Bosnia-Herzegovina

The End of a Legacy

Dr Neven Andjelic, Neven Andjelic

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781135757137
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: History

When the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out a baffled world sought explanations from a range of experts who offered a variety of reasons for the conflict. The author of this study takes Bosnian affairs seriously and in so doing makes it much easier to grasp why the war occurred.

1 The Ruling System

In order to understand later events, especially with regards to nationalism, it is important to describe the basis on which the state was built under the communists. With the importance of nationalist politics established in the 1990s, one has to have an especially careful view of the communist regime in Bosnia, with regards to its nationalities policy. The Yugoslav system was successful in mobilizing popular support and had certain unique features compared with other communist countries, in particular self-management and, later on, the freedom to travel. Nevertheless, it was still tightly controlled from above and much of what happened has to be explained in terms of elite behaviour. In particular, in Bosnia, communist rule mixed with a traditional social structure, where clientelism, cronyism, patronage and kinship networks were widely prevalent. While the Yugoslav federation was becoming ever more decentralized, the elite were much more focused on the leadership of the republics. Each republic became a virtually autonomous, separate communist model, which some authors have described as ‘decentralized totalitarianism’.¹

Thus, Yugoslavia was decentralized but was not democratized. Bosnia- Herzegovina was no exception. Although the leaders were much more loyal to Tito and the partisan tradition than those in the other republics, from the 1970s onwards, they developed their own characteristic set of policies. In this chapter, society and the economy will be discussed, followed by politics in Bosnia during the 1970s and, finally, the relation between the party and the population will be analysed.

SOCIETY AND ECONOMY IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 1945–1980

The period from the 1970s to the early 1980s was a ‘golden time’ for the political elite in Bosnia, which had secured its absolute power by the early 1970s in the typical communist fashion of climbing up the hierarchy. Their rule gave to Bosnia-Herzegovina much needed long-term stability, which was achieved by firm control over the state and society. With the background of the Second World War and the civil war fought in the republic as a side effect, ethnic issues were certainly very important and were exemplified by the ruling ideology.Popular attitudes, however, could be judged only on the basis of a very few incidents and events, since society was tightly controlled and dissidents were all but non-existent. Most of the regime’s credibility had its roots in ‘solving’ the ethnic question and, in Bosnian terms, in significant economic development.

The character of the social system in Bosnia is analysed as the basis for later developments in society. This was a period of further decentralization in Yugoslavia. The republics started to differ more significantly from each other. There was still, however, a unifying factor in the person of President Tito. Despite his presence, some new problems started to appear in Yugoslavia. Ivo Lederer found a clear pattern

…which in the mid-1960s reached disquieting proportions. The process of decentralization in agriculture and industry, and altogether the general trend of political and cultural liberalization, appear to have created special problems among the nationalities. The effort to uplift the undeveloped southern parts of the country…while maintaining the momentum of industrial development in the north has strained the nation’s limited resources… The resulting uncertainties, even in the face of relative prosperity, have produced manifestations of economic nationalism, particularly in Croatia and Serbia.²

Bosnian society, meanwhile, was free of such manifestations, which would have divided the republic’s economy. Two major factors were crucial for the preservation of economic unity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its further development, despite external problems. The first was the personality and role of Tito. The second factor was the leadership in Sarajevo and its policy. This followed the example of the other republics and made the economy more self-sufficient but, at the same time, played on the political unity of the federation, which Tito especially liked as an example. Thus, the leadership achieved credibility externally while internally imposing firm control over society and preventing any development, economic or political, that could ruin such policy. Their Titoism also gained them internal credibility, as did economic development and the improvement of the standard of living. This rule should be analysed in more detail because it lasted until the very beginning of the collapse of the system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the rise of nationalism in neighbouring republics.

Most of the land and companies were nationalized during the early post-war years. Private ownership of agricultural land was restricted to relatively small possessions. Land reform and the colonization of deserted farms in plains formerly populated by Germans, or by wealthy landowners who had withdrawn with the Nazis or had been expelled in post-war years, was very popular among poor peasants. Some sources put the number of colonized peasants from Bosnia- Herzegovina to Vojvodina at 85,442.³ At the same time, colonized land was given within Bosnia-Herzegovina as well while companies were nationalized as a first step towards industrialization and urbanization. The reason fornationalization was ideological, of course, as communists did everything to change the society and put it in line with their own political doctrine.

Before the war, only 2 per cent of the population had been employed in Bosnian industry, while 17 per cent of the population lived in the cities.⁴ Industrialization efforts attracted a huge, unqualified workforce to the developing towns. This policy prevented poverty, which had been common in rural areas, and also created a huge proletarian force in the towns. It effectively solved one problem and even created the basis for solving the other. Instead of poverty and a lack of perspectives in the villages, new generations were presented with work in the town. This enabled the fast industrialization of the whole of Bosnia- Herzegovina, or at least its major urban centres. Figures for industrial productivity during the 1940s show the success of this policy:

In major fields of industry in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the product was doubled. Electric energy, in relation to 1946, grew to 192%, coal mining to 194%, agricultural tools to 376%, wood industry to 247%, etc. The number of employed workers in 1947 was bigger by 66% than in 1937. ⁵

If one compares these achievements to the whole of Yugoslavia, Bosnia is an especially successful story, but one has to bear in mind the inherited underdevelopment and backwardness of the republic in comparison to the rest of Yugoslavia, where the industrial product was 67 per cent higher during the first post-war year than during the pre-war period.⁶ The decrease of agriculture in the domestic product in Bosnia is clearly visible: in 1952 it amounted to 27.2 per cent, while in 1983 it was only 13.7 per cent.⁷ Social and economic trends of urbanization and industrialization can be better understood by comparing the percentage of the population working in agriculture. In 1948 some 72 per cent of the whole Bosnian population participated in agriculture, while in 1961 it was 50. 2 per cent. In 1971 it was just over a third—36.6 per cent.⁸ This also means that agricultural productivity per capita was lower than industrial productivity, because a larger part of the population participated in the field of agriculture than in manufacturing.

The state of Bosnian society can be even better understood by the fact that official estimates put the number of illiterate adults at 900,000 in 1945.⁹ Huge action by the regime managed to dwarf this problem relatively quickly but in the 1980s illiteracy remained a paradigm of Bosnian society. In 1971, there were still 672,000 illiterate people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁰ This will be analysed in later chapters.

Another important characteristic of the Bosnian economy, and of society as a whole, is similar to that of the whole of Yugoslavia: a separate and unique development of industrial relations and a system of self-management that was introduced during the 1950s. One could argue whether this introduction was a consequence of the international relations of the time or a thoughtful experiment.For the purpose of this book it is irrelevant. The international situation certainlycontributed to this step, since the country was not a member of either of the alliances in the Cold War. Socialist selfmanagement was introduced both as an experiment and an answer to ideological challenges in the East and the West. Social ownership stood in a similar correlation to private and state ownership, just as the whole system was positioned between the two political and economic blocks. This experiment made the country unique in terms of discussions of contemporary political systems and in comparison to the rest of communist Europe.

The regime was certainly oppressive. It was during the 1950s that the first dissidents appeared within the party ranks. Tito’s former ally, Milovan Djilas, was even imprisoned for his increasingly liberal views, but this had very little, if any, effect in Bosnia. Lack of dissent was a long-standing feature of society in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the communist reign. Even at the first elections in 1945, when there was a choice to vote for or against the communists, in Bosnia- Herzegovina there was only 4.79 per cent of votes against the regime while, in Yugoslavia as a whole, it was 9.5 per cent.¹¹ This shows the general attitude towards the communist system in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be more deep-rooted than in the rest of Yugoslavia. Therefore, dissent and dissidents were rare.

Alongside the previous example, efforts to develop new relations in the market economy give a much better view into the nature of the system in Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina within it. The reforms initiated during the 1950s were continued into the 1960s, but many important aspects were abandoned in the late 1960s. The reform that would have led to a proper market economy could not work under the political system’s lack of competition. In a state where politics dictated the market, this was impossible. Politics would lose its grip on the system and the only permissible political force, the communists, would have endangered their own positions in society. Furthermore, the first generation of communist leaders was no longer young, energetic and courageous. As they grew older, they were increasingly ready to compromise and abandon potentially dangerous reforms. This form of degenerate governing is typical of any state where the same elite remains in power for too long.

This was the period of the first fall in the number of employed people in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the post-war period. Although there were 483,500 employed, a decrease of a half per cent, the unemployment rate was more significant. It was 60.7 per cent higher in 1968 than in 1964.¹² One of the solutions was the freedom to travel and the introduction of the gastarbeiter workers (literally, a guest worker) in Western Europe.

Although urbanization and industrialization were very important and ever present features in post-war Yugoslavia, they were no longer solving problems. Bosnia-Herzegovina was especially underdeveloped, even when compared to the other republics. The republic’s industry was based on mining, metallurgy and other basic manufacturing, while more sophisticated industries were located elsewhere. Bosnia-Herzegovina was an important source of resources for the Yugoslav economy, and was also important in political terms. The greatest careof inter-ethnic relations was taken in it, the most orthodox communist ideology was developed there and the republic was the last to opt for the development of a self-sufficient economy. Major changes in this new policy were made in the 1970s when the new generation of political leaders took over from the former partisans. They were the ones who inaugurated a policy of Bosnian equality with the rest of Yugoslavia.

An understanding of the elite is of key importance, since in many ways Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, can be typified as totalitarian. Two features of the system were unique. Firstly, the insistence on self-management and social management added layers of complexity to the system. Secondly, the freedom to travel led to the emergence of a new class of repatriated workers with funds to invest. Under these conditions, Bosnian leaders were ready to reorganize the republic and to prevent further migration to the few industrial centres.

Thus, the leaders in Sarajevo secured the stability of political life in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The economic aspects of life in the republic during the 1970s were improving, with growing power in the hands of a few new communist leaders. Almost none of them could have gained their legitimacy from participation in the Second World War, as they were too young to belong to the partisan movement from the beginning. Therefore, their prestige was linked to practical results in political and, especially, economic fields during the 1970s. They built up several large and successful companies that functioned as monopolies in the semi-planned economy. Less successful companies were merged with larger ones, thus concentrating capital in a few very large companies. The general managers of these conglomerates were ordered to participate in establishing a factory in every community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Local unemployment rates fell and the index of the largest Yugoslav companies showed an over-representation of this republic. Almost every year, economic indexes of the Federal Bureau for Statistics showed at least four Bosnian companies to be among the ten financially largest companies in Yugoslavia. These were: Energoinvest, Sarajevo; Unis, Sarajevo; Sipad, Sarajevo; and RMK, Zenica. All major general managers were also members of the Central Committee and were obliged to obey every decision made by the communists.

This system, helped by foreign credit, worked very well and Bosnia- Herzegovina was developing quickly. Its people enjoyed a better quality of life, while its leaders...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
• LIST OF TABLES
• FOREWORD
• PREFACE
• INTRODUCTION
• 1 THE RULING SYSTEM
• 2 THE END OF STRONG RULE
• 3 CIVIL SOCIETY: ITS EMERGENCE AND ITS LIMITS
• 4 THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND THE COMMUNISTS
• 5 THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES
• 6 THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
• 7 NATIONALIST RULE
• CONCLUSION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY