Human Feelings

Explorations in Affect Development and Meaning

Steven L. Ablon, Daniel P. Brown, Edward J. Khantzian, John E. Mack, Steven L. Ablon, Daniel P. Brown, Edward J. Khantzian, John E. Mack

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781138881594
• eBook ISBN: 9781134886975
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Emotions in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Human Feelings provides a comprehensive overview of the role of emotions in human life. Growing out of the research and writing of members of the Harvard Affect Study Group, the volume brings to bear different disciplinary outlooks and different modes of inquiry on various aspects of human affective experience. The book opens with an section of "Theoretical Considerations" that includes an overview of affective development across the life cycle, an examination of affect and character, and an empirical analysis of gender differences in the expression of emotion. A series of clinical reports involving patients in different age groups comprises the next section, "Affect and the Life Cycle." Subsequent sections on "Trauma, Addiction, and Psychosomatics" and "Transformations of Affect" traverse the realms of neurobiology, addictive suffering, stress disorders, epistemology, creativity, and social organization. A final section, "New Directions," further extends the frontiers of inquiry into nonordinary states of consciousness and the vicissitudes of well-being.

An integrative collection of multidisciplinary sweep and scholarly integrity, Human Feelings is a readable source book that brings together rigorous theoretical and developmental studies, experientially vivid self-reporting, and a wealth of illustrative clinical material. An invaluable addition to the libraries of mental health professionals and developmental researchers, this volume will be illuminating for philosophers, social and political scientists, and lay readers as well.

Part I

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The first section of this volume is devoted to developmental theories of affect. No comprehensive theory of affective development across the life span exists in the literature. Yet in the past decade there has been a great deal of interest in affect and affective development. A variety of affect development theories have appeared in the literature, some based on child observation studies and some on clinical observations. Most of the theories are limited to affect development in infancy and do not address affect development in latency, adolescence, or adulthood. The chapters in this section were written to address these gaps in the literature.

Daniel Brown, in “Affective Development, Psychopathology, and Adaptation,” describes a comprehensive and integrative theory of affect development from early infancy through adulthood, basing the chapter on developmental-lines theory, an integration of psychoanalytic clinical-developmental theory, and a rapidly growing body of empirical findings from child observations and child experimental studies. According to Brown's model, there are at least eight major developmental tasks along the normal line of affective development: affect expression, affect experience, affect tolerance, affect verbalization, affect defense, affect orientation, transformation of affect, and consciousness of affect processes. These tasks span from infancy (affect expression and affect experience) to childhood (affect tolerance, verbalization, and defense) to latency (affect orientation) to adolescence (transformation of affect) and to adulthood (consciousness of affect processes). A strength of this model is its extension to latency, adolescence, and adulthood. The developmental task posed at each stage in the structuralization of affect is discussed in detail along with supporting clinical theory, child observation, and empirical data.

Brown shows how his theory of affective development can be applied to clinical situations. He understands psychopathology as a failure of affective development, describing four primary levels of affective psychopathological organization: psychosis, personality disorder, neurosis, and relative health (the psychopathology of everyday life). Each is associated with a failure to master one or more of the tasks along the line of affective development.

One limitation of Brown's developmental model for affect is that it focuses on immediate affective states. Allen Palmer, in “Affect and Character,” addresses the related issue of enduring affective structures. According to his review of the psychoanalytic theories of affect and character development, repetitive sequences of affect can lead to greater continuity and stability of affective states over time. Central to Palmer's thinking is the concept of structuralization of affect. Repetitive sequences of affective states, or evolving core affective dispositions, become integrated with ideational, memory, and regulatory structures and also with self and object representations. The outcome is the formation of stable character style with a unique affective tone or affective signature.

Neither Brown's nor Palmer's chapter adequately addresses the complex issue of individual differences in affective development. Leslie Brody, in “On Understanding Gender Differences in the Expression of Emotions: Gender Roles, Socialization, and Language” thoroughly reviews the existing literature on sex role and gender differences in affective development, and presents some of her own current research on this important topic. Although methodological limitations in many of the studies on gender differences have limited this area of inquiry, nevertheless a clear pattern emerges from the many studies. Brody presents consistent research findings that boys and girls significantly differ in emotional expression. Generally, girls are more intensely emotionally expressive than boys, except in the expression of anger, and boys tend to express emotions more in action-oriented behaviors than girls do. Brody appreciates that these gender differences arise from various sources, such as genetics, biological constitution, and socialization. She believes, however, that socialization makes the main contribution to gender differences. Empirical findings, for example, suggest that emotions are discussed and displayed by parents in one way with boys and in a different way with girls. It seems that parents socialize the emotional development of boys and girls in quite different ways between them. Brody discusses historical differences in gender roles that contribute to this differentiated socialization.

Taken as a unit, these three chapters define the domain of affective developmental theory with respect to the immediate experience of affective states, enduring affective structures associated with character traits, and individual differences in affective development. The next section will show how these dimensions of affect can be applied to clinical situations and other areas of experience.

Chapter 1

AFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND ADAPTATION

Daniel Brown

THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENTAL LINES

There is growing consensus that adult psychopathology can be understood with reference to normal child development. This point of view is represented currently by a movement in psychoanalysis known as developmental lines thinking (A. Freud, 1965), structural psychoanalysis (Baker, 1990; Gedo and Goldberg, 1973) or developmental psychopathology (Sroufe and Rutter, 1984). The field represents an integration of the rapidly proliferating literature on child observational and experimental studies on one hand and a variety of psychoanalytic theories on the other, namely, object relations theory (Horner, 1979; Jacobson, 1973; Kernberg, 1968, 1976; Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, 1975), self psychology (Bach, 1977; Kohut, 1971; Lichtenberg, 1975; Ornstein, 1974; Stolorow and Lachmann, 1980), ego psychology (Blanck and Blanck, 1974), affective development theory (Brown, 1985; Emde, 1983; Greenspan and Lourie, 1981; Sroufe, 1979b), and integrative psychoanalytic theory (Blanck and Blanck, 1974; Gedo, 1984; Gedo and Goldberg, 1973). Human development is seen as a series of phase-specific tasks, the successful mastery of which leads to the emergence of more and more complex psychic structures. Psychopathology is viewed as a failure to master expected developmental tasks or predicted structural achievements.

A comprehensive theory of affective development has not yet appeared, although a number of models for the developmental line of affect have appeared in the literature, particularly in the last decade (Bridges, 1932; Emde, 1983; Greenspan and Lourie, 1981; Kagan and Greenspan, 1986; Lane and Schwartz, 1987; Lewis and Brooks, 1978; Piers and Curry, 1985; Sander, 1975; Sroufe, 1979b, 1984; Stern, 1985). Each of these differs in its conceptualization of and perspective on the stages of affective development. Few of these models are comprehensive in scope in that the developmental stages beyond preschool years are rarely described in any detail.

At this time, there is enough convergence in the thinking about these recently appearing models for affective development to justify an integrated and comprehensive model for normal affective development. The model described here builds on the previous works and is integrative in its attempt to synthesize a rapidly growing body of empirical findings from child observation and child experimental studies with psychoanalytically based theories of developmental psychopathology. The model is comprehensive in its attempt to elaborate the stages of affective development from infancy to adulthood.

THE STAGES OF AFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORMAL CHILD

Affect Expression

Some theorists have argued that affect is innate because a complex array of affective expressions is observable shortly after birth (Demos, 1982; Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962, 1963, 1968). Other theorists have proposed models for a sequential unfolding of discrete stages of normal affective development (Emde, 1983; Greenspan and Lourie, 1981; Lane and Schwartz, 1987; Lewis and Brooks, 1978; Sander, 1975; Sroufe, 1979a, b, c, 1984; Sroufe and Jacobvitz, 1989). According to them, affective experience is contingent on the development of self-observational capacity and upon the maturation of cognitive capacities. Even though genetic and developmental perspectives on affect are a matter of considerable controversy, the nature and nurture positions need not entirely contradict each other. The genetic theories are based on observations of infant affective expression, the developmental theories on inferences about infant subjectively felt affective experience. Both pertain to different aspects of affect, expression, and experience, respectively. The position taken in this chapter is that the capacity for affective expression may be innate, but the capacity for affect experience unfolds in the course of development.

Research strongly suggests that the equipment for affective expression is innate. The normal infant is biologically endowed with a repertoire of specific, basic, programmed response patterns, which are made up primarily of sets of discrete facial muscles but which may also include visceral (autonomic, glandular) elements. Infants’ facial response patterns are highly specific, so that Tomkins has considered the face to be the “organ of affect” (Tomkins, 1968), although this view has been disputed (Ortony and Turner, 1990). Such display patterns can be recognized accurately at birth (Demos, 1982) and can be identified accurately across cultures (Ekman and Friesen, 1986; Izard, 1971).

According to Tomkins (1962, 1963, 1968, 1970; Tomkins and McCarter, 1964), there are eight primary facial response patterns. Each of these eight affective expressive patterns occurs in both a moderate and a high-intensity version: interest-excitement, enjoyment-joy, surprisestartle, distress-anguish, fear-terror, shame-humiliation, contemptdisgust, and anger-rage (Tomkins, 1968). Izard (1977) recognizes ten primary patterns in the belief that contempt and disgust represent separate facial response patterns. He also adds guilt to his list of emotions. The first three listed as basic affects are the so-called positive emotions; the rest are the negative emotions. According to Tomkins and Izard, each of these facial display patterns is characterized by a discrete neuromuscular pattern. Each is triggered by a specific pattern of neural stimulation. For example, interest-excitement is triggered by an increase in neural stimulation, typically by change or novelty. Eyebrows turn down, and the gaze remains fixed on its object during the state of interest. Enjoyment-joy, triggered by a sharp reduction in the gradient of neural stimulation, is characterized by the muscles’ forming the smiling response. Surprisestartle, triggered by a sharp increase in neural stimulation, is characterized by raising the eyebrows and blinking the eyes. Distress-anguish is triggered by sustained levels of nonoptimal stimulation and is characterized by the muscles of the crying response—the corners of the lips are pulled downward and the eyebrows become arched. Fear-terror is triggered by a too rapid acceleration in neural stimulation and is characterized by keeping the eyes frozen open in a fixed stare and exhibiting a tendency to move away from the object (and often by autonomic changes). Shame-humiliation occurs in the context of an emotional relationship and functions to inhibit interest and to reduce facial communication. It is characterized by a lowering of the head, eyes, and eyelids. Contemptdisgust is characterized by raising the upper lip in a sneer and functions to distance oneself from the object. Anger-rage is triggered by interference with goal-oriented activity and is characterized by a frown and a clenched jaw.

Tomkins (1968) believes that each of these facial display patterns is a way of automatically signaling the continuous vicissitudes of stimulation—especially when the intensity of the stimulation is too weak or too strong, when the duration of the stimulation is too long or too short (distress and anger), or when the rate of stimulation is either changing in one direction or another (surprise and fear) or maintained at an optimal level of stimulation (interest). Other facial display patterns function to inhibit interest (shame and contempt). Tomkins believes that the facial display patterns are reflexive behaviors in response to unlearned stimuli.

There is some debate as to what triggers such early affective expressions. Evolutionary theorists like Tomkins believe that the neonate is capable of rapid and spontaneous responding to the vicissitudes of stimulation through specific facial display patterns. Tomkins believes that the facial display patterns are innately activated via preprogrammed subcortical centers according to the vicissitudes of neural firing—that is, changes in the intensity and duration of stimulation. In this view, the neonate manifests direct and spontaneous changes in affective expression according to the contingencies of the internal and external stimulation. Pribram and Melges (1969, 1980) and other neurobiologists argue that it is not the amount of neural firing per se but the organization or “configuration of neural activity” that triggers affective expression. Although the relative contribution of innate programming and early learned organization remains unclear, both Tomkins and Pribram agree that the neonate is capable of rapid and spontaneous response to the vicissitudes of stimulation through the use of specific facial expressions.

Facial display patterns have a clear adaptive function: They facilitate survival by automatically signaling to the care-giving environment the need to adjust the pattern of stimulation for the neonate, whose perceptual system has not yet matured. Facial affective displays function to amplify sensory stimuli (Tomkins, 1962, 1963, 1968), to highlight the salience of vital stimulus-events, and to communicate the need for modulation of the stimulus-pattern to the care-giving environment (Demos, 1982). Affective expressions “guarantee sensitivity to whatever is new, whatever is continuous for any period of time, and to whatever is ceasing to happen,” so that the neonate can find the optimal flow of stimulation that will prompt the perceptual system toward its own maturation (Tomkins, 1968, p. 330).

The eight or ten basic facial display patterns are present at and functioning from birth, but the operation of their muscle groups becomes increasingly refined and coordinated as the child grows. The infant learns to blend discrete display patterns into combinations. The eight or ten basic units function like an expressive alphabet, in which an infinite variety of complex blends become possible that allow for the expression of many subtle emotional nuances.

The expression of certain facial display patterns are either enhanced or inhibited in certain cultural milieus. The reflexive action of these basic units of facial display becomes increasingly mediated by cognitive processes later in development. Thinking about or imagining situations that evoke distinct affects is accompanied by discrete facial display patterns, not overtly noticeable to the subject or the observer but clearly detectable by electromyographic (EMG) response (Schwartz et al., 1976). Thus, for most adults, the continuous facial expression of affects is observable only subliminally, while discontinuous or discrete moments of strong affect (affective states) may be more readily observable to others

The Development of Affective Experience

Interest and Self-Regulation

The task of affective development in the first quarter of the first year of life is twofold: The external task is to actively search the environment so as to develop schemes for perceptual information. The internal task is to maintain inner homeostasis during perceptual maturation. Greenspan and Lourie (1981) have coined the terms “engagement” and “self regulation” for each of these tasks, respectively. The neurobiologist, Pribram (1980) uses the terms “participation” and “preparation,” respectively, for each. He stresses the child's active role in bringing organized stability to the central nervous system. Both processes are part of an overall ta...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Contributors
• Introduction—Steven L. Ablon
• Part I Theoretical Considerations
• Part II Affect and the Life Cycle
• Part III Trauma, Addiction, and Psychosomatics
• Part IV Transformations of Affect
• Part V New Directions
• Index