Transcending Taboos

A Moral and Psychological Examination of Cyberspace

Garry Young, Monica Whitty

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9780415579360
• eBook ISBN: 9781136458231
• Topic: Psicologia
• Subtopic: Storia e teoria della psicologia

Cyberspace is composed of a multitude of different spaces where users can represent themselves in many divergent ways. Why in a video game, is it more acceptable to murder or maim than rape? After all, in each case, it is only pixels that are being assaulted. This book avoids wrestling with the common question of whether the virtual violation of real-world taboos is right or wrong, and instead provides a theoretical framework that helps us understand why such distinctions are typically made, and explores the psychological impact of violating offline taboos within cyberspace.

The authors discuss such online areas as:

• 'Reality' sites depicting taboo images
• Social networking websites and online chatrooms
  
• Online dating websites
• Video game content.

This book considers whether there are some interactions that should not be permissible even virtually. It also examines how we might be able to cope with the potential moral freedoms afforded by cyberspace, and who might be vulnerable to such freedoms of action and representation within this virtual space.

This book is ideal for researchers and students of internet psychology, philosophy and social policy, as well as therapists, those interested in computer science, law, media and communication studies

1  Introduction

The phrase transcending taboos is designed to capture the essential aim of this book, which is to examine not so much what a taboo is but how one copes with the appearance of recognized offline taboos within different virtual spaces, although our focus is ultimately multiplayer gamespace. Does one’s attitude towards a given taboo transcend spaces, particularly between on- and offline worlds? And how does one manage or cope with what one experiences, or how one feels, when encountering putative taboo violation, especially within the context of a game or when otherwise at play? Moreover, what system should we use to police and ultimately decide the permissibility of offline taboos within cyberspace?

It is our contention that contemplating whether a particular virtual representation is or should be ‘taboo’ and therefore morally prohibited is to consider the wrong sort of question. Instead, a more pertinent measure of permissibility is not whether x is right or wrong, or good or bad, but whether, psychologically, we can cope with what is being represented or enacted within a given virtual space. Permissibility should therefore be informed by a greater understanding of the psychological impact of encountering taboos online, rather than the morality of the virtual act itself.

The purpose of this book is to present evidence and argument in support of this claim. We accept, however, that, in an attempt to do this, the book raises a number of questions, not all of which are answered to the extent that we would like or are indeed answerable at present. This is largely owing to the paucity of research relating directly to the issue of taboos within cyberspace. Whilst recognizing this fact, we nevertheless consider what is discussed, and therefore the arguments and evidence that are presented, to be useful in informing future empirical research by providing a clearer conceptual framework out of which we hope will emerge testable hypotheses.

PART 1 SHOULD CYBERSPACE BE A SPACE WHERE, VIRTUALLY, ANYTHING IS PERMISSIBLE?

In Part 1 we consider the issue of permissibility within cyberspace: what kinds of representation, expression and interaction should be allowed and, conversely, what (if any) should not. Of course, we recognize and reiterate throughout the book that cyberspace is not a homogeneous space. In fact, this forms the main theme of Chapter 2, which considers the contingent relation that exists between a given space and what that space affords in terms of representation and interaction. Permissibility is inherently evaluative and so one may feel entitled to question whether what is deemed permissible within a given space should be based on judgements that stem from a moral (even legal) system that is contingent on a different space (e.g. our offline world). To illustrate: it is relatively commonplace within virtual space to represent oneself in ways that differ more or less from one’s physical appearance, including gender. Should this be permitted? Some may consider such an act to be harmless, even playful; others might question the individual’s motives for doing this. Equally, in certain spaces, one can represent oneself as a serial killer and/or rapist, and engage in these (virtual) activities. This would not be permissible offline and the degree to which it should be permissible online is contentious. Virtual killing/murder is much more common than virtual rape, for example, with the former seemingly more acceptable than the latter: but why is this? Should we in fact distinguish between virtual activities that are equally prohibited offline, permitting one but not the other? Might each be judged as equally harmless or playful? Should they be?

In Chapter 3, we consider the role of disgust as a measure of moral wisdom or moral fallibility. Disgust is often elicited in the presence of taboos; so it is within the context of symbolic or virtual taboos that we evaluate the appropriateness of disgust as a measure of what should be permissible or not within cyberspace. In Chapter 4, we discuss the relation between disgust and obscenity, and consider different definitions of obscenity (specifically those of the United States [US] and the United Kingdom [UK]). We also consider obscenity across different virtual spaces and question whether a virtual image, which is not itself a representation of anything offline, could be (or indeed should be) classified as obscene.

In Chapter 5, we engage with what we call the passive voyeur – the Internet spectator who views images of real-life events (photographs, video recordings) online. We speculate over the extent to which the voyeur is in fact passive, and ultimately the permissibility of their actions – questioning whether one could ever view images judged to be taboo offline within a virtual space free from moral condemnation. As part of our discussion, we consider whether images with a purely virtual genesis might constitute just such a permissible image of a taboo event. If this is the case, then any expression of disgust towards such an image might be construed as an example of moral fallibility. However, for such an emotional response (disgust) to be deemed genuine, we must first overcome the challenge presented by the paradox of fiction – the claim that a genuine emotional response cannot be elicited from a character/event known to be fictitious (or virtual).

In Chapter 6, we present the paradox of fiction, and consider its applicability to virtual space. We also present arguments supporting the view that emotional responses elicited within a virtual environment, despite the threat posed by the paradox of fiction, are indeed genuine. We therefore provide a valid basis for the question: If interactions with fictitious characters/events can elicit genuine emotions then how might one cope with the sort of emotion elicited by taboo activity within cyberspace? This is a question that we attempt to answer in the chapters that follow. In addition, characters/events with a purely virtual genesis are most commonly found in video games or role-playing spaces like Second Life. It can be argued that these spaces are essentially playful spaces. In fact, one might wish to extend this claim to the majority of cyberspace – holding that it is essentially a virtual playground.

This view is taken up in Chapter 7, where we introduce theories of play and consider the psychological ramifications of engaging in play that involves, potentially, symbolic taboo activities (STAs). In fact, in Chapters 8 and 9, we discuss STAs in relation to single- and multiplayer gamespace, using examples of actual and hypothetical video and online games (hereafter, simply ‘video games’ unless otherwise stated). We return to the issue of permissibility within these spaces of altered contingencies, and ask: If it is permissible to engage in STAs such as murder and torture, even cannibalism, then why should it not be equally permissible to engage in STAs that feature rape, paedophilia, necrophilia or even incest? After all, it is just a game!

In sum, throughout Part 1, we provide evidence and arguments to support the view that in spaces with altered contingencies, where representations and actions within those spaces have a strictly virtual genesis, moral prohibition or permissibility, if they are to occur, must stem from a moral system born of those spaces, constitutive of the same altered contingencies. As such, moral questions that stem from a system of morality born of our offline world, that concern the permissibility of certain virtual acts, are the wrong sorts of questions to be asking. Instead, we should look to that which transcends the online and offline space – namely, the individual. How is he or she able to cope, psychologically, with the potentially greater moral freedoms afforded within cyberspace? To help address this question, we must examine the nature and authenticity of representations of selves and experiences of embodiment within cyberspace.

PART 2 THE NATURE AND AUTHENTICITY OF SELVES WITHIN CYBERSPACE

Part 2 is concerned with the different ways in which one may present and experience oneself within cyberspace. In , we consider early claims by Internet theorists that cyberspace afforded the realization of a kind of Cartesian ideal whereby one was able to experience one’s self as disembodied. A closer examination of interactions within cyberspace reveals, however, that we typically express ourselves as embodied in one form or other; and although we may escape the physical body within cyberspace, embodiment per se remains a feature of who we are and how we present and experience ourselves.

In Chapter 11, we move away from the idea of disembodiment and consider different theories of the embodied self as applied to virtual environments. Here, we again utilize the notion of altered contingencies and examine more closely the array of possible selves afforded by cyberspace, and how these might be considered as more or less authentic representations of one’s self by others as well as oneself. In Chapter 12, we develop the idea of embodiment further and introduce the notion of progressive embodiment. How might our representation and experience of self progress as a product of the altered contingencies of a given space, and how might this require us to reconfigure our understanding of authenticity of selfhood within or across different spaces? Answers to these questions impact on our sense of psychological parity, we contend, as we try to maintain a sense of self across different spaces with potentially different representations and experiences of the embodied selfhood, or even as we attempt to compartmentalize different selves in relation to these different spaces.

PART 3 PSYCHOLOGICAL PARITY AND CHANGES TO THE SELF

Part 3 begins in Chapter 13 with an overview of research that has looked at the consequences of playing violent video games, often relating to behavioural changes – most commonly, aggression – but also changes in affect and cognition. Chapter 13 also includes leading theories/models proffered to explain aggression, which have been applied to those who play violent video games. In Chapter 14, we consider a more fundamental process that might explain why some players of violent games are affected more than others, behaviourally, cognitively or in terms of changes in affect. This process we call psychological parity. Chapters 14 and 15 consider the importance of identification with one’s virtual self to the question of psychological parity and how one copes with the potential differences in one’s embodied appearance, or how one acts in these different spaces, especially when engaged in or witnessing STAs. In addition, we draw on empirical evidence detailing gamers’ views on STAs before, finally, in Chapter 16, proffering informed considerations and hopefully some direction for future research, which looks at the effect of changes brought about by the process of maintaining psychological parity across spaces and across different representations of self.

Part 1

Should cyberspace be a space where, virtually, anything is permissible?

2 Virtual immediacy

Altered contingencies, altered possibilities

It might be said of cyberspace that it is a space constrained only by the limits of technology and imagination; and although this constraint is permanent, it is nevertheless fluid. Consequently, within these acknowledged parameters, cyberspace really does appear to be a space where, virtually, anything is possible. Such a claim is far from hyperbolic, but neither is it literally true; for there are, of course, some obvious exceptions. Even in cyberspace, it is necessarily the case that I am not at the same time all black and all white; neither can I be a married bachelor, or own a four-sided triangle. Two plus two must still equal four, and if all virtual men are mortal and virtual and Socrates is a man, then he too must be mortal.

Logical contradictions that exist in our offline world must be adhered to within cyberspace; if they are not, then they should (necessarily) be as incomprehensible in virtual space as they are within the space we typically occupy. On the other hand, where a relation is contingent, there exists the possibility for change: for things to be other than they are. This is the scope of cyberspace. It is perfectly feasible, for example, in a given space for virtual telephones to have wings – the ultimate mobile phone! In this space, I might even present myself as a member of the opposite sex, or as more or less able-bodied than I actually am, or even as a half-man/half-beast hybrid. Alternatively, I may simply choose to present myself as myself. It is also possible, and not uncommon, to travel in virtual worlds almost instantaneously. One moment I am located in one part of my virtual world, the next I have travelled a vast virtual distance to some other part (e.g. Entropia Universe). Having arrived at my new destination, it may be that I can just as easily adopt the role of superhero as supervillain, and engage in acts of saintliness or depravity, or perhaps something in between.

ALTERED CONTINGENCIES AND VIRTUAL IMMEDIACY

In this chapter, we present the case for cyberspace as a space of altered contingencies – that is, as a space where things can be other than they are in our offline world because the contingent relations that exist in a given virtual space have been altered (i.e. the rules and costumes of a space that govern how we interact, or even the nature of the environment and our embodiment within it, are all potentially different). To illustrate, take the online game City of Heroes (http://eu.cityofheroes.com/en/ ). In this space, one is invited to be a superhero or supervillain and, if the words of the game’s homepage are to be believed, protect ‘all that is good and just’ or ‘leave a trail of fear and chaos everywhere’. Equally, as a would-be player, I am asked to consider whether I am ‘the brutish type wanting to be in the middle of the action’, or prefer ‘to fire deadly attacks … from afar’ or whether ‘slicing and dicing’ is something I consider ‘a good time’. Alternatively, in a different space, more of a sandbox environment, where one is less constrained by the rules of a game (e.g. Second Life), one may wish to appear as a ‘furry’ (an anthropomorphic feline, canine, lupine, animal hybrid) or, borrowing an example from Boellstorff (2008) of two heterosexual men, decide to maintain an online relationship as the other’s lesbian lover.

What these examples illustrate is that, within cyberspace, not only does there exist the possibility for altered contingencies – for things to be other than they are offline (which is not in and of itself unique to cyberspace) – but also for this change in environment, embodiment and governance to be potentially, perhaps even typically, more far-reaching and more immediate than seems possible offline: a phenomenon we call virtual immediacy.

Virtual immediacy captures not only the scope of cyberspace in terms of the immediacy of the ontological transformation from offline to online world, but also transformations across the different virtual worlds within cyberspace itself. (Later in this chapter, we will define how we intend to use the term ‘cyberspace’, as well as related terms such as ‘virtual reality’ and ‘virtual environment’.) Moreover, accompanying the immediacy of these (virtual) transformations in environment, embodiment and governance is the possibility of experiential change that is likewise much more immediate and far-reaching than that typically found offline. My experience of my virtually embodied self may be as someone with enhanced physical prowess, for example, or special skills, perhaps even with heightened charisma and sex appeal. These characteristics are not something I necessarily need to develop over time (although in certain spaces this may be the case); rather, with relative ease, and a little knowledge of how to customize my avatar (or whatever means of presentation I choose to employ), I can have a presence in cyberspace with almost immediate effect. It is also possible (even likely) that how I choose to present myself will reflect some aspect of the altered contingencies constitutive of a given space (in Chapter 12 we discuss this possibility in terms of the potential for ‘progressive embodiment’). Of course, divergent ‘spaces’ existed long before the advent of virtual technology and continue to exist today; indeed, in these nonvirtual spaces one can also be different selves (Gergen, 1991). This we accept. What the term ‘virtual immediacy’ aims to convey is the speed of accessibility we have to these many divergent spaces, which, when coupled with the altered contingencies afforded by the virtual, provide the potential for a shift in environment, embodiment, governance (including personal attitude and moral code) and experience of some magnitude.

In effect, through virtual immediacy and the altered contingencies of a given space, to borrow from Manovich (2001), cyberspace functions much like a portal into another world where every computer us...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction
• PART 1. Should cyberspace be a space where, virtually, Anything is permissible?
• PART 2. The nature and authenticity of selves within cyberspace
• PART 3. Psychological parity and changes to the self
• References
• Notes
• Index