France and the Second World War

Resistance, Occupation and Liberation

Peter Davies

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781134554997
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire du monde

France and the Second World War is a concise introduction to a crucial and controversial period of French history - world war and occupation. During World War Two, France had the dramatic experience of occupation by the Germans and the legacy of this traumatic time has lived on until today, to the enduring fascination of historians and students.
France and the Second World War provides a fresh and balanced insight into the events of this era of conflict, exploring the key themes of:
* Occupation as a social, economic and political phenomenon
* the Vichy regime and the politics of collaboration
* the 'resistance', resistors and its ideology
* the liberation
* the legacy of the wartime period.

CHAPTER ONE

Occupation

French and Germans

A feeling of rape (Un sentiment de viol) Occupation

Henri Frenay on the Occupation¹

The Occupation of France was heralded by Article 1 of the Franco-German Armistice, signed in June 1940.² This notorious document announced that Germany would be occupying northern and western regions of the country; approximately 35 million French people would, therefore, have to live under direct German tutelage. Agulhon talks about the occupied zone as the ‘third quarter of the disjointed nation’.³ Kedward argues that, initially, French people thought of the Occupation in military terms only and ‘did not envisage it in either political or economic terms’,⁴ while Larkin says that the attitude of most French people was ‘stunned acceptance’.⁵ In the second half of 1940, the Nazis launched a systematic campaign of pro-German, anti-British propaganda.⁶

By 1942 Germany had moved into the southern zone. The Occupation was, by then, complete. We must remember that occupation was not a new experience for France. She had suffered the same fate, albeit for much shorter durations, in 1814, 1871 and 1914. Occupation 1940-style, however, was to be on an altogether different scale. In time it was to become a military, social, economic, political and psychological reality; and it would leave an indelible stain on the nation’s psyche.⁷ Naturally, the Occupation had an immediate and varied impact. The most obvious effect was dislocation. As German troops swarmed into France, a mass of people ‘emigrated’ from the north to the south. This ‘exodus’ involved women and children primarily and, in the decades since, has gained mythical status; in photographs and newsreel film it has been depicted graphically.⁸ Ousby has explored this theme further and called his chapter on the Occupation: ‘Presence and absence’. Alluding to the writings of Sartre, he declares:

The occupation began by demanding that people accept the fact of presence, the presence of a foreign conqueror in their midst. Yet increasingly it demanded that they also reconcile themselves to the fact of absence, or rather to a series of absences which began with the disappearance of friends, neighbours or fellow-citizens and pointed towards a vacancy of the spirit, an engulfing nothingness.⁹

At its most stark, the Occupation meant a climate of fear and suspicion. Larkin claims that there was a safe ‘middle ground’ between resistance and collaboration but that, in practice, everyone was in a state of ‘moral disarray’.¹⁰

However, it would be a mistake to view the Occupation, solely, as a crude Nazi strategy—as, if you like, ‘France under the swastika’.¹¹ Of course, in many ways this was what the Occupation was all about; but, in another way, the Occupation can be viewed as a clever and subtle strategy. For, splitting France in two was a brilliant example of ‘divide and rule’ thinking in action. Creating an ‘independent’ southern zone was a definite tactic. In essence, from the German standpoint, the thinking was: give the French some independence, let them squabble among themselves, and let us not exert unnecessary energy on governing areas of France that have no great economic utility. Kedward expands on this point:

The division between the zones which had seemed a thin line on a map was gradually seen for what it really was, a military frontier which the Germans could close or open at will, and in the first weeks after the armistice it was opened only to selected workers and administrators whom the Germans decided were vital to the smooth recovery of basic industries and public services in Paris and the north. By leaving as many people as possible to French initiatives in the south, the Germans ensured that grievances about food and other provisions were directed against French rather than German authorities. It was part of their tactics for maximising the effects of the war and defeat for which the French would be held responsible, and minimizing the effects of the Occupation which could be held against themselves.¹²

The Germans ruled France via a military governor. He had large freedom of action in both political and economic domains. In general though, he had only one aim: to maintain order and stability. He was aided by staff in Paris and the regions, and also by a well oiled police and propaganda machine. These were important dimensions to the German presence in France, but the key relationship was that between the Military Governor and the German Ambassador in Paris, Otto Abetz. What existed, therefore, was a kind of cabinet-style operation: the Military Governor and the Ambassador working in tandem with a small group of councillors. Together, they possessed a good working knowledge of France and French affairs.¹³

In the next chapter we will examine the Vichy regime and the policy of collaboration, and in Chapter 3 we will explore the reality of the Resistance, in all its diversity and plurality. In these two chapters, the ‘headline’ political issues will be examined and important insights will be gained into the nature of both political ‘factions’ and, through this, into the nature of the profound fault-line that existed in wartime France. This chapter, however, will focus on the political, military, social and economic undercurrents of the Occupation. There are three main issues: Origins: why did the Occupation take place? Reality: what did the Occupation mean in practice? Implications: how should we assess the effects, consequences, and legacy, of the Occupation?

So, in this chapter the nature and everyday reality of the Occupation and the social and economic effects of the German invasion will be considered. For the most part, the situation in the occupied zone will interest us. Occasionally though, it will be helpful to take a more holistic view of the Occupation; at times, therefore, it will be useful to take examples and illustrations from the southern unoccupied zone.

Beginnings

How and why did Nazi Germany commence its Occupation? More specifically, what was the rationale behind the policy? What was Hitler’s tactical thinking? What was the significance of the Armistice and the ramifications of the Montoire meeting?

The Armistice of June 1940 was an event tinged with vengeance. Hitler held the meeting with Pétain in an old railway carriage—an explicit reminder of the 1918 meeting when the roles were reversed and France was in the ascendant. At the start of the chapter we looked at the military ramifications of the Armistice. Here we will examine the aspects of the Armistice which shed light on the Germans’ ‘philosophy’ of occupation, and also those features that can broaden and deepen our understanding of what occupied France, in reality, was like. To sum up: what can the Armistice tell us about the nature of the Occupation?

It is clear, first, that the Occupation was a strategic measure. Article 2 of the Armistice makes this plain: it is not that France is being occupied for the sake of it, or for purposes of revenge, but rather, ‘to assure the protection of the interests of the German Reich’.¹⁴ In this sense the Occupation was a tactic, one part of Hitler’s European master plan. The Armistice goes on to state, and define, the role of the occupier:

In those regions of France occupied by the Germans, the Reich is to exercise all the rights of an occupying power. The French Government undertakes to assist in all ways the carrying-out of orders made for the execution of these rights and to have them put into force with the help of the French administration. Consequently, the French Government is immediately to notify the authorities and public services of the occupied territories that they will have to conform to the decisions of the German military commanders and to collaborate faithfully with them. The German Government will give to the French Government and to the central administrations all facilities for putting into force the administration from Paris of occupied and unoccupied territory.¹⁵

This, as one can see, is an extremely clear statement of intent. As Simon intimates, ‘France’ was a worthless, hollow term after the Armistice.¹⁶

The Armistice was not particularly specific about what the day-to-day reality of the Occupation would be. Perhaps only a quarter or so of the Armistice terms dealt directly with social and economic matters; the rest of the articles were avowedly military in substance. Nevertheless, the raft of non-military terms do go some way to substantiating the view that sees the Armistice as a particularly harsh, vindictive document. The key word is subservience. The French might have been hoping for some kind of partnership; but what they got, in the end, was a servant-master relationship.

This is most vividly illustrated in Article 18: The cost of maintaining German troops in French territory falls on the French Govern-ment.’¹⁷ This was blanket liability—France was to pick up the tab for the whole Occupation. Other significant duties were put the way of France (or what was left of it). It had to ‘assure across unoccupied territory the transit of goods between the German Empire and Italy to the extent required by the German Government’ and also to ‘under-take the repatriation of the population in the occupied regions’.¹⁸

There were thus obligations—and also restrictions. Article 17, for example, states that there must be no transport of ‘securities and food-stuffs’ from occupied territory into unoccupied areas; and further, that the French government¹⁹ will guarantee this. Likewise Article 14 stipulates that: ‘With regard to the French broadcasting stations, a restriction on transmitting will immediately be put into force.°’²⁰ Not everything, though, was put down in black and white. The Germans, after all, had licence to do as they pleased, to make up the rules of the Occupation as they went along, and to dictate terms, continually, during the wartime period.²¹

Reality

The reality of the post-Armistice situation was symbolised by the ‘line of demarcation’²² which separated occupied France in the north from unoccupied France in the south.²³ It eventually disappeared, but this should be viewed as an indicator of total occupation rather than as any kind of German ‘concession’.²⁴ While it existed, the line remained a visible reminder of national division. Sweets comments:

The major crossing-point closest to Clermont-Ferrand was located at Moulins, north of Vichy. Before its suppression on 1 March 1943…this boundary was a major irritant to the French. Because their country was divided by closely watched internal frontiers, they were forced to communicate with friends, relatives, or business associates on regulation postcards and letters subject to German interception and censorship. During the first year of the Occupation, travel between the two zones was restricted severely by German authorities, and occasionally traffic was cut off entirely to pressure the French in negotiations concerning the application of the Armistice terms.²⁵

So ‘the line’ was a real-life symbol. And Paris—the capital of the occupied zone—was akin to a ‘vast German garrison town’.²⁶

There are other important questions: What did the Occupation mean in practical terms? How did France, and ordinary French people, respond to the Nazi invasion? What was the nature of French-French, French-German and German-French relations during the wartime period?

Kedward paints an extremely vivid picture of the Occupation’s initial impact:

Those returning in July to their homes in the occupied zone found all tricolour flags removed from public buildings and replaced by Nazi insignia, street directions in bold German type, a curfew imposed from eight o’clock in the evening to six in the morning, total absence of French cars and lorries, and groups of Germans everywhere buying lavishly in the re-opening shops, riding from one tourist site to another, staging endless parades and holding concerts in the local bandstands…. Shopkeepers had to accept the German currency and were obliged to serve Germans first, though not all German soldiers insisted on this.²⁷

In the crudest of terms, the Occupation can be characterised as an exercise in control and exploitation.²⁸ In this sense, there was massive, and acute, disruption; in another sense, French people just got on with their day-to-day lives and were unaffected. This is the paradox inherent in the Occupation: there was both change and continuity and, in the words of Nettelbeck, ‘disillusionment and illusions…abjection and hope’.²⁹

Most obviously, the Occupation had severe economic effects. Defrasne has described the Occupation as an ‘economic pillage’³⁰ and in reality it would be difficult for anyone to disagree with this verdict. The bare bones are these: France’s index of industrial production fell from 100 in 1938 to 54 in 1941 and 33 in 1944; meanwhile the index for agricultural output fell away from 100 in 1938 to 69 in 1944.³¹

France was exploited mercilessly for the good of the German war effort. The occupiers altered the whole raison d’être of the French economy for selfish reasons. Production, distribution and exchange were all affected. Cobban talks about the ‘Nazi exploitation of France’:

This took many forms. Occu...