Crimes of Globalization

Dawn Rothe, David Friedrichs, David O. Friedrichs

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780415856300
• eBook ISBN: 9781135005863
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

This book addresses immensely consequential crimes in the world today that, to date, have been almost wholly neglected by students of crime and criminal justice: crimes of globalization. This term refers to the hugely harmful consequences of the policies and practices of international financial institutions – principally in the global South. A case is made for characterizing these policies and practices specifically as crime. Although there is now a substantial criminological literature on transnational crimes, crimes of states and state-corporate crimes, crimes of globalization intersect with, but are not synonymous with, these crimes.

Identifying specific reasons why students of crime and criminal justice should have an interest in this topic, this text also identifies underlying assumptions, defines key terms, and situates crimes of globalization within the criminological enterprise. The authors also define crimes of globalization and review the literature to date on the topic; review the current forms of crimes of globalization; outline an integrated theory of crimes of globalization; and identify the challenges of controlling the international financial institutions that perpetrate crimes of globalization, including the role of an emerging Global Justice Movement.

The authors of this book have published widely on white collar crime, crimes of states, state-corporate crime and related topics. This book will be essential reading for academics and students of crime and criminal justice who, the authors argue, need to attend to emerging forms of crime that arise specifically out of the conditions of globalization in our increasingly globalized, rapidly changing world.

1

CRIMES OF GLOBALIZATION AND THE CRIMINOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE

In this chapter we propose to offer some context for our claim that crimes of globalization should be more widely adopted as a criminological concern. In the interest of supporting our claim we begin with a “genealogy” of our project here, and an identification of some underlying assumptions we bring to the project. Next, we address some of the core terms and concepts that arise in relation to crimes of globalization. We then turn to a consideration of two core concepts at the center of our project: “crime” and “globalization.” Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the criminological enterprise, and situates “crimes of globalization” within this enterprise as it evolves early in the twenty-first century.

A cautionary note would seem to be called for here. The relevant literature on the matters addressed in this book is vast. The challenges of globalization are endlessly complex. We are profoundly conscious that we have only identified selective dimensions of the realm within which crimes of globalization occur. For all kinds of reasons, human existence becomes progressively more complicated, with an escalation of complexities of all kinds (Spier 2010). The prominent American writer E. L. Doctorow (2008) has invoked the metaphor of Moby Dick—the white whale—to represent the thesis that the new century may be too much for us to apprehend. So we proceed here with a sense of humility, with no illusion that our account of crimes of globalization can possibly be comprehensive in all respects.

The path to crimes of globalization: underlying assumptions

Our call for criminological attention to crimes of globalization has hardly emerged in a vacuum or out of whole cloth. It is a product of many different strains of criminological inquiry.

First, our project is more closely aligned with an enduring humanistic as opposed to a positivistic tradition within criminology. This humanistic tradition draws core inspiration from the humanities—philosophy, history, literature—as opposed to the natural sciences. It stresses interpretation and description over the testing of hypotheses. It relies more upon qualitative than quantitative data. It accepts the capacity of humans to create and give meaning to their world, and to act in that world, although human action is profoundly influenced by the social environment, broadly conceived. It questions the viability of claims that true objectivity is possible in the endeavor of making sense of the world, and that social observers should always assume a stance of neutrality in relation to matters of social policy. Let us be clear: we do not dispute that work carried out within the alternative, positivistic criminological tradition has value; “scientific” studies can contribute something to our understanding of crime and its control and quantitative data can be useful. We draw upon some work carried out within this tradition when it seems helpful to do so. But the overall interpretation of crimes of globalization set forth here is more closely aligned with the humanistic tradition.

Second, we identify strongly with a multi-disciplinary understanding of the criminological enterprise, as opposed to the notion that criminology can or should claim the status of a unified discipline. The fundamental issues of crime and its control, broadly conceived, are endlessly complex, and a sophisticated understanding of these issues draws upon a wide range of disciplines. Of course it has long been acknowledged—perhaps by most criminologists—that criminology usefully draws upon sociology as a core foundation, as well as such disciplines as history, political science, economics, psychology, anthropology, and for at least some criminologists, biology and neuroscience. The significance of the scholarly field of international affairs has been far less recognized. In an increasingly globalized world, the realm of scholarship generated in relation to international affairs becomes increasingly important. Accordingly, here we draw upon knowledge and insights generated by scholars aligned with a broad range of disciplines.

Third, we reject the notion of uni-causal explanations of crime or “general” theories of crime and its control. Crime and its control are far too complex for such explanations and theories. Crimes of globalization and the control of such crime can only be understood through the application of an integrated, multi-dimensional theory of crime, and we put forth the basic dimensions of such a theoretical approach as applied to crimes of globalization in Chapter 4. Some initiatives toward the development of integrated theories have been developed within mainstream criminology, and some within critical criminology. We draw principally upon the latter efforts. Some integrated theories have been applied to conventional crime, and some to white collar crime, or to crimes of states. Again, our effort is part of the latter initiatives.

Fourth, we draw principally upon a criminology of the crimes of the powerful, as opposed to the traditional focus of criminology on the crimes of the powerless. Crimes of globalization fall under the broad ambit of white collar crime (in the European literature often labeled “economic crime”) rather than conventional crime. Crimes of globalization, in colloquial terms, are “suite crimes,” not “street crimes.” Criminology as a whole, throughout the past century and even today, privileges attention to the latter over the former. Within white collar crime scholarship, and going back at least to the pioneering work of Edwin H. Sutherland, there has been attention to individual offenders and to organizational offenders. In relation to crimes of globalization, the principal focus is upon organizational offenders, although the role of individual actors is not wholly disregarded. A criminology of white collar crime is now firmly established. We also draw upon more recently emergent criminologies of crimes of states, sometimes characterized as international criminology or supra-national criminology.

Fifth, the general framework of criminological concern has been on crime that occurs locally, then within a “state” (in the sense of the fifty states of the United States), and then within a country (or in the American context, within federal jurisdiction). In recent years we have the emergence of a transnational and global criminology, and obviously attention to “crimes of globalization” by definition is a proposed element of a rapidly evolving global criminology. We will have more to say about global criminology later in this chapter.

Sixth, through most of its history the dominant focus of criminology has been on criminal offenders. From the 1960s on, however, a revival of the original eighteenth-century “classical” school focus on the criminal justice system itself became a very large part of the criminological enterprise, although often as part of the “field” of criminal justice. And principally from the 1970s on (albeit with earlier roots) we have the emergence of more systematic attention to victims of crime, as part of victimology and a victim’s rights movement. A criminology of crimes of globalization ultimately must attend not only to offenders but to entities of control and to victims. The field of criminal justice studies has overwhelmingly—in the American context, as an example—attended to local, state and federal criminal justice agencies in relation to conventional forms of crime. These entities have to date a limited and often indirect engagement with crimes of globalization. Accordingly, we must look to international and civil society entities in relation to actual or potential sources of control over the parties that perpetrate crimes of globalization.

Seventh, for the mainstream of criminology the key term “crime” has been defined in terms of violations of the criminal law within a particular local, state, or federal jurisdiction. But an alternative tradition in relation to the meaning of “crime” applies the term more broadly. Attention to “crimes of globalization,” as will be evident, is aligned with the calls for broader conceptions of the meaning of crime, and for criminological attention to harms not encompassed by the criminal law. The definition of crime issue is addressed further on in this chapter.

Eighth, during the course of its history criminology has generated a large number—some would suggest a bewildering variety—of criminological perspectives and theories. It has not been uncommon to classify many of these perspectives and theories as falling under the ambit of “mainstream” criminology, whereas many others are seen as manifestations of an alternative—non-mainstream—tradition. We identify with and draw principally (although not exclusively) from this latter tradition. We address the application of different strains of critical criminology to crimes of globalization in the final section of this chapter.

Key terms in relation to crimes of globalization

The type of crime addressed here occurs within the context of a globalized world. Much about this world and the way to best characterize it is contested. Some of the key terms that are invoked in relation to crimes of globalization are used in quite different ways, and some terms are regarded as fundamentally misleading while others are regarded as pejorative or politically incorrect. It may be useful here to identify some of these terms and to acknowledge early on the contested meaning of some of them.

Both the terms crime and globalization are hugely problematic, insofar as both terms are invoked to mean many different things. Since these two terms are literally the core terms for a project focused upon “crimes of globalization” we will address each of them at some length in the next two sections of this chapter.

Crimes of globalization principally occur within the poorer countries of the world. But how are these countries best described or labeled? For a long period of time the term Third World has been used for such countries. This term originated in the 1950s (inspired by the three “estates” of eighteenth-century France): the United States exemplified a First World country; the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia) a Second World country. The economically struggling countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America—with a colonial past, in most cases—were the Third World countries. Although the term continues to be quite widely invoked, some observers reject it as arbitrary in terms of which countries should be included and pejorative in relation to the link with a colonial past. Some other terms applied to the countries where crimes of globalization are concentrated include: the global South, developing countries—or least developed countries (LDC)—non-industrial countries, non-aligned countries, debtor countries, majority countries (in the sense that the majority of the world’s population live in such countries), and countries of the periphery (in World System theory). Any such terms have limitations of some kind. We have chosen in this book to go principally with the global South.

Since mention has been made of the World System, which historically has been dominated by such core countries as Great Britain and the United States, we can also note that some commentators refer to a Global Empire and a New International Economic Order. While such terms are used somewhat interchangeably, in relation to our project here the second of these is perhaps the best fit.

If the countries of the global South are the developing countries those of the West or global North are variously also referred to as rich countries, industrialized countries, part of the Triad, or the developed countries (with the similarity of developing and developed surely generating some confusion). These “developed” countries have long aligned themselves, most formally in the recent era as part of G6 countries that met in 1975 in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. With the addition of Canada they became the G7 countries and when Russia was added they became the G8 countries (made up of, in addition to Canada and Russia: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States). Russia is sometimes classified as one of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) that were in an earlier era classified among the developing countries but are now viewed as “newly industrialized” with such fast growing economies that the developing country classification no longer applies. The BRICS countries first met in 2006 on their common interests, with South Africa the most recent addition (in 2010) to this group. These countries are also sometimes referred to as Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). However, an important cautionary note needs to be introduced in all of this. Obviously those who live in the global North include millions of powerless, poor people, illegal immigrants among them; and those who live in the global South or the BRICS countries include millions of comfortably middle-class people and some extremely wealthy people, including billionaires. Given this, one should not think of the global North and the global South in exclusively geographical terms, but more in terms of asymmetrical global distributions of power and privilege.

In 1999 a proposal surfaced for a broader forum economic affairs council in a rapidly expanding international financial system. In 2008, in response to the unfolding global financial crisis of that year, top finance ministers of nineteen wealthy nations plus the European Union first met to address common concerns. These countries collectively account for some 80 percent of the gross world product (GWP). Hence the term G20 countries has now surfaced as a replacement economic council for the more limited G8 countries. The G20 countries in subsequent meetings have been the target of protests that their perspective and policy proposals are skewed to favor the powerful and the privileged.

The term Western hegemony refers to the dominance of the developed countries of the West (or global North) not only economically but politically and culturally (and in technological terms). Somewhat more narrowly, the economic dominance of the recent era—essentially, since the 1980s (with Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in Great Britain as dominant leaders)—has been largely driven by neo-liberalism, free market fundamentalism, or the Washington consensus. All three of these terms are often used interchangeably, and refer to essentially the same thing: economic policy should privilege “free” markets and private sector enterprise—or a purely capitalist economic system—over one with substantial government or public sector controls and engagement. As Margaret Thatcher famously declared, “[T]here is no alternative.” But this “free” market model is alternatively characterized as a “rigged” game greatly favoring Western corporations and financial institutions—and countries of the global North more broadly—over all other constituencies.

If “neo-liberalism” has become the dominant economic orientation of the global North countries, various theorists have promoted concepts that transcend purely economic considerations to capture essential emerging dimensions of contemporary society. Manuel Castells’ (2004) is associated with promoting the concept of a network society. By this term Castells means that we increasingly live in a world of global networks made possible by advanced communication technologies, challenging traditional hierarchies of governance. We find this term useful in relation to crimes of globalization because global networks of public, private and semi-public/private actors and entities make such crime possible. Ulrich Beck (2008) is associated with promoting the concept of risk society. By this term Beck means that the intensification of dangers from environmental, financial, terrorist-driven and other global threats has dramatic consequences and has transformed the way in which people think of contemporary social existence. We regard this term as useful also in relation to crimes of globalization because at their core they involve the shifting of huge risks—economic, environmental and other—on to people in the global South countries especially poorly positioned to protect themselves from such risks.

With all the attention to an increasingly globalized and inter-connected (and inter-dependent) world there is widespread recognition that states have hardly disappeared as key actors in this world, and in some accounts they are even more potent actors than at an earlier time. The term nation-state is sometimes applied. The principal value of the term nation-state is that it clarifies that here one is not speaking of “state” in reference to Pennsylvania, Virginia, and so on—obviously in the U.S. context a source of confusion in relation to the invocation of the term “state.” However, it assumes that a nation must be a state and on the flip side, that a state must be a nation. If one considers Palestine, which is not a recognized state but a territory and, one could argue, a nation, we can appreciate the confusion from using such a term. As such, we invoke the terms state and country interchangeably. If the states of the global North (starting with the United States) are commonly regarded as strong and generally stable, at least some of the states of the global South are characterized as weak, fragile, failed or even collapsed states. To the extent that such characterizations are warranted, the question arises: to what extent should this state of affairs be attributed to internal failings and to what extent to the policies and practices of the powerful states and the international organizations based in these states?

If the state is the premier public sector entity, the corporation is the premier private sector entity. It has long been recognized that transnational corporations or multinational corporations are especially potent actors in the modern world. The terms transnational and multinational corporation are often used interchangeably, and abbreviated as TNCs and MNCs. The term global corporation has also been used for these corporations, which are typically based in the United States or some other wealthy country but have operations in many different countri...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Notes on authors
• Acknowledgments
• Preface
• 1 Crimes of globalization and the criminological enterprise
• 2 What are crimes of globalization?
• 3 Some current cases of crimes of globalization
• 4 Towards an integrated theory of crimes of globalization
• 5 Crimes of globalization and the global justice movement
• Appendices
• References
• Index