Early interventions
Scale has long been one of Geography’s core concepts. Nonetheless, prior to the 1980s – and despite some efforts in the early twentieth century to examine critically the constitution of scales such as “the urban” and “the regional” (see Chapters 3 and 4) – scale was largely a taken-for-granted concept used for imposing organizational order on the world. Whereas both physical and human geographers – as well as many other natural and social scientists – had frequently employed scales such as “the regional” or “the national” as frames for their research projects, looking at particular issues from, say, a “regional scale” or a “national scale,” they had generally spent little time theorizing the nature of scale itself. Rather, researchers typically had simply imagined the world as inherently hierarchically compartmentalized, with scales such as “the regional,” “the national,” and “the global” conceptualized as natural geographical units/ spatial echelons (from the French échelon [rung of a ladder], which itself comes from échelle, meaning both “a ladder” and “scale”), as simply the most logical way in which to carve the world up into manageable pieces for the purposes of analysis, or as no more than handy mental contrivances for ordering the world. To all intents and purposes, though, in such approaches scales were seen simply as tools for geographically circumscribing “a relatively closed … system, the majority of whose interactions remain within its boundaries” (Johnston 1973: 14) – they were viewed as what Lefebvre (1974/1991: 351) evocatively termed “space envelopes.”
Generally, such approaches drew upon the conceptual approach out-lined by eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1781/ 2007). Whereas Isaac Newton (1687/1999) had viewed time and space as real and absolute things which form a container for natural and social phenomena and processes, Kant argued that neither time nor space were objective, real things but were, instead, subjective constructs through which humans make sense of the world. For Kant, any order appearing in the world is the result not of material processes but of the categorization imposed on it by our brains. Although historically Kantian-ism has infused much writing in Geography (May 1970; Livingstone and Harrison 1981), it was perhaps Hart (1982: 21–22) who most forcefully articulated a Kantian view of scales when he suggested that they are merely “subjective artistic devices.” Given that he viewed them as, essen-tially, mental fictions, for Hart there could thus be “no universal rules for recognizing, delimiting, and describing” scales, whilst his argument that scales are “shaped to fit the hand of the indi vidual user” encouraged a theoretical stance which viewed the absolute spaces of the Earth’s surface as capable of being more or less arbitrarily divided up into bigger or smaller areas, with little concern for how such areas might relate to anything “on the ground.” Whilst there are many examples of works adopting such conceptual formulations, Peter Haggett’s Geography: A Modern Synthesis, arguably one of the most influential texts of the 1970s’ “spatial science” tradition within Geography, epitom ized this approach to scale. Thus, Haggett (1972/1975: 17) used a scalar schema for divid-ing up the world that relied principally upon a fairly arbitrary mathematical progression through what he called “Orders of Magnitude” – his Fifth Order of Magnitude represented areas on the Earth’s surface between 1.25 km and 12.5 km in diameter, his Fourth Order areas between 12.5 km and 125 km in diameter, his Third Order areas between 125 km and 1,250 km, his Second Order areas between 1,250 km and 12,500 km, and his First Order anything with diameters from 12,500 km to 40,000 km, the planet’s approximate equatorial circumference. For Haggett, the important analytical questions were not how scales are delineated or made but how “changes in scale change the important, relevant variables” (Meentemeyer 1989: 165) as they affect various pro-cesses and phenomena, whilst the key theoretical declarations involved arguing that multiscalar analysis is crucial for understanding the complexities of human and natural systems. However, following the publica tion of two articles by Taylor (1981, 1982) and of Smith’s (1984/ 1990) book Uneven Development, the concept of scale began to be hotly debated within Human Geography – and, to a degree, Physical Geography – and continues to be so today.
Drawing upon world-systems analysis, Taylor (1981) argued that particular scales take on certain roles under capitalism. Specifically, he main tained that: the global scale is the “scale of reality,” the scale at which capitalism is organized; the national scale is the “scale of ideology,” as it is the scale at which the capitalist class primarily promulgates class-dividing ideologies (such as nationalism); and the urban scale is the “scale of experience,” for cities are where everyday life is primarily lived in capitalist societies. Taking this further, he subsequently argued that there were fundamental contradictions with regard to the scales at which socio-economic classes have historically organized (Taylor 1987). Hence, under capitalism, classes “in themselves” have often been defined globally, such that it is possible to talk analytically of a global working class and a global capitalist class. Classes “for themselves,” however, have tended to organ ize nationally, regionally, or locally. For Taylor, then, there was a disconnect between the scales at which classes under late industrial capitalism exist and the scales at which they often perceive themselves to exist. Despite offering important analytical insights, though, Taylor’s approach suffered from two lacunae: i) by suggesting that certain scales played particular roles within how capitalism operates, his argu-ment seemed to present a somewhat functionalist approach to scale; ii) it did not have much to say about how scales come about in the first place, for it focused instead upon how they are used once in existence (for more on world-systems analysis, see Box 1.2).