Transatlantic Relations since 1945

An Introduction

Jussi Hanhimaki, Barbara Zanchetta, Benedikt Schoenborn

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136327094
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Diplomacia y tratados

Transatlantic Relations Since 1945 offers a comprehensive account of transatlantic relations in the second half of the 20th century (extending to the present-day).

The transatlantic relationship has been the bedrock of international relations since the end of World War II. This new textbook will focus on the period since the defeat of Nazi Germany, when the multitude of links between United States and Western Europe were created, extended, and multiplied. Written in an accessible style, it emphasizes transatlantic interactions, and avoids the temptation to focus on either U.S. 'domination' or European attempts to 'resist' an American effort to subjugate the old continent. That influence has travelled across the Atlantic in both directions is one of the starting points of this text.

Structured chronologically, the book will be built around three key themes:

• Security: From the Cold War to the War on Terror

• 
  
  

• Economics: Integration and Competition

• 
  
  

• 'Soft power' and Transatlantic Relations.

• 
  
  

This book will be of great interest to students of transatlantic relations, NATO, US Foreign Policy, Cold War History, European History and IR/International history.

1 American Commitment to Europe, 1945–1949

Europe in Ruins

As the Soviet troops advanced into Germany at the end of World War II, the German dictator wrote – in what would become known as The Testament of Adolf Hitler – these famously prophetic words:

With the defeat of the Reich and pending the emergence of the Asiatic, the African, and perhaps the South American nationalisms, there will remain in the world only two Great Powers capable of confronting each other – the United States and Soviet Russia. The laws of both history and geography will compel these two Powers to a trial of strength, either military or in the fields of economics and ideology. These same laws make it inevitable that both Powers should become enemies of Europe. And it is equally certain that both these Powers will sooner or later find it desirable to seek support of the sole surviving great nation in Europe, the German people.¹

Europe’s weakened condition after the war, and the collapse of the German economic and political power did, indeed, clear the way for the preponderant emergence on the world scene of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was the beginning of the bipolar era. Much of the history of the post-war years, in fact, revolves around the European attempt to recapture the centrality lost in 1945. The trial of strength between the United States and the Soviet Union predicted by the German dictator did ensue. However, the new superpowers would not become enemies of Europe, but rather enemies in Europe. And Germany was to be, at least initially, the battleground of the rivalry.

World War II had destroyed much of Europe. After the war, the assessments on the conditions of the European economy and possibilities of reconstruction were not encouraging. Most of the continent had been devastated by the military operations. In particular, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – through which the front line had passed – had suffered enormous damages. Poland had lost almost 20 per cent of its population, Yugoslavia around 10 per cent, and the casualties for the Soviet Union are estimated to have been between 15 and 20 million. Germany lay in ruins. Not only its industrial capacity, but also its administrative and political structure had totally disintegrated after the collapse of the Nazi regime. And any future prospect was hindered by the military occupation and division of the country. While the Western European countries had suffered fewer human casualties, the material damages were catastrophic. France, weakened by the Nazi occupation and its internal divisions, suffered damages that were estimated as triple the annual pre-war internal growth rate, while the industrial sector was working at only 35 per cent of its overall capacity. Italy’s agricultural production – the most important sector for the country’s economy – was 60 per cent less in 1945 than in 1938, while the industrial sector lost around 20 per cent of its capacity. Both France’s and Italy’s transport infrastructure – roads and railways in particular – had suffered huge damages. In contrast, Great Britain’s structural losses were comparatively less, although the German air bombings had inflicted severe damages in the cities. But it was mainly in economic terms that World War II was a hollow victory for the British. The second largest creditor nation in 1939, Britain became the largest debtor as a result of the war, which had cost an estimated quarter of the country’s overall wealth. Exports were reduced to 60 per cent of the pre-war total, while expenditures had increased fivefold.

Considering the situation in Europe, the emergence of the United States and of the Soviet Union on the world scene was, perhaps, inevitable. The United States was the only country untouched by the devastation of the war. It was the rising economic power, already expanding during the interwar years, despite the negative impact of the Great Depression. The Soviet Union, while having paid an overwhelmingly high price for the war, was the only power that maintained a direct and preponderant military presence on half of the European continent. Europe lay in-between, divided by a front line that did not match any political, ethnic or historical criteria. The military occupation created a geographic division, which would then evolve into opposing political and ideological entities. The end of the war therefore also marked the abrupt emergence of an East–West division that would last for four decades. The Western European countries turned to the United States for both economic relief and protection against Soviet expansionism. For its part, Washington pursued its own strategic objectives and the expansion of its influence over Western Europe. The Cold War transatlantic relationship was at its inception.

American Idealism Versus European Realism

Roosevelt’s Grand Design

When the Allied leaders met at the Yalta conference in February 1945 they were aware that the end of the war in Europe had become only a matter of time. The ‘big three’ – Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin – therefore looked to the future. While the wartime alliance was still perceived as solid, different visions of the post-war European order were clearly emerging. For the United States, the war had been necessary in order to counter the threat posed by Hitler’s regime. But as the objective of defeating Nazi Germany was being achieved, Roosevelt looked towards creating a new international world order, one that would avoid the devastations of another world war.

The key element of the American president’s ‘grand design’ was the creation of international organizations, such as the United Nations, to maintain peace and security, and financial institutions to regulate economic relationships and coordinate the reconstruction. Roosevelt’s ideas derived from America’s traditional aversion towards defining permanent spheres of influence and from the Wilsonian idealism that, in the interwar years, had inspired the League of Nations. At the same time, Roosevelt’s vision was coherent with promoting American interests. In 1945, these were not identified with the maintenance of a presence in Europe. Before the coming of the Cold War, the US objective was to assure for itself the pivotal role in the economic relationship with Europe, while delegating security aspects to the newly founded United Nations.

Churchill’s and Stalin’s Realpolitik

The American plans for the post-war international order raised questions and reservations for Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Churchill’s and Stalin’s visions were inspired by more traditionally realistic security concerns. Both wanted to create and defend their respective spheres of influence in Europe, and thus pursued the type of policies that Roosevelt’s grand design sought to overcome. Despite their radically different ideologies, the two European leaders in fact shared a common approach, which had clearly surfaced in the so-called ‘percentage agreement’ of 1944. As Soviet troops moved to liberate Romania and Bulgaria in the fall of 1944, Churchill decided to deter further Soviet expansion by reaching an agreement with the Soviet dictator. At a meeting in October 1944, the two agreed that the Soviet Union would have 90 per cent control over affairs in Romania and 75 per cent influence in Bulgaria. With the Red Army already in control of both countries, Churchill felt he was not sacrificing much. Both sides would have equal influence over Yugoslavia and Hungary. In return, the British leader obtained 90 per cent Western influence over Greece. While Churchill would later undermine the importance of this agreement, for the Soviet leader it would remain a reference point in his dealings with the West and the basis for justifying his subsequent demands.

Spheres of Influence Emerge

Since the early stages of World War II, Washington had acknowledged Stalin’s desire to create a ‘security belt’ around the perimeter of the Soviet Union, composed of governments friendly to Moscow. Roosevelt himself realized that a future predominant role of the Soviet Union in Eastern European affairs was inevitable. However, during the Allies’ various war conferences little was done to actually define the extent of Stalin’s requests and their concrete political significance. Moreover, the unfolding of the war operations seemed to prompt the emergence of different spheres of influence, as the Western powers moved towards Germany from Italy and France, while the Soviet troops advanced from the East. The principle – outlined by Stalin – that the occupying military power would impose its control over the liberated territory was gradually emerging.

However, the surfacing of spheres of influence, perhaps a consequence of ill-conceived wartime strategies, did not necessarily entail the political and ideological confrontation of the Cold War. This resulted, on the one hand, from the American refusal to accept the imposition of a strictly enforced communist rule on the countries of Eastern Europe and, on the other, from the Soviet Union’s insecurity and ‘capitalist encirclement’ complex, which induced Stalin to pursue those policies. The European countries themselves, weakened by the war, were unable to effectively counter these two positions. Ultimately, each European country would turn to one or the other of the superpowers (either by choice or by imposition) for its reconstruction and development. Consequently, Europe as a continent and collective unity would come to accept its division.

America’s Economic Policy

Initially, America’s policy towards Europe seemed to have a long-term vision only in terms of economic policy. According to US policymakers, such as Cordell Hull and Hans Morgenthau, the political crisis in Europe, which had led to the emergence of Nazism, had been caused by the repercussions of the Great Depression. The collapse of the world’s economy had led to the creation of closed economic spaces through the erection of tariffs and trade barriers. This had in turn contributed to fuel the potent nationalist forces which triggered World War II. If economic protectionism had – directly or indirectly – led to the tensions that developed into war, then the precondition for assuring peace and security was the lifting of barriers and the creation of an open market.

This was a revolutionary development. For decades, in fact, Washington had adopted rigorous protectionist policies in order to protect the US economy from European competition. The war changed this framework. The United States emerged as the unquestionable leader and driving force of the world’s economy, producing half of the world’s industrial goods in 1945. Consequently, Washington had to adopt policies that would both promote international development and ensure America’s predominant position.

These notions constituted the basis of the Bretton Woods agreements, which established a set of rules and regulations for commercial and financial relations, thus creating a new system for the post-war international economic order. The central aspect of the agreements was the decision to link each country’s currency to a reserve currency that would guarantee the stability of exchange rates. The only currency that could play this role was the US dollar. The American currency therefore became the reserve currency and, to bolster confidence in the dollar, Washington agreed to link it to gold for the price of 35 dollars per ounce. At this rate, dollars could be exchanged for gold. This created a system for international payments in which all currencies were defined in relation to the dollar, itself convertible into gold. Another important aspect of the Bretton Woods accords was the decision to create two new financial institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later called the World Bank). The IMF was designed as the keeper of the rules of the new system, while the World Bank’s purpose was to lend money to countries in need of capital.

The decisions adopted at Bretton Woods put the United States in a position of absolute centrality in the world’s future economic system. This marked the beginning of a profound evolution in America’s relationship with the rest of the world, and with Europe in particular. It signalled the overcoming of America’s traditional economic and political isolationism. Washington realized that an assumption of responsibility on its part was needed in order to foster the reconstruction and development of Europe. The United States therefore prepared itself for this role, novel to its history. And with the assumption of responsibility came also a series of advantages, as the US gradually emerged as the leader of the Western camp.

The Wartime Alliance Starts to Crack

In the weeks following the Yalta conference, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union became progressively more strained. The key controversy related to Stalin’s policy towards Eastern Europe. At Yalta, the Soviet leader had agreed to issue the Declaration on Liberated Europe, according to which the Allied powers had to consult during the transition in order to aid the creation of governments responsive to the will of the people. However, Stalin, strengthened by his army’s presence in Eastern Europe and reassured by Churchill’s tacit approval expressed in the ‘percentage agreement’, did not abide by the Declaration (the Soviet dictator cited as a justification the so-called ‘Italian precedent’ by which the Allies had not consulted with him on the future government of Italy). In fact, a few months after the Declaration, the Soviet Union imposed a ‘friendly’ government in Romania. Afterwards, the main point of contention would focus on the future of Poland.

Truman Enters the White House

In the United States, the stiffening of the stance towards the Soviet Union coincided with the death of President Roosevelt (on 12 April 1945). The arrival of Harry Truman at the White House brought about a reassessment of US policies, which resulted in a more rigid and intransigent attitude towards Moscow. The incoming president was convinced that Roosevelt had been too forthcoming towards Stalin and had, particularly at Yalta, made too many concessions. Consequently, Truman corrected the US line of action. In a meeting with Soviet foreign minister Molotov in April 1945, the new American president forcefully protested against Moscow’s inobservance of the Yalta agreements on Poland. The US leadership had by then realized that the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe was translating into tight political control. This triggered an even greater preoccupation in Washington: that the Soviet Union would seek to expand its political and ideological sphere of influence to the countries of Western Europe that had been most weakened by the war. The idea of setting a clear limit to the expansion of Soviet influence was therefore emerging.

The US and the Major Western European Countries

Concurrently, the United States moved to tighten its relationship with the key Western European countries. Within the framework of America’s new economic policy, already in late 1945 Washington decided on a series of loans – to Great Britain, France and Italy in particular. The most substantial aid programme was given to the UK, for both economic and political reasons. Despite the acknowledgement of the inevitable decline of British power after the war, the relationship with London remained central to the pursuit of American objectives. Great Britain still maintained a strong political and military position compared with the other European countries. Moreover, it had strong and long-standing cultural ties with the United States, which both sides sought to deepen after the war. In short, it was a ‘special relationship’, which would have a deep impact both on British domestic policies and on the shaping of the post-war world order, as Washington stepped in to undertake the global role previously held by London. The special character of the relationship did not, however, eliminate the causes of tension. It was only reluctantly, in fact, that the British accepted (as the precondition to the aid programmes) to ratify the Bretton Woods agreements and to gradually abolish restrictions on its trade policies. London’s defence of its economic interests within the Commonwealth contradicted Washington’s view of promoting free trade and open access to resources. This dichotomy would continue to be a cause of friction between the two countries, particularly throughout the 1950s.

The American policy vis-à-vis France was geared towards restoring its pre-war international standing. The American attitude was i...