Subjection and Subjectivity
eBook - ePub

Subjection and Subjectivity

Psychoanalytic Feminism and Moral Philosophy

Diana T. Meyers

Share book
  1. 256 pages
  2. English
  3. ePUB (mobile friendly)
  4. Available on iOS & Android
eBook - ePub

Subjection and Subjectivity

Psychoanalytic Feminism and Moral Philosophy

Diana T. Meyers

Book details
Book preview
Table of contents
Citations

About This Book

Diana Tietjens Meyers examines the political underpinnings of psychoanalytic feminism, analyzing the relation between the nature of the self and the structure of good societies. She argues that impartial reason--the approach to moral reflection which has dominated 20th-century Anglo-American philosophy--is inadequate for addressing real world injustices. Subjection and Subjectivity is central to feminist thought across a wide range of disciplines.

Frequently asked questions

How do I cancel my subscription?
Simply head over to the account section in settings and click on “Cancel Subscription” - it’s as simple as that. After you cancel, your membership will stay active for the remainder of the time you’ve paid for. Learn more here.
Can/how do I download books?
At the moment all of our mobile-responsive ePub books are available to download via the app. Most of our PDFs are also available to download and we're working on making the final remaining ones downloadable now. Learn more here.
What is the difference between the pricing plans?
Both plans give you full access to the library and all of Perlego’s features. The only differences are the price and subscription period: With the annual plan you’ll save around 30% compared to 12 months on the monthly plan.
What is Perlego?
We are an online textbook subscription service, where you can get access to an entire online library for less than the price of a single book per month. With over 1 million books across 1000+ topics, we’ve got you covered! Learn more here.
Do you support text-to-speech?
Look out for the read-aloud symbol on your next book to see if you can listen to it. The read-aloud tool reads text aloud for you, highlighting the text as it is being read. You can pause it, speed it up and slow it down. Learn more here.
Is Subjection and Subjectivity an online PDF/ePUB?
Yes, you can access Subjection and Subjectivity by Diana T. Meyers in PDF and/or ePUB format, as well as other popular books in Philosophie & Geschichte & Theorie der Philosophie. We have over one million books available in our catalogue for you to explore.

Information

Publisher
Routledge
Year
2014
ISBN
9781134711970
1

Difference: The Challenge to Moral Reflection

Over the years, I have gradually and, I confess, somewhat reluctantly become convinced that the classic philosophical project of setting out an account of justice that anticipates a comprehensive social ideal is misguided. It seems to me that ideal theories—theories of the principles that perfectly just societies would implement—often distract attention from pressing social problems and that, when these problems are addressed through ideal theories, the ideals they commend are too stringent to be helpful for purposes of devising feasible solutions in a profoundly nonideal world. Abstracting from the realities of pervasive and persistent injustice and historical animosity between social groups, ideal theory overlooks the problems of entrenched domination and oppression, offers (at best) vague guidance for eliminating those evils, and even obstructs social change by locking in place ostensibly neutral standards that in fact disadvantage some social groups.
In view of these deficiencies, it is doubtful that ideal theory should be moral and political philosophy’s paramount concern. Instead, it seems to me best to scale back our philosophical ambitions and to try to understand the process through which moral insight may be gained and through which practices and policies designed to rectify injustice can be defended. Thus, I have turned to problems concerning moral subjectivity and moral reflection. In my judgment, however, the most prominent contemporary philosophical treatments of these topics remain too much in thrall to the traditions of impartial reason. As a result, they ignore important dimensions of experience that are conventionally tagged feminine, and they fail to provide an adequate basis for defining and defending feminist objectives.
One way to understand these failings is to trace them to the lingering influence of logical positivism. Early in the twentieth century, the logical positivists—partly out of outrage over Nazi propagandistic abuses—prosecuted a vigorous and thoroughgoing campaign of philosophical purification. They sought to purge philosophy of ambiguity, to cast its arguments in certifiably valid forms, and thereby to ensure the soundness of its claims. Stylistic flourish and figurative language were regarded as suspect and consigned to the disdained category of poetry. Thought to be devoid of cognitive content, such uses of language were dismissed as merely emotive. Indeed, normative ethics itself did not fare well under the positivist juggernaut. Having reduced prescriptive and proscriptive claims to expressions of emotion, positivism banished them from philosophy proper. Only metaethics—that is, theory about the nature of normative statements—was deemed amenable to rational analysis and argument and therefore within the ken of philosophy.
It took the civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement and the urgency of the issues they raised to prick philosophy’s collective professional conscience and spark a revitalization of philosophical treatments of public policy questions. Around the same time, John Rawls published A Theory of Justice (1971), the first major work of systematic political philosophy to appear in this century, and the topic of social justice regained a spot on the philosophical agenda. Since then, normative ethics and political philosophy have remained philosophically respectable.
Yet, normative ethics and political philosophy remain deeply tradition-bound. Kantianism and utilitarianism dominate debate both as contenders for acceptance as general theories and also as ways of addressing timely issues. Curiously, Kantianism and utilitarianism defend themselves against positivist skepticism by conceding a great deal to it. Moral subjects are construed as rational deliberators—either checking their beliefs for consistency or devising ways to maximize social welfare. In short, these views seem to enable normative moral and political philosophy to proceed without “betraying” reason and descending into the “nether world” of emotion and rhetoric.
Despite the undeniable importance of this body of work, I believe that normative ethics and political philosophy have been stunted by this aversion to the realm of affect and expressiveness. Indeed, it seems to me that emotion and rhetoric are pivotal in nonideal theory, for prejudice against members of some social groups and systematic misconstrual of their needs, desires, and aspirations often block solutions to urgent social problems. In my judgment, when Kantianism and utilitarianism do not simply bypass these aspects of moral reality, they treat them superficially.
This study aims to remedy the oversights of standard accounts of moral subjectivity and moral reflection and to do so in a way that accommodates feminist critique and feminist demands. I begin by clarifying the political challenge that contemporary accounts of moral subjectivity and moral reflection face. Since systematic group-based social exclusion is one of the most pressing, pervasive, and seemingly intractable injustices, I contend that an account of moral subjectivity and moral reflection that cannot fruitfully address this wrong should be rejected. I then argue that philosophy’s unitary rational subject is ill-equipped to address this problem and that it is necessary to look beyond philosophy for a realistic and rich view of moral subjectivity. In psychoanalytic feminism, I have found a salutary corrective to philosophy’s monistic moral subject. Unlike most philosophers, psychoanalytic feminists appreciate the role of culturally transmitted imagery in shaping people’s moral perception, the contribution of empathy to moral reflection, and the potential of a complex moral identity to enhance moral insight. Thus, I propose to mine this literature in order to set forth a view of moral reflection designed to handle the sort of serious, real-world social problems that feminists and many other social activists raise.

1. The Problem of Difference

Until recently, the problem of unjust social exclusion was commonly construed as the problem of prejudice or bigotry—mass contempt for and concerted discrimination against individuals simply because they belong to a minority or powerless social group. But thinking of social exclusion solely in terms of the prejudice of the excluders reduces the problem to the despicable attitudes of a dominant group and leaves out two important dimensions of the problem: (1) the institutionalization of exclusion, and (2) the viewpoint of the excluded. Recasting the wrong of group-based social exclusion as the problem of difference acknowledges the role of prejudice in perpetuating this injustice, but this reformulation has the advantage of bringing out these added complexities.
The problem of difference is partly a problem about how we think about people. Instead of noticing individuals, we consign people to exclusionary categories organized by sex, race, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, religion, and so forth, and then we dismiss the people thus classified—for example, women, African-Americans, lesbians and gays, and Muslims—as inherently defective. In this way, difference—the neutral fact that people look different, act different, and choose different affiliations—degenerates into “difference”—the censorious freighting of the facts of difference.
Yet, prejudice by no means exhausts the problem of difference, for “difference” is memorialized in entrenched social practices. When established institutions and the policies they implement are taken to be natural and fair, any change that accommodates “different” people will disrupt the settled expectations of members of the dominant group—the people for whom these arrangements were designed and who accept them. As a result, such change will appear to interfere with these individuals’ freedom and will be regarded as departing from neutrality in bestowing undeserved benefits on a new group of claimants. Yet, the status quo is not neutral for members of socially excluded groups—their free choice and prospects for self-realization are obstructed by the very institutions and policies that serve others so well.
When unilateral ascriptions of “difference” are institutionalized in this way, the double bind that Martha Minow calls the “dilemma of difference” arises. As Minow points out, “[t]he stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and by focusing on it” (Minow, 1990, 20). A society trapped in the dilemma of difference seems to be without resources to rectify unjust social exclusion. By ignoring difference and treating everyone as the same, government may “freeze in place the past consequences of difference,” but, by creating programs that acknowledge difference, government “make[s] those differences matter and thus symbolically reinforces them” (Minow, 1990, 42). Neutral policies often perpetuate the subordinate status of “different” social groups, and difference-sensitive policies often catalyze backlashes.
By pretending that women in the United States today are no different from men, equal opportunity guarantees that many women who regard having and raising children as a core project and who take time off to fulfill this goal will be left behind in their careers. They have chosen, goes the familiar rationale, to put family ahead of professional advancement and thus to sacrifice work experience, which is, after all, a legitimate factor in promotion decisions. However, if government were to provide affirmative action for women who leave career tracks to care for preschool children and who later wish to rejoin the workforce (Held, 1984, 19), the cri de QUOTA would be raised. Women would be stigmatized as freeloaders—taking “vacations” to raise kids and returning to unearned advantages in the workplace. Either way, women who become mothers in the context of traditional relations with men lose. As equals, they do not measure up; as recipients of special favors, they would be despised and resented.
What is to be done? Minow suggests two ways in which the dilemma of difference can be resolved. One possibility is to “expand the definition of who is the same”—that is, to recognize excluded others as persons, too (Minow, 1990, 95). Another possibility is to “broaden the definition of difference”—that is, to recognize that one is oneself different from the standpoint of excluded others (Minow, 1990, 95). These two strategies—accepting universal humanity and accepting diversity—correspond to two forms that the dilemma of difference takes.
In one form, blindness to commonality where it exists or where it could exist creates artificial boundaries between groups of people that work to the detriment of all but the most powerful of those groups. In Chapter 2, I shall argue that this form of the dilemma of difference can be resolved through more skillful and imaginative use of Kantian impartial reason—the approach to moral reflection that figures most prominently in judicial reasoning and in public policy debate in the United States. By including purportedly different people in established moral categories or by creating more inclusive moral categories, impartial reason can identify and justify policies that break down unjust social and economic exclusion.
However, Kantian impartial reason is no panacea. In Chapter 2, I shall also argue that this approach to moral reflection is not capable of addressing the second form of the dilemma of difference. Here contempt for self-ascribed and cherished difference or irremediable and non-negligible difference is invoked to justify a powerful group’s indifference to or exploitation of others. Broadening the definition of difference presupposes recognizing difference as such and appreciating it. But since the logic of social reform based on Kantian impartial reason is a logic of conceptual, and sometimes behavioral, assimilation, this approach to moral reflection fails to accord due respect to individuals who regard their difference as central to their identity and to individuals who suffer from disabilities that few others share. In these cases, impartial reason’s universal categories negate differences that demand direct moral attention and thwart moral recognition of diversity.
In my estimation, an account of moral reflection and moral subjectivity that is incapable of addressing the second form of the dilemma of difference is untenable, for this kind of group-based social exclusion is among the most glaring and widespread injustices confronting societies today. Now, it seems to me that the intractability of this form of the dilemma of difference is an artifact of routinized, unidimensional moral reflection coupled with a monistic, rationalistic conception of the moral subject. Thus, it is my objective to develop an account of moral reflection that endows moral subjects with resources adequate to the task of resolving this form of the dilemma of difference.

2. The Problem of the Moral Subject

The view of the moral subject that currently dominates discussion in moral and political philosophy is a legalistic view—one preoccupied with the distribution of social goods and with accountability. To frame the problem of social distribution in manageable terms, individual idiosyncracies, deep interpersonal bonds, and cultural affiliations are set aside, and a set of universal human interests that can be equitably satisfied is enumerated. Hence, people are conceived as fundamentally homogeneous. Moreover, since the concern with accountability dictates treating the moral subject as a locus of control, those influences that people do not recognize or that are too powerful to resist are discounted. Hence, the self is seen as largely independent, transparent, and rational. But this conception of the moral subject bears little resemblance to the people we know and value. Our vital, baffling, fascinating friends are reduced to ciphers in a social order of rationally certified rights and duties.
A related problem with much work in applied ethics is that the positions taken and the arguments supporting these positions typically reprise rival traditional moral theories—that is, they draw out the implications of the author’s preferred moral theory with respect to a current issue. To find such an argument persuasive, one must already endorse the tenets of the moral theory that anchors it. But since these theories are themselves controversial, the arguments derived from them seldom convince a broad audience.
Indeed, the power of impartial reason to settle moral questions has often been exaggerated. In A Theory of Justice, for example, John Rawls proclaims his interpretation of the original position to be the “philosophically favored” one, and he maintains that the parties to the original position would decisively reject utilitarianism and perfectionism and opt for a rights-based welfare state (Rawls, 1971, 17–18, 22). But it was not long before Robert Nozick invoked impartial reason to defend a libertarian vision of justice (Nozick, 1974). Since then, the challenges to Rawls’s theory have multiplied, and Rawls eventually weakened his claims about the conclusiveness of his earlier arguments (Rawls, 1985, 224).1 Impartial reason’s record so far hardly warrants according it exclusive sway over the problem of social justice. There is little reason to think that impartial reason will ever bring the debate over social justice to an end or, for that matter, that controversy over the nature of justice will ever cease. Furthermore, the Rawls-Nozick debate testifies to the malleability of impartial reason in the hands of skilled practitioners and thus to its susceptibility to manipulation that merely rationalizes the status quo. There is no assurance, then, that impartial reason will detect unjust social policies and practices and prescribe needed remedies.
This quandary suggests that there is an acute need to examine the pretheoretical resources available to moral reflection. In other words, our conception of the moral subject needs to undergo a corrective naturalization. As everyone who is not a professional philosopher knows, people are endowed with an array of moral capacities that they bring to bear on their moral perplexities (for helpful discussion of the role of interpersonal skills in moral reflection, see M. Walker, 1989, 1991; for an account of autonomy competency, see Meyers, 1987b). Likewise, people typically endorse a variety of values. Indeed, it hardly seems likely that privileging a single moral capacity, such as rationality, or privileging a single moral value, whether fairness or happiness, will lead to better moral judgments. Moreover, since both interpersonal forces and intrapersonal forces belie the unity of the subject, there is reason to think that a nonunitary moral subject should displace the rational monolith of the Kantian tradition.
Still, acknowledging the pluralistic, heterogeneous, multiskilled nature of the moral subject generates a novel set of problems. Pulled hither and yon by disparate, possibly incoherent influences, people may seem incapable of critical moral judgment and firm moral conviction. However, I shall urge that, on the contrary, the nonunitary moral subject renders basic social critique and far-reaching social change morally defensible.
To help me with this project, I have turned to recent psychoanalytic feminist theory, for I believe that intimations of a more convincing view of moral subjectivity and moral reflection are to be found in this literature. First, these theorists are specifically concerned with dimensions of moral subjectivity that are conventionally coded as feminine, such as emotion and the unconscious. Thus, they highlight capacities and concerns that philosophers have by and large ignored. Second, the psychoanalytic feminist literature is serving as a laboratory for experimenting with the medium of figurative language for purposes of critiquing and reconstituting gender. Thus, psychoanalytic feminist theory includes precisely what I miss in moral and political philosophy. This book is not, then, a work of psychoanalytic feminism. It is, rather, an attempt to correct and expand moral and political philosophy with the assistance of psychoanalytic feminism. I believe that this unorthodox juxtaposition of disciplines yields a radical and felicitous reconceptualization of moral reflection and moral subjectivity.

3. Psychoanalytic Feminism and Moral Reflection

Since its inception, psychoanalysis has played a controversial role in intellectual history. A revolutionary doctrine from the start—some...

Table of contents