Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism

Dawa Norbu

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134895472
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Nationalism in specific political systems combined with a theoretical framework that draws out its universal significance. Ten case studies from South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Europe focus on local cultural factors.

1 Introduction: western concepts and non-western realities

This introductory chapter initiates a theoretical discussion of some of the fundamental questions concerning the nature and concept of Third World nationalism. What are the structural components of Third World nationalism? Have the existing theories of nationalism done justice to such a structure of Third World nationalism? If not, what are the methodological considerations for an alternative theory of non-western nationalism?

THE STRUCTURE OF THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM

This essay attempts to conceptualize non-western nationalism in terms of widely accepted social science propositions so as to construct a general theory in outline. It commences with a sociological definition of nationalism and nationhood, then traces the various developmental stages of proto-nationalism and the emergence of national identity under a set of modern conditions, and finally it demonstrates the process of production of mass nationalism as a direct result of the politicization of society, especially its value system by means of social communication and mass mobilization. This complex process, I argue, tends to produce social and psychological levelling effects upon a whole class structure which engenders a society-wide ‘mechanical solidarity’ (Durkheim 1964:79) during a nationalist movement.

In the context of such a conceptualization, the structure of nationalism consists of two equally powerful components: traditional data (such as race, language, literature, tradition, territoriality), and egalitarian ideology (such as freedom, equality and fraternity). The predominance of traditional data characterizes the early Third World nationalism, and that of western nationalism by egalitarian politics. However, in practice the essence of any contemporary nationalism in the Third World is the fusion of modern and traditional components which typically manifest as: (a) societal consciousness about national identity that provides the necessary dynamics of national unity; (b) an all-encompassing value system to guide and motivate political action; (c) a pan-ethnic movement to generate social power that is utilized to achieve national unity and independence; (d) a foreign policy centred upon the concept of national interest.

Nationalism is conceived in this study more as politicized societal consciousness than as neatly-formulated ideology. Proto-and generic nationalism with which this essay is basically concerned cannot by itself functionally be considered an ideology because it cannot define situations or propose rational solutions unless it degenerates into Fascism, whereby racism becomes the essential reference point and working framework. Otherwise, nationalism is a fusion of traditional culture and modern ideology capable of generating great social power.

The post-French Revolution nationalism, however, usually has an ideological dimension: egalitarianism to be worked first of all vis-à-vis the absolute monarch or colonial power, and after independence within the nation-state itself among its various classes. Egalitarian ideology forms the modern component of nationalism which not only defines the present situation but also proposes rational solutions to social problems and thus points the way towards a new future. The social potency and mass appeal of nationalism resides in this unique combination of two contrasting idea-systems: traditional culture provides the emotional power that mystifies the rational mind; egalitarian ideology a rational framework for the resolution of social problems.

This dual structure of Third World nationalism enables us to conceptualize this baffling socio-political force in terms of Marxian and Weberian sociological categories: social consciousness and social action. We know Marx and Lukacs used the adjective ‘class’ rather than ‘social’ to qualify their concept of consciousness; still we can take a cue from their concept, especially from its social etiology. According to Marx, consciousness as such is a function of human existence: ‘Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life process’ (Marx and Engels 1942:13). This may apply to those educated classes whose social cognition and intersubjective sensitivity are sharpened by modern rationalist education and who are therefore more conscious of their life-process. But peasant masses who become the major target of Third World nationalism are ‘conscious’ to the extent that they are alive, possessing habitual, not rational, consciousness. Ploughing the field or herding animals or hawking in the street is certainly activity but not prone to social consciousness. When we speak of nationalism as a social consciousness, we refer to that intensified state of social cognition directed towards purposeful action. Thus, Georg Lukacs reformulates Marx’s materialist proposition in this way: ‘The question of consciousness may make its appearance in terms of the objectives chosen or in terms of action’ (1971:59).Nationalism tends to amplify social consciousness and articulate group interest.

In the light of our findings about the dynamics of Third World nationalism, we can further qualify Lukacs’s concept of action that brings about social consciousness. It is usually social/political activity that engenders optimal social consciousness because politics begins with the realization that group interest can be best achieved by group action. This is the normative assumption and beginning of politics in the Aristotelian sense. To that extent most world religions have the potential for mass politics. The caliphate was supposed not only to maintain law and order but also create material conditions for an ideal Islamic society, the Dharmaraja, an ideal Hindu society; the Bodhisattva, an ideal Buddhist society. This worldly political dimension of religion brings it in indirect but effective contact with politics. That is why the transition from religious activity to mass politics has been easy in Third World historical societies. Modern mass politics makes such social goals more explicit and above all shows the rational means of achieving them.

In this essay we describe mass mobilization and social communication as the typical instruments of arousing social consciousness which is potentially present in the form of collective conscience derived ultimately from a religious tradition. This implies that at least the most inclusive form of social consciousness of a society can seldom materialize naturally or spontaneously without provocation or intervention; it has to be amplified by a voluntaristic process of mass politics and/or a catalytic event that makes masses think beyond their habitual existence and propose an alternative course of action to remedy a desperate situation. That political process inevitably politicizes social consciousness, thereby making it ripe for social action.

While a definite linkage exists between consciousness and action, it is difficult to specify whether action precedes consciousness as materialists maintain, or consciousness precedes action as psychologists postulate. To those of us interested in an interactionist approach, this dichotomic question might sound like the chicken-or-egg parable. Marx was apparently overreacting to German idealism when he dogmatically wrote, ‘Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life’ (Marx and Engels 1942:14). However, our study suggests that the beginning of social consciousness is traceable to the literate strata of a given society which usually, though not always, precedes any rational course of social action. But once mass mobilization commences, there is undoubtedly a close interaction between social consciousness and public activity, reinforcing each other, at which stage it is practically impossible to separate the two domains. More specifically nationalism as a form of politicized social consciousness begins with the politically literate classes’ conscious discovery of society as an entity in and for itself in contradistinction to generalized others, which refers to familiar but not intimate group members that facilitate the differentiation of ‘we’ from ‘they’. And this in simple terms is the beginning of Third World nationalism.

Nationalism is not only a most inclusive form of social consciousness; it is also an all-encompassing social action that includes both non-rational and rational elements. This explains nationalism’s transclass, societal appeal to the majority in a mobilized society. Weber’s sociological definition of action is apt for our purpose. He says,

We shall speak of ‘action’ in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behaviour—be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. Action is ‘social’ in so far as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course.
(1978:4)

As evident throughout this essay, nationalists, both leaders and the masses, indeed attach enormous subjective meanings to their action and behaviour. Emile Durkheim makes this point clear: ‘Surely the soldier who falls while defending his flag does not believe that he sacrifices himself for a bit of cloth’ (1954:228). We must pay particular attention to the symbolism of that ‘bit of cloth’ which is a key to the subjective meanings attached to nationalist action. For instance, national identity is psychologically nothing but an other-induced reference point which indeed ‘takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course’. Similarly, the nation as a cultural community that is politicized in relation to other similar units within the international system, is overloaded with subjective meanings that derive in one way or the other, depending upon a given situation, from national tradition and popular culture, language and literature, racial descent and homeland, culture heroes and political institutions, and so on.

In short, the traditional data component of nationalism—imparts nationalism with glorified subjective meanings which somehow make nationalists’ sacrifices meaningfully worthwhile and their hardships bearable.

Weber’s typology of social action consists of four ideal-types of which three are found in the structure and function of Third World nationalism. He states that traditional action is determined by long-formed habits; affectual action by powerful feelings; principled action (wertrational), by conscious belief in the intrinsic value of acting in a certain way, regardless of consequences; and rational action, by calculating appropriate means to achieve desired ends (Weber 1978:4–8). These are of course ideal-types; in practice they overlap each other. For instance, habitual action may be reinforced by principled action such as in religious fundamentalist behaviour; affectual action by principled action such as in traditional learned classes’ early behaviour towards European powers; and rational action may converge with those actions performed out of principle and conviction. The sheer complexity of human motives compel us to agree with what even physical scientists call ‘the principle of uncertainty.’

Indeed, what makes nationalism such a powerful socio-political force in the modern epoch is precisely the strange convergence of complex motives: affectual, wertrational and rational actions. Nationalism has the objective tendency to transform habitual or traditional modes of behaviour and action of peasant masses into affectual and wertrational actions, if not into rational action. Sacrifices at the altar of nationalism were made possible by a combination of affectual and wertrational actions which flow directly from the traditional component of nationalism. We also discern a progressive tendency among the nationalist vanguard to rationalize their action. This is due partly to the influence of modern ideology and the demonstration effects of modernity in general. Thus, we often refer in the course of this study to the non-rational core and rational elements of nationalism that determine its behaviour and action.

Nationalism is a classic case of social action both in ordinary language and the Weberian sense. It is social action in the ordinary language sense because the majority of a mobilized society are emotionally and practically involved in this co-operative activity, and exhibit similar collective behaviour. The goals of such a social action include national independence, unity and national interest of a nationality. At the same time it is social action in the sociological sense because its structural centrality constitutes a national identity and functions are largely determined by the behaviour and action of the dominating other.

A CRITIQUE OF THE EUROCENTRIC THEORY OF NATIONALISM

This analytic construct grew out of my dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs in the study of nationalism as such and Third World nationalism in particular. Although there are numerous works on country-specific nationalisms by various Third World scholars, there is not a single book that conceptualizes non-western nationalism as different from the European predecessor. Instead the European paradigm is often uncritically used as the standard measurement for the study of Third World nationalism. But, the latter differs from the former in several critical respects: the salience of culture in national identity formation, the voluntaristic process of mass mobilization as a means for a nation-in-the making, and such a nationality struggling to create or seize state power structure as the basic goal of any non-western nationalism.

There is also a methodological shortcoming in the existing literature on various nationalisms in the non-western world. Most Third World scholars tend to view their nationalisms in ideological terms which equate non-western nationalism as a natural reaction to western imperialism or colonialism (Amin 1976, 1983; Chandra 1972, 1979; Fanon 1967, 1970; Sithole 1959; Hu 1981, and so on). This is highly simplistic, for the social phenomenon of nationalism is much more complex and deep rooted than nationalist historians think. Nor do I subscribe to the ‘imitation theory’ of non-western nationalism as ably advocated by a number of western scholars. Although a certain amount of learning process is involved, there is a serious limit to imitation unless supported by favourable objective conditions. I shall show later how the shared culture, cohesive social structure and common communication system of any historical society provided the necessary conditions for the rise of nationalism in the Third World.

None of the above-mentioned lacunae has so far been filled by western scholars either. They have confined themselves to editing anthologies of nationalistic writings by various nationalist leaders and ideologues. Sylvia Haim’s Arab Nationalism (1962) and Elie Kedourie’s Nationalism in Asia and Africa (1970) are classic examples. These anthologies might perhaps suggest that to the western mind Third World nationalism is so bafflingly different from the familiar European experience that it is beyond conceptualization. The only way, such scholars might have felt, was to let the Asian, Arab and African nationalists speak themselves out through anthologies. But the problem is that words seldom speak for themselves; they have to be arranged in such a way so that their underlying meaning, general pattern and internal logic are made intelligible both to the specialist and public. This is the major task of this work.

But the fact is that like most academic disciplines we study in the Third World universities, the study of nationalism was pioneered and still remains largely a domain of the western scholars who have almost exclusively focused upon western or more precisely European historical experience of nationalism. This state of affairs has bred Eurocentric theories of nationalism that have little relevance to the non-western world. In 1983 Anthony Smith acknowledged that ‘We are still not free of the Eurocentrism common to most studies of nationalism’. He adds that there

has been a marked tendency to judge, and explain, non-western nationalisms by reference to this western criterion. So, for example, African nationalisms are sometimes adjudged to be genuine or not, according to whether they display the same features as their European counterparts.
(1983:xi–xiv)

This Eurocentric tendency in the study of nationalism perhaps started with Ernest Renan in the early 1880s and continued right up to the 1950s by a host of western historians, notably Hans Kohn. Renan argued that nations were a peculiarity of Europe as it developed after Charlemagne. His study sought to explain why nationalism prevailed in western Europe, and not yet (at the time he wrote) in Eastern Europe and the non-western world. He describes how Teutonic conquerors arrived without sufficient number of women, and intermarried with the local women, and adopted the religion of the conquered. Next, the absolutist monarchies imposed the unity of large societies. However, Switzerland, Holland, America and Belgium were formed by voluntary union of provinces. Finally the French Revolution changed everything: it taught humankind the principle of nationalism, ‘the idea that a nation exists through itself and not by grace of a dynasty’ (Gellner 1987:6–28).

Ever since then the term nationalism came to be equated with the modern political doctrine of popular sovereignty, and any nationalism that does not have this pronounced democratic bias is called ‘culturalism’ or ‘traditionalism’, as is often described in the case of early Chinese, Indian or Arab nationalism. This Eurocentric school of thought seems to understimate the considerable role of Christian sects and the Church in the production of nationalism in most of the leading European nations since the sixteenth or seventeenth century, as documented by several discerning western scholars at the turn of this century (Church 1873; Mathew 1918; Cecil 1919). For national culture reflects the general will in society.

A very general distinction has been made between the western and eastern nationalism, but such variations in character flow more from their different historical situations which compelled nationalist leaders to emphasize one aspect of nationalism at the expense of others to suit their respective situational requirements. Now it depends upon the prevailing situation whether the traditional or modern data base should be emphasized in order to enhance mass mobilization and social communication.

In the west the social basis of religious ideas and institutions had been systematically undermined and eroded by a series of revolutionary changes since the sixteenth century: the Renaissance, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, scientific and rationalistic education. There the ground was much better prepared for the rise of egalitarian politics, which defined the main characteristic of western nationalism. Moreover, there were far fewer cases of imperialism, a foreign political system controlling various nationalities or even nations in the west than in the Third World where imperialism or colonialism became the major target of nationalism. In the west the main issue before nationalism was how to replace royal authority or monarchical rule by various forms of popular mandate, whereas in the Third World colonies it was how to overthrow foreign colonial domination.

The relative absence of religion-eroding revolutionary changes in the recent history of most Third World countries meant that tradition was—still is—a live social force that moved the hearts and minds of millions which could be effectively manipulated for mobilization purposes. That is why religion-induced culture has given the basic orientation to Third World nationalism. But this does not mean that non-western nationalism was without any egalitarian element. For example, Bal Gangadhar Tilak whom Ernst Haas classifies as a tradition-bound restorationist (1986:733) among the pantheon of Hindu nationalism in fa...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Figures
• Tables
• Preface: Field Experience And Social Theory
• 1 Introduction: Western Concepts And Non-western Realities
• 2 Towards A New Definition Of Third World Nationalism
• 3 The Stages of Proto-nationalism: Tribalism, Ethnicity And Patriotism
• 4 Social Structure Of The Nation: The Ordering Principle Of National Attributes
• 5 The Evolution Of Religious Sects And The Emergence Of National Identities
• 6 Modern Nationalism And Egalitarian Ideology
• 7 The Politics Of Nationalism: Mass Mobilization, Linguistic Transformation And Nationalist Movements
• 8 The Mechanism Of Mass Mobilization: Symbol Manipulation And Identity Assertion
• 9 Nationalism As Social Power: Restructuring Egalitarian Systems
• 10 The Monoethnic State And Polyethnic Social System: The Rise Of Ethnic Nationalism
• 11 Conclusion: Cultural Differentiation And Political Rationalization
• Epilogue: The Rise Of Slavic Nationalisms And The Collapse Of Transnational Ideocracy
• References