The Handbook of Jungian Psychology

Theory, Practice and Applications

Renos K. Papadopoulos, Renos K. Papadopoulos

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781135480776
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychologie
• Subtopic: Geschichte & Theorie in der Psychologie

The field of Jungian psychology has been growing steadily over the last twenty years and awareness is increasing of its relevance to the predicaments of modern life. Jung appeals not only to professionals who are looking for a more humane and creative way of working with their clients, but also to academics in an increasingly wide range of disciplines.

This Handbook is unique in presenting a clear, comprehensive and systematic exposition of the central tenets of Jung's work which has something to offer to both specialists and those seeking an introduction to the subject. Internationally recognised experts in Jungian Psychology cover the central themes in three sections: Theory, Psychotherapy & Applications. Each chapter begins with an introduction locating the topic in the context of Jung's work as a whole, before moving on to an investigation of contemporary developments and concluding by demonstrating how Jung's theories continue to evolve and develop through their practical therapeutic applications.

The Handbook of Jungian Psychology is the definitive source of authoritative information on Jungian psychology for Jungian analysts, psychotherapists, counsellors and related professionals. It will be an invaluable aid to those involved in Jungian academic studies and related disciplines.

Theory

DOI: 10.4324/9780203489680-2

Jung's epistemology and methodology

Renos K. Papadopoulos

DOI: 10.4324/9780203489680-3

To begin with, it is important to address the very inclusion of a chapter of this nature in this Handbook. This clarification is necessary because Jung is not particularly known for his contribution either to epistemology or to methodology. Jung is widely known mainly for a number of innovations which do not include his epistemological expertise; mostly, these contributions are connected with the content of his theories (i.e., he introduced new theoretical ideas e.g., about the collective unconscious and the archetypes, etc.), his particular approach to psychotherapy (e.g., he advocated not to reject the symptom but to endeavour to find meaning and value in it), and the implications of his ideas to wider existential and cultural considerations. Epistemology and methodology are not areas that are usually associated with Jung. Yet, this chapter will argue that if one were to read Jung in a certain way, one would find important epistemological and methodological insights; moreover, it will be further argued that these insights are of relevance today and they can enrich substantially current debates in these fields.

Difficulties

Several difficulties could be identified in the undertaking of the task of discerning Jung’s epistemological contribution. The first has to do with the basic fact that Jung did not write clearly and specifically about epistemology and methodology; whenever he addressed these issues he did so in passing, in the context of writing about something else. This means that his insights on epistemological and methodological matters were interwoven into the very fabric of his theories and his overall psychology and, therefore, would require a special extraction procedure to be brought to light in order to be examined in their own right. Related to this difficulty is another consideration, i.e., by formulating his insights in his usual idiosyncratic language (which was tightly interconnected within his theories), Jung’s implications for epistemology are not easily noticeable either by the specialist epistemologists or by the majority of Jungian psychologists; the former would not even look in Jung’s writings for this kind of information, and the focus of the latter has been mainly on his innovative contributions to the theory and practice of psychotherapy.

Another difficulty in developing Jung’s contribution to epistemology and methodology is that such an activity would seemingly contradict Jung’s own strong views about the very essence of his work. Jung is known for being adverse to any suggestion that his theoretical formulation could be separated from his overall psychology. More specifically, he detested the idea that his work could be considered as constituting any ‘free-standing’ philosophical statement, abstracted, distinct and independent from its clinical-therapeutic context: ‘I have set up neither a system nor a general theory, but have merely formulated auxiliary concepts to serve me as tools as is customary in every branch of science’ (Jung 1952a: par. 1507).

Evidently, Jung perceived a sharp distinction between two possible ways that his work could be understood: according to the first one, his work was ‘empirical’ and grounded on solid clinical observations; and, according to the second one, his work was a collection of philosophical speculations and abstractions unrelated to the clinical realities. Throughout his life and in his writings, Jung struggled to gain legitimacy for his work and endeavoured to condemn strongly the latter position and did everything he could to convince others to espouse the former position. However, this sharp distinction presents two difficulties: first, according to the latter view, any philosophical relevance that Jung’s work could have possible had was dismissed as being ‘philosophical speculation’; this means that this sharp distinction does not allow for any positive appreciation of anything that could be considered even remotely connected with philosophy. Consequently, all possible epistemological and methodological insights were tainted as being philosophical and were, thus, rejected by Jung. Second, surely, this sharp distinction cannot be deinitive, regardless of how it is understood. In other words, any comprehension and (more so) any presentation of ‘empirical’ ‘facts’ inevitably involves theoretical and philosophical assumptions that need to be taken on board.

This means that Jung’s very perception of his work (in terms of this sharp distinction) prevented him (and others after him) from appreciating any contribution he made which could have been construed as being ‘philosophical’. More specifically, throughout, Jung was particularly concerned not to venture into anything that he considered that could dilute the validity of his psychological work and in doing so, in effect, he minimised the importance of the epistemological implications of his work. Moreover, it seems that, even when he was aware of the epistemological impact of his formulations, somehow, Jung perceived them as an integral part of his overall theoretical approach (which, indeed, they were) and, consequently, he did not flag out their importance, in their own right.

Accordingly, the main objectives of this chapter are to attempt, first, to argue that Jung indeed had a remarkable epistemological sensitivity and vigilance, second, to delineate those parts of his work that could convey his epistemological awareness and to develop them into a more coherent formulation, third, to trace his epistemological development through the different phases of his career and the way this development interacted with his wider theoretical formulations and with his own life, and finally to examine the present-day relevance of his epistemological contribution in the light of wider developments and current debates in this field. Needless to say, these objectives will have to be scaled down considerably in scope in order to fit within the space limitations of a single chapter.

About epistemology and methodology

Before going any further, it will be important to develop a working understanding of what is meant by epistemology and methodology. As their respective fields are vast and there are many technical definitions of both of them, it will be useful to limit our understanding to a working conception of them, for the purposes of this chapter.

Epistemology is the logos of episteme. The Greek logos is often translated as study, science, discipline, systematic investigation and discourse. In Greek, episteme means knowledge but, not surprisingly, it has an interesting history and a wide range of meanings; the Latin equivalent, scientia, does not seem to share this rich philosophical past.

Etymologically, episteme is related to the verbs ephistemi and epistamai which mean ‘to set or place upon’ and ‘to know how’, respectively. Both verbs refer to standing over or upon (epi) implying some king of ‘overseeing’ activity. Whereas in English to understand is signified by ‘standing under’, in Greek it is by standing over, above. The noun epistema is ‘anything set up, e.g., a monument over a grave’ (Liddell and Scott 1869: 575). Therefore, episteme could be understood as the act of marking a territory that was observed and comprehended.

There is long debate about the meaning of episteme in ancient Greek philosophy (mainly in Plato and Aristotle). This is mainly in connection to its opposition to techne (which is often translated as art, craft or practice). In short, the general trend has been to attribute episteme to knowledge of pure theory and techne to the know-how connected with practice and application. In other words, the predominant tradition has been to equate episteme to theoretical knowledge and techne to applied technology. This is reflected somehow in the old division between a university and a polytechnic (in Greek Pan-epistemeion and Poly-techneion). However, this sharp distinction is not always valid. For example, Plato has Socrates clarifying that the knowledge (episteme) of health is the medical craft (techne) of the physician (Charmides, 165c). In other words, according to Socrates, applied and theoretical knowledge are not in a mutually excluding and oppositional relationship.

This debate is not unrelated to Jung’s own understanding of knowledge and craft in psychology and psychotherapy. For example, Michael Whan (1987) suggests that Jung’s approach transcends the opposition between episteme and techne and proposes the term phronesis as the most appropriate term that characterises the Jungian approach. Thus, for Whan, Jungian therapeutic practice is not based either on ‘theoretical knowledge’ or on ‘technical knowledge’ but on an awareness which he terms ‘ethical consciousness’. In fact, the ethical consideration has been proposed as a dominant epistemological drive in mental health care, in general (and not only in relation to the Jungian approach) and as superseding the perceived dichotomy between techne and episteme (Crowden 2003). Needless to say, Jung would have strongly agreed that an ethical stance cannot be divorced from epistemological and technical considerations; indeed, on numerous occasions he emphasised this very point (e.g., Jung 1949: par. 1412, 1934a: par. 315; McFarland Solomon and Twyman 2003; von Franz 1975).

The reference to episteme vs techne in the context of the Jungian approach is indicative of the complexities involved in delineating boundaries between the various disciplines; these debates, of course, are not limited only to the therapeutic realm. Indeed, the problematic acceptance of knowledge outside the framework of ethical perspectives is universal and it affects most areas of human activity. Characteristically, Levinas proposed the primacy of ethics and maintained that no knowledge was possible without reference to ethical considerations (e.g., Bernasconi and Critchley 1989; Cohen 1986; Levinas 1984). This strong and close relationship between knowledge and ethics makes it imperative to investigate judiciously their boundaries so that their interrelationships can be understood better. Indeed, without this specific understanding, many dangerous confusions and epistemological errors can be committed. For example, this is particularly evident when attempts are made

to understand and deal with the effects of political violence from exclusively psychological and psychopathological perspectives [without considering] intrapsychic, interpersonal and external dimensions … [and without appreciating] the wider political, historical, social, economic, ethical, spiritual and moral perspectives.

(Papadopoulos 2005: 46)

Then, often we tend to become ‘prone to get confused and commit methodological and epistemological errors, ending up psychologising the political realm and pathologising human suffering’ (Papadopoulos 2005: 46).

Returning to the developing of a working meaning of epistemology, the majority of definitions in non-specialist dictionaries refer to epistemology as ‘the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods and validity’ (Oxford English Dictionary). Other, more technical texts define epistem-ology as ‘the philosophical inquiry into the nature, conditions, and extent of human knowledge’ (Sosa and Kim 2000b: ix). Essentially, epistemology is the study of how we know that we know, of what constitutes a valid understanding/explanation/knowledge. A more general definition that would offer a working framework for this chapter would be that epistemology is the systematic investigation of what makes us accept (think/feel) that we know something, of what makes us mark a certain territory as observed and comprehended. This means that epistemology addresses not only the conditions that make the knower know but also the interaction between the knower and the known, as well as the circumstances within which this interrelationship takes place.

Continuing wit...