Presidents as Candidates

Inside the White House for the Presidential Campaign

Kathryn D. Tenpas

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781135937874
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First published in 1998. It is with great pleasure that we introduce the inaugural volume in the series "Politics and Policy in American Institutions." The series strives to show the interaction of American political institutions within the context of public policymaking. Presidents as Candidates offers a truly unique treatment of the White House role in the re-election efforts of contemporary presidents since 1956. Throughout the volume, Kathryn Tenpas compares and contrasts these eight re-election efforts (from Eisenhower through Clinton). She considers the many unique differences and similarities of each White House-led effort. As with any good study, she considers the multitude of political, institutional and policy factors (domestic, economic and international) that affect the strategies and decisions made.

CHAPTER 1
Managing the President’s Campaign
Its Evolution 1956–1996

Modern day incumbent presidential campaigns are no longer dependent on the party organization. This emancipation has prompted presidents to rely instead on their personal staff and an independent campaign organization (e.g. Carter/Mondale ’80, Bush/Quayle ’92). Of the eight presidents under study, Eisenhower is the only president who allowed the national party to play a pivotal role in the reelection campaign. The declining role of the political party and the expanding role of the White House in the president’s campaign have permanently altered the management of the incumbent’s campaign. This chapter examines the evolution of the reelection campaign and, in the process, draws attention to significant electoral and institutional developments since 1956.

PRESIDENTS AS CANDIDATES SINCE 1956

Beginning with President Eisenhower’s reelection campaign is appropriate since campaigning for the presidency occurred in a very different context than it did for Presidents Nixon through Clinton. Historically, one might in fact make President Eisenhower the dividing point between the old method of campaign organization with the party organization at the helm, and the modern method with the White House and the president’s personal campaign organization at the helm. Eisenhower’s reelection campaign in 1956 is classified as a “unified” campaign organization, one in which the president runs the campaign through the national party organization that he seeks to direct. According to Ogden and Peterson, the election campaigns of 1936, 1940, 1944, 1948 and 1956 are all examples of a unified campaign organization in which the party and the president’s staff were fully integrated into a single campaign organization.¹

Not only did the RNC run the 1956 reelection campaign, but in the precampaign stages, it pressured President Eisenhower to seek a second term:

Whatever doubts may have been in the President’s mind, or whatever family pressures may have been brought on him to serve but one term, the official party organization never wavered in its outspoken demand that he should run.²

In addition to demanding that the President seek reelection, it was the RNC in 1955 that approved plans for a late convention and a short campaign. The party operation, with Len Hall as the chair of the RNC, continued and expanded Eisenhower’s reelection campaign.³

It remains true…that the Republican National Committee in the 1956 campaign was probably as well organized and as effective as it ever has been.⁴

Though the independent campaign organization was not a component of Eisenhower’s reelection effort, upon closer examination, it appears that the organization of the RNC reflected a classic campaign organization:

In that campaign Leonard W.Hall [Chair of the RNC] of New York was chairman [of the campaign]. Below Hall several divisions were arranged. The Campaign Division, under the direction of Robert Humphreys, had responsibility for plans, programs, and the implementation of policy incidental to the campaign.
The Executive Division, under the direction of Chauncy Robbins, a veteran national committee staff man, had charge of such matters as patronage and budget… The organization of the Republican National Committee— which in 1956 was the campaign organization—was that simple.⁵

This campaign was the last of its breed, as subsequent incumbent campaigns gradually moved away from the unified model.⁶

The next sitting president to launch a bid from the White House was Lyndon Johnson in 1964. It is critical to remember, however, that the Johnson campaign in 1964 took place under the cloud of the Kennedy assassination. LBJ, a president unelected in his own right, campaigned extensively in hopes of obtaining a mandate to carry out the Kennedy agenda as well as to establish his Great Society programs. In addition, Johnson was sensitive to the needs of the Kennedy people and was careful not to make drastic alterations.⁷ President Johnson allowed many Kennedy and Johnson staff members to participate in “political” activities for the 1964 presidential campaign.⁸ Keep in mind, however, that this decision was also intensely strategic:

Needing the Kennedy men in 1964 to help carry the North and East as they needed Johnson and his men in 1960 to help carry the South, President Johnson promptly asked the entire Kennedy team to stay, in the Cabinet, on the White House staff, and at the National Committee.⁹

Thus, the 1964 campaign represents the initial shift away from the unified model of campaign management. Rather than letting the DNC run the campaign, participation involved three different entities: the DNC, the Kennedy holdovers and the Johnson team within the White House.

Johnson, it will be recalled, was again eligible for the presidency in 1968. After he was elected in his own right in 1964, Johnson was essentially free from obligation to the Kennedy holdovers—there would not be a divided staff as there was in the 1964 election. His campaign organization had the potential to become the embryo of future campaigns—a personal campaign organization with peripheral involvement from the party. However, reelection planning for 1968 was stymied by LBJ’s “secret” decision not to run. According to Press Secretary George Christian, “The truth is, there wasn’t much [campaign] planning going on [because of the possibility of Johnson’s withdrawal].”¹⁰ However, the President’s senior aide (equivalent to the modern-day chief of staff) Marvin Watson moved down the hall to deal exclusively with reelection planning. Though Watson apparently was aware of LBJ’s decision not to run, he doubted that LBJ would stick to this decision and wanted to be prepared. When Johnson finally announced he would not seek reelection, a semblance of a campaign operation already had developed under the auspices of Marvin Watson, and even in its nascent form, it was not a unified campaign organization characterized by extensive involvement from the party organization. Rather, similar to the 1964 campaign, it is likely that the party’s role would have been diluted by White House involvement.

President Nixon followed LBJ’s practice of utilizing the White House as a means for initiating early campaign planning. In fact, Nixon was the first president to execute fully this method of campaigning for reelection since neither Kennedy nor Johnson sought reelection after serving a complete term in office. This development is especially interesting given the fact that Nixon did not follow the path of his former boss, President Eisenhower, who incorporated the RNC in reelection planning. In addition, President Nixon was the first president to establish an independent campaign organization, the Committee for the Re-election of the President (CREEP). As Sidney Milkis argues:

The complete autonomy of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CREEP) from the regular Republican organization in the 1972 campaign was but the final stage of a long process of White House preemption of the national committee’s political responsibilities.¹¹

The Nixon reelection campaign was the first completely White House-directed reelection campaign and the first campaign to have an independent campaign organization. The direction from White House staff members, primarily Chief of Staff H.R.Haldeman, coupled with the influx of White House staff to the campaign headquarters, demonstrates the dominant White House influence.

The Ford campaign in 1976 continued the trend of White House-dominated campaigns and the establishment of an independent personal campaign organization (despite Ford’s initial refusal to establish such an entity). However, President Ford’s experience was quite unusual in that his succession to office eleven months before he declared his candidacy for the 1976 presidential election thrust many of his aides, both inside and outside the White House, into campaign planning shortly after they arrived. Further, the likelihood of a tough primary challenge and the compliance and disclosure requirements mandated by new campaign finance laws accelerated and intensified campaign preparation. Nonetheless, the management of the campaign reflected the Nixon campaign in 1972—an independent campaign organization with substantial involvement from the White House.

THE OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS: REELECTION POLITICS WHITE HOUSE STYLE, 1978–1996

By the time of the 1980 presidential election, Presidents Nixon and Ford had set the precedent for a White House-directed campaign complete with the establishment of an independent campaign organization. However, midway through President Carter’s term, another stage in the development of the White House-dominated reelection campaign emerged with the establishment of a special office that dealt with the earliest stages of reelection planning in addition to other “political” tasks.

During the first two years of Carter’s term, there was much criticism about the lack of political sensitivity permeating the White House. The administration was characterized by many observers as a “bunch of political novices.” As a result, part way through Carter’s first term, he appointed his scheduling deputy, Tim Kraft, to fill the position of Assistant to the President for Political Affairs and Personnel.¹² Kraft met regularly with John White, the Chair of the Democratic Party, and supervised party affairs. Kraft and the political affairs team made a serious effort to sharpen political sensitivities within the executive branch. In addition, Kraft initiated the first campaign planning efforts at the direction of Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan. While Jordan drafted the first reelection planning memo to the President, he left nuts-and-bolts campaign planning to the Office of Political Affairs and Personnel.¹³

Though President Carter was the first to designate an individual to fulfill these duties, the position, as stated in the U.S. Government Manual, was vaguely referred to as Assistant to the President. It was not until President Reagan that this staff member was given a descriptive, formal title and a separate office, Assistant to the President for Political Affairs. Initially, Lyn Nofziger led this office with Ed Rollins and Lee Atwater as his assistants. Nofziger, however, accepted this position contingent on his departure one year later. After the 1980 election victory he intended to return to California, but was asked by Jim Baker to stay on in this capacity.¹⁴ Adhering to his agreement to stay in the White House for one year, Nofziger resigned in 1982, leaving Ed Rollins at the helm and Lee Atwater as his assistant. Under Rollins, there was a staff of roughly fifteen members presiding over political activities. This office also participated in reelection planning as it did in the Carter administration. After the midterm elections, Chief of Staff James Baker, and Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, along with strategis...