China and the World since 1945

An International History

Chi-kwan Mark

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136644764
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

The emergence of China as a dominant regional power with global influence is a significant phenomenon in the twenty-first century. Its origin could be traced back to 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong came to power and vowed to transform China and the world. After the 'century of humiliation', China was in constant search of a new identity on the world stage. From alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, China normalized relations with America in the 1970s and embraced the global economy and the international community since the 1980s. This book examines China's changing relations with the two superpowers, Asian neighbours, Third World countries, and European powers.

China and the World since 1945 offers an overview of China's involvement in the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet split, Sino-American rapprochement, the end of the Cold War, and globalization. It assess the roles of security, ideology, and domestic politics in Chinese foreign policy and provides a synthesis of the latest archival-based research on China's diplomatic history and Cold War international history

This engaging new study examines the rise of China from a long-term historical perspective and will be essential to students of Chinese history and contemporary international relations.

1 The Chinese Civil War and
European Cold War, 1945–9

The Chinese Civil War of 1945–9 resulted in the establishment of the PRC and the transformation of East Asian international relations. While the conflict was domestic in origin, the outbreak of full-scale war in mid-1946 was significantly shaped by superpower politics. The final outcome was determined as much by the diplomacy of the two rival Chinese parties as by their military strategy and tactics. During 1949, Mao had to ponder on China's future relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, which remained in a state of constant flux.

Domestic causes

By the time Japan accepted unconditional surrender in August 1945, the GMD under Chiang Kai-shek remained in power in China. Yet in the course of the Sino-Japanese War, Chiang had lost some of his best armed units, and his government became increasingly corrupt and incompetent. If President Franklin Roosevelt had regarded Nationalist China as one of the ‘Big Four’ in the defeat of Japan and the construction of a post-war international order, his successor, Harry Truman, harboured serious reservations about the ability of Jiang to maintain stability and unity in China.

In the post-war years, the Nationalist government faced serious domestic problems. It alienated many of the urban elites (businessmen, intellectuals, and local leaders) by imposing new taxes, monopolies, and levies on them to finance the civil war. Economic mismanagement proved to have fatal consequences. To cope with escalating inflation, Nationalist officials relied on money printing, thus creating a vicious circle for the urban economy. By early 1949, the loss of legitimacy of the GMD state had reached crisis proportions. In January, Chiang announced his resignation from the presidency and his replacement by Li Zongren as ‘acting president’ (although Chiang remained the head of the GMD and was still influential in policy-making).

As a result of the Sino-Japanese War, the CCP became a viable political alternative to the GMD. The CCP transformed itself from a weak and disunited party into an efficient, highly disciplined, and mass-based organization, thanks to the leadership, charisma, and thinking of Mao. Through myth-making (such as the heroic myth of the Long March), theoretical writings (the ‘Mao Zedong Thought’), and the rectification campaign of 1942–4 (in which Mao defeated his party rivals including Wang Ming), Mao established himself as the supreme leader of the CCP. Through moderate land reform and a de-emphasis on revolutionary ideology, Mao had attracted many peasants and other discontented elements to the Communist movement in the base areas. ¹

Nevertheless, by mid-1945 the balance of power between the GMD and the CCP was still very much in the former's favour. Militarily, the GMD forces were more numerous and better equipped, and controlled more territories, especially cities where the Communists were conspicuously absent. Diplomatically, Chiang's government was recognized by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Cold War impact

During the final stage of the Second World War in early February 1945, the three Allied Powers’ leaders, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill, met at Yalta to discuss war strategy and the post-war order. To secure a Soviet invasion of Japan, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to Stalin's demands that the Soviet Union would establish a predominant position in Manchuria in Northeast China. The secret Yalta Agreement on China was confirmed in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, signed between the Nationalist and the Soviet governments on 14 August 1945, the same day as Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced unconditional surrender. Accordingly, the Soviets used Port Arthur (Lushun) as a naval base and exercised joint control over Manchurian Railways (the Chinese Changchun Railroad) for a period of 30 years. China accepted the independence of Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union recognized the GMD as the legitimate government of China, and would withdraw its troops from Manchuria within three months after Japan's surrender.²

Stalin approached China from a global perspective. In establishing Soviet prominence in Manchuria, he had an eye on the security threat posed by Japan to the Soviet border. By recognizing the legitimacy of Chiang's government, Stalin aimed to continue the wartime collaboration with the United States and prevent the resumption of civil war in China. On the other hand, Stalin had few illusions about the strength of the CCP in a military showdown with the GMD. For these reasons, the Soviets prevented the CCP forces from entering the main cities and communication routes in the Northeast.

Although believing that the GMD forces were far stronger than the CCP's, Chiang realized that he needed a period of peace to resolve China's economic and other problems. With Washington's and Moscow's diplomatic recognition, Chiang was confident that he could exploit superpower politics to force the CCP into a subordinate political position and eventually destroy it. On the same day as Japan's surrender, Chiang invited Mao to Chongqing to discuss the political future of China. The Chongqing talks, from 28 August to 10 October, resulted in the Double Ten Agreement, which recognized the equality of all parties and called for the unification of military forces and the democratization of the central government.

Mao agreed to participate in the peace talks on Stalin's advice. Realizing that the CCP forces were no match for the GMD's and the prospect of substantial Soviet assistance was remote, Mao indeed had little room for manoeuvre. By following Stalin's instructions, Mao hoped that the Soviets would restrain Chiang from launching a full-scale attack on the CCP. In short, in August and September, the situation in China stabilized due to US–Soviet cooperation and Chiang's restraint.

But US–Soviet cooperation in China was fragile. Although the Truman administration aimed to prevent the outbreak of civil war, it also wanted to contain Soviet influence in Manchuria. Thus, from the outset, the US policy of ‘neutrality’ in the GMD–CCP struggle was compromised. In September, the United States landed more than 50,000 marines in Tianjin and other northern ports pending the arrival of Chiang's forces; it also airlifted and transported half a million GMD troops to take over strategic locations in the North and the Northeast. Moscow became increasingly suspicious of Washington's policy in China – and in Japan. At the Foreign Ministers’ Conference between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union in mid-September, it became clear that the Americans wanted to exercise exclusive control over the occupation of Japan. To indicate their displeasure at US policies, in early October the Soviets encouraged the CCP troops to enter the Northeast and provided substantial Soviet weapons. But after Chiang launched, in November, a large-scale assault on the then Communist-controlled Shanhaiguan (which was the gateway to Manchuria), together with Washington's diplomatic pressure, Moscow backed down.

The United States did not want the situation to deteriorate further. In late November, General George C. Marshall was appointed as the President's special representative to China with the objectives of securing a ceasefire and a coalition government. As a result of the Marshall Mission, the two rival Chinese parties reached a ceasefire agreement in early January 1946, and a military reorganization agreement in late February. But when it came to implementation, Mao was unwilling to give up his independent armed force in creating a unified national army, for it would leave the CCP at the mercy of the GMD.

What finally ended the fragile peace in China was the emergence of the Cold War in Europe. By March, US–Soviet relations deteriorated rapidly over Eastern Europe. In consequence, Moscow announced the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Manchuria, which meant that the CCP was now allowed to occupy the main cities and transport routes in the Northeast. From April onwards, Mao sent CCP forces to replace the Soviet garrisons. By early May, the Soviets completed their withdrawal from Manchuria. In June/July, Chiang launched his large-scale assaults in Manchuria. The Chinese Civil War had erupted fully. Despite the fact that Marshall would stay on as mediator in China until early January 1947, it is clear that the United States could no longer exercise effective influence over the situation on the ground.

While planning his military campaigns, Mao, the Marxist theoretician, tried to clarify the relationship between the Chinese revolutionary movement and the growing US–Soviet conflict. One of the main issues to address was whether the Chinese Civil War would lead to a world war. In August, during an interview with visiting American journalist Anna Louise Strong, Mao talked of the concept of an ‘intermediate zone’. To Mao, the ‘main contradiction’ in the world was that between ‘the US reactionary clique’ and the peoples of the ‘intermediate zone’ – capitalist, colonial, and semi-colonial countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa that separated the two superpowers. The United States would not unleash a third world war against the Soviet Union unless it controlled the ‘intermediate zone’. As long as the peoples of the ‘intermediate zone’ persisted in their struggle against the American imperialists, Mao argued, a third world war could be avoided. As part of the ‘intermediate zone’, the CCP played an important role in the world-wide struggles of national liberation. Rather than causing a third world war, the Chinese Civil War thus contributed to world peace.³

Between mid-1946 and 1947, the Soviets provided more support to the CCP including weapons, military uniforms, and raw materials. Yet, the amount of aid was smaller than what Mao had expected and fell far below the level of US assistance to the GMD during this period. Although Marshall, who became Secretary of State upon his return from China in early 1947, ruled out direct US military intervention in China, the administration continued to provide military and economic aid to Chiang's government. As the Cold War in Europe gathered momentum in 1947, White House policy-makers and State Department officials had to mobilize support from Congress and the American public for the new grand strategy of containment. To secure congressional appropriations for the European Recovery Programme or the Marshall Plan, in 1947–8 the administration approved the China Aid Bill of 1948, which provided for $570 million worth of economic and military aid to the GMD government. In a word, the imperative of domestic mobilization for the European Cold War underscored the US involvement in the Chinese Civil War during 1947–8.⁴

US economic and military aid, however, was not enough to save Chiang's regime. From late 1947 onwards, the CCP forces began to seize the military initiative. In September Lin Biao launched an all-out offensive in Manchuria and basically conquered the entire region by November 1948. This decisive victory was followed by the capture of Beiping and Tianjin, the two major northern cities, and the battle of Huai-Hai, which involved more than a million men on each side fighting for the control of China north of the Yangzi River. By the end of January 1949, the Chinese Communists were in control of the northern half of China.

Establishing the principles of diplomacy

While planning his military operations south of the Yangzi, in early 1949 Mao contemplated the prospects for relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. Throughout the civil war, CCP–Soviet relations had been ambivalent and complicated, thanks to Stalin's global considerations and personal mistrust of Mao. In 1947 and 1948, Stalin had turned down Mao's requests for a visit to discuss Sino-Soviet cooperation. In 1948 Stalin fell out with Josip Tito, the leader of Yugoslavia, on the grounds of the latter's alleged deviations from Marxism-Leninism. Although the CCP quickly demonstrated its solidarity with Moscow, Stalin could not help but have doubts about Mao's credentials as a true Marxist, given the Chairman's emphasis on peasants rather than workers in the revolutionary struggle. It was feared that Mao would become a ‘Chinese Tito’ one day.⁵

Stalin's reservations about the CCP did not dissipate during 1949. In early January, Chiang, in his last-ditch attempt to prevent a total Communist victory, requested the Soviet Union to mediate the civil war. Historians have debated whether Stalin accordingly advised Mao not to cross the Yangzi River, but to seek a north–south division of China at the Yangzi. New research findings suggest that Stalin did consult with Mao about the prospect of a peaceful solution to the civil war through direct negotiation between the CCP and the GMD. His primary aim was to avoid a direct US–Soviet confrontation (especially at the time of the ongoing Berlin blockade), if not to keep the GMD in power. But when Mao indicated his strong objection to foreign interference in Chinese affairs, Stalin did not press the issue further.⁶

Mao, on the other hand, devised new principles and policies for dealing with the Western countries. Shortly after occupying Shenyang in Northeast China, in November 1948 the CCP's Military Control Commission in the city ordered all Western diplomats there to hand over their radio transmitters within 36 hours. The order was due partly to Moscow's advice and partly to the CCP's security concerns about American espionage activities in Shenyang. On Washington's instructions, the American Consul General in Shenyang, Angus Ward, refused to hand over the transmitter. On 20 November Ward was held under house-arrest by the PLA troops, and the consulate's offices and residential compound were confiscated. A year later, Ward and four of his colleagues were formally arrested on the grounds of espionage and finally expelled from China.

In handling the Ward case, Mao was simultaneously formulating the basic principles of New China's foreign policy, especially concerning diplomatic relations with the Western powers. Feeling strongly about the ‘century of humiliation’, Mao was determined to make a clean break with the old China. During the spring and summer of 1949, Mao developed the principles of ‘making a fresh start’ and ‘cleaning the house before inviting the guests’. To Mao, the new Communist government would not recognize the legal status of any diplomatic establishments and personnel accredited to the former Nationalist regime as well as the treaties and agreements concluded or inherited by it. New China would establish diplomatic relations with all countries, including the Western ones, on the principle of ‘equality’. But it would not be in a hurry to seek foreign recognition unless and until all vestiges of imperialist power and influence on the mainland were eliminated.⁷

In May/June the Chinese Communists established direct contact with American diplomats. After the fall of Nanjing in late April, on Washington's instructions, US Ambassador John Leighton Stuart was ordered to stay in order to protect American interests and remaining citizens in China and to maintain a channel of communication with the CCP authorities. A former missionary educator in China, Stuart felt that the United States could play a role in influencing the CCP's orientation and policy, for example, by offering US economic assistance to China after the civil war. Mao, for his part, wanted to explore the US attitude towards the CCP. In early May, Huang Hua, the director of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs in Nanjing, was asked to begin a series of secret talks with Stuart. (It was no coincidence that Huang was a graduate of Yenching University where Stuart had once served as president.) The talks touched upon the two governments’ respective position and policy. In June, it was proposed that Stuart should visit Beiping to talk directly with Mao and other leaders.

In the summer of 1949, the Truman administration, preoccupied with European affairs, was pursuing an inconsistent and self-contradictory China policy. In view of the Communist occupation of Nanjing, in May the new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had laid down three basic conditions for US recognition of a new Chinese regime: the...