Cuban Insurrection 1952-1959

Ramon L. Bonachea

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351524704
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

The Cuban Insurrection is an in-depth study of the first stage of the Cuban Revolution, the years from 1952 to 1959. The volume depicts the origins of the conflict, details the middle years, and ends with Fidel Castro's victorious arrival In Havana on January 8, 1959. Based on a wealth of hitherto unpublished original material, including confidential military reports, letters from various leaders of the insurrection and data gathered from interviews held In Cuba and abroad, the book Is a descriptive historical analysis of the struggle against military dictator Fulgencio Batista.

The authors challenge the traditional premise that Cuba's insurrection began in the rural areas and only later expanded into urban areas. Instead they argue that the insurrectionary struggle was based upon combined urban-rural guerrilla warfare against the regular army.

Basically, The Cuban Insurrection treats two major movements involved in the struggle—The Directorio Revolucionario and the M-26-7—and examines the growth, ideology, conflicts, and military strategies of their respective rural and urban organizations. The book includes a detailed analysis of combat, strikes, uprisings, and expeditions. Original maps and charts illustrate battles, maneuvers, and guerrilla political structures.

1

The Moncada Attack

Fidel Castro Ruz was born on August 13, 1927,¹ on “Manacas,” the farm owned by his father, Angel Castro Argiz, in Birán, municipality of Mayarí, Oriente. At age seven he began his primary education in Santiago de Cuba. He completed these early studies at the Jesuit school of Dolores. In 1941 Fidel was accepted at the Colegio Belén in Havana, which was the most exclusive Jesuit educational institution in the country. In 1945 he entered the University of Havana’s law school.

Fidel’s political career began in that year, with his unsuccessful campaign for the presidency of the law school. In 1947 he ran for secretary to the student assembly but again failed to muster enough support from his fellow students.²

Fidel was not unique in attempting to start a political career while still a young man. Cuban youth in general was highly politicized, for Cuba had long been a country of shifting power and alliances. In their university years or even earlier, many Cubans became involved in theorizing, planning and acting to grab whatever share of power was available. Thus many groups formed, worked together, broke up and realigned with slightly different objectives. Fidel Castro was but one of the radical young Cubans who had an early vision of power and took every opportunity to reach his goal.

Fidel’s political activism led him to become involved with the “action groups” predominant under the Ramón Grau San Martín (1944-48) administration. Andrés Suárez has described the young revolutionary who joined these groups as “loyal only to his tiny independent group, full of contempt for those he referred to as the ideologists,” and “thoroughly convinced that violence alone could decide everything.”³ There were several action groups, but two of the most important were the Revolutionary Socialist Movement (MSR), led by Rolando Masferrer, and the Revolutionary Insurrectional Union (UIR), headed first by Emilio Tró, and later by Jesús Diéguez. These organizations fought each other savagely under the cloak of their particular “revolutionary” program. Leaders like Policarpo Soler, Masferrer, Mario Salabarría and Tró surrounded themselves with young men who became terrorists ready to murder for political leverage, money or personal rivalry. The activities of these groups affected every aspect of Cuba’s public life. Havana University was the main headquarters, even though many of the group leaders and members were not registered students. Masferrer and Salabarría provide excellent examples of the widely divergent types of young Cubans who were involved in “revolutionary” activities.

Rolando Masferrer combined student life with political activism. His academic record was outstanding, and he had won almost every major honorary distinction in open competition in the law school. He had at one time belonged to the Communist party, had been a renowned fighter against the Gerardo Machado dictatorship (1925-33) in his youth, and later had enrolled in the International Brigades which fought in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). After he left the Communist party, he became a notorious gang leader. Mario Salabarría, on the other hand, was a brutal killer with little or no academic background. The Grau administration commissioned Salabarría and Tró as majors, giving one charge of the national police academy and the other control of the national police’s investigation department.

At the university the action groups exerted total control over university affairs. Under the influence of “Ojos Bellos” (Pretty Eyes), “E1 Colorado” (The Reddish) and “El Manco” (The Lamed), they were even able to help determine who would be granted professional degrees, particularly in the school of law. As in most such organizations, recruits had to prove their intentions by participating in “direct action” like shooting an enemy of a rival group or engaging in terrorist activities against their critics.⁴

Public reaction to these activities is suggested by a 1949 editorial demanding government action against the high incidence of daylight shooting in the capital: “Gangsterism—once again—erupted in broad daylight in the downtown area, resulting in two deaths, those of Justo Fuentes, vice-president of the Federation of University Students (FEU) and Miguel Siaez, a bus driver. Both were victims of that somber cloak—Mafia-like—that has taken over a large part of our youth.”⁵ At the scene of the shooting the police arrested Fidel Castro Ruz, a member of the UIR. He was held briefly at police headquarters and then released. In an interview with the press, young Castro said Fuentes had died because “he had refused protection from the UIR.”⁶ Two weeks later the UIR’s Felipe Salazar (“Wichy”) was shot to death by men of the MSR. The only witness to the shooting was Fidel Castro, who testified that the MSR was responsible for the assassination.⁷

Earlier in the summer of 1947 Fidel, despite his association with the UIR, had joined an MSR-sponsored group of Dominican exiles, soldiers of fortune, revolutionary idealists and gangsters who planned to invade the Dominican Republic and depose dictator Rafael L. Trujillo (1930-61). The MSR was to supervise the Cubans who enrolled in the expedition, and to that end it appointed a committee which included among others, Manolo Castro (no relation to Fidel) and Carlos Gutiérrez Menoyo.⁸ On July 30 the would-be invaders reached Cayo Confites, off the port of Nuevitas, Camagüey province, where they awaited orders to proceed to the Dominican Republic. In September the Grau administration decided not to support the invasion, and the Cuban navy arrested the expeditionaries. Fidel returned to Havana after a daring escape from a navy frigate.⁹

The rivalry between the MSR and the UIR continued to escalate. In September 1947, shortly after the Confites episode, the two groups fought a bloody battle in what became known as the “massacre of Orfila.” Emilio Tró was killed; Policarpo Soler was arrested but escaped and joined Trujillo as one of the dictator’s henchmen; and Jesús Diéguez was promoted to the leadership of the UIR.

Still the terrorism continued. On February 22, 1948, Manolo Castro— president of the FEU—was assassinated. He had been elected to the FEU presidency in 1944, running successfully against Fidel’s friend, Luis Conte Agüero. Manolo had been active in organizing the Confederation of Cuban Peasants and in promoting various campaigns against dictators such as Trujillo and Spain’s Francisco Franco. Rolando Masferrer charged Fidel with the murder, and two days after the killing. Fidel was arrested, though he was later released for lack of evidence. Fidel responded by accusing Masferrer of attempting to take over the MSR’s leadership and of slandering him for not supporting Masferrer’s aspirations to control the university.¹⁰ Masferrer pledged to kill Fidel at the first opportunity.¹¹ At this point Fidel decided that it would be a good idea to leave the country for a while until things cooled off.

He found his opportunity in dictator Juan Perón’s attempt to organize “anti-imperialist fronts” throughout Latin America. The Latin American Student Association was the peronista instrument for mobilizing public opinion against the United States throughout Latin American universities. Perón’s delegate. César Tronconi, gained the support of several students in Havana. Together they organized a congress to denounce imperialist activities throughout the continent. It was agreed that the congress would take place in Bogotá, Colombia, to coincide with the Ninth Inter-American Conference. Among the chief Cuban organizers of this congress was Fidel Castro, Enrique Ovares, Alfredo Guevara, Pedro Mirasón, Armando Gali-Menéndez and Rafael del Pino.¹² Fidel arrived in Bogotá on March 31, 1948, accompanied by del Pino, Ovares and Guevara. On April 9, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, leader of the Colombian Liberal Party, was assassinated and the Bogotazo erupted. The Cubans sought refuge in the Cuban embassy, and returned to their country on April 13, 1948.¹³ Fidel was back in Havana by June 6, 1948, when he was charged, at Havana’s Fourth District Criminal Court, with the assassination of Oscar Fernández Caral, a campus police sergeant and member of the MSR. Caral had been instrumental in supplying ammunition to the MSR for the massacre of Orfila, and had been sentenced to death by the UIR. The charges were dropped, however, since there was no evidence that Fidel was the assailant.¹⁴

Four months after this incident Fidel married Mirta Díaz Balart. Mirta, a philosophy student, bore an only son who was Fidel’s name-sake. Gang warfare began to subside, finally, toward the end of 1948, and the Partido del Pueblo Cubano-Ortodoxo (also known as PPC-O), led by Eduardo R. Chibás, gained strength in Cuban politics. Fidel withdrew from the action groups, and began to dedicate himself to party politics.

Fidel’s experiences throughout his years of involvement in acts of violence convinced him that direct action was the shortest way to political solutions. This conviction would keep him one step ahead of the other young leaders who emerged during the insurrection, for he grasped only too well the role of violence in Cuban politics. He also knew that most politicians had had their share of involvement in graft, corruption and murder through the action groups. In the course of the insurrection, former members of action groups were to play important roles in acts of violence against Batista. Fidel’s first-hand knowledge of violence and back-room politics helped him establish his important position in the decisive period of the insurrection.

The Road to Action

Several years later Fidel’s insurrectionary career swung into high gear. The FEU of Havana and Oriente issued declarations condemning Fulgencio Batista’s 1952 coup d’etat. On March 24, 1952, Fidel Castro filed a suit against Batista. Quoting from the Social Defense Code he asked that Batista be punished for violating the constitution and the laws, thereby challenging the judicial system to act. According to Article 147 of the code, anyone who attempted to change the constitution or the form of government through violent means would be imprisoned for six to ten years. Furthermore, Article 148 stated that “anyone who promotes an armed uprising against the constitutional power of the state will be imprisoned for three to ten years.”¹⁵ If the insurrection was carried out, the penalty could be 20 years of imprisonment. Other violations of the code would sentence Batista to a total of 100 years of imprisonment. Fidel Castro argued:

If, in the face of these flagrant crimes and confessions of treachery and sedition, he is not tried and punished, how will this court later try any citizen for sedition or rebelliousness against this unlawful crime, the result of unpunished treason? That would be absurd, inadmissible, monstrous in the light of the most elementary principles of justice.¹⁶

Similar suits were introduced by Eduardo Suárez Rivas, of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano-Auténtico (also known as PRC-A), and Pelayo Cuervo Navarro, of the PPC-O; in all of them the courts ruled that “revolution is a lawful source.” Batista’s coup d’etat was interpreted as a de facto, revolutionary overturn of the constitution. Fidel Castro took careful note of this judicial decision.

Many young people were troubled by the coup. Even many who had not been previously involved in politics started to consider opposing Batista. Among the first to agree on the need to fight the regime were Abel Santamaría Cuadrado and Jesús Montané Oropesa. Santamaría was an accountant for the Pontiac branch in Havana, and Montané was personnel manager for the General Motors Inter-American Corporation of Havana. On May 20, 1952, Santamaría and Montané put out the first edition of a mimeographed paper entitled Son los mismos (They are the same). In this task they were helped by Abel’s sister, Haydée, Melba Hernández, a lawyer, Raúl Gómez García, a philosophy student, and Elda Pérez among others.¹⁷

Since all of them belonged to the youth section of the Ortodoxo party it was inevitable that they would come into contact with other Ortodoxos’ ideas, like those of Fidel. At the suggestion of the latter, the title Son los mismos was changed to El Acusador.¹⁸ The second issue of El Acusador included two articles: one signed by the poet Raúl Gómez García entitled “The Origin of a Dwarf”—a sarcastic attack on Alberto Salas Amaro, editor of the Ataja newspaper and staunch supporter of Fulgencio Batista; the other signed by Alejandro (Fidel) and entitled “Critical Assessment of the PPC.”¹⁹ The latter article argued that only two political alternatives remained open: electoral politics or insurrection. Fidel called for a return to constitutional normalcy while offering his pledge to oppose the regime until it gave up power.²⁰ This article by Fidel was reprinted in the third issue of El Acusador, dated August 16, 1952. The issue also included Fidel’s “I Accuse” article, and Gómez García mourned the first anniversary of the death of Eduardo R. Chibás in an article, “A Voice.”²¹ This third issue of El Acusador was distributed at Havana’s national cemetery around the tomb of Chibás.

The group editing El Acusador included Raúl Gómez García, chief editor, Abel Santamaría Cuadrado, assistant editor, and Juan Martínez Tinguao and Jesús Montané as editorial assistants. The chief source of political orientation was Fidel Castro.²²

Whether out of a sense of duty or feverish enthusiasm this tiny group began to approach other young people who shared similar ideas about the Cuban situation. In this fashion they looked for students associated with the Ortodoxo party at Havana University. Thus, Pedro Miret, majoring in engineering, Lester Rodríguez, a medical student, and Abelardo Crespo, also in the school of engineering, were recruited into the incipient “movement.” Despite their efforts, in mid-1952 the common expectation was that the ousted Auténtico party of Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948-52) would take the lead in returning the country to constitutional normalcy. Aureliano Sánchez Arango, for example, gave the impression that he and his secret Triple A organization would soon lead an insurrection against Batista.

Rumors about the Auténticos’ activities led Castro to extend his contacts to the nearby province of Pinar del Río, especially to Artemisa, where a number of young Ortodoxos were persuaded to join the movement. Some of the recruits who came o...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 The Moncada Attack
• 2 Elections and Amnesty
• 3 The Student Movement
• 4 Prologue to Insurrection
• 5 The Making of the Guerrillas
• 6 The Palace Attack
• 7 Challenge and Repression
• 8 Ideology and Politics
• 9 A New Strategy
• 10 The Frustrated Strike: April 9, 1958
• 11 The Summer Offensive
• 12 The Westward March
• 13 The Last Battle
• 14 The Final Decision: Batista Leaves
• 15 The Perils of Counterrevolution
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index