The Kashmir Question

Retrospect and Prospect

Sumit Ganguly

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• Print ISBN:
  9780714655581
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135756574
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

India, which had been created as a civic polity, initially sought to hold on to this Muslim-majority state to demonstrate its secular credentials. Pakistan, in turn, had laid claim to Kashmir because it had been created as the homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. After the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 the Pakistani irredentist claim to Kashmir lost substantial ground. If Pakistan could not cohere on the basis of religion alone it had few moral claims on its co-religionists in Kashmir. Similarly, in the 1980s, as the practice of Indian secularism was eroded, India's claim to Kashmir on the grounds of secularism largely came apart. Today their respective claims to Kashmir are mostly on the basis of statecraft. This title provides a comprehensive assessment of a number of different facets of the on-going dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Among other matters, it examines the respective endgames of both states, the evolution of American policy toward the dispute, the dangers of nuclear esculation in the region and the state of the insurgency in the Indian-controlled portion of the disputed state.

Index

(bold print indicates a table)

Abdullah, Farooq 4, 26, 64, 183, 187, 189

Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammed (leader of Jammu and Kashmir National Conference) 2–4, 40, 46, 85, 161, 187

Abdullah, Umar (son of Farooq) 187

Advani, L. K 177, 184, 186

Afghanistan 8–9, 55, 79, 98

Afghans, Lashkar-e Tayyba and 25

Agra, failure of negotiations after Kargil War (2000) 133

“Agreement Between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Cease-Fire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir” see Karachi Agreement

“Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” see Seventeen-Point Agreement

Ahl-e-Hadis’ ultra-conservative Gorba faction 80

Ahmad, Waqar, operation K2 and 81

Akbar, Wasim, shot dead by SOG (2001) 83

Akram, Munir (Pakistan Ambassador to UN), statement by 134–5

Akshardham Temple attack (2001) 85, 197

al-Badr 59

al-Qaeda, ETIM and 147

Alam, Shoaib 83

All India Services, Article 312 of 18

All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (pro-Pakistan) 38, 40

All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) 12, 16, 163

primary demand 191–2

represents Kashmiris on both sides of LOC 188–90

short-term tactics 197–8

All-India war 79–86

Alsace-Lorraine, flashpoint (1870–1945) 118–19, 121

Amnesty International 46–7, 147–8

Anagnost, Ann 165

Anderson, Benedict 151

Ansari, Aftab, attack on US building in Kolkata 84

Ansari, Jalees 80

anthropology of the state, analytical orientations 150–53

Armitage, Richard (US Secretary of State) 105, 184

arms control 91

subset of confidence-building 93

autonomy, high-level study group six point plan 17–18

Azad (Free) Kashmir 93

Azhar, Maulana Masood (jihadi leader) 81–2, 84, 195–6, 198

Babbar Khalsa International 81

Babri Masjid, demolition (1992) 80

Badal, Chandrashekhar 16

Badal, Prakash Singh 16

Bahajib, Hamid 80

Baig, Bilal Ahmad 82

Baig, Hilal Ahmad 82

Baig, Mirza Afzal 4

Bajrang Dal (Hindu group) 197

Bangladesh 43, 97, 109, 124, 195

Bangladesh Nationalist party 195

Bangroo, Mohammad Abdullah (Hizb-ul-Mujahe...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• India’s “Potential” Endgame in Kashmir
• Pakistan’s Endgame in Kashmir
• Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in Theory and Practice
• US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Prospects for Resolution
• Politics, Proximity, and Paranoia: The Evolution of Kashmir as a Nuclear Flashpoint
• Kashmir and Tibet: Comparing Conflicts, States, and Solutions
• Kashmir: All Tactics, No Strategy
• Abstracts
• Notes on Contributors
• Index