The Psychology of Prejudice
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The Psychology of Prejudice

The Ontario Symposium, Volume 7

Mark P. Zanna, James M. Olson, Mark P. Zanna, James M. Olson

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eBook - ePub

The Psychology of Prejudice

The Ontario Symposium, Volume 7

Mark P. Zanna, James M. Olson, Mark P. Zanna, James M. Olson

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This volume consists of expanded and updated versions of papers presented at the Seventh Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology. The series is designed to bring together scholars from across North America who work in the same substantive area, with the goals of identifying common concerns and integrating research findings. The topic of this symposium was the psychology of prejudice and the presentations covered a wide variety of issues. The papers present state-of-the-art research programs addressing prejudice from the point of view of both the bigoted person as well as the victim of bigotry. The chapter authors confront this issue from two major -- and previously separate -- research traditions: the psychology of attitude and intergroup conflict. The chapters are organized in the following sequence of topics: the determinants and consequences of stereotypes, individual differences in prejudicial attitudes, intergroup relations, the responses of victims to prejudice and discrimination, and an integrative summary/commentary. Illustrating both the diversity and vitality of research on the psychology of prejudice, the editors hope that this volume will stimulate further research and theorizing in this area.

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Information

Year
2013
ISBN
9781134769933
1
Stereotypes as Consensual Beliefs
R. C. Gardner
University of Western Ontario
PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPES—GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Prejudice is bad! To declare that someone is prejudiced is to make a critical comment about them. Stereotypes, too, are bad! They are perceived to be so by many researchers because they are seen as comprising “a set of beliefs that is incorrectly learned, overgeneralized, factually incorrect, or rigid” (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981, p. 16). To accuse someone of stereotyping is a serious condemnation. Often, stereotypes and prejudice are seen to coexist (cf. Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981). They are both bad. As Stroebe and Insko (1989) stated: “It will be argued that the concepts of ‘stereotype’ and ‘prejudice’ are closely related and that prejudice as a negative attitude towards an outgroup or the members of that group is usually based on a negative stereotype, that is, on beliefs that associate that group with predominantly negative attributes” (p. 4).
The argument put forth in this chapter is that the terms prejudice and stereotypes are bad in a different sense, namely, their scientific utility: Both terms have acquired such a great deal of excess meaning (often in the absence of any empirical justification) that when researchers gather to discuss them, they often talk at cross purposes. Theorists use the same terms to refer to very different phenomena, often referring to the same previous research, and then are surprised to find that they disagree on very basic conclusions.
The difficulty can be seen by considering the concept of prejudice. At one level, the term prejudice refers simply to a judgment about something before the fact (a prejudgment). It represents a preconceived notion about something, often a social object or class of objects. Conceptually, therefore, it is identical to many uses of the concept stereotype. At another level, a prejudice may have an evaluative component, and the evaluation may be positive or negative. Thus, one speaks of someone as being prejudiced for or against a particular social object or class of objects. Viewed in this way, prejudice is restricted to evaluative prejudgments. At a third level, the definition of prejudice may be restricted even more to refer to negative judgments. This type of definition is often used in the context of ethnic relations (cf. Stephan, 1985). For example, Stroebe and Insko (1989) cited Harding, Kutner, Proshansky and Chein (1954) and Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, and Chein (1969) and defined prejudice as an attitude toward members of some outgroup and in which the evaluative tendencies are predominantly negative (p. 8). Note, with this definition, prejudice cannot be positive, nor can one have a prejudice about an ingroup. That is, ingroup favoritism (Brewer, 1979), by definition, is not a form of prejudice!
This example highlights a major problem with research in the context of prejudice, stereotypes, and ethnic relations. Often researchers start off with underlying definitions of various concepts, and these definitions help to determine the results obtained. If, for example, one defines prejudice as a negatively evaluative prejudgment about a category and stereotypes as negatively evaluative judgments about a category, then obviously they are interconnected. If, however, either or both concepts are defined somewhat differently, different results might emerge. With relatively slight alterations in meaning, a rather simple concept can be changed quite dramatically. You can well imagine the argument that would ensue if three researchers attempted to discuss prejudice but each held a different one of the three meanings discussed previously.
Overview
In this chapter, I consider various conceptualizations of stereotypes and show that each reflects one of three basic notions. Stereotypes are seen as consensual beliefs, unjustified beliefs, or beliefs that distinguish one category from another. I show how one's characterization of the concept of stereotype colors one's views of various issues such as the consequences of stereotyping, the relation of stereotypes to prejudice, or the personal and social relevance of stereotypes. I show too that often the measurement operations associated with stereotype assessment confuse levels of analysis. Sometimes, generalizations based on data at one level are applied to another level. Considering all of these issues, I argue that the most meaningful conceptualization of stereotypes is to be found in their consensual nature and that there are many important implications from this perspective. I review studies relevant to a number of issues that highlight both the individual and societal role played by stereotypes.
Definitions of Stereotype
The concept of stereotype is even more plagued with excess meanings than is that of prejudice. Over the years, stereotypes have been characterized as rigid, illogical, oversimplified, exaggerated, negative, and so forth (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brigham, 1971; Lippman, 1922; Taylor, 1981; Taylor & Lalonde, 1987). Table 1.1 presents a representative sample of these definitions. As the definitions in Table 1.1 demonstrate, there are some differences in the excess meanings attached to stereotypes, but there is general agreement that stereotypes are beliefs.
TABLE 1.1
Representative Definitions of Stereotypes
Allport (1954)
p. 191
A stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its function is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category.
Vinacke (1957)
p. 229
For experimental purposes, a stereotype has, in effect, been defined statistically as a collection of trait-names upon which a large percentage of people agree as appropriate for describing some class of individuals.
Brigham (1971)
p. 31
An ethnic stereotype Is a generalization made about an ethnicgroup, concerning a trait attribution, which is considered to be unjustified by an observer.
McCauley and Stitt (1978)
p. 935
…Stereotypes are best understood as predictions that distinguishthe stereotyped group from others…stereotypes are best measured as diagnostic ratios.
Taylor (1981)
p. 155
Stereotype is defined as “consensus among members of onegroup regarding the attributes of another.”
Stroebe and Insko (1989)
p. 5
…we will define (1989) stereotype as a set of beliefs about thepersonal attributes of a group of people.
Some researchers argue that the term stereotype should not be restricted only to consensual beliefs. Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) proposed that the term “stereotype should be reserved for the set of beliefs held by an individual regarding a social group and the term ‘cultural stereotype” should be used to describe shared or community-wide patterns of beliefs” (p. 19); such sentiments are shared by others (e.g., Karlins, Coffman & Walters, 1969; Vinacke, 1957). This distinction may or may not have value, but the simple truth is that it is not consistently made in the literature, and it sometimes takes a careful reading of an article to ascertain which stereotype is under investigation. A major focus of this chapter is to raise the possibility that stereotypes as consensual beliefs do have behavioral implications and that, at a minimum, researchers should determine the extent to which the beliefs they are investigating are consensual.
Regardless of the excess meanings associated with the term, the actual assessment of stereotypes is relatively straightforward. When one studies ethnic stereotypes, one asks individuals to give their views of the attributes of a particular ethnic group. Thus, the basic information obtained comprises individuals’ beliefs about a category. Viewed in this light, stereotypes about ethnic groups become just another set of cognitions. An individual can be said to have beliefs about Blacks, Germans, Canadians, and so forth, in much the same way as she or he has beliefs about old people, dill pickles, professors, and dogs. Alternatively, I suppose, one could speak about stereotypes of Blacks, professors, old people, dogs and/or dill pickles.
This type of framework eliminates much of the confusion and disagreement that permeates the literature on stereotypes, prejudice, and ethnic relations. Moreover, this particular framework provides an added bonus because it permits a researcher to study both individual differences in such beliefs and correlates of these differences. Thus, one might study whether there is any relation between an individual's attitude toward a group and the degree to which that person ascribes evaluative attributes to that group. Based on the research by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977), one would certainly expect there to be such a correlation (see also Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, in press). Or, one could investigate the factor structure of beliefs about a particular group or about a number of groups. Or one could study the relationship between individuals’ beliefs about various groups and their behavior toward those groups. Or one could determine whether some individuals had exaggerated beliefs about a group, or whether these beliefs were rigidly held. Thus, this approach to the concept of ethnic stereotypes, or any type of stereotypes for that matter, permits one to determine where, or if, the excess meanings associated with stereotypes apply.
The problem with this perspective is that it no longer permits reference to the concept of the stereotype about a specific group, such as, for example, Germans. One can speak about an individual's beliefs (stereotypes) about Germans, but this is not “the stereotype” about Germans. This is where the notion of social stereotypes or consensual beliefs becomes useful. This is a particular class of beliefs, and it is an important one in the context of ethnic relations. Consensual stereotypes tell not only something about an individual's beliefs, but also something about the beliefs that tend to be shared within a particular group. This distinction is important, because often it is the set of consensual beliefs that people are referring to when they talk about stereotypes leading to prejudice.
These also are the types of beliefs investigated in many studies of ethnic stereotypes. Often researchers summarize the beliefs held by the sample by identifying those attributes selected most frequently (Katz & Braly, 1933), presenting mean percentage endorsements about a group (Brigham, 1971), or identifying those attributes that distinguish an ethnic group from the general class of people (McCauley & Stitt, 1978). In such situations, one can then consider the statistics computed on the sample to be reasonable estimates of the corresponding population parameters. The important point to note, however, is that these are estimates of the general beliefs in the population. Not all members of the population, nor all members of the sample for that matter, necessarily subscribe to these beliefs. But these are the beliefs represented in the sample data.
Consider, for example, the stereotypes identified by Katz and Braly (1933) and investigated in follow-up studies by Gilbert (1951) and Karlins et al. (1969). These investigators asked individuals to select, from a list of 84 adjectives, those that best characterized a number of ethnic groups. Table 1.2 presents an example of the stereotype of the Chinese as summarized by Karlins et al. (1969). These three studies are often cited as evidence for the stability of stereotypes. Their major data are in terms of the percentage of the samples that selected various attributes to characterize the different groups. These studies are also cited as ones that investigated the consensual nature of stereotypes. What is seldom emphasized is the generally low levels of endorsement of the various attributes. Although one speaks of consensual beliefs, in point of fact there is relatively little consensus. Of the 120 attributes listed in the Katz and Braly (1933) study as being in the stereotypes, only 7 attributes were selected by more than 50% of the subjects. These were sportsmanlike (53%) for the English, scientifically minded (78%) and industrious (65%) for Germans, artistic (53%) for Italians, shrewd (79%) for Jews, and superstitious (84%) and lazy (75%) for “Negroes” In fact the mean percentages for the 12 consensual attributes for each group were generally quite low: 27.92% (Americans), 20.92% (Chinese), 28.67% (English), 29.67% (Germans), 24.67% (Irish), 27.17% (Italians), 22.00% (Japanese), 28.75% (Jews), 32.42% (“Negroes”), and 18.00% (Turks).
TABLE 1.2
Stereotypes About the Chinese Obtained From Three Classic Studies
Attributes
Katz and Braly
Gilbert
Karlins, Coffman, and Walters
%
%
%
Superstitious
34
18
8
Sly
29
4
6
Conservative
29
14
15
Traditional loving
26
26
32
Loyal to family ties
22
35
50
Industrious
18
18
23
Meditative
19
-
21
Reserved
17
18
15
Very religious
15
-
6
Ignorant
15
-
7
Deceitful
14
-
5
Quiet
13
19
23
Courteous
-
-
20
Extremely nationalistic
-
-
19
Humorless
-
-
17
Artistic
-
15
Adapted from Karlins, Coffman, and Walters (1969).
Comparable values were reported by Gilbert (1951) and Karlins et al. (1969). In the former case, only 2 attributes were selected by more than 50% of the subjects, and in the latter case, the number of such attributes was only 5. It is not as if there was a great deal of agreement as to the nature of the various groups. That is, the majority of the students in all three studies did not subscribe to the stereotypes listed. Whether these low percentages reflect relatively little consensus in the stereotypes or a limitation of this methodology (see the following section) cannot be ascertained from these data. What is clear is that little true consensus is demonstrated in these studies!
THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS
When attention is directed to stereotypes as consensual beliefs, it is necessary to differentiate between two units of analysis. First, because stereotype refers to those beliefs that are held by a group of individuals, an obvious unit of analysis is the group. When Katz and Braly (1933) stated that the stereotype about “Negroes” is that they are superstitious, lazy, happy go lucky, and so on, they are using the group as the unit of analysis. Similarly, when they stated that “The manner in which public and private attitudes are bound up together is shown in the order of the ten racial and national groups as determined by the definiteness with which students assigned characteristics to them,” (p. 289) they again are making a generalization based on...

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