Handbook of Arab American Psychology

Mona M. Amer, Germine H. Awad, Mona M. Amer, Germine H. Awad

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781135019181
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychologie
• Subtopic: Psychologie clinique

The Handbook of Arab American Psychology is the first major publication to comprehensively discuss the Arab American ethnic group from a lens that is primarily psychological. This edited book contains a comprehensive review of the cutting-edge research related to Arab Americans and offers a critical analysis regarding the methodologies and applications of the scholarly literature. It is a landmark text for both multicultural psychology as well as for Arab American scholarship.

Considering the post 9/11 socio-political context in which Arab Americans are under ongoing scrutiny and attention, as well as numerous misunderstandings and biases against this group, this text is timely and essential. Chapters in the Handbook of Arab American Psychology highlight the most substantial areas of psychological research with this population, relevant to diverse sub-disciplines including cultural, social, developmental, counseling/clinical, health, and community psychologies. Chapters also include content that intersect with related fields such as sociology, American studies, cultural/ethnic studies, social work, and public health. The chapters are written by distinguished scholars who merge their expertise with a review of the empirical data in order to provide the most updated presentation of scholarship about this population.

The Handbook of Arab American Psychology offers a noteworthy contribution to the field of multicultural psychology and joins references on other racial/ethnic minority groups, including Handbook of African American Psychology, Handbook of Asian American Psychology, Handbook of U.S. Latino Psychology, and The Handbook of Chicana/o Psychology and Mental Health.

Part I

Identity, Culture, and Context

1

The Arab Region

Cultures, Values, and Identities

Charles Harb

Misconceptions about the Arab world are pervasive, with media accounts and news headlines often portraying the Arab Middle East as a region of perpetual and often irrational violence, with radicalized religious groups that have nihilistic tendencies bent on the destruction of the “Western world” and its values. As Edward Said (1999, p. 24) observed long before the events of 9/11 and the subsequent “War on Terror:”

Uncounted films and studies have by now permanently impressed the average consumer of TV news and movie entertainment that Arabs are terrorists, and that unlike any other people connected to monotheism, such activities as permanent war against infidels and the gratuitous abuse of women and other disadvantaged people are congenital to the Arab psyche.

The scarcity of rigorously conducted empirical research on the Arab world and the consequent paucity of reliable and valid information on its social and cultural fabric have left traditions of misconceptions guide the discourse on the Arab peoples. A Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) search conducted in December 2014 on the key words “Arab” and “psychology” for the past quarter century (1989–2014) yielded a stunningly low 73 hits, almost half of which dealt with Israeli–Arab issues or terrorism. Research by Öngel and Smith (1994), and Smith, Harb, Lonner, and van de Vijver (2001) showed that over a period of 25 years, about 1% of studies published in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology included Arab samples or authors. The inaccessibility and scarcity of locally produced research has often permitted externally imposed propositions, distorted knowledge, and popular stereotypes to go unchallenged (Said, 1997).

Until the 1980s, scholars interested in studying the Arab world and Islam were often led toward studies in Orientalism, which were the predominant venues that informed American and European scholars about the Middle East and its people (Said, 1994, 1995/1978). Orientalist studies present the “Orient,” or Eastern culture and history, through the eyes of Western values and assumptions, exaggerating the differences and distorting perceptions of the region. Extensive academic inbreeding and little concern for rigorous methodologies led Orientalism to become an externally imposed and ethnocentrically biased school of knowledge (Said, 1995).

An example of this bias is illustrated by the casual mention of “Islamic countries” whenever one refers to populations that predominantly follow Islam (Halliday, 1996, 2000; Said, 1997). Islam is a religion, and as such should be distinguished from governance models and state polity. Of the many countries around the world with majority-Muslim populations today, only Iran (which is not part of the Arab world) can be labeled an Islamic state, since it is the only country with an exclusively Islamic rule, and with Islamic Law (Sharia) as the sole basis for legislation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could also be considered Islamic in that the legal system is almost entirely based on derivations from the Qur’an and sayings (hadith) of Prophet Muhammad, even if interpreted through a particular religious lens and applied to an absolute monarchy. All other countries around the world with majority-Muslim populations follow a complex set of laws and constitutions that combine, to various degrees, both secular and Qur’an-inspired legislative systems. Consequently, labeling them as “Islamic countries” is akin to labeling nations in the West as “Christian countries.”

This chapter provides a brief social, economic, political, and cultural description of the Arab world, highlighting the complexity and diversity of the region. This contextual framing is then followed by a review of prominent theories on values, with a focus on those models with data collected from samples in the Arab region. A case example of a Lebanese expatriate living in Saudi Arabia is provided to illustrate some of the cultural nuances and diversity seen across the Arab world. Finally, the existing literature is critiqued, with suggestions for future advancement.

The Arab World

The Arab world consists of 22 countries spread from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian-Arabian Gulf, with an estimated population of 363 million (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2013). The 22 countries, as defined by membership in the League of Arab States, comprise Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. The population of the Arab world is similar in size to that of the U.S. or of the European Union.

The Arab world is diverse, with people from different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. Skin color ranges from white to black, with sometimes wide variations seen within the same country. While specific and rigorous estimates are difficult to find, the majority of individuals in the Arab countries are Arab and Muslim (including both Sunni and Shi`a Muslims). However, there are notable populations of ethnic and religious minorities. For example, about 20 million individuals (40% of Moroccans and 20–25% of Algerians) identify themselves as belonging to the Berber-Amazigh ethnic minority (International Crisis Group, 2003), and more than five million ethnic Kurds live in Syria and Iraq (Aziz, 2011). Furthermore, about 13 million identify themselves as Christians, and make up significant portions of nationals in some countries, including 38.3% in Lebanon, 14.5% in Bahrain and 14.3% in Kuwait (Pew Research Center, 2011). There are also sizeable groups of people who adhere to the Druze, Jewish, and Hindu faiths. While formal and semi-formal Arabic are shared across the Arab region and dominate written communication, colloquial Arabic and dialects are region specific and dominate verbal communication. Additionally, French and English languages are widely used in nations where a strong colonial past existed.

The current “modern” borders of Arab countries were artificially decreed by the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, through which the French and British colonial powers divided the region into their respective spheres of influence (Barakat, 2008; Hourani, 1991). While direct colonization of some Arab countries ended with the end of the Second World War, some countries did not gain their independence until 1971 (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, UAE). The region continues to be of significant geostrategic importance as nearly half of the world’s total proven oil reserves are in Arab countries, making the region “the world’s single most important supplier of crude oil” (Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2012, p. 9). Although U.S. dependency on foreign oil production has decreased, other economic powers (e.g. China) continue to rely on Middle Eastern oil to meet their domestic needs. Controlling this area is of strategic importance and one reason why dozens of Western military bases continue to pepper the region. It is thus not surprising to see local populations expressing negative attitudes toward Western powers (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2013).

The Four Cultural-Geographical Divisions

Historical developments across the 22 countries shaped four main cultural divisions within the Arab world (see Barakat, 2008; Hourani, 1991): the Fertile Crescent (a crescent-shaped region capping the Arabian Desert/Arabian Peninsula), the Nile Valley (located in eastern North Africa), the Gulf states (situated in the Arabian Peninsula), and the Maghreb (situated in western North Africa).

The Fertile Crescent. This area includes Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The territory is historically rich, being the birthplace of two of the world’s monotheistic religions (Judaism and Christianity), and the location of some of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world (see World Heritage sites identified by United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, n.d.). People living in this part of the Arab region are especially diverse in ethnicities and religious sects, a diversity that is both a blessing (bringing e.g. cultural wealth) and a curse (bringing e.g. sectarian and ethnic tensions). The Fertile Crescent has been plagued by decades of conflict and wars, with the Israeli–Arab conflict (ongoing since 1948), and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as two infamous examples. The region continues to be marred by internal and sectarian conflicts (Iraq, Lebanon, Syria), and is a stage for proxy wars (a war instigated by a major power that does not itself participate) between regional and international powers.

Nile Valley. This region contains what was once the largest country in Africa (Sudan, before its southern section split into a separate nation in 2011), and the most populous nation in the Arab world (Egypt). Egypt is distinguished by its millennia-old history, mixing both its Ancient Egyptian Pharaonic past and Arab-Islamic identity. Egypt’s rich history and demographic weight give it a pivotal role in inter-Arab politics and relations, and a central role in the Israeli–Arab conflict. Egyptian politics have been dominated by rivalries between nationalist-secular and Islamic parties (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood), and all Egyptian presidents from Egypt’s independence to the uprisings of 2011 came from military backgrounds.

The Gulf States. This region includes the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, as well as Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. The arid Arabian Peninsula, home to Islam’s holiest site Mecca, saw little development until the discovery of oil over a century ago and the socioeconomic boom that followed (Barakat, 2008). The monarchies of the Gulf have allowed few political freedoms, and have relied instead on strong family networks and ties, and a strict enforcement of perceived religious norms to enforce their rule. Some cities in the Gulf, such as Dubai (UAE) and Doha (Qatar), have witnessed massive and rapid economic development and physical expansion, and have become globalized international destinations.

The Maghreb. Nations in this region (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania) currently form an economic development union, “Union du Maghreb Arab”. The large Sahara Desert and the Atlas mountain range favored the Maghreb’s relations and trade with Mediterranean countries, especially with France, a former colonial power (French language is widely used in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria). Conflict over the Western Sahara area, as well as conflict over the civic and cultural rights of the 30-million-strong Amazigh people, continues to sour inter-Maghreb relations (Barakat, 2008). As in many Arab countries, the power struggle between nationalist/secular parties and religious ones is decades old, and varies from bloody conflict (e.g. the Algerian civil war of 1991–2002) to relatively peaceful political transitions (e.g. the Tunisian uprising of 2011).

Social Divisions

Although the four regions of the Arab world have been considered culturally and politically distinct entities, levels of similarities and differences have not been sufficiently investigated. Some sociologists proposed an alternative approach to understanding the region, based on societal diversity, and suggested distinguishing among three models: socially homogenous, socially mosaic, and socially pluralistic (Barakat, 2008). The socially homogenous category refers to societies in which the social structure is made up of one group that is completely integrated socially and culturally. This homogeneity leads to a highly centralized and dominating political system, in which consensus is easy to reach (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya). The socially mosaic category refers to societies in which the social composition is made up of several groups, the identities of which overpower the general (or collective) identity, and which often lead to a system of differential power-sharing. In such societies, intergroup relations alternate between coexistence and conflict (e.g. Lebanon, Sudan). Finally, the socially pluralistic category refers to societies in which the social structure is made up of several groups that preserve their particular identities, but which have found a way of agreement and consensus between their individual identities and the collective/national one. The independence of their particular identity does not prevent the “need to merge;” for example, the various groups adopt one educational curriculum for all (e.g. Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Morocco).

Social Realities

While social and geo-cultural categorizations of the region help paint a diversified Arab landscape, bleak social realities unify them. A series of in-depth United Nations reports covering the Arab region showed high levels of illiteracy, huge disparities in wealth, a majority of citizens living in poverty, gender inequities, and inadequate health and educational benefits (United Nations Development Programme, 2002, 2003, 2006). The GDP of all Arab countries combined was reported to be less than the GDP of Spain (United Nations Development Programme, 2002). A 2005 report noted widespread authoritarianism, corruption, and abuse of power by ruling elites (United Nations Development Programme, 2005). Foreign military occupation and wars only add to this bleak picture (United Nations Development Programme, 2009). These realities have a strong effect on Arab youth, and thus the future of the region.

The Youth Bulge. The Arab populations are young, with majorities in many countries under 25 years of age. Some estimate that a third of the Arab region is under 15, and a fifth are between the ages of 15 and 24 years. This “youth bulge” is thought to have peaked in 2010, and is set to decline from 20 to 17% in the coming years (Mirkin, 2013).

Unemployment is a top concern for youth in the region. With one in every three Arabs currently without a job (Urdal, 2012), employment ranks as the highest priority across polls and countries of the region (see e.g. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2013; ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2014). The Arab region is the only region in the world with unemployment rates above 10%, with Arab youth hit hardest (Mirkin, 2013). These rates vary by nation, from a low of 2% youth unemployment in Qatar, to a high of 30% in Egypt and 44% in Iraq (Mirkin, 2013). United Nations analysts estimate that 92 million jobs need to be created by 2030 to absorb this growing workforce (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2014b).

It is not surprising that a quarter of Arab citizens want to emigrate from the region (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2013). A 2009 report on Arab labor migration noted a brain drain effect with 12–14% of the Arab populations’ highly skilled persons (and 18.2% of Arab doctors) living abroad (League of Arab States, 2008; United Nations Department of Eco...