Experts Versus Laymen

A Study of the Patsy and the Subcontractor

Barney Glaser

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351520980
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

"This book studies the relationship and balance of power between experts and laymen. It is rooted in the author's analysis of customer and contractor interactions in the housing industry, but relevant to other kinds of expert-layman relationships. Many of the conflicts between customer and contractor noted by the author also occur in lawyer-client, student-teacher, and doctor-patient relations.The author's research is structured around three core categories pertaining to experts' relations with laymen: choosing experts, power symmetry, and what he calls ""elsewhereism."" The first category has to do with seeking experts, finding them, referrals, and judging whether or not to use experts. Power symmetry concerns the inherent imbalance of power between an expert and a layman. ""Elsewhereism"" focuses on the constant competition that laymen face with unseen others in claiming the time and services of an expert.Experts versus Laymen broadens the analysis of expert-layman phenomena far beyond similar studies. It examines processes of bidding, gaining information, inspecting and evaluating work, winning trust, bargaining over costs, and determining who has situational control. This book discusses not only the contracting process in the housing industry, but far more important a world of power and domination in expert-laymen relationships."

Part I

Comparative Bidding

The comparative bidding system, as I have said, is designed to allow a person (layman or expert) competitively to bid experts against each other so the person taking the bids may choose the best qualified expert for the best price to do work according to an acceptable schedule, (or in the case of bidding merchandise, money, commodities, etc., to choose the best quality and/or most quantity at the best price.) The prime function of this system regarding experts is protection from exploitation by experts, through giving the layman a comparative control over the interrelationships among price, quality and timing. In subcontracting, using the bidding system is the expected, legitimate procedure and provides the initial basis for equality in the power symmetry between the patsy and the subcontractor. Comparative bidding is one highly valued American way to achieve orderly competition.

In contrast, for general contractors, the prime function of the subcontracting bidding system is to find the best prices relative to quality and timing of the total job. In this way, a general can put together a total price for the house that leads to a profit, whether for speculation or custom building. He does not need protection from subs, being fully aware of decent prices and what to expect temporally regarding quality ranges from most local subcontractors.

The bidding system has two other important functions for the patsy. First, it provides a systematic occasion for engaging in the information gaining process, which is crucial for the inexperienced patsy vis-a-vis specific jobs and the general articulation of the total construction. This process allows the patsy to discover, as he interviews each subcontractor, which kind of jobs can be done and what kind of jobs he wants, and when he can ask for jobs through what he is told by various subs. As the patsy gains in experience this process becomes less important. (We lake up this form of learning process in Chapter III, on “Detailing the Job.”)

Second, bidding and comparing provides the data upon which the patsy develops a resultant trust in his chosen subcontractor. Concomitant to this trust is his effort to minimize risks through comparisons about the quality he will obtain for the price, and whether the promised timing can be depended on. For example, does an “economy bid” mean that the promised time of arrival on the job will be continually altered by elsewhereism—other people paying more for the same job—or that the promised duration of time on the job will be adhered to or will be enough to secure the desired quality? Comparisons take the patsy a long way toward making accurate judgments about trust and minimal risks associated with making adequate choice of a subcontractor. (Trust and choice are considered at length in Chapters III and IV) Under what conditions trust and comparative choosing, hence protection. break down is considered in Chapter IV, the section on how subcontractors beat the system.)

II

Inviting Bids

Bidding System Rules

To begin engaging in the subcontracting bidding system, the patsy need only know that he must ask several subcontractors for bids on jobs and must compare bids to find the best price relative to time and quality. Such rules of bidding that exist are few and flexible, and they emerge quickly as the patsy begins to invite bids. For example, he will quickly find out that bids are free by looking for subcontractors in the yellow pages of the phone book where “free estimates” are advertised. He also quickly finds out that bids are to be kept confidential. It is an impropriety to divulge one sub’s bid to another, though it makes good leverage to get another to lower a bid. Clearly this confidentiality rule allows much fruitful deviance for both subcontractor and patsy (as I shall bring out in Chapter IV of Part I on “Beating the System”).

The rules are not codified anywhere for the patsy’s reviewal. They emerge quickly because they are generally known and adhered to tacitly. Breaches are clearly ignored or avoided. Consequently the patsy picks up his transgressions quickly when trying to keep his interaction with the subcontractor flowing toward his desired end. For example, subcontractors clearly avoid asking what others are bidding and, usually, avoid hearing any droplets of another sub’s bid made by the patsy. Another rule of confidentiality is that one does not let two subcontractors bidding on the same job meet at the job itself. To be sure, that would be awkward, but more importantly it would contaminate the competitive bidding, if they knew, for sure, whom they were bidding against. Knowing each other’s relative price ranges, they could adjust bids accordingly, instead of giving their best job for the best competitive price in a generalized market. Thus, if the novitiate patsy engages in the impropriety of having two subs come to the site at the same time, then one will surreptitiously wait in his truck until the first sub has left. While waiting he may feign not knowing who his rival is—though he cannot but know if the rival’s name is painted all over his truck.

The emergence of this subcontracting bidding system is virtually unobservable to any other person. All know it is going on, but none can really see it happening, save for such an impropriety as just mentioned. The patsy and subcontractor relationship is private and confidential at this stage. Even the process of how and whom the patsy finally chooses is completely invisible and is unaccountable to anyone else. The patsy can of course tell anyone of his bidding experiences and determination, even seek consultation, but he need not—and when he does it is ad hoc, relative to the system. The slight crack that it poses to the system is soon covered over. The privacy of the system protects both the patsy and the subcontractor from annoying intrusions into their mutual deal.

The system’s flexibility and invisibility puts its control almost completely on a morality basis; it also makes for individual strategy as on a calculative basis. There are no legal contextual controls (save general criminal and civil codes) and infrequent and little informal, concerted social control. The latter may emerge, say, when plumbers get together at a bar for a beer after work. If one mentions that a patsy is mickey mousing his bid, others may replicate his experience or simply pitch in to help put the patsy in his place. Then, the patsy may find himself controlled by all reputable local plumbers. More likely, one of these subs will use the data to beat the system and get the job. Once out, the word on a patsy can travel fast, and interpretations about him will vary very much.

Various bidding systems may differ considerably with regard to their rules of procedure, flexibility, observability and control. In contrast to the subcontracting bidding system—which is flexible, nonobservable, nonaccountable and confidential—there are several quite visible and rigidly controlled institutionalized bidding systems: as in large-scale general contracting commodity markets, and in auction and oil and gas leasing markets. In these, the opening and timing of bidding to the public may be publicly announced or advertised and the rules firmly set forth. To maintain secrecy and control, laws provide for sealed bids, neutral panels to evaluate them and/or clear evaluation criteria. Hand bidding signals are clear, and bids always indicate a clear legal commitment, if accepted, for the bidder to come up with the work or money on time—or he will be legally penalized plus, perhaps, lose a purchase or a job. By contrast, patsies will seldom if ever penalize a subcontractor who does not comply with promised time. But large-scale general contractors may be penalized thousands of dollars for each day that they are late with a satisfactory completion. Bidding systems (like subcontracting) will be more flexible and less controlled when what happens as a result of bidding is least pervasively fateful to the public, the communities of bidders and the takers of bids.

This flexibility of subcontracting also may be contrasted with the rigidity of professional experts (such as doctors, lawyers and accountants) who permit no concerted comparative bidding. Their initial strategy to avoid comparison is to charge for the first visit and immediately start to act as the professional on the job or refer the client to a more appropriate professional. When referring, even though ethics may require mentioning three people, the expert may sometimes direct the layman to at least one specific referral implicitly—thus comparatively pointing out the best expert before the layman has a chance to comparatively bid them himself. True, the expert then is saving the layman money and time. However, in subcontracting the patsy makes his own decision as based on first-hand data.

Now let us turn to discussions of: 1) how the patsy initially starts to protect himself when inviting bids, 2) his initial call, 3) how he arranges the site visit of subcontractors during each stage of the construction (sub-floor, rough-in and close-in periods), and, 4) how he handles the “can’t say no” pattern of subcontractors—a prevalent pattern among many kinds of experts.

Protection

The Referral System: The patsy begins by inviting “free estimates.” As all laymen know, the protection obtained against incompetent experts will vary with the kinds of sources by which one finds them. Thus, the prudent patsy goes to sources that initially increase the probability of protection against scoundrels and generate trust in “good workmen.” There are three types of sources that he may use: being referred to, direct seeking of subcontractors, and solicitation by subcontractors. Within each type he seeks the most validating source and each one is related to the general referral system of subcontractors.

Regarding referrals, he will ask friends who can refer someone, “Vouching for” from experience. Also he may ask for an approved list from the local contractors’ exchange, better business bureau or related business people such as general contractors, material suppliers and salesmen, other subcontractors in a different field, or a realty firm.

When he starts asking around for “good” subs, he soon finds himself in the middle of an intense, willing and affable referral system. As in medicine and law, it is not hard to find out who “the best men” are; their names are on everyone’s lips and list. The intense part of the referral system is the ready referral by subs on the job of subs in other fields. The former do it mainly because of probable reciprocal referring—job feedback: “Tell him I said to call.” Sometimes they do it for a rebate. And sometimes they refer another sub in their own area as a polite way of disqualifying themselves just now because of the job’s size or because they have a full work load elsewhere: but they do not want to cut the patsy off without placing him in someone’s trust. In this way the referring sub hopes to be called back later for another job, perhaps when he needs work. Or if he does not want a callback, still he does not want a negative image of himself floating back into the referral structure because this will damage chances for future, more appropriate calls from elsewhere.

However, there is a risk in giving referrals. If the referred sub gets the job but does poor work, it reflects back on the referring sub as one who cannot be trusted. With patsies the danger is less, since they do not discern poor quality and timing as well as do experienced laymen or general contractors. But the danger is still there and many a sub will refuse to refer—having discovered that it never works out well on feedback or having lost customers through poor jobs or even having seen the referred sub in turn referring other patsies elsewhere but not back to him.

Other subs may be so eager to refer that they eavesdrop on the discussion of a job, and then break into a conversation with a recommendation of a “good” sub. Or they may leave business cards all over the floors for the subs who will do the next job after theirs. For example, the dry-wall contractor drops cards for a painter. Material suppliers will refer subcontractors in the hope then of being used more by the sub. One lumber yard did this and broke the “yellow pages” (business phone numbers) monopoly of a door contractor. The lumberman hoped to sell wood to both subs, since the latter, not being in the phonebook, lacked business. Another supplier of glass referred a patsy to its installation division. This amounted to a referral-solicitation. Subs who are out of work often travel as a crew with subs who are getting jobs, in order to weasel implicit referrals. The sub proudly shows his crew as another sub, while the latter suggests calling him directly next time.

The intense part of the referral system also produces strong cross validating references because many referrers lean heavily on “good” or “best” characterizations when referring. As these cross validations pile up, trust and protection in a few subs grow to the point where the patsy knows he will be comparing the bids of a competent range of reputable subcontractors.

The patsy is fed into the referral system via his search for subcontractors through: the yellow pages of the phone book, signs and phone numbers of trucks seen in the area, hearsay on subs from friends, and through friends who happen to be subs. The yellow pages present an initial array of comparative data by which to choose which subcontractors to invite. Besides advertising free estimates, the advertisor may describe the size and type of job specialized in and their firm’s history (“since 1954”) in the county—which survival validates, presumably, competence and guarantee. The advertisors may also advertise how fast they work and how accessible they are (“24 hour service”). After seeking a few subs, the patsy then gets referred around to others in other fields.

When seeking friends who are subcontractors themselves, protection is maximized or minimized depending on whether or not the patsy knows the friend’s work. If it is quality work, then o.k., but if unknown and the bidding does not work out, it may be hard to refuse the friend solely on comparative bidding grounds. Friendship is a condition that breaks through the bidding system and erodes the patsy’s protection. (In two cases the author suffered by not refusing friends the jobs; he had to support delayed and frustrating work situations along with mediocre quality.) Also a search is required when as a cost control measure, the patsy wishes to find workmen who are not licensed but will subcontract for less. Often they are only found outside of the referral system, so they are not legitimated by references. Finding them is sensible for very simple jobs, such as tree cutting where complexity and quality do not warrant higher costs. Another type of direct search consists of callbacks to subcontractors known through other jobs or experience.

Another aspect of the referral system is the solicitation of bids by subcontractors. In essence, most soliciting is based on someone’s referral to the sub telling him to call the patsy—which is the alternative to the patsy calling the referred sub. Thus when the patsy’s building permit is approved, the city notifies the builder’s exchange which publishes a newsletter or paper on who is building current projects. The paper provides those subcontractors who need work with the names and numbers of whom to call to request permission to give a bid. Again material suppliers or other subcontractors may tell subs whom to solicit “cold,” or ask the patsy if they can refer him to a few subs so that the latter can solicit—thus bringing the patsy into the referral system. Some contractors as a preliminary solicitation send out letters about themselves and follow through either cold or with permission. Touring is another form of solicitation: a sub out of work may travel through a neighborhood that has a lot of building, asking the boss at each job if he can bid on, say, “the electrical work.” The overflow from other jobs close by also results in soliciting. Thus the sub is called to a project down the street and after tendering his bid, drops in on the patsy to ask if he can give a bid since he is working in the area. These unarranged site-solicitations either can be embarrassing if other subs are bidding the same job on the site or annoying and interrupting of ongoing work. They seldom work out. The fastest strategy for removing the intruder is to thank him, say the job is taken and promise to refer him elsewhere: in short, the sub is placed back under the controls of the referral system which he tried to get around. When solicited bids look good, however, the patsy can turn to the referral system for validation references merely by checking around to see who knows the soliciting subcontractor and his work.

Types of Subcontractors and Fit: Through the referral system and the accompanying validation process, the patsy also finds out rather quickly that there are various types of subcontractors. He finds which to ask, and which afford the most protection by finding the best “fit” between sub and job. Some subcontractors only do new construction or large remodeling jobs, while others repair and do small alterations. Some do both. The patsy conserves his time by learning to call only those who do new construction in his own “proportion.” That is, some subcontracting firms are so large they wish only to do a number of houses at a time, and some are so small that his size of house can be a burden. A clear way to find out what type of sub to call is through the business pages of the phone book. Many subcontractors advertise the type of construction and the size of job in which they specialize, also their own size. They may also advertise the location where they do most work: “serving all X county” or “serving north county.” The referral system also specifies these dimensions when the patsy is passed on to a sub who fits his needs. What the patsy does not know about the sub can easily be found out by an initial phone call designed to discover if enough of a fit exists to warrant a visit. (I shall discuss the initial phone call in the next section.)

These basic dimensions of subcontractors configurate to give the patsy a notion of the right type of subcontractor from whom to invite bids in order to gain power symmetry over the working relationship and to maximize protection of quality, costs and temporal control. For example, if the contractor is too large or too small, temporal control is easily lost to elsewhereism. With the large contractor, the patsy can never hope to compete with the sub’s many large clients—who can demand immediate attention. With the very small contractor, the patsy will find that the sub is “in and out” of business in order to stay alive: he can easily be drawn elsewhere if he has to work for another big contractor for a week or two or more to make a living, especially when he does not have enough current jobs.

Quality control may also be in question with the large and the very small subcontractor. The large ones work fast using a work hierarchy in depth and once they consider a job done they can be immune to the patsy’s maneuver, then back again to do the job right. For them, one small liability does not hurt. On the other hand, the very small contractor has not the financial backing to stand behind his work: his guarantees do not carry weight. For “system” type jobs—like plumbing, electricity and heating—a guarantee and the ability to back them up are vital.

Also, the territory where the subcontractor does most of his work is crucial. If, for need of a job, one goes out of his territory, the patsy then may discover that his quality and temporal control is poor. Thus, the contractor may be delayed making his visits, for these are interruptions to normal rounds done in another territory. And when out of it he may work too fast in order to get...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• I Playing Patsy
• Part I Comparative Bidding
• Part II Generalling the Job
• Part III Concluding Views