Rethinking Vietnam

Duncan McCargo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781134374397
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: History

A uniquely comprehensive overview of a fascinating and rapidly changing country, dealing with the politics, economics, society and foreign policy of Vietnam from the Doi Moi reforms of market socialism in 1986 to the present day. Drawing on fieldwork and analysis by an international team of specialists this book covers all aspects of contemporary Vietnam including recent history, the political economy, the reform process, education, health, labour market, foreign direct investment and foreign policy. The contributors show how the blurring of old and new pressures and traditions within Vietnam requires a more complex analysis of the country than might initially be assumed.

1 Introduction

Duncan McCargo

As every Southeast Asianist knows, Vietnam is a country, not a war. Yet the legacy of ideological and military conflict that has shaped Vietnam has long impeded dispassionate discussion of Vietnamese society. Writers on Vietnam typically bring with them considerable intellectual baggage. Much work on Vietnam derives – to use a phrase coined by Herbert Phillips in another context – from a ‘scholarship of admiration’ (Phillips 1979: 449). Yet this widespread enthusiasm is a mixed blessing for critical analysis. Commentators and academics who admire the achievements of Vietnam, notably the remarkable achievement of successively defeating both the French and the Americans, have tended to write in broadly positive terms about the country’s performance in a wide range of areas. In particular, Vietnam’s record in the basic education and health sectors, combined with its relatively low socio-economic inequalities, has attracted considerable plaudits. Many of those plaudits have come from writers on the left, especially the European left, who saw in those statistical indicators further evidence that the nationalist struggle with the United States of America had been a just cause. For them, Vietnam was the socialist society that worked. For some American scholars, those same achievements vindicated their own previous opposition to United States (US) involvement in the Indochina conflict. For these writers, Vietnam’s success would be determined by the degree to which the country could defend the socialist ideals underlying the revolutionary struggle.

The 1986 introduction of doi moi, a programme of economic reform and renovation, introduced a new form of admiration for Vietnam, especially when the early years of reform produced striking benefits in ameliorating the shortcomings of a centralised state structure. Vietnam acquired a new set of admirers: neo-liberals who saw the country as a laboratory for the introduction of a very different set of economic principles, and international investors who saw Vietnam as a country ripe for entrepreneurial activities, a sizeable domestic market, and an important regional player in the wider Indochinese and Southeast Asian economies. The mood of this period was captured in Thai prime minister Chatichai Choonavan’s call for the battlefields to be turned into marketplaces. Implicit here was a quiet triumphalism on the part of conservative analysts, for whom Vietnam’s adoption of free market principles was a belated vindication of the Indochina conflict: Vietnam might have dealt the United States a temporary military setback, but the forces of capitalism were now defeating Vietnamese communism on the basis of the inexorable logic of the market. The demise of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Soviet bloc communism at the end of the 1980s served to reinforce this view, according to which the sooner Vietnam embraced Western market principles, the more successful the country would become. Linked to this argument was a wide range of policy changes urged upon Vietnam by international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, including reducing the size of the state sector and deregulating large swathes of economic activity. Behind these pressures lay hopes that sooner or later economic liberalisation would be followed by political change, including a loosening of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s (VCP’s) hitherto firmly monopolistic grip on power. This was the heyday of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation: just as once the Americans had feared that the countries in Southeast Asia would fall to communism like a set of dominoes, now many in the West hoped that the region would similarly succumb to democracy (McCargo 2001: 145–6). For observers with this perspective, the measure of Vietnam’s success would be the degree to which the country ‘opened up’, to embrace Western economic, social and political values.

Yet many scholars working on post-doi moi Vietnam continued to harbour considerable admiration for the tenacity and independence of the regime, preferring to believe that Vietnam might be able to strike the optimal balance between retaining a distinctive identity and political order, whilst making the requisite concessions to the demands of the global market place. For these scholars, Vietnam’s success or failure will ultimately be determined by the degree to which Vietnam can convincingly perform a tricky balancing act, negotiating between a range of competing pressures and interests. Perhaps the majority of social science researchers now working on Vietnam – including many Vietnamese scholars themselves – fall somewhere within this camp, undertaking case-specific, sectoral and overview studies in the hope of elucidating analytically this complex negotiation process.

Broadly speaking, then, those working on contemporary Vietnam can be divided into three main groups: admirers of the revolution, still looking for socialism to work; advocates of capitalist change, confidently expecting socialism to fail; and critical sympathisers, looking for mechanisms by which Vietnam can negotiate a distinctive socio-economic and political order within a complex domestic and international environment. The aim of this volume is to ‘rethink’ Vietnam by moving beyond the scholarship of admiration, asking awkward questions about Vietnam’s politics, economy, society and international relations – and not shirking from inconvenient or incomplete answers. Many of the contributors to this volume have recently completed doctoral theses on Vietnam; others are well-established academics with a longstanding interest in the country; some are Vietnamese, but most are not.

Rethinking Vietnamese politics

Chris Dixon’s chapter is the real introduction to this book, raising issues and flagging up debates that are returned to throughout the volume. His central question concerns the nature of state-society relations in Vietnam: how far is the state dominant, and how far has society been able to secure any substantive autonomy? Dixon is convinced that there are no easy answers to these questions: simple alternative typologies, such as those suggested by Kerkvliet (2001b), actually mask much larger debates. Dixon argues that there is far more continuity between pre-reform and post-reform Vietnam than is generally assumed: Vietnam never was a monolithic one-party state, but always permitted considerable divergence of views and of regional practices, along with well-established mechanisms for consulting the masses. He sees the VCP as generally ‘absorbing’ rather than ‘repressing’ dissent. This longstanding tendency was reinforced by political changes after 1986, including strengthening the role of the National Assembly – membership of which was refreshed with a new influx of members – after 1992. The National Assembly flexed its muscles in 1998 by rejecting land reform measures proposed by the VCP. By 1994, clear factional divisions were evident in the VCP leadership, partly reflecting a greater climate of openness and popular anxieties about the reform process. Dixon cautions against a simple division into conservative and reformist cadres, arguing that positions and groupings are rarely fixed, and typically vary from one issue to another. The late 1980s saw a backlash against dissenting voices; yet this was followed by a further period of liberalisation, which saw the growth of political activity outside the direct control of the state. Even official publications were full of critical discussions about the failure of key policies and programmes. Despite persistent discrimination against the domestic private sector, a new business elite was now emerging, leading to a blurring of old boundaries between the state and private sectors.

Out in the provinces, significant environmental movements began to emerge in places, as did rural protests over issues such as corruption and land rights. Demonstrations became a relatively common occurrence (Ngo Vinh Long 2002: 459–60); the state typically reacted by combining tough action to quell protests with attempts to address core local grievances. An unspoken pact appeared to operate, under which a certain degree of dissent would be tolerated within the context of shared efforts to develop the economy, and state intervention to address striking inequities. Yet this pact is predicated on the basis that the VCP’s monopoly on power will not be challenged. Accordingly, there has been no overt challenge to the Party itself: civil society groups tacitly support greater democratisation of the existing order, rather than any dismantling or overthrow of that order. Within the broad framework of what Dixon (like many others) terms the ‘party-state’, a wide range of formal and informal political activity is thriving. The party-state has gradually ‘softened’ since 1986, despite intermittent reversions to clampdown mode. Dixon therefore suggests that the Vietnamese regime might best be described as ‘soft authoritarian-corporatist’, informed by growing levels of dialogue between the party-state and wider society. An alternative description could be ‘participatory-authoritarian’, holding out the promise of a very gradual increase in pluralism.

In her chapter, Sophie Quinn-Judge offers an historical explanation that rather neatly supports Dixon’s analysis. Reviewing the history of the VCP, she argues that the Party (and its precursors, the ICP and the VWP) was never the monolithic entity that many observers have assumed. Rather, the VCP has long done a superb job of concealing its internal wranglings, projecting the misleading image of a highly disciplined body, unified beneath the overarching leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Quinn-Judge suggests that the VCP has always actually been a coalition of competing interests. A close analysis of recent memoirs and new documentary evidence reveals the extent to which the early history of the party was characterised by intense ideological debates, in which Ho Chi Minh’s views by no means held universal sway.

In fact, Quinn-Judge argues that it was only at the beginning of the 1950s that Ho Chi Minh established his current dominant position in party historiography. Ho had no formal party position during the 1930s; at the end of the Pacific War he faced substantial challenges from a rival faction, culminating in open resistance to his authority by 1948. Only after receiving endorsement from Mao and Stalin was Ho able to consolidate his hold over the Party, yet factional divides over issues such as land reform and revisionism persisted right through the 1960s. Quinn-Judge argues that these old factions have now become partly institutionalised in two broad ‘wings’ of the VCP, one pro-openness and reform, the other intent on preserving the communist order. Yet she notes that the full picture is more complex, an interlocking matrix of regional clans over-ridden by ideological disagreements. This internal complexity has been compounded by Vietnam’s small size: far more than the Russians or the Chinese, the VCP needed to retain a pragmatic, flexible international stance reflecting its multiple strands of opinion.

In a chapter that perfectly straddles the troublesome divide between politics and the economy, Martin Gainsborough concentrates on one central question: what is meant by ‘reform’ in the Vietnamese context? He links this to the related issue of whether reform has been slowing in Vietnam since the second half of the 1990s. By reform, he refers primarily to key structural changes, building upon the wholesale marketisation that commenced in 1986. These changes include administrative reform, trade reform, state enterprise reform and banking reform, all of which are shaped by principles of decentralisation and a scaled-down state. By focusing on four important claims made about reform, Gainsborough is able to plot their progress during the 1990s. These claims are that reform is export-oriented, stresses the private sector, supports reducing the state sector, and involves tightening credit to state-owned enterprises.

In brief, he finds that Vietnam’s reforms fail to meet all four of these criteria. These failures reflect the existence of pervasive bureaucratic and financial interests among sections of the party-state, dedicated to resisting changes of this kind; they also reflect a residual ideological aversion to the free market and to global capitalism. If reform has slowed, this could reflect an apparent trend towards ‘re-centralisation’, perhaps reflecting conscious or unconscious alarm among Vietnam’s elite that decentralisation may have gone too far. Gainsborough argues that the Vietnamese state has a highly developed capacity for reinventing itself, breathed centralising life into areas where reform has lost the initiative. Overall, Gainsborough presents a picture of a strong party-state reluctant to relinquish control, and unwilling to address core issues such as curtailing credit to state enterprises.

Claudia Zingerli takes the debate out into communes in the Northern mountain region – the site of her doctoral research – where she examines how far Decree 29 has been implemented. This 1998 Decree called for the promotion of ‘grassroots democracy’ in local areas, an example of the decentralisation viewed with scepticism by Gainsborough. Vietnam has a long history of democratic centralism – typically associated with top-down power structures. Zingerli argues that this tradition makes the Vietnamese leadership very nervous about broadening political participation, or allowing autonomous civil society groups to emerge. Thus the decree calling for strengthening of grassroots participation was often implemented simply as another party-state directive by local bureaucrats and cadres. At the same time, there was considerable ambiguity in such decrees, allowing for flexibility of interpretation by local authorities. Zingerli argues that socialist ideology was alive and well in the mountain communes, sustained by regular dialogue between local cadres and villagers. Nevertheless, many cadres held paternalistic views, seeing local people as lacking the necessary education and understanding to implement important policies. ‘Lack of knowledge’ on the part of villagers was sometimes a bureaucratic code for foot-dragging or active resistance by local people in the face of unpopular edicts.

In practice, the grassroots democracy decree was not implemented uniformly. In one community studied by Zingerli, residents did enjoy a degree of self-determination, and had been able to continue with customary practices to support their livelihoods; yet in another community, national policies completely overrode local concerns. Zingerli’s findings support Dixon’s view of a very heterogeneous state apparatus, applying policies with varying degrees of consistency in different places and during different periods of time. She notes that by strengthening local autonomy, the Vietnamese state has created greater scope for popular participation – yet also greater scope for the arbitrary use and abuse of power by local bureaucrats. Despite her scepticism about the implementation of Decree 29, Zingerli arrives at the cautiously optimistic conclusion that there may be ‘a trend towards more discursive politics in Vietnam’.

Rethinking Vietnam’s economy

During the initial years of doi moi, Vietnam enjoyed remarkable levels of economic growth: the end of collectivised agriculture gave a substantial boost to the rural economy, while an influx of foreign investment coupled with liberalisation of private sector economic activity brought considerable benefits. By the second half of the 1990s, however, the economy was slowing, partly influenced by wider regional problems after the 1997 Asian crisis, but primarily because of domestic factors. Ari Kokko picks up the argument where Martin Gainsborough left off, asking how far that slowdown reflected a decline in Vietnam’s commitment to the reform process, and also the extent to which the downturn reflected structural problems rather than temporary setbacks. His answers focus on three key areas: trade policy, state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform, and the position of the private sector.

On trade policy, Kokko paints a fairly positive picture. Vietnam’s 2001 Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States was a major landmark in the direction of eventual World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession, and there is plenty of evidence that Vietnamese exports have been enjoying a sustainable recovery in recent years. This reflects the outward orientation of private sector Vietnamese firms and of multinational corporations with operations in Vietnam. Substantial overseas development aid disbursements and private cash remittances (often transferred by overseas Vietnamese to relatives and business partners in the country) have helped boost Vietnam’s balance of payments. State enterprise reform is another matter entirely. Like Gainsborough, Kokko insists that the lack of progress here is undeniable; most SOEs are loss-making and have continued to enjoy preferential access to credit, while the bulk of ‘equitisations’ to date have not affected the largest and most troublesome state enterprises. Kokko notes that the private sector remains underdeveloped, faced with various forms of discrimination and limited access to credit. At the same time, he is more positive than Gainsborough in highlighting certain areas where private sector reform has proceeded quite rapidly. He praises the 1999 Enterprise Law, which has led to the registration of numerous new small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Kokko also singles out support from international donors for private sector capacity-building – notably Japan’s ‘Miyazawa plan’, which has provided substantial funding to nurture SME development. Ultimately he suggests that SOE’s reform might be tacitly bypassed: ‘future strategies should focus on the development of the private sector while accepting more gradual reform of the SOE sector’. He also expresses concern that Vietnam needs a better welfare and ‘safety net’ infrastructure to protect its citizens from the uncertainties of the market, and to reduce both urban and rural poverty.

Ari Kokko’s concluding remarks set the scene perfectly for Gerard Clarke’s chapter on the social aspects of SOE reform. Drawing upon consultancy work undertaken in the Nam Dinh ‘textile town’ and in the coffee-growing region of the Central Highlands, Clarke focuses on two major SOEs: Natexco and Vinacafé. He argues that most existing work on SOEs has focused on economic questions, rather than the underlying social issues. He discusses in some detail the paternalistic relations between SOEs and their workforces, relations that are based upon rights and responsibilities enshrined in legislation such as the 1994 Labour Code. Since SOEs are an important constituency of support for the Vietnamese Communist Party and related mass organisations, reducing employment in the sector would have a direct impact on vested political interests. In practice, much of the retrenchment in the sector has affected female contract labourers rather than permanent male employees. The government has been considering extending the range of welfare benefits available to retrenched SOE workers, thus creating a dilemma for the donor community. On the one hand, donors are tempted to...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Illustrations
• Contributors
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction
• Part I: Politics
• Part II: Economy
• Part III: Society
• Part IV: Foreign Relations
• Bibliography