Culture and Politics

Jan-Erik Lane, Uwe Wagschal

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415673259
• eBook ISBN: 9781136650222
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This concise, accessible text presents an overview of the relevance of culture for politics. Culture figures prominently in the theories of the great classics such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber. Recently, the cultural approach to politics has developed quickly, and the concept of political culture has played a role in these developments, particularly given the emergence of large-scale survey research into political value orientations.

Seeking to outline this rapid development, the book is divided into three sections:

• Section I of the book discusses the relevance of cultural perspectives to political analysis including discussion of the most significant concepts and methods.
• Section II looks at the core elements of political culture – tradition, ethnicity and religion.
• Section III examines emerging research avenues and opportunities including social capital, value orientations in the postmodern world, newer formulations of political culture such as gender and sexuality and the influence of the environment.

Drawing on a wealth of examples and a comprehensive analysis of comparative data, this textbook is essential reading for all students of political culture, research methods, political sociology and comparative politics.

Part I

On the methodology of
cultural analysis

The current debate on the costs and benefits of cultural analysis (CA) in comparison with those of rational choice (RC) includes reflections on the scientific status of the models in these two approaches. While RC has its roots in the neoclassical decision model of economics and expands its scope into the social sciences, CA accepts from the beginning the possibility of altruistic behaviour and the primacy of moral commitments in human communities. But these methodological differences do not carry over to the objectivity of social research. Whatever starting point one may have in analysing and interpreting human behaviour or social systems, and whatever values or bias one may bring to this research, all results from scientific enquiry need empirical validation.

CA does not, like RC, possess a strong set of methodological assumptions that outline enquiry procedure. The paradigm of RC has been illuminated by scholars such as Becker (1976) and Shepsle (2010), who have created the canon for research. The discussion of the pros and cons of RC methodology is known as the rational choice controversy (Friedman 1996). In CA there is great methodological variety as well as dissent on the merits of alternative approaches. We shall discuss two issues in the methodological debate surrounding CA, namely whether cultural enquiry can be objective, and whether cultural enquiry has a specific methodology radically separate from that of RC. The thesis about a special methodology for CA is by no means a new one, since a radical separation between two methodologies, that of the natural sciences and that of the cultural sciences, was already made 100 years ago. It has, however, received new relevance with the emergence of hermeneutics in the social sciences, especially in sociology and anthropology, challenging positivism – see for instance the cultural studies by Geertz (1988).

Here we shall examine the thesis that cultural enquiry has a subjectivist bent that makes it different from other forms of scientific investigation. The subjectivist thesis comes in two versions, one focusing upon the problem of scientific objectivity as well as ethical neutrality and the other dealing with the proposed inherently subjective nature of the topics of the cultural sciences, namely human conduct. The first subjectivist thesis is of an epistemological nature, whereas the second refers to ontology. We will question the radical methodological position that cultural analysis is inherently ‘subjective’, meaning that the ordinary canons of the conduct of scientific enquiry do not apply to CA, in Chapter 1. However, we shall argue in Chapter 2 that cultural enquiry is special in the sense that it often employs interpretation techniques as well as the case study method.

1 Cultural enquiry

Scientific objectivity and ethical neutrality

Introduction

Cultural analysis, it may be pointed out, has a different methodology from that of rational choice analysis. CA employs an interpretative methodology and does not proceed from a small number of axiomatic assumptions as does RC. CA is highly suitable for research into the postmodern society, where identity, meaning and borders are problematic. This is also the case within postmodernist philosophy. But it is often argued that CA has an inherent tendency towards subjectivism or value bias, since its focus is values. Aaron Wildavsky once asked whether postmodernism had killed scientific objectivity, stating his position succinctly:

My largest aim in teaching a seminar on political cultures is to bring values and facts, humanistic understanding and social science methods together as part and parcel of the same mode of analysis, abandoning neither the rigor of scientific intention nor the substance of humanistic concern.

(Wildavsky 2005: 339)

In the following section we shall discuss the notion of scientific objectivity, especially with regard to the social sciences and cultural studies. One must today raise the issue of whether scientific research in general and academic enquiry in particular can be said to deliver objective knowledge in an ethically neutral manner, when the information society à la McLuhan has replaced the ivory towers of yesterday’s academic world.

We live now in an information society where knowledge production is a huge undertaking, involving not only the academic entities but also government bureaus and private enterprises. The postmodern society provides Big Science with a prominent role in social and economic change. Big Science is not only preoccupied with explaining the natural world and the universe, but also investigates human behaviour and values. Thus, not only is economic research the focus of global projects, but cultural analysis has internationally risen in importance as evidenced by research such as the BIG (Beliefs in Government) project or the several waves of the World Values Survey (WVS). However, we must ask whether human culture and its values can be researched across countries in an objective manner; are its methods themselves value neutral, and are its findings intersubjectively testable? If all research today is value ingrained, then perhaps CA is more so than RC.

Objectivity in academic research

Academic institutions are of crucial importance for enhancing knowledge as the pursuit of truth; this has been shown in the many investigations into the social functions of universities and colleges since the American Carnegie Commission in 1970. United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Association of Universities (IAU) both arrive at the same conclusion in their respective efforts to promote higher education, defending its claim to autonomy (Neave and van Vught 1991). University autonomy is crucial partly because it promotes scientific objectivity and ethical neutrality in science. Yet we must rethink the principles of university autonomy in this era of the information society with its Big Science. As the scientific enterprise with its numerous academic institutions and research centres has come to dominate society, will scientific research remain objective and impartial? Can it be so in the social and cultural sciences?

The problem can be described as follows. Higher education units have grown exponentially in size and complexity since the Second World War. Their research operations are increasingly linked with the needs of huge organizations, such as government, multinational corporations and organized interests, for applied knowledge. So-called research parks mushroom, where high-powered academic interests are to be combined with mundane and down-to-earth activities that have quick applications and huge profits. Various so-called think-tanks, whether funded by right-wing or left-wing interests, claim to deliver the same high-profile research as age-old universities. Scholars work with both private laboratories and university research centres, and move easily from one to the other. University professors are sometimes active within a political party or openly state their political preferences. Not only is social science research highly policy relevant, but increasingly so is natural science enquiry. Higher education is looked upon as the bringer of change in a country, building its future, although a future alternative possibility would be a democratic decision made by ordinary men and women. Will academic research bend to the interests of powerful organizations and bypass its pursuit of pure research and the dissemination of the truth, as suggested by Appignanesi and Horrocks (2002)?

The issue of the autonomy of academic research has two somewhat contradictory sides. On the one hand, higher education has become so large and so prestigious that it constitutes a system of its own in society, being able to challenge the state and powerful private interests. On the other hand, higher education has developed so many links with the government and the private sector that it is no longer clear what independent and neutral pursuit of truth embodies. What, then, is the meaning of scientific objectivity and ethical neutrality today? When suggesting an answer to this essential question, let us start from the position outlined by Weber in the early twentieth century before the arrival of the information society and Big Science.

Weber’s theory of science and society

At a time when there was ‘Little Science’, a concentration of classical university research at a few centres of excellence of modest size, Weber outlined a theory for the ethics of the scientific community. It has been much commented upon and also criticized, but it is worth restating here as the benchmark for a discussion of a new scientific ethic in the period of Big Science.

Weber never presented a coherent collection of his ideas concerning objectivity, neutrality and science as a vocation. They are to be found in various places, i.e. in articles written over a long time-span, essentially from 1904 to 1918, two years before his death. These papers each have a different aim, and one has to work to extract from them a persuasive theory of the relationship between science and society. It may be justifiable to list the key papers (Weber 1946, 1949, 1968a, 1978b):

• ‘Science as Vocation’ (1918) (Weber 1946)
• ‘The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality in Sociology and Economics’ (1918) (Weber 1949)
• ‘Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy’ (1904) (Weber 1949)
• ‘Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences’ (1906) (Weber 1949).

These papers were edited together in volumes after his death in 1920 (Weber 1968a), and were translated into English rather late, only after the Second World War. Although they deal with several topics, and are often written in a polemical fashion against other contemporaries of Weber, one may chisel out a coherent position regarding the conduct of academic research and the search for true knowledge in a society where politics and practical interests had begun to have considerable impact on universities.

Weber aims to preserve the notion of science as the impartial pursuit of objective knowledge, although he had realized that many factors impinge on science: values, biases, interests, pecuniary rewards, propaganda, politics, etc. His attempt to rescue the notion of the pure pursuit of true knowledge includes an argument based upon the following principles:

• Ultimate values guide human action, and they cannot be verified by science.
• Science is dependent upon these ultimate values, i.e. science has value premises.
• Value premises influence the choice of scientific topics of interest and decide whether science is useful or not.
• It is not proper for scholars to propagate their value premises.
• Although value premises permeate science, there rests a core of scientific beliefs that can be objective, value neutral and true.

Science as a vocation

Weber’s theory sets up a tension between his value premises, which suggest what is interesting and useful, and the scientific beliefs that purportedly describe the world as it exists or may be theoretically conceived. Extensive discussion has focused on whether this balance can be upheld, especially in regard to the social sciences and economics (Nagel 1961; Kaplan 1998; Bohman 2000). One argument states that value premises play such a major role in driving the scientific establishment that objectivity and neutrality must be sacrificed (Myrdal 1990). The counter-argument points to the rationality of value premises, hinting at the possibility of rationally motivating ultimate values. Whether Weber’s sharp distinction between science and values is defensible or not, it remains true that his theory suits a society with Little Science but not a society with Big Science. It is a philosophy of science and society for the period of the so-called Privatdozent, i.e. the German researcher who volunteers his or her career in the pursuit of pure or objective knowledge. If the researcher’s call (Beruf) is strong enough, the balance between scientific objectivity and neutrality and the propagation of ultimate values may be upheld. With the arrival of a Big Science society after the Second World War and its enormous expansion of academia and higher education, in numbers of students as well as units, Weber’s theory of scientific ethics appears outdated.

In his article ‘Science as Vocation’, Weber discusses an issue concerning the meaning or the purposes of science. He lists three major aims as:

• to create technology for controlling life, by calculating external objects as well as human activities;
• to develop methods of thinking, the tools and training for thought;
• to gain clarity. (Weber 1946: 129–156)

However, he downplays the importance of these three functions since science cannot help resolve the great Tolstoyan mystery of life: What is good conduct? Why do we live our lives as we do? Again, it is the sharp distinction between science and ultimate values that makes the difference. Even if science had the above-specified functions, one could ask: Qui bono: Science remains to Weber a means that cannot decide upon its ultimate value(s).

From Weber’s theory of science and society and his ethics of science springs the following antinomy:

• Science in itself carries the undeniable claim to objectivity and value neutrality. It is an activity with its own vocation that can never be compromised. Here, he elevates science to the ivory tower position.
• Science cannot help resolve the most basic questions of human existence. As it has no intrinsic value, Weber debases the relevance of science.

Perhaps these two ideas – both the elevation of science and its debasement – were correct for the time of Little Science. In Big Science, one has seen a complete reversal of these two principles. Therefore, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between science and any pursuit of information. Conversely, science appears to be involved in almost every serious human activity today, making it highly relevant to almost every aspect of life. In an information society with Big Science, almost all of the parameters change: funding...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Culture and Politics
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Foreword
• List of abbreviations
• Introductory chapter: on cultural analysis of politics
• PART I On the methodology of cultural analysis
• PART II Elements of culture
• PART III Research into value-orientations: some critiques
• PART IV Exploration into new values
• Appendix 8.1
• Bibliography
• Index