes from disparate literatures, research traditions, and theoretical approaches. There is a need in the field for a comprehensive framework for understanding and investigating the role of affect in creativity. The model presented here spells out connections between specific affective and cognitive processes important in creativity, and personality traits associated with creativity.

Identifying common findings and themes in a variety of research studies and descriptions of the creative process, this book integrates child and adult research and the classic psychoanalytic approach to creativity with contemporary social and cognitive psychology. In so doing, it addresses two major questions:
* Is affect an important part of the creative process?
* If it is, then how is affect involved in creative thinking?

In addition, Russ presents her own research program in the area of affect and creativity, and introduces The Affect in Play Scale -- a method of measuring affective expression in children's play -- which can be useful in child psychotherapy and creativity research. Current issues in the creativity area are also discussed, such as artistic versus scientific creativity, adjustment and the creative process, the role of computers in learning about creativity, gender differences in the creative process, and enhancing creativity in home, school, and work settings. Finally, Russ points to future research issues and directions, and discusses alternative research paradigms such as mood-induction methods versus children's play procedures.

1

Affect and Creativity

The study of creativity is the study of some of the most valued processes in human development. To study creativity is to focus on what is optimal in the individual. Because of the rather magnetic quality of the creativity area, the topic of creativity has attracted a large number of researchers and scholars from a variety of disciplines and theoretical perspectives.

This chapter reviews definitions of creativity; stages of creativity; cognitive, affective, and personality processes important in creativity; and presents a new model of affect and creativity. This model is discussed in detail throughout the book.

A first task for the field has been that of definition. What is creativity? There seems to be a consensus in the field about what makes something creative.

The Creative Product

A useful distinction is that of the creative product as opposed to the creative process (Golann, 1963; MacKinnon, 1962). The creative product is the output of the individual. It is the output that is to be judged as creative or not creative. Of the numerous attempts to identify the criteria by which to judge a product as creative, two characteristics are repeatedly listed (Hayes, 1978; MacKinnon, 1962). For a product to be judged as creative, it must be: (a) unique, original, novel; (b) good, that is, adaptive, useful, aesthetically pleasing, according to the standards of the particular discipline.

Both components are necessary. There must be a newness to the theoretical solution or artistic piece. Torrance (1988), in a review of definitions of creativity, concluded that newness is a major criterion of judging the creative product. A product is creative if old facts are integrated in new ways, new relationships emerge from old ideas, or there is a new configuration. Novelty, however, is not a sufficient criteria. It is also necessary that the product be good (i.e., aesthetically appealing if it is a work of art; an accurate solution to a scientific problem; a useful invention for consumers). Vernon (1989) put forth a comprehensive definition of creativity that includes these major components, “Creativity means a person’s capacity to produce new or original ideas, insights, restructuring, inventions, or artistic objects, which are accepted by experts as being of scientific, aesthetic, social, or technological value” (p. 94). Thus, cultural values and norms are an inevitable part of the criteria for judging something to be creative. That is, of course, a problem when a work is good, but ahead of its time and goes unrecognized as being creative for a number of decades. Occasionally, these two criteria conflict. Something might be so new that it breaks the rules of the discipline by which something is judged to be good, and time is needed for the standards to catch up with the advance in the field. One way around this occasional lack of recognition might be to judge whether or not the work is original and has some potential for being judged as good. If so, final judgment about its creativity could be held in abeyance. The work or solution could be placed on a potentially creative list. This list could be used by researchers in the area of creativity. The “cold fusion” experiments, the paintings of Andy Warhol, and the music of Philip Glass might be candidates for this potentially creative list. This list could be used by researchers in the area of creativity.

Given these two criteria for a product to be judged as creative, the question is often asked, “can children be truly creative?” Although they can generate new and good products, the products are usually not at a level of sophistication necessary to truly contribute to an area. However, if one considers whether or not a product is new and good for that age group, then children can be considered as generators of creative products. If age norms are taken into consideration, then it makes sense to talk about children being creative and to study their creative processes. A point made by Thurstone (1952) seems relevant here. Thurstone stated that even though a discovery may have already occurred, if it is new to the thinker, then it is a creative act. Thus, children could demonstrate a number of creative acts that would involve creative processes.

A major question in studying creativity is “what are the processes that are part of the creative act?” What cognitive and affective processes are involved in the creative process and increase the likelihood that an individual will generate a creative product? If we can identify the different processes involved and the nature of their interaction, then we can begin to develop a picture of the nature of the creative act.

Stages of Creativity

The first well-known attempt to conceptualize the creative process was by Wallas in 1926. Although Wallas did not identify specific processes, he did articulate different stages that reflect different processes. Although Wallas’ stages are crude and global, his four-stage model has helped order our thinking about the creative process. A detailed discussion of this model can be found in Armbruster (1989). His four-stage model consists of:

1. Preparation Stage – information gathering, mastering the knowledge base, identifying the problem. It is in this stage that the basic techniques and knowledge base of a particular domain are mastered. For example, techniques of painting are mastered or the research literature is totally investigated. It is probably in this stage that basic intellectual processes are important in determining the rapidity of learning and the complexity of issues that are tackled.

2. Incubation Stage – ideas incubate without the individual directly, logically working on the problem. It is in this stage that processes unique to the creative process are so important. It is also in this stage that Wallas and others (Armbruster, 1989; Sinnott, 1970) introduced the concept of the unconscious. Problems are not consciously worked on, but much restructuring and free associating occurs outside of conscious awareness. In chapter 2, there are several descriptions by creative individuals of the subjective experience of the incubation stage. Thoughts are permitted to roam in a free-ranging manner. It is here that affective processes may play an especially important role.

3. Illumination Stage – the solution to the problem occurs or is recognized. The artistic plan develops. This stage is often referred to as the “aha” experience of the creative scientist. In reality, as many have pointed out (Gruber & Davis, 1988, Weisberg, 1988), reaching a solution is probably a gradual process in most instances. The sudden illumination occurrence is probably the least frequent manner by which a solution occurs.

4. Verification Stage – the solution must now be evaluated. Is it indeed good? The hypothesis must be tested; the painter must stand back and evaluate and rework the painting. Critical thinking and logical thinking must be dominant in this stage.

In general, the basic cognitive processes of logic, memory, and abstract thinking should be dominant in the first and last stages. Different types of cognitive processes should be dominant in Stages 2 and 3. Stages 2 and 3 are especially important in creative problem solving and creative artistic expression. It is in the incubation stage that affective processes most likely play a major role.

As Gruber (1989) correctly pointed out, Wallas’ stage model is incomplete. It does not include the early stage of problem finding (Arlin, 1986; Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976) or the final stage of expansive application of the creative product. However, Wallas’ basic stages remain theoretically useful and continue to be the basis for training approaches (Torrance, 1988).

As Vinacke (1952) stressed, the stages of this creative process are probably not so ordered as Wallas first proposed. Individuals go back and forth rapidly between the stages, sometimes letting their thoughts roam, sometimes calling on their critical thinking faculties. It is the ability to shift between stages that is important to the creative process, perhaps involving the ability to gain access to or call into play creative cognitive and affective processes (or let them occur). Psychoanalytic theorists refer to this ability as “regression in the service of the ego” (Kris, 1952).

Cognitive Creative Processes

A key theoretical question in the area of creativity is “what cognitive and affective processes are involved in the creative process?” Much of the focus in the area of creativity research has been on cognitive processes.

Guilford (1950, 1967, 1968) made major theoretical contributions to the area of creativity in that he identified and investigated cognitive processes not previously focused on in tests of intelligence. In general, Guilford believed that creativity was made up of many different components. He discussed both cognitive processes and personality traits as contributing to creativity. His research, however, focused on cognitive processes. Guilford’s work was based on several principles that continue to be the basis for creativity research today.

The first principle was that creative abilities fall on a continuum. Guilford (1968) did not hold to the view that only a select number of eminent individuals were creative and should be studied. All individuals possess creative abilities to some degree, “creative acts can therefore be expected, no matter how frequent or how infrequent, of almost all individuals” (p.82). Thus, creativity can be studied in normal populations.

A second principle was that creative thinking is something different from what intelligence tests measure. Intelligence tests measure logical thought processes that reflect convergent thinking. There is one best answer for a problem, not a variety of responses as in creative divergent thinking. Research has supported the concept that creative abilities are separate abilities from what we define as intelligence (Kogan, 1983). Most studies find low to moderate positive correlations between creativity tests and intelligence tests (Runco, 1991). Until recently, it was widely accepted that a certain amount of intellectual ability was necessary for creativity to occur. Studies show that in the upper ranges of intelligence, the correlation with creativity is zero (Kogan, 1983). This has been known as the threshold theory. However, work by Runco (1991) suggested that the relationship between creativity and intelligence is a function of the measures used and the samples studied. He concluded that the threshold theory is “at least partly a psychometric artifact” (p. 171).

Guilford’s third principle is that creativity is really a form of problem solving – not a magical, mysterious process. Guilford also stated that Wallas’ four-stage model of creativity is consistent with other models of problem solving.

Guilford (1968) identified cognitive processes that were unique to creativity. He concluded that two major categories of cognitive processes were important in the creative process. First, divergent production abilities were uniquely important in the creative process. Guilford thought that the key concept underlying divergent production abilities is variety. One can generate a variety of solutions to a problem or associations to a word. Divergent thinking is thinking that goes off in different directions. For example, a typical item on a divergent thinking test would be “how many uses for a brick can you think of?” As Guilford (1968) stated “divergent thinking is a matter of scanning one’s stored information to find answers to satisfy a special search model” (p. 105). A broad base of search and free-ranging scanning ability increases divergent thinking production. Wallach (1970) stated that divergent thinking is dependent on the flow of ideas and the “fluidity in generating cognitive units” (p. 1240). He stressed the importance of the ability to “ride the associative currents.” Divergent thinking should be especially important in the incubation stage of Wallas’ stages of creativity. Divergent thinking is discussed in detail throughout this book.

The second category of abilities relevant to creative ability is what Guilford termed transformation abilities. These abilities enable the individual to transform or revise what one knows into new patterns or configurations. A flexibility to reorganize and break out of old sets is important here. The individual reorders, redefines, or reinterprets what is currently known. One sees a new solution to a problem that is different from the usual approach. Much of Guilford’s research focuses on identifying cognitive processes that make up these two categories of abilities – divergent thinking and transformation abilities and devising tests of these abilities.

Guilford conceptualized these abilities as cognitive abilities. Although he felt that personality characteristics were important to creativity, he believed that they were separate from these cognitive processes. However, as we see later, recent research suggests that affective processes influence divergent thinking abilities and transformation abilities.

Currently, major work on the cognitive processes involved in creativity has been carried out by a number of researchers (Langley & Jones, 1988; Simon, 1977; Sternberg, 1988; Weisberg, 1986, 1988). Sternberg (1988; Sternberg & Davidson, 1982) stressed the importance of insight in creative thought. Sternberg and Davidson (1982) postulated that three types of insights are involved in creativity. Selective encoding involves separating relevant from irrelevant information. Selective combination entails synthesizing isolated pieces of information into unified wholes. Information is organized in new ways. Selective comparison involves relating new information to old information. These three types of knowledge acquisition set the stage for creative insights. One might speculate that divergent thinking abilities and transformation abilities partially underlie these types of knowledge acquisition and insight abilities.

Weisberg (1986, 1988) viewed creativity as another form of problem solving that involves matching what one knows with the situation. He stressed the incremental nature of problem solving. There are few real leaps of insight. Rather, novel products evolve in small steps that utilize local memory searches. The incremental nature of problem solving is true in both science and art. Weisberg would agree with Guilford that creative thinking does not involve extraordinary abilities, but rather ordinary cognitive processes that are found in all individuals.

On the other hand, Metcalfe (1986) presented evidence that some insight problems are different from memory retrieval tasks. She used a “feeling of knowing” paradigm to determine whether similar processes were involved in an insight problem and a memory based trivia problem. In two studies, she found that people could predict memory performance fairly well, but could not predict performance for insight problems. She concluded that insight problems do involve a sudden illumination that can not be predicted in advance.

Simon (1977) greatly influenced the field with his work on models of information processing and problem solving as they apply to creativity. He also led the way in the area of computer simulation of creative problem solving. His work on selective forgetting and familiarization in memory helps explain the insight process. Langley and Jones (1988) developed a computational model of scientific insight. They stressed the importance of use of analogy in creative problem solving. Insight involves the recognition, evaluation, and elaboration of analogies. Memory processes are important in recognizing appropriate analogies for new situations. The role of computer simulation in the study of creativity is discussed in chapter 7.

Affect and Creativity

The term affect is used th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Chapter One: Affect and Creativity
• Chapter Two: Primary Process, Affect, and Creativity
• Chapter Three: Children’s Fantasy, Play, Affective Expression, and Creativity
• Chapter Four: The Affect in Play Scale
• Chapter Five: Personality Trait Approach to Creativity
• Chapter Six: Mood-Induction and Motivational Systems Approaches to Creativity
• Chapter Seven: Neurological Processes, Artificial Intelligence, and Creativity
• Chapter Eight: Implications for Home, Educational, and Therapeutic Environments
• Chapter Nine: Affective Components of the Creative Process: Conclusions and Future Research Directions
• Appendix: The Affect in Play Scale
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index