The Truth of History

C. Behan McCullagh

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• Print ISBN:
  9780415171106
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134696253
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

Modern relativism and postmodern thought in culture and language challenge the 'truth' of history. This book considers how all historians, confined by the concepts and forms of argument of their own cultures, can still discover truths about the past.
The Truth of History presents a study of various historical explanations and interpretations and evaluates their success as accounts of the past. C. Behan McCullagh contests that the variety of historical interpretations and subjectivity does not exclude the possibility of their truth. Through an examination of the constraints of history, the author argues that although historical descriptions do not mirror the past they can correlate with it in a regular and definable way.
Far from debating in the abstract and philosophical only, the author beds his argument in numerous illuminating concrete historical examples. The Truth of History explores a new position between the two extremes of believing that history perfectly represents the past and that history can tell us nothing true of the past.

1 The truth and fairness of historical descriptions

In practice, professional historians have little hesitation in saying that descriptions of the past for which there is abundant evidence are true. There are thousands of basic facts about the past for which there is so much reliable evidence that no one doubts their truth for a moment. In theory, however, several philosophers have argued that such confidence about the truth of historical descriptions is misplaced, indeed is irrational.

Attacks on the truth of history have been mounted on three fronts. First there is a critique of the historical inferences which historians draw from evidence available to them, showing that they rely upon historians’ personal epistemic values, and that even when the inferences are widely accepted their conclusions are not necessarily true. Second there are arguments from cultural relativism, which point out that historians’ descriptions of the world are largely determined by the concepts and language of the culture in which they live, and so cannot be regarded as simply representing the world as it was. It is therefore naive to think that historical descriptions correspond to what happened. The third attack on the truth of historical descriptions comes from postmodernists who say that such descriptions pretend to describe the world, but really only represent people’s concepts of the past, concepts which are essentially linguistic and which have no particular relation to reality.

These three lines of attack have each justified a measure of scepticism about the truth of historical descriptions, and together their effect upon many philosophers of history has been overwhelming. The idea that historical evidence does not prove the truth of any descriptions of the past seems to be supported by the fact that historians sometimes are unable to agree among themselves over what happened. Keith Jenkins, for example, cites uncertainty about Hitler’s intentions after gaining power as evidence of the unreliability of historical descriptions. He was probably referring to the debate over the significance of the Hossbach Memorandum, in which Hitler outlined his plans to acquire extra territory for Germany. Some have interpreted it as an honest declaration of intent; and others, notably A.J.P.Taylor, have doubted its sincerity, suggesting that it was a plan which Hitler hoped would justify increased expenditure on armaments. (See my discussion of the document in McCullagh, 1984, p. 121.) Jenkins argues that if distinguished historians disagree over the significance of the same data, you can conclude: ‘whilst the sources may prevent just anything at all from being said, nevertheless the same events/sources do not entail that one and only one reading has to follow’ (Jenkins, 1991, p. 13). In fact this statement is not entirely true. In many cases inferences from historical evidence are so reasonable that there is no dispute about them at all. For instance, there is no dispute among historians that the Hossbach Memorandum is a record, more or less accurate, of a speech made by Hitler on 5 November 1937. When Jenkins declares ‘Epistemology shows we can never really know the past’ (p. 19), he exaggerates. Indeed even he goes on to admit, inconsistently, that some historical facts, such as dates of events, are ‘“true” but trite’ (p. 32). Generally, however, scepticism about historical knowledge pervades his book. To explain why historians believe their descriptions are true, sceptical philosophers like Jenkins refer to their professional interests in adopting a certain line about their subject, or to their preference, often reflecting the attitude of their society, for a certain picture of the past. Indeed Jenkins calls history ‘an ideological construct’ (p. 17).

The facts of cultural relativism have also produced considerable scepticism about the truth of historical descriptions. Different cultures sometimes describe the same things differently. Descriptions of the world vary with the writer’s world-view, their standards of rationality and their practical interests in the subjects of their descriptions. Thus an illness which a person in one culture might attribute to an evil spirit, a person in another might describe in terms of a medical theory. Even advanced western scientific world-views change from time to time, with changes in the prevailing paradigm, as Thomas Kuhn explained. If we are entirely trapped within our own culture, some have argued, we cannot have knowledge of a world which exists independent of that culture, far less knowledge of another culture altogether.

What is the significance of the fact that our perceptions of the world are a function of the conceptual framework we have acquired through living and being educated in our culture? Some are inclined to say: the world we live in is constructed from the concepts and beliefs of our culture, and we have no idea of what exists independent of our beliefs. Paul A.Roth asserts this to be the case:

past events exist, qua events, only in terms of some historically situated conception of them. The notion of a historical truth for events, that is, a perspective on happenings untainted by human perception and categorization, proves to be incoherent. There exists a world not of our making, but any subdivision of it into specific events is our doing, not nature’s.

(Roth, 1991, p. 185)

Roth denies that historical facts can be true in any correspondence sense. ‘My rejection of…“historical truth” is no denial of reality; what it does rule out is invidious distinctions between our view of events and some God’s-eye perception of states of affairs’ (p. 186). (See also Roth, 1988.) So far Roth has strongly denied that any description of the world can be independent of its author’s point of view, which is entirely reasonable. However, he takes this to imply that descriptions of the world cannot tell us anything about it. Roth endorses a proposal of Murray Murphey, that historical descriptions are like the theories of physics, theoretical constructions designed to account for some available evidence. He adds: ‘There is no warrant for maintaining that there is some static past world which diligent research in the archives…uncovers’ (1991, pp. 186–7). Indeed he applauds ‘ridding oneself of a notion of historical truth’ (p. 187). Roth’s view is that ‘events’ are given shape by the language we use to describe them, so that it is unintelligible to speak of events other than those postulated and described in historical writing. ‘Events’, he writes, ‘are not natural entities and exist only under a description’ (Roth, 1988, p. 10). So there are no events in the past for historical descriptions to be true of. The events which historians describe are merely constructions of their historical theories. This sceptical ‘constructionist’ theory of history has become quite a popular alternative to a realist interpretation, which is generally regarded as naive.

There are three major attacks on the truth of history which can be called postmodern. The first two depend largely upon Saussure’s theory, subsequently developed by Derrida (1982), that the meaning of words and sentences depends upon their relation to other words or concepts, and not upon their relation to the world. Roland Barthes has said that although historical descriptions apparently refer to things in the world, they are really about the historians’ ideas or concepts of the past. He said that historians mistakenly assume that their descriptions of the past are about the past itself, and heighten that impression by providing vivid, detailed accounts of what happened (Barthes, 1986, pp. 138–9). In fact he thinks that the relation between what happened and historical descriptions is entirely problematic.

The second postmodern ground for scepticism is the argument that since historical descriptions are derived from evidence, which usually consists of other texts—letters, newspaper reports, official documents and the like—they are not really about the past at all. Historical descriptions on this account are merely texts (descriptions of the past) inferred from other texts (written evidence) whose significance is purely linguistic. Like the first, this argument really depends upon the theory that the meaning of texts is provided by other texts, and that texts have no regular relationship with the world.

Finally Lyotard and others, while not doubting that historians can describe the past, have argued that their descriptions are always general and so inaccurate, designed to force the past into concepts which suit the historian’s interests. Consequently it is wrong to imagine that they accurately portray the past.

Historians have commonly responded to these attacks upon the truth of historical descriptions by trying to ignore them, reaffirming the adequacy of their own procedures for reaching the truth about the past (e.g. Elton, 1991, ch. 2). I know of no practising historians who admit that they cannot discover anything true about the past. They may admit to being fallible, but they do not deny that a lot of the basic facts they present are very probably true. Some philosophers of history have suggested other responses to these challenges to historical credibility, but historians have not. For if they seriously doubted their capacity to uncover facts about the past, why would they continue to practise history? They may as well write historical fiction.

One historian who has expressed concern about postmodern denials of the possibility of historical truth is Lawrence Stone. He wrote:

My only objection is when they declare not that truth is unknowable, but that there is no reality out there which is anything but a subjective creation of the historian; in other words that it is language that creates meaning which in turn creates our image of the real. This destroys the difference between fact and fiction, and makes entirely nugatory the dirty and tedious archival work of the historian to dig ‘facts’ out of texts. It is only at this extreme point that historians have any need to express anxiety.

(Stone, 1992, p. 193)

If historians cannot answer these attacks on their credibility, their whole profession remains under a cloud. Are historians offering us what they cannot in fact supply, namely information about what has happened in the past? Are they now performing some sort of academic ritual, which does not have the significance they have so long imagined? Should we just adopt those accounts of ‘the past’ which suit our aesthetic, moral, political or other preferences?

In this chapter I consider the various attacks upon the truth of history, and argue that they are not as devastating as their proponents have thought. Although historical descriptions are not necessitated by the evidence for them, I shall argue that when they are well supported by evidence it is reasonable to believe that they are very probably true. In reply to the cultural relativist I shall argue that although different cultures conceive of the world differently, their descriptions are all true if the world is such that the truth conditions of their descriptions of it are satisfied. Finally, against the postmodernists I shall argue that both the meaning and truth of our descriptions of the world depend not just upon other texts, but also upon personal experiences which are produced by things in the world. That is why they can be said to refer to things in the world, and can be true of them. I agree with Lyotard and others that our descriptions of the world are always somewhat general and abstract, but disagree that they are therefore false. I shall argue that descriptions, no matter how general they are, can be true.

These conclusions fall short of what a very naive realist would assert. Rather than say that well supported historical descriptions are true without qualification, I say that they could be false, even when there is no reason for believing that they are. Rather than say that our ideas of the world mirror it precisely, as we normally assume, I say that a description of the world is true if possible experiences of the world correspond to those implied by the world view of which it is part. An adequate world view allows that different cultures perceive the world in different ways, while denying that perceptions of the world are the product of nothing but culture. Finally, a naive person might imagine that if a description of the world is true then it is absolutely precise, whereas I admit that this is not the case. All descriptions, even true ones, are vague, though not necessarily so vague as to prevent their truth from being decidable.

The concept of truth which I recommend is what I call a ‘correlation’ theory of truth, a close cousin to the correspondence theory which we all use unreflectively in everyday life. The correspondence theory says that a description of the world is true if there is something in the world which resembles one of the conventional truth conditions of the description. For example it is true that a river runs through London if there really is something in the world which resembles what we would normally envisage as a-river-running-through-London. Along with this theory there normally goes the belief that we can check the truth of a description by perceiving the world, and directly observing whether part of the world resembles or ‘corresponds to’ the truth conditions of the description or not.

There are numerous problems with the correspondence theory, but three seem particularly important. First, scientists tell us that our perceptions are caused by things in the world stimulating our sense receptors (eyes, ears, nose and so on), which in turn produce electrical impulses carried by nerves to the brain, which finally produces the perceptual experiences with which we are so familiar. This being so, our perceptions are best described as providing us with information about reality, but not necessarily mirroring it precisely. For instance, our brain does not contain the colours and sounds and smells which it causes us to experience. These are characteristic of our experiences, but not of the medium which supplies them. Scientists deny that they characterize the light waves, sound waves and chemical reactions which produce them either. Thus our experiences provide us with vivid information about the world, but do not seem to mirror it. Second, our perceptions are influenced by our culture. People from different cultures perceive the same things differently. One person sees a leaf, another sees it as a herb, a third might see it as a botanical specimen of a certain kind. A trained botanist might even discern features of the leaf which others would not notice, which enable him to classify it as of one species rather than another. So our perceptions of the world are not pure sense impressions of it. They include information about what is before us, and they include different degrees of perceptual detail. Finally, our perceptions are influenced by our needs, interests and desires. These direct our attention, so that we scarcely notice what is not relevant to them. Recall the experience of searching for a friend’s face in a crowd; you hardly notice the others. Interests do not necessarily distort our perceptions, but they help to focus them. For these three reasons, at least, it is wrong to say that our perceptions simply correspond to the world.

Although our perceptions do not correspond with the world, we nevertheless believe they provide some informaiton about it, as they are partly caused by it. If we see an apple we immediately suppose an apple is present. If asked to justify that assumption, we could say that we think an apple is present to explain our perception. The beliefs we have about the material world can thus be considered explanations of our perceptual experiences. These explanations normally imply further observable facts. For instance, if it is true that we are seeing an apple, then from our general knowledge about apples we can infer that it would be sweet and crunchy to eat. Our explanations are true if they cohere with our other beliefs about the world, and if all the observations they entail would be verified in the experience of anyone who tested them. If we had not really seen an apple, but only a plastic replica of an apple, then it would not taste sweet and crunchy when we bit it. In which case, it would be false to say that we had seen an apple, assuming that our general knowledge about the sweetness and crunchiness of apples was true.

The descriptions of the world we develop to account for our perceptual experiences are clearly charged with all sorts of observable implications. These implications are based upon general knowledge of the things we assume to exist, such as general knowledge of the sweetness and crunchiness of apples. So when we test the observable implications of even quite a simple description of the world, we are really testing the whole collection of beliefs from which those implications were inferred. That is why we say that for a description of the world to be true, the world view of which it is a part must be confirmable by observation. The world view in question includes all those beliefs about the world from which the implications were derived.

Occasionally the very concepts used to explain what we perceive are rejected because they are inconsistent with other facts based upon other perceptions. Thus, for example, scientists no longer allow that our perception of the sun climbing in the sky is caused by movement of the sun because the theory which best explains our observations of the planets has the sun stationary and the planets turning instead. Once again, the truth of a description depends upon the truth of the whole theory of the world of which it is a part.

People’s perceptions are couched in the concepts of their culture, and focus upon the features of the perceptual field which interest them. In deciding what observations a true theory would imply, we have to frame them for observers with a particular culture and set of interests. Usually the implications are described using concepts of the theory being considered, on the assumption I suppose that those who test a theory will be familiar with its concepts. To test special scientific theories it is often necessary to learn how to identify the perceptions they imply. Thus only trained pathologists can detect the presence of a disease by studying a blood smear under a microscope, as they have learned to identify the cells which are evidence of the presence of that disease. Even descriptions of everyday events can be verified only by people familiar with the concepts used to describe their implications. Some terms common in one language do not translate neatly into another.

In practice it is not always possible to check all the implications of an explanatory description of the world, especially the implications of those descriptions inferred by historians. Although the evidence available and the inferences drawn from that evidence often warrant firm belief in the truth of their descriptions of the past, because the past is inaccessible to present observation we cannot check out the truth of those descriptions ourselves. They are true, nevertheless, if we could have had the perceptual experiences they entail, had we been present at the time of the events being described. Notice that for any description of the world there is normally a range of possible alternative perceptions which would confirm them. Imagine, for example, the variety of perceptions which would establish the truth of the statement that Caesar’s army crossed the Rubicon. It could have crossed by bridge, by boat, even by wading, or all of the above.

Suppose a theory of the nature of the world were confirmed by all the perceptions which it implies. What can be said about the relation between that theory and the world? If all the perceptible implications of a description of the world were confirmed, then we could reasonably accept that description as if the objects, properties, events and states of affairs it describes had counterparts in the world. This is consistent with there being other adequate explanatory theori...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• INTRODUCTION
• 1. THE TRUTH AND FAIRNESS OF HISTORICAL DESCRIPTIONS
• 2. THE TRUTH OF HISTORICAL GENERALIZATIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
• 3. DESCRIPTIVE EXPLANATIONS
• 4. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS
• 5. THE MEANING OF TEXTS
• 6. THE TRUTH OF CULTURAL HISTORY
• 7. CAUSAL, CONTRASTIVE AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS
• 8. EXPLAINING INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS
• 9. EXPLAINING COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
• 10. EXPLAINING SOCIAL CHANGES
• 11. SHOULD WE PRIVILEGE THE INDIVIDUAL?
• CONCLUSION
• REFERENCES