The Nature of War in the Information Age

Clausewitzian Future

David J. Lonsdale

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781135757205
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

There has been a great deal of speculation recently concerning the likely impact of the 'Information Age' on warfare. In this vein, much of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the Information Age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test. Using a range of contexts, the book sets out to look at whether the classical Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war will retain its validity in this new age. The analysis covers the character of the future battlespace, the function of command, and the much-hyped concept of Strategic Information Warfare. Finally, the book broadens its perspective to examine the nature of 'Information Power' and its implications for geopolitics. Through an assessment of both historical and contemporary case studies (including the events following September 11 and the recent war in Iraq), the author concludes that although the future will see many changes to the conduct of warfare, the nature of war, as given theoretical form by Clausewitz, will remain essentially unchanged.

1

Classical Strategic Thought and the Nature of War

‘The central ingredients of military victory or defeat will continue to reflect the enduring nature of war at least as much as the transient means used to prosecute it.’ ¹

INTRODUCTION

Before undertaking an analysis of any subject, it is often necessary to define some of the main terms used. In the context of this book a satisfactory understanding of the word ‘nature’ is required. The ultimate objective of this work is to test the continued validity of the fundamentals of warfare, the constants if you will, those elements which are the very essence of war across both time and place, rather than its more transient features. Words such as ‘nature’ are often used rather loosely, both in general language and more importantly within the academic and professional literature. It is not unusual to come across works in which analysts clearly state that the nature of warfare will change. In The Future of Warfare Francois Heisbourg confidently claims that a series of technological, political, social and economic changes ‘are transforming the nature of warfare’.² Similarly, Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that the information revolution will bring the next shift in the nature of warfare.³ Even more ambitiously Robert R. Leonhard asserts that the information age represents the greatest change to the nature of war.⁴ These are substantial claims that should not go unchallenged. Therefore, the first step in verifying these assertions is to understand what the nature of warfare actually is.

According to one dictionary definition, ‘nature’ refers to ‘a thing’s essential qualities’.⁵ In this sense the nature of warfare is different from its character. The character of war, or rather its style, is a constantly changing phenomenon; it is less absolute. For example, the Napoleonic Wars were clearly of a different character to the campaigns in the Pacific during World War II. Features of the latter such as carrier-borne aircraft, strategic bombing (including the use of atomic weapons) and island hopping distinguish it from the former. The forces, tactics and operational art employed vary depending upon a number of factors. These include the period of history one is considering, which security communities are engaged, the technology in use and the policy objectives to be attained. These self-evident truths should not be taken as evidence that the character of war is of little importance. Understanding the character of a particular war is an important prerequisite to its successful conduct. However, in relation to this work, of even greater significance is the possibility that the character of war could change to such an extent that the nature of war itself may be altered. Consequently, this work will test the hypothesis that a dynamic relationship exists between the character and nature of war, and that the changes wrought by the information age will be so momentous that the nature of war itself will be transformed. In theory, if all wars were concluded by calculations of ‘information dominance’, or through information attacks against information infrastructures, warfare would all but cease to be a violent activity. Should that come to pass, the nature of warfare would have been altered by a change in the character of war. Such possibilities may explain the proclivity of certain authors to proclaim the rise of Sun Tzu at the expense of Clausewitz, since the former is noted for his admonition to achieve victory without fighting.⁶ However, thus far, although the character of war has proved mutable, the nature of warfare has been resistant to significant or permanent change.

In light of the above thoughts, the main objective of this chapter is to define the nature of warfare, as it is traditionally understood. This will be achieved using various accounts and memoirs of war, as well as the three great works of classical strategic thought: Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini’s The Art of War. In this sense, the fate of these three works, and especially On War, are entwined with that of the nature of warfare itself. The historical record is also utilised in the endeavour to understand the true nature of war. The value of using history in an attempt to understand warfare is well expressed by Moltke, who described military history as ‘the most effective means of teaching war during peace’.⁷

Any attempt to capture the essence of an activity as complex as war is self-evidently a large undertaking, and will ultimately fail to accurately reflect the true reality. James Kiras is convincing when he declares, ‘Definitions rarely convey the complexity of a subject in either theory or practice.’⁸ It is because of this that we turn to the theories of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and Jomini to act as aids in the task. Clausewitz identifies the value of theory in this respect when he notes: ‘Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order.’⁹ So, strategic theory provides an important conceptual tool for our analysis. Still, an important question remains: why choose these particular works of theory from amongst the mountain of literature that has been written on the subject of war? The answer to this question lies in the fact that these three works are regarded as the founders of modern military thought, and as performing the role of enabling students of war to understand the central elements of the activity.¹⁰ The language and ideas expressed in these works permeate a great deal of modern military doctrine and academic work on war. With regard to understanding the nature of war this is particularly the case for Clausewitz’s work. There is perhaps no better example of this than the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC) doctrine manual Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 ‘Warfighting’ (FMFM-1). Clausewitzian ideas and language dominate this document. Indeed, Warfighting stipulates that Clausewitz’s On War is ‘the definitive treatment of the nature and theory of war’.¹¹ Warfighting regards both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as essential reading for any marine officer.¹² Clausewitz and Sun Tzu’s influence can be seen in many other doctrinal works, including British Defence Doctrine: Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01.¹³ Although not as obvious as the other two theorists, Jomini’s influence can also be detected in modern military thought. Daniel Moran notes that the principles of war upon which modern military doctrine is based are all reminiscent of Jomini’s ideas.¹⁴

As previously noted, this book does not rest its understanding of the nature of war solely upon these three works. Memoirs and accounts of warfare play an equally valid role in understanding war’s true nature. However, a further validation of using the three chosen works of theory emanates from the fact that all of the three great theorists were practitioners of war, and therefore their works are the theoretical representations of their real experiences. It follows from this discussion that, since it is the works of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and Jomini which have been most influential in shaping our understanding of the nature of war, it is these three works which will be examined to discern how relevant they remain, and consequently whether the pre-information age concept of the nature of warfare retains its relevance.

Why is it important to understand the nature of war? There are two main answers to this question. The first concerns a purely academic interest which stems from man’s desire to understand the world around him and in particular the activities in which he engages. Since war can be such an important event for the individual, the state or indeed the whole international system, a desire to better comprehend it is understandable. However, there are more practical reasons to engage in an attempt to grasp the essence of war. This relates to how actors prepare for hostilities. What one perceives as the nature of warfare greatly influences the development of doctrine, force composition and training. Clausewitz himself noted that the nature of war affects which forces will be used.¹⁵ Turning once again to the USMC, Warfighting declares: ‘our understanding of the nature and the theory of war ... must be the guiding force behind our preparation for war’.¹⁶ If we take for example the training and education of officers, this is based on the established belief that war is a political, chaotic, violent, uncertain and human activity. It follows that, if the nature of war should be altered by the information age, then the whole panoply of war preparation (including military culture) will require amendment in order to prepare for a very different kind of conflict than has occurred historically.

THE GENESIS OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT

Before embarking upon an analysis of the nature of war, it is important to describe briefly the influences upon the three classic theorists. Any thinker, including the author of this book, will be influenced by their experiences and the intellectual environment of their time and place. Indeed, Roger Parkinson has identified a vital relationship between Clausewitz’s experiences and his writings.¹⁷ In the context of understanding the true nature of war these influences must be considered. It may transpire that each theorist’s notion of warfare is more a reflection of his experiences and his intellectual environment than a representation of the immutable reality of war. When we come to analyse the nature of warfare in the information age it may be profitable to consider that our own perspective will be coloured by our own times and cultur...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Series Editor’s Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Classical Strategic Thought and the Nature of War
• 2. The Future Battlespace
• 3. Future Command and the Fate of Military Genius
• 4. How Strategic is Strategic Information Warfare?
• 5. Information Power: Strategy, Geopolitics and the Fifth Dimension
• 6. Concluding Thoughts: A Clausewitzian Future
• Bibliography
• Index