Women, Power and Policy

Comparative Studies of Childcare

Jennifer Marchbank

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781134554782
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book provides an accessible engaging account of childcare policies in Britain and beyond. In examining the progress of women's initiatives and childcare, Marchbank considers subjects including: the history of childcare policy, particularly during the Second World War
childcare policy and women's economic activity across the EC
detailed case studies of policy making in practice
the covert and overt barriers to equality-based policy making
successful strategies and counter-strategies for policy makers and campaigners.

1
Skirting the issue
Power, nondecision-making and gender

Nondecision-making theory argues that subtle and covert uses of power can be, and are, used in the policy process to maintain the status quo. This chapter outlines the radical beginnings of this theory, where it differs from pluralistic views of politics, and why I believe that it can offer some answers to why and how Women’s Interest Issues (WIIs) are marginalised. Before beginning a review of appropriate political theories it is necessary to situate this research, to explain my aims. Unlike earlier writings I do not intend to prove the existence of nondecision-making—that was achieved over two decades ago by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Crenson (1971). Rather, it is my aim to attempt to fulfil the most basic and important aim of feminist research, to find ways to create the social change that feminists demand. I believe that if we understand the methods used by patriarchal systems to keep WIIs off the agenda, marginalise and delegitimise them then we shall be able to devise strategies for effectively challenging the patriarchal status quo. One of these methods is, as I will show, nondecision-making.

Previous studies of nondecision-making have addressed a variety of issues from ‘race’ and poverty (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970); air pollution (Crenson, 1971) and community disempowerment (Gaventa, 1980) all of which are primarily investigations of issues of social justice. Equality between women and men is also, at its most basic level, an issue of social justice. However, despite its radical beginnings it seems that nondecisionmaking theory has not been viewed as appropriate to an examination of gender equality issues. Exceptions to this observation are later studies which have employed aspects of nondecision-making to issues of gender and power (Dahlerup, 1984; Outshoorn, 1986). I hope to advance this by examining gender equality in the context of all aspects of nondecision-making, by focusing on policy for women, in particular equality-based childcare policy.

An examination of childcare policy-making must, by definition, address the relationship between women and the state—locally, nationally and internationally. My reasons for selecting childcare are that I believe it also to be, like Bachrach and Baratz’s focus on ‘race’, a radical issue. Lovenduski and Randall (1993) argue that it has not always been as easy for feminists to present childcare as a radical issue compared to other issues such as violence, pointing out that the elevation of motherhood evident in some feminist writings (see Rich, 1976) does not ‘translate so easily into the more mundane campaigns to make the lives of actual mothers more tolerable’ (Lovenduski and Randall, 1993:282). However, it is my contention that childcare is, and always has been, a radical issue in that it challenges the patriarchal divide of public/private like no other issue, and as such, goes to the root of struggle for gender equality and the public use of resources.

The format of the remainder of this chapter is tripartite: first, an outline of my approach and methodology; second, a review of policy-making theories ending with the presentation of an adapted model of nondecision-making which offers a more complete understanding of how it affects WIIs.

Methodological and epistemological considerations

The original research impetus for this book arose from case studies of policy-making on childcare in two Scottish local authorities along with an historical investigation of childcare provision both within the UK and across the European Community. A further area of research developed from this which focused on the positions and strategies available to women in the policy process, again utilising the experiences of women within actual political bureaucracies, some directly acquired, others from secondary sources. Given that much of this book is based on original research, conducted from 1989 to 1996, it is appropriate here to outline the issues which arose in actually performing the research, issues of my methodologies and epistemology.

My first concern was that nondecision-making should not occur in the formulation of the methodology. To examine childcare as it affects women’s ability to return to the workforce because the economy requires women’s labour would be such a case; as Gustafsson (1994) relates such definitions have been used to argue for subsidised childcare in Sweden. In the United States childcare subsidies have been viewed as a way in which to increase the labour market potential of single mothers, not to increase their human potential but to decrease their reliance upon state welfare systems (Gustafsson, 1994).

Childcare must be studied as a woman’s right whether she chooses to work or not. Childcare must be considered as it affects women’s lives and not as it affects men’s or society in general. To perform the latter is to conduct an androcentric study which will reveal very little about women and nondecision-making (and in particular the setting of political agendas).

Methodology is the theory and analysis of how research should proceed (Harding, 1987:3). Defining a methodology for studying women, or policy for women, is not simple. It is not enough merely to adapt established social science methods. Some feminist researchers, arguing that traditional theories are often applied in such a way as to mask gendered effects and to view male experience as the norm, have produced adaptations which they claim can be used to explain women’s social position. It is not adequate merely to add women to a social science study and expect to achieve accurate results. The examination of women’s contribution to aspects of society already studied has increased our knowledge of women’s voting behaviour, work patterns and contributions to the arts but this is often in relation to men’s activities. Feminist critics have frequently drawn attention to the biases in traditional social sciences research with ‘malestream’ studies’ tendencies to employ stereotypical images of women to support male superiority (e.g. Siltanen and Stanworth, 1984). Price (1989) refers to the ‘male agenda of political sociology’ which, with its emphasis on power, political elites and government institutions, cannot fail to be sexist and, as such, it is clear that there has been a need for the feminist revisiting of political and social science which has occured in recent years. Bourque and Grossholtz (1984) go further to claim that the dominance of traditional groups is maintained by the use of ‘knowledge’. Millet (1971), in using the ‘tools’ of the male academic mode, discredits the knowledge systems which men have created. She argues that male knowledge-makers merely project and protect self-interest and are far from objective. In addition, Millet notes that women are excluded from certain areas of knowledge. This leads me to the conclusion that a feminist approach to social science is necessary to ensure that women’s experiences are articulated accurately and not misrepresented by patriarchal definitions of the situation, masculinist interpretations of data and supposedly genderless usage of methods.

A useful summary of feminist political science is provided by Randall (1991) who delineates four basic positions: cultural, postmodern, standpoint and empiricist. She situates herself in the latter category with the pragmatic observation that:

if we want feminist research to change things, it has to be convincing. It will hardly convince fellow academics, policy-makers or the media if rigour and method are jettisoned as so much patriarchal baggage.

(Randall, 1991:5)

Although empiricists accept that traditional methods are a justifiable target, in that they can be used to lend legitimacy to a study, there is a preference to express scepticism about the conceptual underpinnings of certain projects rather than critique the methods themselves. This is in contrast to the wholesale rejection of the notion of ‘scientific objectivity’ by cultural feminists who argue that method, which is inherently male, oppresses women. They contend that women can free themselves of male misinterpretation by abandoning male academic modes and developing female forms of study and expression. Related to cultural feminism is the position of feminist standpoint theory. It too rejects masculine objectivity believing that women, due to our position in society, are often in a privileged situation to view the truth—akin to the Marxian arguments regarding the superiority of the proletariat view of society and its structures. However, standpoint theory does not reject scientific method but rather adopts a radical interpretation of social science. Standpointers maintain that women’s distinctive experiences of the world can be uncovered through focusing on feminist epistemology in the formulation of methodology and the utilisation of methods. As Harding argues:

To achieve a feminist standpoint one must engage in the intellectual and political struggle necessary to see natural and social life from the point of view of that disdained activity which produces women’s social experiences instead of from the partial and perverse perspective available from the ‘ruling gender’ experience of men.

(Harding, 1987:185)

Thus, feminist standpoint theory argues that such an approach is a more scientifically complete investigation and, therefore, less distorted than traditional social science procedures.

Both feminist standpoint theory and feminist empiricists are criticised by postmodernists for holding themselves up as ‘successor sciences’, that is, claiming to be improvements. Both are further criticised for accepting the concept of a ‘true reality’ as postmodernists do not accept that there is any one truth. Postmodern rejection of ‘universalising claims’ and of the use of metanarrative, overarching explanations leads to a view of science as a doomed project and they prefer to ‘relativise’ experience within micropolitics. They criticise standpoint theory by cogently arguing that if one standpoint exists then that opens up the possibility for many more. Thus, there is not one feminist epistemology but rather ‘a range of feminist epistemologies exists’ (Stanley and Wise, 1990:33).

Having summarised, albeit extremely briefly, the major debates around feminist social science it is now possible to establish the position employed here. To examine the development of political policies requires an investigation of the workings of the political systems operated by society as they currently exist, to elucidate the points of conflict which may pertain between the creation of policy by and for women and the prevailing biases within society towards a masculinist view of issues. I feel that neither a culturalist nor a postmodern approach is appropriate. This is due to my faith in empirical methods, which need not be used simply in a traditional fashion but may be employed to advance feminist research (Kelly, Burton and Reagan, 1994). Further, I agree with Harding’s contention that there is no such thing as ‘feminist method’ (1987), for method is simply the technique of evidence gathering. The fact that a method may be carried out by a feminist researcher does not make it a feminist method but merely a feminist application of a method which may elucidate more accurate or different information (for example, may listen more carefully to women). However, I believe that there are certain features of methodology which feminist researchers employ which reveal factors hitherto unexposed. Therefore, a variety of interview techniques were employed according to the situation of the interviewees to allow the experience of women to be expressed. Further, it was my aim to allow women to describe their experiences in their own words, whilst alongside this approach was a more ‘traditional’ method of analysing the life cycle of policy developments.

I am very aware that such an empiricist methodology lays me open to accusations of essentialism. However, to utilise a postmodern paradigm would, I believe, be an inadequate exercise in this context. Although I recognise that women, and our experiences as women, are diverse and distinct I maintain that our experiences of, and treatment by, public policies and political bodies are sufficiently equivalent to reveal certain patterns and responses (see Basu, 1995). Conducting a postmodern investigation would imply that a sufficiently different socialisation process operated upon each individual woman and that each of us responds differently to the structural setting in which we find ourselves. Although this is true in some respects, on the whole it can be argued that women, in the liberal democratic system discussed here, do meet with much the same socialisation experiences in relations with state bureaucracies (see Chapman, 1987; Githens and Prestage, 1987; Iglitzin, 1974; Sapiro, 1984) and as such, I believe that, in this context, women can be discussed as a group. In other words I do not follow the postmodern notion that the categories ‘women’ and ‘patriarchy’ only exist as metanarratives to be deconstructed theoretically, for to do so implies that there is no place for women to take a collective stance against oppression and marginalisation (see Jackson, 1992/3).

However, I do believe that masculinity and femininity are socially constructed, and I am aware that what it means to be a woman varies over geography, history, culture and society. Thus, I am not claiming that ‘woman’ is a unitary, absolutist category. Nonetheless, it is still the case that women are defined with respect to our (assumed) reproductive abilities but any biological essentialism here is not the making of my feminist position but by the patriarchal assumptions of policy-makers. This applies to all women, young and old, black and white, heterosexual and lesbian, married and single, for as Jackson outlines ‘our lives are materially bounded by membership of those categories’ (Jackson, 1992/3:30). The ability of women alone to bear children impinges upon the economic, and therefore, the political life of all women. It is just exactly the influence of these social constructions which will be explored in the context of nondecision-making.

Despite arguing against a distinctive feminist method I do believe that research which is informed by feminism can be particularly useful. A feminist conceptualisation of a social phenomenon may differ greatly from a nonfeminist view; for example, men’s lesser contribution to domestic chores is a ‘problem’ to the former but not the latter. Thus, to recognise the importance of women’s experience in defining the ‘problem’ under examination ensures that the questions women want answered are addressed. This is an important distinction for as Harding reminds us:

[t]he questions about women that men have wanted answered have all too often arisen from desires to pacify, control, exploit, or manipulate women.

(Harding, 1987:8)

If this study were only to answer such questions that would be a definite act of nondecision, that is, the refusal to address the issues of the less powerful within society.

Feminist political science must question why women’s political actions and treatment by the polity should be gauged on our ability to succeed in, and affect, masculine structures. Therefore, although this study relies heavily on empirical investigation and the application of the theories of nondecision-making, there is a constant and continuous feminist interpretation of the issues and the questions. In other words, my approach is most certainly empirical but directed from my personal standpoint as a feminist; I do not believe that the two are mutually exclusive.

Policy-making: review of appropriate theories

Public policies are not made in a vacuum but rather in a world full of influences, opinions, competing demands and motivations. In addition, the decision-making process is a series of hurdles or barriers which an issue must overcome before becoming a policy. Each of these hurdles can provide access points for rival factions to put their case. This can improve or diminish an issue’s chances of making it to policy status. Support or opposition need not be open to have influence and it is covert opposition that nondecision-making theory uncovers. As such it provides a suitable model to being an investigation of the marginalisation of WIIs. However, although it was defined thirty years ago it is not a term in common usage and requires further explanation.

In a perfect world the interests and problems of every individual in society would be represented and receive equality of treatment. However attractive this scenario may be pragmatic considerations automatically rule it out for, not only would the necessary bureaucracy be so cumbersome as to be ineffectual and costs prohibitive but, by definition, such a system would negate itself. Equality of treatment of interests is impossible for the simple reason that one person’s interest is another person’s problem: the environmentalist seeking tighter river purification legislation would be counterbalanced by the equality of treatment offered to the industrialist seeking a method of disposing of by-products and effluents. However, it is the existence of these competing interests which is seen to ensure the maintenance of liberal democracy. Democracy implies equality, yet as Phillips (1991) argues, when applied to an unequal society it allows some people to count for more than others. In other words, in the real world some interests are given, or take, priority over others. This prioritisation of interests, whether conscious or not, is the very essence of decision-making. This is why who decides, and what priorities decision-makers have and how they perceive, and, as Bacchi (1999) outlines, how they represent the issue is crucial to the policy outcome.

There is a general consensus among students of decision-making that decisions automatically invo...