Elites and Democratic Development in Russia

Vladimir Gel'man, Anton Steen, Vladimir Gel'man, Anton Steen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• ISBN:
  9781134399031
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica

The transformation from Communist rule towards democratic development in Russia cannot be fully understood without taking the elites into full consideration. Elites and Democratic Development in Russia examines how elites support and challenge democracy and why they are crucial to Russian democracy in particular.
In this innovative volume, twelve respected scholars investigate how elites have affected the transition from Communist rule towards democratic development in Russia. They discuss how the elites' degree of integration on national and regional levels may constitute the main condition for the consolidation of the emerging political regime and interpret the complex post-communist elite patterns of behaviour and attitudes into a theoretical framework of elitist democracy.
This book will appeal to those interested in democratization, elites, post-Soviet Russia and post-communist studies.

1 Elites and democratic development in Russia
An introduction

Vladimir Gel'man and Anton Steen

As classics of elite theory suggest, studies of political systems are studies of political elites. This is especially true for societies undergoing ‘the triple transitions’, and facing complex tasks of simultaneous democratization, marketization and building of the nation-states (Offe, 1991). Russia is no exception in this respect – the post-Soviet transition in Russia, as elsewhere, to a great extent was produced by and depends upon various segments of elites. However, the outcomes of the transition process in Russia were quite different from those of most East European countries. While many post Communist countries seem to pursue a general pattern of political development that becomes more similar to West European states, the perspectives of democratic development in Russia are still uncertain after more than a decade without Communist rule.

Most scholars, who try to explain patterns of Russia's development from early historical times until the breakdown of the Soviet Union, focus their research on the attitudes and behaviour of its rulers. The unprecedented and sudden political and economic changes in Russia after 1991 were to a great extent initiated and supported by various segments of the elites. However, elites are not operating in a vacuum; their actions are limited by a set of constraints, even in a turbulent post-Soviet environment. On the one hand, elites are constrained in their actions because their attitudes and values stem from a certain constellation of background, recruitment and ideology. In other words, these constraints have consequences for the elites’ demands. On the other hand, elites are influenced by various incentives provided by political institutions. These institutions form a supply that creates certain patterns of elite thinking and behaviour. The supply/demand balance in stable political systems (whether Western democracies or Communist dictatorships) is more or less certain and known to most of elites. In contrast, post-Soviet developments in Russia dramatically changed this supply/ demand equation through a series of political and economic crises and then re-equilibrations and stabilization (see, among others, Shevtsova, 1999; McFaul, 2001; Higley et al., in this volume; Gel'man, in this volume).

The challenges for Russian elites that emerged in the post-Soviet period are mainly based on three major dimensions – political democratization, economic deregulation and state decentralization (or even disintegration, in the case of the collapse of the Soviet state). Despite the very fact that all these processes were initiated by elites under Gorbachev's rule, and the elites' demands heavily contributed to these changes, their consequences were rather unintended. Thus, in the 1990s until the early 2000s Russian elites were forced to change themselves through a trial and error process of adaptation to a permanent transformation of supply (for example, due to institutional changes). While democratization produced a basis of electoral contestation of elites, deregulation and decentralization played a crucial role in the formation of new segments of Russian elites, which acquired a significant autonomy from the central leadership and from each other. The emergence of new elites and transformation of old ones posed problems of elite coordination and cooperation going into the heart of Russian political agenda. While the long-term consequences still remain to be seen, the process of ‘triple transition’ in Russia seems to be over. Thus, time is ripe for analysing its outcomes and for assessing the role of elites in post- Soviet political changes. This is the point of departure for this volume.

The making and shaping of elites

If elites are regarded as crucial actors in political and economic developments, it is essential to be clear about their characteristics and the reasons for their importance. The social science literature dealing with elites addresses four main questions: Who are they, how unified are they, how important are they for democratization and policy outcomes, and what forces shape them?

The question of what constitutes an ‘elite’ has been answered differently by what might be conveniently labelled the ‘power school’ and the ‘pluralists’. Building on the classic works of Mosca, Pareto and C. Wright Mills, the power school asserts the existence of an integrated governing or power elite that controls any modern country's political regime and makes all main policy decisions. While there are other and contesting elite groups, these manage to influence only secondary aspects of government policy. This thesis of a core power elite has been challenged sharply by scholars who depict elites in modern democratic systems as much more pluralistic (Dahl, 1961, 1971). In their view, in Western democracies there is no dominant or integrated elite but rather constantly shifting constellations and coalitions of more or less equally powerful and organizationally distinct elite groups. Elite configurations vary, and common ‘elite interests’ do not determine the cooperation of elites, instead it is the type of government policy that influences the interests of various elite groups.

While the pluralist model of elite behaviour is rooted in societal interests and is posited on long-term experience with Western democracies, the conditions for post-Communist elites are quite different. Because Russian democracy is new and its elites cannot clearly be classified along socioeconomic cleavages, the question of elite differentiation remains an open one to be explored through empirical research. One major purpose of this volume is to provide more informed answers to the question of to what extent elite pluralism is developing in Russia. The fact that the Russian Constitution guarantees a separation of powers while also instituting a strong presidency makes it pertinent to ask if the institutional distinction between elite groups may have consequences for elite integration and fragmentation.

Higley and his collaborators have sought to combine these opposing perspectives by arguing that political elites in stable democracies are, in fact, both strongly integrated and widely differentiated or pluralistic (see Burton and Higley, 2001). They contend that such ‘consensually integrated’ elites are a stable democracy's sine qua non. However, the possible way of consensual integration of Russian elites is not so obvious. Higley argues that during decades of Communist rule the Soviet elite was rather ‘ideo-cratic’, and during Gorbachev's period it suddenly changed toward disunity and fragmentation (see Higley et al., in this volume; also Lane and Ross, 1999). While observers have depicted Russian elites as falling well short of consensual integration during the 1990s, the new challenges in the 2000s are even more salient for prospects of Russia's democratic development. Numerous attempts of Russian elites under Putin to overcome their fragmentation and establish a new framework of elite integration are double-edged. On the one hand, one could consider a possible danger of restoration of the omnipotent ‘power elite’, but on the other hand, it is hard to imagine that Russia's democratic development could have a solid basis without improvement of government performance and effective coordination of national and regional elites.

Dozens of books and hundreds of articles on Russian elites have been written over the last decade by Western and Russian specialists. There exist numerous theoretical and empirical studies, focusing on the composition of Russian elites, their recruitment, career paths, conflicts and pacts, and role in the regime change (for an overview, see Gel'man and Tarusina, in this volume), although few solid answers have so far been given about the elite's political integration and its long-term consequences for democratization in Russia. Asking ‘why we need one more collection in this field’ is obvious. Posing the question ‘what might we learn about democratic development in Russia through the prism of studies of its elites?’ is a natural further step and is the major fundament of our volume. In other words, if we would like to explain uneasy developments and problematic prospects of Russia's troubled transformation, we should look closely at the attitudes and behaviour of its elites.

From Communist elites to elitist democracy

During the 1990s the term ‘elites' soon became a keyword in Russia, and was adopted as a basic focus of analysis in the public debate and in research contributions. Articles appearing in newspapers and magazines have typically blamed ‘elites' for all national problems, or they see some enlightened leaders as the only hope for Russia's future. The purpose of this volume is not to join this polarized – and in our view, rather unfruitful – debate about the shortcomings and virtues of the elites. The aim is to provide empirical studies that may give some clues for a better understanding of how the elites have put their imprint on the political development in Russia.

A major characteristic of the Soviet Union was a hierarchically centralized decision-making system with carefully selected Communist elites. In particular during the last decades of Communism they formed a self-enforcing and privileged class sustained by the nomenklatura system. Surprisingly for many observers, the degree of elite turnover in post- Communist Russia was very low in comparison with East European countries (Wasilewski, 1998), and most of the new elites were deeply rooted in former Soviet nomenklatura (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 1996). However, the process of transformation of Russian elites was much more complicated. Yet, the partial reproduction of elite membership was very natural in Russia due to the lack of an alternative recruitment pool for new elites (like the dissident movement or trade unions in Poland). The demise of the Soviet Union did not imply a complete break with the past, and in particular many well-educated younger persons who had started their career during the end of the Communist era saw new opportunities in politics and the capitalist economy (Lane and Ross, 1999). We will not discuss this here, but it is clear that continuity on all levels has taken place. To what extent the uneven constellation of old and new elites contributed to democratic development in Russia is, however, an empirical question.

Even if one could trace similarities in the backgrounds of Communist and post-Communist elites in Russia, it should be noted that the institutional frameworks of elite politics are very different. First and foremost, after the bloody conflict between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet in 1993, Russia adopted a new Constitution, which has not been challenged by anyone for a decade and has proved to be stable over time (McFaul, 2001). Three major pillars of the Russian constitutional order, namely, a presidential/ parliamentary form of government, regular multi-party elections and federalism, provide new incentives for actions of various segments of Russian elites.

But what does this really mean? According to Schumpeter, who defined democracy as the process by which ‘individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote’ (Schumpeter, 1947: 269), elections are a regular feature in such a democracy. In this respect, democracy is more a device for institutionalizing the elite's competition for power than a means of mass public influence on politics and compromising politics. The Schumpeterian concept is often regarded as an ‘elitist model’ (Held, 1996); it considers elite contestation as a minimal necessary condition for democracy. Although modern theorists criticized ‘electoralism’ (Diamond, 1999) due to its insufficiency for democracy, one cannot deny that democracy without the electoral contest of elites is impossible. This critique is also relevant for Russia, because of its rather mixed record of democratization, or even ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Fish, 2001). The elitist democracy in Russia is still highly fragile and vulnerable due to serious obstacles from both the demand and supply side of elite politics. As to the supply side, the institutional constraints of elitist democracy are still weak and inefficient. These weaknesses have been observed during the period of Yeltsin's presidency (Shevtsova, 1999; McFaul, 2001). But after the unexpected rise of the previously virtually unknown Vladimir Putin to presidency in 1999–2000, Russia is probably even further away from a liberal democracy. New challenges to democratic developments in Russia have appeared to stem from a more centralized leadership.

Russian elites under Putin used a similar set of institutions to that installed under Yeltsin but for different purposes: not for the destruction of the Communist regime, but for stabilization of the new order. Thus, Russia seems to have entered a period where elite relations have become relatively peaceful. Despite the fact that the trend towards centralization of elite politics contributed to their integration after more than a decade of hyper-fragmentation (see Higley et al., in this volume), the democratic nature of this reintegration process casts some doubts. The attempts of elites to avoid electoral contestation both on a national level (see Gel'man, in this volume) and a regional level (see Tarusina, in this volume), the underdevelopment of political parties, especially in the provinces (see Golosov, in this volume), and the questionable merits of the restoration of federal control over regional and local politics (see Blakkisrud, in this volume), are evident. In fact, while in the early 1990s the fragmentation of elites and collapse of Soviet institutions resulted in ‘feckless pluralism’ of elite politics, after 2000 the integration of Russian elites accompanied by the recentralization of the institutional framework could easily return to ‘dominant power’ elite politics (Carothers, 2002).

From the perspective of the demand side of elite politics in Russia the situation is even more complicated. The political culture of post-Soviet elites relied heavily on the Soviet legacy, especially due to the persistence of members of former nomenklatura, who inherited attitudes and values from the Communist period (see, for example, Duka, in this volume; Hughes and John, in this volume). No wonder that their commitments are still rather illiberal, authoritarian and anti-Western. The rise of military and security elites in Russia under Putin could probably enhance this trend. On the other hand, the generational change of Russian elites has changed this gloomy picture toward more positive elites' perceptions of democracy and market economy (see Hughes and John, in this volume) as well as of cooperation with the Western countries. In fact, the elite turnover in the long run would gradually lead to the rise of young, urban-born, better educated, more internationally open elites to the apex of decision-making processes in Russia. But as yet, the uneven constellation of old and new elites in Russia is also accompanied by the uneven mixture of the orientation of elites toward major political issues, such as political regime, state, economy and international relations.

The picture presented in the recent study of Steen (2002), based on two extensive surveys of Russian elites, clearly illustrates some controversies from the demand side of the elite politics in Russia. The Russian elites do not deny the basic principles of democracy and market economy (like universal electoral suffrage or individual competition), but they are more sceptical about their major institutions (like the multi-party system and private ownership). In fact, Russian elites, both national and regional, are oriented towards state regulation as the major solution to economic and societal issues (such as income difference and welfare) and are less likely to leave such issues to market forces. Duka in his study (in this volume) observed similar orientations among St Petersburg elites, which are commonly considered as a liberal vanguard of Russia as a whole.

This mixed demand of elites is probably not surprising after ten years of output decline, high inflation and the collapse of the national currency. Consequently there are solid grounds for accepting the statement of Lane (2000), who views the future of Russian capitalism as a state-led hierarchically organized corporatism. Due to the general low level of inter-elite trust, the Russian elites put their trust in a ‘strong’ leader. Russian elites also have confidence in the state but are very sceptical about societal institutions (see Steen, in this volume). These demands have an impact on the elites' behaviour, instigating a principal U-turn toward the recentralization of government in Russia in the early 2000s (see Blakkisrud, in this volume), which was enthusiastically adopted by most of national elites (see Steen and Timofeev, in this volume).

The complicated combination of incentives provided by demand and supply sides of elite politics in Russia challenged a nascent elitist democracy, which is faced with a ‘dilemma of leadership’ (Roeder, 1994). While elites desperately need a strong leader in order to overcome current multiple crises or prevent future ones, they are also aware of the threats that this leader poses. The consequences of post-Communist attempts of Russian elites to solve such a dilemma are contradictory for democratic development. In Yeltsin's period, the solution was found on a basis of patron/client relationships at the expense of the decline of state capacity and the undermining of the rule of law (Shevtsova, 1999). In Putin's period, the solution through the ‘imposed consensus’ (see Gel'man, in this volume) could restore state capacity at the expense of democratic contest and political pluralism. In this respect it is unclear if the elitist democracy in Russia has become a device to preserve authoritarian elite politics while also institutionalizing democratic rule. Our main question is how such institutionalized uncertainties, as Przeworski (1991) argues are the main feature of democratic rule, have influenced the elites' ability not only to negotiate viable settlements but also to strengthen and deepen Russian democracy.

The research issues and the structure of the book

Two major challenges of Russian politics have caught the attention of the authors of this book. The first is democratization. Without doubt, a few top leaders initiated the transition from authoritarian rule to elitist democracy while democratic performance must be safeguarded by the broad national and regional elites. One main question in post-Communist Russia is how these elites may contribute to stable and pluralist democracy. The second is the impact of the reorganized federation, which brought more autonomy to regional and local elites, although under Putin central elites are pulling them back to centralized c...