Navigating Perilous Waters

An Israeli Strategy for Peace and Security

Ephraim Sneh

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781135754266
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Nationale Sicherheit

Israel is a Jewish state in a Muslim Middle East. How can it survive in that region? This book answers this question by analyzing the dangers and threats that Israel faces today. The book also highlights an important component of Israel's strength: the endurance and the cohesion of its social fabric, which the author sees as the key to his country's survival in the Middle East. Written by Israel's former deputy minister of defence, this book is essential reading for all those interested in the contemporary politics of the Middle East.

1

PERILIOUS WATERS

Israel must base its actions on the assumption that the Middle East will continue in the foreseeable future to be an unstable and even combustible region, even if the circle of countries with which Israel has signed a peace treaty widens. This is because the region contains permanent elements of instability. More precisely, three causes of imbalance may be discerned, and where there is imbalance there is instability.

The first imbalance is the unequal distribution of wealth in the Arab world. Anyone wondering why Saddam Hussein received so much support in the Arab streets will find the answer in this imbalance. Saddam Hussein turned himself into the champion representative of the oppressed and the deprived of the Arab world. These people enthusiastically identified with him, and he with them. The Arab populace’s long-standing bitterness toward the petroleum magnates, those princely families in whose hands fabled wealth is concentrated, who live profligate and dissolute lives, is enormous and pervasive. It is directed toward the Western world as well, first and foremost the United States - a rich, modern, and permissive world, which excites their envy.

This is why Osama bin Laden is now the hero of many in the Arab and Muslim world from Ramallah to Jakarta.

The gap between the few very rich and the vast numbers of very poor in our region will not decrease significantly in the foreseeable future. As long as this gap exists, as long as the distribution of wealth remains so unequal, the region will remain unstable. Lhere will always be someone able to exploit this bitterness, this feeling of deprivation, to his own ends.

The rising tide of Islamic fanaticism, which found its most monstrous expression in the September 11, 2001 attacks by the al-Qaeda organization on the World Lrade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, is flooding the world. One of its important sources is the deep economic failure of the Islamic polities. Its source lies not only in the internal social imbalance in Islamic countries, but also in the frustration and envy excited by the rich, modern Western world. Lhis failure is also the backdrop to the growth of the Islamic organizations that are at war with the State of Israel. For example, Iran founded Hezbollah in southern Lebanon among the Shi’ite population, which justifiably feels neglected by the central government in Beirut.

The second imbalance is between the large radical states and the small conservative ones. Lhis imbalance is most prominent along the Persian Gulf. On the one hand we have Iraq and Iran, the largest states in terms of territory, population, and resources; on the other, the Gulf states - small in territory and population, but also possessing great resources.

There are 66 million people in Iran, whose annual GNP is $80 billion. In all of the Gulf States taken together there are 24 million people, and their GNP is $204 billion. Iraq’s population is smaller than that of the Gulf States, at 23.7 million. But Iraq’s GNP before the war was eleven times smaller than that of the Gulf states: $19 billion. Lhis imbalance is made worse by the fact that the large and militarily strong states of the Persian Gulf, whose annual income per capita in $1,200 (Iran) and $790 (Iraq), face small countries whose income per capita is $8,500, seven and ten times greater respectively. Lhis imbalance is the objective basis for the ceaseless danger of conflict in the region; the temptation for the strong states to attack their richer but weaker neighbors is one cause of the ever present risk of war. When a new Iraq emerges, even maybe years from now, no matter what its political structure may be, it will face the same temptation. The war in Iraq left the basic causes of imbalance in the region unchanged, uncorrected, and thus its instability has remained as well.

The third imbalance is that between Israel and its surrounding countries, and I will discuss it at some length. It is important to understand this imbalance, and especially the fact that it will continue to exist even when there is peace between Israel and all of its neighbors, a distant dream these days.

First of all, one must remember that Israel will always be different from its neighbors in the region. Israel is a Jewish state in the composition of its population, in its character, and in the fact that the Jewish people as such does not enjoy sovereignty anywhere else in the world. Israel’s surroundings, both close and farther away, will always be Arab-Muslim, and the Middle East is known neither for its tolerance toward minorities nor for the ability of its minorities to survive here. The Lebanese Christians’ fate is but one example.

Israel’s perennial “otherness’’ will not change even if a state of warm, true peace - full of practical measures that strengthen and stabilize the peace - is achieved. It seems obvious to me that we, the Israelis, have an interest in preserving this special identity, in not allowing it to disappear. Because Israel is, as I have noted, the only place where the Jewish people is sovereign, we must never forget that the difficulties Israel faces as a Jewish state in Arab-Muslim surroundings, even should they wane or fall dormant for many years, may one day reawaken. This is not paranoia, nor is it a desire to invent danger where none exists. It is, rather, the only responsible attitude for ensuring the continuation of a people that for most of its existence has not enjoyed sovereignty on its own soil, and was the victim of the most terrible and murderous cruelty known to the human race. Armed with this consciousness, we will be better able to discern just how inferior Israel’s position is to that of its neighbors, in terms of its population and its territory.

Israel has today some 6| million people, of whom 5| million are Jews. Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon together contain 97 million people. Lhe Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip number about 3 million. If we add Libya, the Maghrib states, Iraq, and Iran, there are about 260 million Arabs and Muslims living in this area.

Israel’s territorial imbalance with its neighbors is revealed by a casual glance at a map. Israel’s territorial area is 11 percent of that of Syria, and about 2 percent of that of Egypt.

The strategic significance of Israel’s small dimensions is made all the more serious by the density of its Jewish population, especially along the coastal plain between Acre and Ashkelon, or, as we say in Israel, from Hadera to Gadera. Lhis density makes Israel extremely vulnerable, because not only is the majority of its population concentrated on the coastal plain, but so too are its principal economic, technological, academic, and cultural assets. It is difficult to defend such a country, and even more so against weapons of mass destruction.

This imbalance in territory and population is also expressed in the proportion of quantitative military forces between Israel and its neighbors. Even if we count, for this purpose, only Israel’s immediate neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon), the ratios of fighter planes, of tanks, and of regular soldiers are all to Israel’s detriment.

On the face of it, Israel’s economic power balances out its quantitative inferiority in terms of population and territory. Israel’s GNP is equivalent to the sum of those of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, whose populations are together fifteen times higher than Israel’s. However, this enormous economic advantage, while far-reaching in its significance for Israel’s chances of enhancing and strengthening its status in the region and the world, cannot neutralize its quantitative inferiority and vulnerability under conditions of conflict with its neighbors.

Only the combination of two factors can correct this disadvantage and grant Israel strategic balance with the countries surrounding it. One is the combination of military, technological, and intelligence superiority. The other is a defensible border. This is perhaps the essence of the answer to the question of how to navigate safely in perilous territory, but in the following chapters I will address the details of the dangers and threats facing us - and of how to respond to them.

2

BETWEEN THE JORDAN AND THE SEA

“The heart of the conflict” - that is the shopworn but true phrase that expresses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s place in the overall Arab-Israeli conflict over the land of Israel in the tapestry of relationships in the region, and the deep emotional element bound up in the struggle between the two peoples.

This conflict is fundamentally a conflict between two national movements for rule over a narrow strip of land between the Jordan River to the east and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. The area is densely populated, both peoples are deeply attached to the land, and there is no solution other than to divide the land between them. Division of the territory, if final and accompanied by a general formula for coexistence between the peoples, will bring about a historic reconciliation.

Continuation of hostilities means the terrible reality of thousands of casualties and the destruction of both the Palestinian and Israeli nations’ economies. Reconciliation and economic cooperation between these two energetic and educated peoples, on the other hand, bears an enormous potential for economic vigor.

The gap between the two alternatives is extreme indeed. When I served as the head of the civil administration in the West Bank (1985-1987), I got to know the Palestinians from close up. Since then - especially since then -1 have believed very strongly that reconciliation is inevitable, and I believe in the economic benefits of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. I continue to hold to my belief even in the bloody times in which this book is being written.

The war over the land of Israel, or Palestine as the Arabs term it, provided the Arab states with an excuse to reject the existence of the State of Israel during its first three decades. Even when, for lack of any realistic alternative, they accepted Israel’s existence, their solidarity with the Palestinian struggle continued to nourish their hostility to Israel. It provided the Arab radicals with a pretext for continuing to fight against Israel in various ways. For the moderates, it was a reason to slow down normalization of their relations with Israel. Moreover, the Palestinian question was the single moral cause around which the Arab world could unit. In fact, it is still the case that the Arab countries, hostile and suspicious toward each other, can unite, at the appropriate time, only on this subject. This is true even though the Arab regimes scorn and abuse the Palestinians. The Palestinians say that the Arab states treat them just as European societies once treated the Jews: with scorn born of envy. It is well known that Palestinians hold many of the highest management positions in the Gulf countries and provide a large and decisive contribution to the economies of Jordan and other Arab states. Palestinian businessmen belong to the elite of the Arab world’s business community. All this excites envy and hatred toward a people dispersed, like the Jews, throughout the world. Not a few heads of Arab states resent Yassir Arafat himself. The way they talk about him at closed meetings is uncomplimentary, to say the least. But at every Arab summit he makes masterful use of the code words of the Palestinian plight - and by doing so gets his way.

Hence, it is clear why Israel’s relations with the Palestinians decisively influence its relations with the other Arab states. At the height of the Oslo accords’ implementation, when there was an atmosphere of Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement and reconciliation, the peace agreement with Jordan was signed. Following this, we established diplomatic relations with the states in the Persian Gulf and North Africa. As our relations with the Palestinians have worsened, however, our relations with these countries have become cold to the point of being frozen, and in some cases relations have even been severed. An Arab regime cannot afford to risk infuriating its masses too much - and the masses’ fury rises when they see televised confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers, which are always presented in a manner extremely hostile to Israel. At such a time, the Arab public, principally the radical religious opposition that exists in every Arab country, considers normal relations with Israel - however diluted - to be moral treason against the Palestinian cause in particular and the Arab cause in general. Thus, we have no chance of improving our relations with Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf States, Tunisia, and Morocco without improving our relations with the Palestinians. The Palestinian question is the spark vital to every regional anti-Israel conflagration. I will address this issue later in the chapter.

Before addressing the dangers deriving from our prolonged conflict with the Palestinians, I feel I should very briefly take stock of the agreements we have signed with them. To put it simply, were the Oslo accords a historic achievement or a tragic mistake? In the big picture, the Oslo accords were not mistakes. Overall, signing these agreements with the Palestinians was the correct thing to do. Correct - but not the most correct. The historical greatness of the Oslo pact lies in the fact that within its framework, the Israelis and the Palestinians - Rabin and Peres on the one side and Yassir Arafat on the other -decided to move the solution to the conflict between them from the battlefield to the negotiating table. They did not ignore the conflict, or its malignancy, but decided that it should be resolved through compromise and reconciliation. The basis of the Oslo accords was not the formula of “territories for peace,’’ but rather that of “sovereignty for security.’’ Reading the text of the Oslo agreements, one immediately comprehends that the pact is in effect a simple bargain: the Palestinians will receive a state (by implication, more or less within the 1967 borders), and in return will sincerely and effectively fight Palestinian terror. They will gain their own state, and we will gain security from terror. In addition to this fundamental agreement, the pact contains very detailed provisions concerning cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, beginning at its formative stage. The agreement provided for economic cooperation as well as collaboration in the fields of health, energy, agriculture, and some twelve other subjects - in short, in all areas of life. This multidisciplinary collaboration was to have created the practical foundation for good neighborly relations from which both sides would benefit. The Paris accord, signed by Abraham Shochat, Israel’s minister of finance, and Abu ‘Ala (Ahmed Qurie), a top Palestinian official, in April 1994, provided the basis for health economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. These relations were to have strengthened and complemented the political agreement signed at the White House on September 13, 1993. It should be remarked that the cooperation that took place among experts in various fields and among military personnel from both sides brought hundreds of people from each side into a routine of businesslike and professional communication, the kind that leads to the fall of barriers, cordial personal relations, and the reduction of hatred. The Western Wall tunnel riots, in which the Palestinians responded violently to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s decision in September 1996 to excavate a tunnel abutting the Temple Mount, set this positive phenomenon back for a certain time, and the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000 brought it to an end.

What, then, was the flaw in the Oslo agreement? It was not conditional. Arafat gained recognition by Israel in return for signing it, and not in return for practical measures taken against terror. Only later did Rabin defer the transfer of the Palestinian cities to Arafat’s authority until such time as Arafat stopped the murderous attacks of Islamic Jihad and Hamas by real action. By the time the first Palestinian city, Jenin, was handed over to full Palestinian control in the framework of the interim agreement, Rabin was no longer alive. It must be recalled that in return for his promise to fight the extremist opposition groups, Arafat received Israel’s agreement to the establishment of police and intelligence forces with tens of thousands of armed members. The three withdrawals in which the greater part of the West Bank was to be transferred to Palestinian Authority control were meant under the Oslo agreements to serve as reward to the Palestinians for their satisfactory progress in the permanent status negotiations. When these negotiations withered during the Netanyahu era, these withdrawals also metamorphosed from a response to what the Palestinians had already done into an incentive for what they might perhaps do in the future.

Any future Israeli-Palestinian agreement will be based on the Oslo equation: effective Palestinian action against terror and against the extremists, in return for Israeli agreement to a Palestinian state and assistance in its development. When the first and second Oslo accords were signed, both sides envisioned a similar, even identical, permanent solution: two states coexisting in peace and economic cooperation. It was already clear then that there was not complete agreement as to the details: What exact percentage of the West Bank’s territory would eventually be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty? What would be the fate and eventual status of the settlements Israel had established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since taking control of those territories in 1967? How would control and sovereignty be divided in Jerusalem’s Palestinian neighborhoods and sacred places? How would the refugee problem be solved? Rabin assumed that the five years that would pass before Israel would need to decide on these details would be ones of confidence-building that would prepare the hearts and minds of both populations for compromise solutions.

What happened after his murder was the exact opposite. During the four years between Netanyahu’s victory in the May 1996 elections and the failure of the Camp David talks in July 2000, confidence was destroyed rather than built. Prime Minister Ehud Barak came to Camp David with fair offers, but after a year in power during which almost no progress had been made in the dialogue with the Palestinians, and their trust in his sincere goodwill had been totally eroded. Arafat remained intransigent on all the points that remained controversial. He maintained his old rhetoric that gave preference to victory over compromise and struggle over achievement, and his image of a uniformed and uncompromising leader. This eventually brought about the violent crisis in the relations between Israel and the Palestinians. But it was the Palestinian leadership, no...