Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem

In Defence of Interaction

Karl Popper, M.A. Notturno

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9780415115049
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135975364
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Based upon the Kenan Lectures that Karl Popper delivered at Emory University in 1969, Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem raises problems connected with human freedom, creativity, rationality, and the relationship between human beings and their actions. These are what Popper calls big issues - too big for easy answers, but too important to be ignored. In these lectures, and in the discussions that follow them, Sir Karl develops a theory of body-mind interaction. This theory involves evolutionary emergence, human language, and that realm of autonomous products of the human mind which Popper calls World 3. According to Popper, consciousness emerged in the course of evolution as a kind of control system for the body, like a driver is a control system for a car. Objective knowledge - the kind of knowledge that is found in books and libraries - then emerged in the course of evolution as a higher level control system for the mind. Simply put, objective knowledge is the mind's control system for critical problem solving. In this way, full consciousness - the kind of consciousness that humans can have - is anchored in World 3 and is closely linked to human language, problems, theories, and criticism. And it is mainly through this use of objective knowledge as a control system for critical problem solving that we are able to exercise our freedom, creativity, and rationality - first by making contributions, like science books and works of art, to World 3; and then by using these contributions to bring about changes in Worlds 1 and 2. The Kenan Lectures were well-attended and provoked lively discussions. This book is published in the same informal language in which they were originally delivered and so can be easily understood by a general audience.

1

Knowledge: Objective and Subjective

Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a great honour to be invited to Emory, and I am very conscious of the fact that this invitation has put a great burden of responsibility on my shoulders. I have called this series of lectures ‘Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem’. I should perhaps have given it a better-sounding title, like: ‘Human Knowledge and the Human Mind’. But this sounds a little airy, and I am allergic to hot air – even more than to tobacco smoke.

have planned these six lectures as follows:

1. Knowledge: objective and subjective
2. Evolution, language and the third world
3. The myth of the framework
4. The interaction of the three worlds
5. Rationality
6. Freedom

But I have no intention of keeping strictly to this plan, and I regard it as a great advantage to have a connected course of six lectures. For this means that I do not need to worry about time: I can stop when the clock shows 3.50, saying that we shall continue next week. This is an advantage I do not want to forgo by tying each lecture to a definite topic. I may also change my mind while going along, especially if you, ladies and gentlemen, are willing to raise questions.

This brings me to a technical point. I like to be interrupted, and to have questions put to me. And I ask you especially to interrupt my lecture whenever I say anything that is not quite clear. In fact, I prefer discussion to lecturing, and I shall regard myself free to change my plans for these lectures if any topic is raised in the discussion here, or perhaps in the seminar, that seems to me to justify a change.

In addition to interruptions, there will be another possibility for you to raise questions. I shall stop at 3:50 for those who want to leave or who have to leave. But anybody who has time and who would like to stay on for discussion is invited to stay on and to ask questions.

I should like to tell you, especially since I see Professor Paul Kuntz in the audience, that you should not be afraid of me – in spite of what Professor Kuntz has written in the paper. I think I am misinterpreted by him: I am very meek and mild, and I have never in my life called anybody a blockhead – least of all a student. I might call a colleague a blockhead, but I can’t remember having done so.

Another point that I wish to make before starting is this. I regard it as my first duty to my audience always to do my best to be easily understandable. I regard it as my second duty to let you always see which way I am going. This will enable you to consider my arguments critically, and especially to check whether I am misleading you.

I try to achieve this by presenting you with my problems, and usually even with my tentative solutions; and only afterwards shall I proceed to develop my arguments. In this way you can see in advance which way I am going, and can all the time look at my arguments critically.

It means that my course of lectures will have a kind of spiral structure.

Begin like this:

On the way from A to B, I give a broad outline of the problem in hand. This is then narrowed in stages, until we arrive at the tentative formulation F.

Now I will begin by explaining to you the two main sets of problems I intend to discuss. They are:

(A) the problem of two kinds of knowledge and their relationship:

1. knowledge in the objective sense,
2. knowledge in the subjective sense; and

(B) the body-mind problem or, as it is also called, the mind-body problem.

I will explain the first of these problems with the help of some examples.

1. We may say:
   ‘It is well known that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen’; or ‘It is well known that we can explain atomic and nuclear structures in terms of so-called elementary particles, but it is not known whether elementary particles have a structure in their turn: this is still an open problem.’
   These examples explain what I mean by ‘knowledge in the objective sense’.
2. The following examples may explain knowledge in the subjective sense:
   ‘He knew he was exceeding the speed limit.’
   ‘He knew that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen.’

The following examples may also be treated under the heading of subjective knowledge, even though they are somewhat different:

‘He thought that elementary particles have an internal structure.’

‘He observed that the moon was full.’

‘He observed a yellow disk.’

‘He saw a yellow flash.’

‘He hit his shins.’

I hope I have made the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge – objective knowledge and subjective knowledge -reasonably clear. It is interesting to note that most philosophers, though not all, discuss only knowledge in the subjective sense or (as I will say for brevity’s sake) subjective knowledge. There exist many philosophical books devoted to the theory of knowledge – a theory which is also called ‘epistemology’ – which never mention that there is such a thing as objective knowledge. And if they ever discuss objective knowledge, then most of them assume that objective knowledge can be fully explained in terms of subjective knowledge. In other words, it is assumed that objective knowledge consists of many elements of subjective knowledge somehow linked together.

I may tell you from the very start that for at least thirty-five years I have taken precisely the opposite view – without, however, making much impact. So here is a point where you will do well to look critically at what I am going to say.

My position is this: I am mainly interested in objective knowledge and its growth, and I contend that we cannot understand the first thing about subjective knowledge except by studying the growth of objective knowledge and the give and take between the two kinds of knowledge (where subjective knowledge is more taking than giving).

When I have finished my general introduction, the remainder of today’s lecture will largely be devoted to this problem.

Why is this problem of knowledge important? Because it raises certain issues which I will here call ‘big issues’. It bears on the big issue of rationality, on such big issues as the growth of scientific knowledge and its role in our civilization, on the big issues of the moral responsibility of the scientist and our indebtedness to civilization, and on the big issues of the function of a University and tradition vs. criticism. However, the problem of knowledge has a definite advantage over these big issues: it can be discussed in a critical and rational manner, while direct approach to any of the big issues is in danger of degenerating into preaching and of producing that hot air to which I am allergic, as I have said before.

The problem of knowledge will be one of my two main problems in this course. The other, you will recall, is:

(B) The body-mind problem or, as it is also called, the mind-body problem.

I will now explain this a little. We live in a world of physical bodies, and we ourselves have physical bodies. When I speak to you, however, I am addressing myself not to your bodies but to your minds. So in addition to the first world, the world of physical bodies and their physical and physiological states, which I will call ‘world 1’, there seems to exist a second world, the world of mental states, which I will call ‘world 2’. And so a question arises concerning the relationship between these two worlds, the world 1 of physical states or processes and the world 2 of mental states or processes. This question is the body-mind problem.

When I am talking to you I am, in the first instance, making some noises, which are physical events – physical events you can detect with the help of your ears, which are detectors of pressure waves. But you do not only detect these waves, you decode them: you hear meaningful sounds. These physical waves carry a meaning to you (or so I hope): they are significant – they may (and I hope they will) make you think.

According to the famous French philosopher René Descartes, also called ‘Cartesius’, my mind is now acting on my body, which produces physical sounds. These, in turn, are acting on your body, that is, on your ears; and then, your body is acting on your mind, making you think. Descartes and the Cartesians called this the ‘interaction’ between body and mind. And we may replace this by speaking about an interaction between physical and mental states.

I think that it is just common sense to accept, at least tentatively, that there exists indeed this interaction between physical states (or processes) and mental states (or processes), or between the worlds 1 and 2. And since things which interact may be said to be real, we may accept the reality of these two worlds. Thus I can describe myself as a Cartesian dualist. In fact I am doing a little better than even Descartes: I am a pluralist, for I also accept the reality of a third world, which I will call ‘world 3’. I will very briefly explain this at once since it is my policy to put before you, from the very beginning, not only my problems but also my tentative solutions to these problems – and the theory of the reality of world 3 is the most important ingredient within my tentative solutions.

By ‘world 3’ I mean, roughly, the world of the products of our human minds. These products are sometimes physical things such as the sculptures, paintings, drawings, and buildings of Michelangelo. These are physical things, but they are a very peculiar kind of physical things: in my terminology they belong to both the worlds 1 and 3. Some other products of our minds are not precisely physical things. Take a play by Shakespeare. You may say that the written or printed book is a physical thing like, say, a drawing. But the performed play is clearly not a physical thing, though perhaps it may be said to be a highly complex sequence of physical events. But now please remember that no single performance of Hamlet can be said to be identical with Shakespeare’s play Hamlet itself. Nor is Shakespeare s play the class or set ot all or its performances. The play may be said to be represented or reproduced by these performances, in a way similar to that in which a building or a sculpture may be said to be represented by one or several photographs, or in which a painting or a drawing may be said to be reproduced by prints of varying quality. But the original painting itself is different from its reproduction. And in a somewhat similar way, Shakespeare’s Hamlet is, in itself, different from its various reproductions or performances. But while an original painting is, as we’ve said, a peculiar physical thing, Shakespeare’s Hamlet clearly is not. Although its reproductions may be said to belong both to the world 1 of physical things and to the world 3 of products of the mind, the play, Hamlet itself, belongs only to the third world.

It is similar with a symphony. The written score of Mozart’s Symphony in G Minor is not Mozart’s symphony, although it represents Mozart’s symphony in a coded form. And the various performances of Mozart’s Symphony in G Minor are also not Mozart’s symphony: they stand to the symphony in the relation of reproductions. These performances simultaneously belong to both world 1 and world 3. But the symphony itself belongs only to the third world – that third world which comprises architecture, art, literature, music and – perhaps most important – science and scholarship.

The idea of world 3 is, I realize, an unusual and a very difficult idea. So please don’t think that you are supposed to grasp it fully at this first mention of it. Still, I think it best to put all my cards on the table at once, so that they are open for your inspection, and so that you can know which way I am going.

Incidentally, this reminds me of an anecdote. Many years ago, when I lived in New Zealand, I had a friend, old Dr Farr, an emeritus professor of physics, a famous student of geomagnetism, and known for his ready wit. When he was almost 80 years old he was still interested in the students of his old physics department and often talked to them in the street. One day a student was clearly embarrassed and, when asked ‘What’s wrong with you?’, stammered: ‘Excuse me, Dr Farr, but your hat is on the wrong way round!’ Like a shot came back the reply: ‘How do you know which way I am going?’

Now I do want you to know which way I am going, so that you can find out more easily what is wrong with me. Therefore I will now give you what, in a way, may be described as the main thesis of my course. It is this:

We cannot understand world 2, that is, the world inhabited by our own mental states, without understanding that its main function is to produce world 3 objects, and to be acted upon by world 3 objects. For world 2 interacts not only with world 1, as Descartes thought, but also with world 3; and world 3 objects can act upon world 1 only through world 2, which functions as an intermediary.

We can put this by way of a simple diagram:

World 3 consists, among many other things, of records, and may consist of temperature records. In the case of temperature records, it may look as if here world 1, through a graph and an automatic recording instrument, acts directly upon something in world 3. But this is not so. It is we who arrange and are the intermediaries and make this temperature record and regulate the whole thing so that it really becomes a temperature recording, a graph, which belongs to both world 1 and world 3. It is only through our intermediary action that world 1 can act upon world 3.

A similar example in reverse would be the automatic control system of a chemical plant. Here again, world 3 – that is to say, certain objective plans and objective aims which exist in world 3 -somehow regulates what happens in the world 1 chemical plant through automatic machines. But these automatic machines must be installed by us, and it is only through us that the actual aims will have an effect upon world 1.

If my thesis is correct then we cannot expect to get anywhere near a solution of the body-mind problem unless we take world 3 into account. For the body-mind problem was the problem of the relationship between worlds 1 and 2. And if it is an important element in this relationship that world 2 functions as an intermediary between worlds 1 and 3, then the body-mind problem must remain incomplete, as it were, until we extend it to cover the interrelationships between all three worlds.

You may now understand why I said that I am not only a dualist but a pluralist. In this I am decidedly unfashionable. The prevailing fashion in philosophy is d...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Author’s note, 1993
• 1. Knowledge: Objective and Subjective
• 2. The Autonomy of World 3
• 3. World 3 and Emergent Evolution
• 4. Description, Argument, and Imagination
• 5. Interaction and Consciousness
• 6. The Self, Rationality, and Freedom
• Editor’s afterword
• Bibliography
• Name index
• Subject index