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Chapter 1
Group Mobilization from the Economy, Society, and Government
Matt Grossmann
Before President Obama formulated and passed his national health care reform legislation, he consulted with dozens of interest group leaders; he claimed that they represented the breadth of the American people and the American economy. Organizations attending the 2009 White House Forum that kicked off the health care debate included the American Hospital Association, the Service Employees International Union, the AARP (formerly the American Association of Retired Persons), the National Association of Manufacturers, PhRMA (an association of pharmaceutical companies), the American Medical Association (the main professional association of doctors), the Center for American Progress (a liberal think tank), and the National Council of La Raza (a Latino rights group). It is no surprise that interest groups like these play a central role in American politics. How these particular groups were invited to share their views with Obama is less well known. Not everyone who cares about health care has a permanent spokesperson residing in the nation’s capital or an ally with an invitation to the White House.
Where do American interest groups come from? What parts of our economy and society generate organizations and lobbyists to speak on their behalf? These questions have traditionally been at the heart of research on interest group mobilization. Scholars look at the composition and dynamics of the interest group population, dividing the interest group community into sectors in order to establish which companies, industries, social groups, and advocates participate most in the political process. Researchers consider both the number of interest groups and their relative capacity. Longstanding, but largely separate, strands of research investigate either (1) economic mobilization by corporations and trade associations (like the manufacturers, hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies at the White House meeting) or (2) societal mobilization by social groups or public interest concerns (like the groups representing retirees, Latinos, and liberals at the same meeting). Yet recent studies have found that the entire community of interest groups mobilizes in response to the agendas of government officials: all of these groups mobilize because the government is discussing health care.
This chapter reviews the most general and systematic findings that scholars have uncovered about interest group mobilization and relays some key lessons from these investigations. First, I sketch the history of theoretical perspectives on interest group mobilization. Second, I report information on the growth of the national interest group community and its distribution by type: how many groups are in Washington and what are they doing there? Third, I detail the distribution of involvement across interest groups: do all groups have equal chances to become active participants? Fourth, I compile research on why some businesses and industries mobilize more than others: for instance, why is the medical industry so well represented? Fifth, I present some data on which public constituencies generate the most organized representation: why are doctors better represented than patients? Sixth, I review findings from research on the role of government in stimulating interest group mobilization and directing its issue focus: does Obama’s agenda explain why and when these groups mobilize? Next, I describe interest group mobilization in state capitals: to what extent does it mirror the national picture? Finally, I address the bigger picture: what can we take away from studies of interest group mobilization?
Several intriguing findings appear consistently. The national interest group community is growing, but the share of business interests is falling. State interest group communities are also expanding, but business remains dominant. Larger businesses that have something to gain from government (like sales contracts) or something to lose (like regulation) participate the most and tend to stay engaged once they become politically active. Advocacy groups better represent the most civically engaged ethnic, religious, occupational, and ideological constituencies (groups like Jews, lawyers, and gun owners mobilize more than groups like students and hairdressers). When government creates new programs, more organizations appear and increase their involvement. The agenda of government officials shapes what these groups lobby about.
For students of American politics, these findings show the promise of interest group mobilization research but also suggest caution in interpreting scholarly debates. Even though thousands of interest groups have mobilized, policymaking involvement is highly concentrated among a small number of organizations. Group mobilization responds to the actions and concerns of government, but there is striking consistency in the types of economic sectors and social groups that tend to be best positioned to organize politically. Even though the interest group universe is responsive to changes in the society, economy, and government, opportunities for regular participation are afforded quite disproportionately to different social and economic groups. Scholars study group mobilization to understand not only how a population of organizations maintains resources but also why some parts of the society and economy are better positioned to have their leaders earn an invitation to the White House.
Theoretical Perspectives on Interest Group Mobilization
The first scholars of American interest groups tended to see social and economic groups as the base units of political competition: people acted collectively to pursue their shared interests and agendas, competing with other groups that had opposing interests and often organizing to influence decisions in government institutions.1 This perspective, originally associated with Arthur Bentley and David Truman, developed into a theoretical framework called pluralism, usually associated with Robert Dahl. Although it had many variants, the framework had several basic te-nets: (1) many different social and economic groups are likely to compete to influence public policy; (2) these groups often develop formal organizations to speak on their behalf before government; (3) a different subset of these organizations is active in each issue area; (4) government institutions and policy outcomes reflect the preferences of well-organized groups; and (5) new groups regularly mobilize in response to social and economic change and government action.2
Bentley and Truman focused mostly on how these groups developed and organized in social and economic life, whereas Dahl focused on who possessed resources to help influence government and who was most active in political decision-making. Dahl added two important caveats to pluralist tenets. First, ambitious government officials often mobilize support from groups for their own goals rather than adjudicating among groups. Second, political professionals dominate decision-making, even as they claim to be acting on the public’s behalf, because most citizens are uninvolved.3
Critics of pluralism tend to invoke a further set of maximalist claims supposedly associated with pluralist scholars: (1) mobilized interest groups are broadly reflective of American society, especially individual citizens; and (2) these interests are each amply represented and effectively balanced against one another.4 E. E. Schattschneider argued that interest groups would instead benefit mainly the most educated and highest-income citizens and that every step in the political process, from organizational mobilization to government decision-making, would tend to be biased in favor of similar elites.5 Others argued that these elites would conspire to prevent the poor from realizing and acting on their grievances and manipulate the political process to prevent their concerns from becoming political issues.6
Yet Mancur Olson made the critique that had the most influence on the direction of interest group scholarship. He argued that individuals with shared interests or ideas will not usually act collectively to pursue shared goals. To promote mobilization, leaders of large groups need to provide benefits that are only available to members to incentivize participation; otherwise, most will decide to free ride on the work of others and no one will build, support, or maintain an organization to speak for the group.7 As a result, the interest group system will consist of organizations that have substantial side benefits (like health insurance discounts from the AARP), require participation (such as unions), or represent small industries or groups.
Most evidence collected by interest groups scholars rejects the claim that groups must provide “selective” incentives, those available only to members, to stimulate support for broad causes.8 Olson’s model of collective action nevertheless helped inspire two important conclusions in subsequent interest group research. First, Jack Walker found that most interest organizations form and survive via financial support from patrons like foundations, governments, or rich individuals.9 Most organizations do not need to stimulate much public support. Second, Robert Salisbury found that most interest organizations are institutions like corporations, charities, and staff-led organizations, rather than membership associations; they do not even have any members to mobilize.10
Several scholars have attempted to revive and reformulate traditional pluralism to take account of these findings.11 Few contemporary interest groups resemble broad social group mobilizations, but changes in the size and diversity of the interest group community may be reflective of changes in the economy and society.12 Interest groups representing public concerns have fewer resources than corporations, but they may have substantial influence on the government agenda.13 Other scholars have attempted to refine the Olson model of interest mobilization, adding other types of incentives for participation, emphasizing the dominance of institutions, and focusing on the implications for inequalities in the interest group system.14 Overall, interest group scholars have moved away from broad pronouncements about how sectors of the economy and society will compete in government and toward an analysis of the population of interest organizations and their lobbying behavior.15
The National Interest Group Population
The most important finding in analysis of American interest groups is the tremendous growth in the number of organizations. The number of interest groups listed in the Washington Representatives directory doubled from 1981 to 2006 and continues to grow.16 Figure 1.1 visualizes this growth, dividing the community into five categories of organizational types: (1) corporations and their associations, (2) government organizations, (3) occupational associations and unions, (4) public interest, identity, and issue advocacy groups, and (5) other groups. The number of organizations of each type has grown over time, but advocacy groups and go...
