Understanding the European Union's External Relations

Michèle Knodt, Sebastiaan Princen, MICHELE KNODT, SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134433407
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The European Union is one of the world's biggest economies. However, its role as an international actor is ambiguous and it's not always able to transform its political power into effective external policies. The development of an 'assertive' European Union challenges the image of an internal project aimed at economic integration and international relations theories based on unitary state actors. This book systematically links the EU's external relations to existing political theories, showing how existing theories need to be modified in order to deal with specific characteristics of the EU as an international actor.

Part I
The development of the EU’s external role
Between co-operation and fragmentation

1
A fragmented external role
The EU, defence policy, and New Atlanticism

Sten Rynning

The principled decision to craft an EU Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 raises a number of fundamental questions about the political nature of the Union itself. The ESDP can be seen as an example of states seeking to form an alliance, in order to increase their weight in armed conflict. However, the depth of EU centralized decision-making authority and EU policy breadth, make the label ‘alliance’ inadequate. We are then left with two basic options. We may see the ESDP as a linear consequence of past integration and think of the EU as an incipient strategic actor—an emerging pole in international politics. Conversely, one could argue that the ESDP is one of several factors that push the EU in a novel direction, effectively breaking the past trajectory of a seemingly ‘ever closer union’ and pointing to a more fragmented organization of European political authority.

This chapter questions whether the EU is a new strategic actor in the making, or whether a fundamental break is occurring with the past idea of ‘one’ community. The question is not whether the EU is already a strategic actor, because it is clearly not. Neither is it the aim of this chapter to rank centralized and hierarchical governance higher than other political models: this is a normative question better left for other contexts. The question is, rather, whether viewing the EU as a strategic actor helps us understand its dynamics. This analysis will search for answers by focusing on the key dimensions of a strategic actor, the extent to which the political centre is endowed with a vision of itself, its purpose, and finally whether it is supported by institutions capable of mobilizing defence resources.

The argument is that the EU is not a strategic actor in the making. Rather, the introduction of defence co-operation exposes a number of underlying tensions that likely will lead to a break with past patterns of integration and necessitate new institutional arrangements. The EU will become a more capable ‘civilian actor’ building on the vision of peaceful co-existence that is part of the EU’s foundation. However, defence policy and the use of military means for coercion—peacemaking, intervention, and war—will not be rooted in the EU. Instead, we are likely to witness the development of a new ‘concert’ among the willing and capable—here labelled ‘New Atlanticism’—that will attract notable attention among the old great powers of Western Europe (Great Britain, France, and Germany) along with the US. This development is contingent: it demands of the EU the recognition that ‘flexible co-operation’ must be applied to the defence domain, and it demands of the US a willingness to promote, via NATO, a more capable European security and defence pillar. The analysis concludes that these scenarios are likely, and that they invite scholars and observers to assess the nature and scope of a new turning point in the history of European integration.

High politics and grand strategy

How do we assess the impact of the ESDP on the EU? Realist theory offers itself as a useful tool because it deals primarily with the high politics inherent in the ESDP. It focuses on enduring questions of order (Kissinger 1994:806): what are the basic units; what are their means of interaction; and what are the goals on behalf of which they interact?

Realist theory generally does not foresee a qualitative transformation of international politics and has tended to focus on the limitations rather than the potentials of European integration (see for example Wivel 2000:99). A motley crew of constructivist scholars has therefore challenged the fundamental validity of realism, arguing that the EU is either representative of a fundamental transformation in international relations or, alternatively, a phenomenon of international relations so heavily dominated by ideas, as opposed to material power, that realism is reputed. These critics tend to use Waltz’s (1979) abstract Theory of International Politics as a baseline for comparison (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999) and argue that the realist model, ‘based solely on material conceptions of actors’ interests’ (Risse et al, 1999:148), cannot cope with ‘ideas’.

Two problems are evident. First, neo-realism is a theory of the international system, not policy,¹ and second, realists who do analyse foreign policy—that is neoclassical realists—naturally accept that ideational and material factors interact.² Moreover, the jury is still out on the issue of whether the EU is an important anomaly in the history of international relations.³ As long as the EU is significantly influenced by states acting autonomously of the EU itself, there is no reason to discard realist theory a priori. Realists have historically demonstrated how states block integration beyond the nation-state, harness economic gains from cooperation and struggle to establish political primacy within common institutions (Hoffmann 1995; Taylor 1983; Milward 1992; Pedersen 1998). Realists also believe that Europe’s future is intimately tied up with the poles of power that emerge on the basis of collective histories and political leadership (Calleo 2001).

We may take our analytical clue from here: vision and material power are the key dimensions of a strategic actor. In the vocabulary of Fareed Zakaria’s (1998: 38) ‘state-centred realism’, states will expand political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power. State power has two dimensions. First, decision-makers must define the scope of state responsibility—define a vision for the state—and they must to some extent be autonomous from other social forces in the pursuit of this vision. Second, states must have a central policy-making apparatus capable of articulating and implementing policy, and they must be able to mobilize resources for policy. These dimensions combine into a spectrum where at one end we find states that are cohesive, autonomous, and wealthy, and at the opposite end states that are divided, society-penetrated and poor (Zakaria 1998:39).⁴

Will the EU find itself at the poor end of the spectrum because states will bicker about ESDP prerogatives, or will the ESDP to the contrary put the EU on a path to become more autonomous and coherent? An answer will emerge from a consideration of (a) the ability of EU leaders to articulate a coherent vision and (b) the ability of the EU institutions to produce policy and mobilize resources. These two questions will be dealt with in the sections below.

First, it may be worth noting that we are dealing with more than just a spectrum running from strong autonomy to dependency. I label these opposites ‘strategic actor’ and ‘community’. The former is capable of coercing the environment to respect its ideas, the latter focuses on the task of maintaining cohesion within.⁵ In addition, centralized institutions may conceivably combine with abstract visions to produce an actor rich in means but with poorly defined and therefore fragile policies. This possibility I label ‘civilian actor’ because it is incapable of generating the policy cohesion necessary to exert violence—to coerce—in a specific conflict. It is conversely conceivable that fragmented institutions co-exist with strong visions. In this case we are dealing with a ‘directorate’ that will emerge whenever the context (i.e. an external crisis) calls attention to the area of common vision, after which the capable and willing will act on behalf of the larger community. The combined image of EU futures is presented in Table 1.1.

Turning now to political vision and institutional power, we are capable of tracing the trajectory of the EU and the impact of the ESDP. Many people will argue that Europe has traditionally centralized, but that it has been split between two visions of ‘Europe puissance’ and ‘civilian power Europe’. An analysis of current developments indicates that the EU is following a new path and that a ‘directorate’ is the more likely scenario.

Political visions of Europe

Table 1.1 EU futures

The EU convention outlining a founding treaty, which EU heads of state and government will negotiate in 2004, has provoked a debate on the purpose and destiny of European co-operation. German Foreign Minister Joska Fischer ignited the debate in May 2000 when he outlined his vision of a federal Europe building on a core of proactive states. Federalism was soon opposed by intergovernmental cooperation based on the ‘democratic nation-state’, first by French President Chirac in June 2000, then by British Prime Minister Blair in October 2000. Hovering above the political fray, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana (2001), has argued that ‘The Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is part of the wider project of building Europe’s political identity’. While recognizing that the ESDP will not be easy, ‘It demands a reorientation of national militaries and wiser spending. It requires new expenditure. And it necessitates a look at other imaginative solutions’. But Solana is optimistic. He argues that, ‘All of these steps are underway’.

Observers may not share this optimism. Even in a favourable setting of regional stability, EU governments tend to get bogged down by treaty bickering that provides for, at best, incremental solutions. In the current setting, stability is far from given. This is particularly the case when one considers two external developments: first, the EU is about to enlarge its membership to include up to 27 countries, although 24 is the likely number in the short run; second, the US is waging a global security campaign against sources of terrorism.

Realist theory normally points out that ‘external threats’ generate internal cohesion. States band together to provide for their security and wellbeing. However, enlargement is not commonly recognized as a ‘threat’ in the European Union. Some countries, such as France and Spain, have vested interests in the smaller Union and have historically fought to secure ‘deepening’ before ‘widening’. But a significant number of EU countries are strongly supportive of enlargement and believe that a bigger Union will reinforce their European visions. If game theory has taught us that institutionalization is more likely when group membership is held constant over time (Axelrod 1984), then game theory also tells us that the EU’s current ‘opening’—in terms of membership and practical policy—will weaken political cohesion. Enlargement may therefore be a cause of political division rather than a factor of internal unity.

The same condition applies to the US security campaign launched in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. All European countries support the campaign against terrorism but they respond differently when it comes to policy detail and the extent to which the US should gain political and military support for operations in the Middle and the Far East. Some EU countries are drawn closer to the US, while some remain at a distance. The EU has responded to terrorism by outlining a strong package of anti-terrorist measures, but a symptom of the EU’s ‘low-intensity’ role is that these measures fall within the third pillar of the EU (Justice and Home Affairs) and the EU has not responded to terrorism through its second pillar (the ESDP). In short, terrorism has reinforced the difficulties of generating a joint EU security and defence vision.

The impact of these events is underscored by an inquiry into the history of European security policy in the 1990s and notably the development of a ‘low-intensity’ security role standing in stark contrast to the US focus on global competitors and ‘high-intensity’ warfare. Recent events demonstrate that this supposed division of labour, while once appearing to rest on solid ground, is frail.

In the mid-1990s, European unity as a ‘vision’ was encouraged by an aloof American policy and the intractable difficulty of intervening in the Balkan wars while also building an institutional architecture in Western and Central Europe. A political vision took root in Paris, London, and Berlin. Europe—in one shape or another—needed to organize itself in order to deal with a range of new security tasks that notably the US was not interested in handling. Britain and France, along with the Netherlands, therefore spearheaded a Rapid Reaction Force that intervened in Bosnia ahead of the Dayton peace talks in 1995. Later, in 1998, Britain and France joined forces in the St Malo agreement that became the turning point in the creation of the ESDP (Cogan 2001:99). The two countries agreed that if the US does not want to become engaged, the EU must be able to act autonomously. This ambition of European conflict resolution had an instinctive appeal to most EU members (EU Presidency 1999a, 1999b). Germany lacked a national defence policy, for obvious historical reasons, and demonstrated its engagement in mediation during the Kosovo conflict of 1999. The small and neutral EU countries have traditionally supported policies that reinforce the general principles of international order—as opposed to power politics—and they, like Britain, saw in the ESDP an opportunity to maintain the American engagement in European security. Enhancing EU crisis management capacities and US leadership vis-à-vis European great powers were thus mutually supporting goals.

For its part, the US focused on its global security posture. An ‘hegemonic impulse’ is present throughout the 1990s, beginning with the new world order in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War and the 1992 Pentagon ‘Planning Guidance’ that urged post-Cold War dominance. But this impulse, however constant, has also given birth to policies that waver between ‘off-shore balancing’ and ‘continental engagement’. Continental engagement is visible in the continued presence of 100, 000 US troops deployed in Europe and US investment in NATO as ‘a means of maintaining and lengthening America’s grip on the foreign and military policies of European states’ (Waltz 2000:20). In contrast, the balancing position is visible not only in the erratic engagement alongside Europeans in the Balkan conflicts, revealing an aversion to missions of ‘nation-building’,⁶ but also in the policy of discouraging the defence dimension of the EU from developing too far. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott declared in the fall of 1999, the US does not want a European defence capability ‘that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO’ (Talbott 1999).

Through the 1990s, then, a transatlantic consensus emerged around the axis of high and low intensity operations. In the words of Pentagon analyst James Thomas (2000), the US prefers ‘high-intensity offensive’ operations and is increasingly willing to let other allies undertake ‘long-term peace-support operations’. Few political leaders have explicitly emphasized this division of labour for fear of promoting a complete Atlantic de-coupling, but through the 1990s it became increasingly clear that the Euro-Atlantic area was in need of a new security deal based on precisely this division. The US does not handle ‘nation-building’ operations, while the Europeans realize their 1992 Petersberg ambition to handle crisis management—up to the level of ‘peacemaking’—and thus give impetus to their political identity.

Differences in national outlook within Europe presented an obstacle to the realization of the Petersberg agenda, but this fact, as noted by some observers (Heisbourg et al. 2000:21), ‘is not particularly novel, and is of limited helpfulness’. In light of the Kosovo intervention and the fact that ‘half of NATO’s European members were participating in combat operations’, they conclude that ‘differences between the two ends of the spectrum are narrowing’ and furthermore that ‘the centre of gravity of the spectrum is moving to greater, not lesser, acceptance of parti...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Series editor’s preface
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: Puzzles and prospects in theorizing the EU’s external relations
• Part I: The development of the EU’s external role: Between co-operation and fragmentation
• Part II: Internal decision-making on external policies: The challenges of multiple levels and multiple Pillars
• Part III: Promoting European norms, values and ideas: The EU as an exporter of models
• Part IV: Conclusion