The Third Republic in France 1870-1940

Conflicts and Continuities

William Fortescue

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• ISBN:
  9781134740215
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia mondiale

An essential introduction to the major political problems, debates and conflicts which are central to the history of the Third Republic in France, from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 to the fall of France in June 1940.
It provides original sources, detailed commentary and helpful chronologies and bibliographies on topics including:
* the emergence of the regime and the Paris Commune of 1871
* Franco-German relations
* anti-Semitism and the Dreyfus Affair
* the role of women and the importance of the national birth-rate
* the character of the French Right and of French fascism.

The emergence of the Third Republic, 1870–1

The Third Republic in France emerged in the most unfavourable circumstances – military defeat, revolution, further military defeats, civil war and a humiliating peace treaty. These circumstances profoundly influenced nearly all aspects of French life, particularly during the first decades of the Third Republic.

During the 1860s the diplomatic situation in Europe was transformed by the rise of Prussia under Otto von Bismarck and the policies that he successfully pursued to create a united Germany. After military victories against Denmark (1864) and Austria (1866), Bismarck had in 1866 formed the North German Confederation, dominated by a greatly extended Prussia, but excluding the South German States. Bismarck then decided to persuade the South German States to join a united Germany by provoking a confrontation with France. His first attempt, the Luxembourg Affair (1867), failed, but his second, the Hohenzollern candidacy to the Spanish throne, succeeded. After the Spanish throne had become vacant in September 1868, Bismarck pressed the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (a junior member of the Prussian royal family) and, on 2 July 1870, several Parisian newspapers reported that the Spanish crown had been offered to a Hohenzollern prince. Napoleon III and his government reacted to this news in a belligerent manner for several reasons.

Throughout the 1860s the Second Empire had been losing popularity, particularly among the French urban working class. In response, a series of liberal reforms had been introduced, but these had done more to help the opposition than to win popular support for the imperial regime. In a national plebiscite held in May 1870 a significant majority voted in favour of accepting a new constitution, but this probably indicated support for liberal reform rather than for Napoleon III, and in any case it made the regime more susceptible to public opinion.

Foreign policy reverses had also contributed to Napoleon III’s unpopularity. French military intervention in Italy (1859) had alienated Catholics because it led to the absorption of the Papal States into a new Kingdom of Italy, while republicans considered that Napoleon III had betrayed the cause of the Risorgimento by not fighting on until Venetia had been liberated from Austrian rule and by maintaining a French garrison in Rome to defend what remained of the Papal States. During the 1860s, while the balance of power in Europe was increasingly threatened by the aggrandizement of Prussia and the prospect of a united Germany, Napoleon III in various ways alienated the other main European powers and wasted French resources on a costly and disastrous military intervention in Mexico (1861–7).

Faced with these weaknesses and failures, the Emperor, along with the Duc de Gramont (the Foreign Minister) and Emile Ollivier (the Prime Minister), decided to restore his fortunes by threatening the use of force unless the Hohenzollern candidacy was withdrawn. Initially, this policy succeeded: as a result of pressure from the French government on King William of Prussia, the Hohenzollern candidature was withdrawn on 12 July 1870. However, Gramont instructed Benedetti, the French ambassador in Berlin, to extract from William, as King of Prussia, an assurance that the candidacy would never again be authorized. In response, William refused to make what he regarded as a humiliating and unnecessary declaration, and from Bad Ems informed Bismarck of his decision. The famous Ems Telegram (13 July 1870) was not edited but completely redrafted by Bismarck so as to give the misleading impression that Bismarck had dismissed the French ambassador. In order to influence public opinion, Bismarck’s version was communicated to the press (Carr, 1991, pp. 196–8).

Egged on by an outburst of chauvinism in Paris, by the bellicose enthusiasm of the Empress Eugénie (who was Spanish by origin), by unfounded confidence in the French army, and by equally unfounded hopes of support from Italy and Austria-Hungary, the French government decided to declare war on 15 July (although Bismarck did not formally receive the French declaration of war until 19 July). Hopelessly unprepared for the magnitude of the task confronting it, the French army lost a series of engagements at Wissembourg (4 August), Forbach and Froeschwiller (6 August). Marshal MacMahon, the senior French commander, decided to concentrate most of his forces, known as the Army of Châlons, in and around the small town of Sedan, where almost immediately on 31 August they were encircled by superior German forces. Outnumbered, lacking adequate supplies of ammunition and food, burdened with large numbers of wounded, and almost entirely within range of German artillery fire, the French position was hopeless. After a day’s fighting, Napoleon III, who had unwisely left Saint Cloud to join his army on 28 July, decided to surrender.

Document 1.1 The French Defeat at Sedan (1 September 1870)

The interior of Sedan and the approaches to the town were in an indescribable state: the gates of the town were obstructed with carts, waggons, cannon and all the ‘impedimenta’ and débris of a routed army. Bands of soldiers, without rifles or equipment, constantly rushed forward, throwing themselves into the town. At the drawbridges the congestion was terrible, with some unfortunate soldiers being crushed to death. Cavalrymen were dragged by their horses through the crowd with their stomachs on the ground. Ammunition carts passed by at the gallop, cutting a path through the panic-stricken masses. The few soldiers who had retained some reserve of energy seemed to use it only to accuse and to curse: ‘We have been betrayed!’, they cried: ‘We have been sold out by traitors and cowards!’

Source: E.F. de Wimpffen, La Bataille de Sedan. Paris: A. Le Chevalier. 1872, p. 57

General de Wimpffen had been recalled from Algeria, where he had been serving as governor of Oran, to replace the general commanding the French troops defeated at Froeschwiller. He joined the Army of Châlons on 30 August with instructions from the Minister of War in Paris to take command if Marshal MacMahon should be incapacitated. Around six in the morning of 1 September MacMahon was severely wounded, but he passed his command to General Ducrot, and it was not until approximately four hours later that Wimpffen was confirmed in his command. He tried to organize break-outs without success, and then offered his resignation to Napoleon III. The Emperor declined it and instead insisted that Wimpffen should negotiate the surrender of the army to the Germans.

In the passage quoted, Wimpffen was obviously anxious to confirm that the situation at Sedan was hopeless. He was also anxious to attribute blame for the disaster, and he pointed the finger at Napoleon III as ‘le grand coupable’ (Wimpffen, 1872, p. 44). As active head of the regime, as ultimately responsible for the French declaration of war and as an interfering presence on the battlefield at Sedan, Napoleon III must bear a heavy responsibility for the catastrophe. However, the Franco-Prussian War also revealed major deficiencies in the French army.

The art of warfare had recently been revolutionized by the development of breech-loading rifles and artillery and by the possibilities provided by railways for the rapid concentration and supply of mass armies. Prussia had already demonstrated this in the war against Austria of 1866. The French army had benefited from reforms and improvements: a law of January 1868 introduced a five-year term of military service, followed by a further five years in the reserve; plans were drawn up for a new militia (garde mobile), but were not implemented outside the Paris region for political and financial reasons; and new weapons were brought into service, the chassepot (a breech-loading rifle) and the mitrailleuse (an early form of machine-gun). However, the French had not mastered the military use of railways and their mobilization was a shambles; the standard of education and training of most officers and men was well below that of their German counterparts; the German artillery and supply services were better than those of the French; and, unlike the Prussians, the French had no general staff to keep commanders in the field supplied with a regular flow of information and advice. The failure at Sedan was not just that of an army, but of a whole system.

Document 1.2 The French Surrender at Sedan (2 September 1870)

General de Wimpffen began by presenting to General von Moltke the Emperor’s letter which empowered him to negotiate the terms of the surrender.
General Moltke spoke first and, while acknowledging the bravery with which the French army had fought during the day, he stated that, since the war threatened to continue, the King of Prussia had considered it necessary to reduce as much as possible the forces with which France could oppose him.
Consequently, he insisted as a condition for the surrender that the French troops should hand over their arms, and that the entire army should become prisoners of war, with only the officers being allowed to retain their swords, horses and personal possessions. General de Wimpffen observed that these terms seemed very severe, that they would humiliate the army and France, and that, instead of leading towards the peace treaty which everyone wanted signed as soon as possible, they could result only in prolonging the war and in pushing France towards more obstinate resistance. He requested that the French army should be allowed to leave Sedan with its weapons and equipment, and that the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers should be free to return to France while promising on their word of honour not to bear arms against Germany again as long as the war lasted.

Count von Bismarck then intervened. He said that the King of Prussia had too much esteem for the French nation to think of humiliating the French army; that there was nothing humiliating in the terms presented; that French ill-will towards Germany had been known for a long time and that it had erupted in the present circumstances in the most unfortunate manner for his country; that Germany had been provoked in this war; that it had unsuccessfully attempted to avoid the war by making all the concessions consistent with the maintenance of its dignity; that for two centuries the aggressive character of the French had disturbed the peace of Europe; that Germany had to protect herself against similar aggression in the future; that, in order to sustain the current war, Germany had had to shoulder the heaviest sacrifices, which it would be impossible for Germany to repeat often, and that, consequently, it was necessary for Germany to acquire material guarantees for peace in the future; that these guarantees would be found by making it impossible for France to start the war again easily; that he did not doubt that all the officers would faithfully observe any engagement which they might make, but that he could not have the same confidence in the word of noncommissioned officers and soldiers; that once they had returned home, their promises would be circumvented; that it would be said that they had been disposed of without their consent; that they were not obliged to keep a promise which they had not given, which they certainly would not have given, etc.; and that even if the French government had the scruples not to reintegrate them in the army, they could not remain inactive in the midst of a movement of national defence, and that they would form an excellent nucleus or at least instructors for the organization of the military forces of the country.

General de Wimpffen replied. He said that he had the highest opinion of the French soldier’s respect for an engagement taken either by himself, or on his behalf by his commanders; that no nation was more appreciative than the French of noble sentiments and distinguished conduct; that Prussia, in showing herself to be generous in the present situation where it was the stronger, would do more for the maintenance of peace in the future, for the appeasing of old grudges and the establishment of a genuine regard for two neighbours which were made to respect each other, than in being excessively preoccupied in searching for material guarantees. He then based his argument on the past, maintaining that France had always treated Prussia generously, and that France had a right to expect a certain reciprocity of goodwill.

Source: ‘Sedan et Wilhelmshöhe’, La Revue de Paris, 15 October 1929, pp. 857–9

This is a record made of the exchanges between General de Wimpffen (the French army commander), General von Moltke (the German army commander) and Count von Bismarck (Chancellor of the North German Confederation) when they first met late in the evening of 1 September 1870 to begin negotiations for a French surrender. One of the French negotiators, General de Castelnau, recorded what was said.

The exchanges are interesting for what they reveal about French and German attitudes at this crucial moment and, in particular, about Bismarck’s intentions towards France. The German terms of surrender were no less severe than might reasonably have been expected, and, indeed, for Napoleon III (honourable confinement in the German palace of Wilhelmshöhe for six and a half months) and for French officers (allowed to retain their personal weapons, horses and possessions), they were arguably quite generous. In contrast, the French proposal, that the French forces in Sedan should be allowed to leave with their weapons and equipment and just a promise not to rejoin the war against Germany, was quite unrealistic and unacceptable. As Moltke pointed out, the conditions of surrender had been set by the King of Prussia, not by Bismarck or himself, and the French were not in a position to bargain – 82,000 exhausted, demoralized and ill-equipped French troops were trapped in Sedan by a formidable German army approximatel...