Understanding Terrorism in America

Christopher Hewitt

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• Print ISBN: 9780415277655
• eBook ISBN: 9781134472253
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political History & Theory
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Christopher Hewitt's comprehensive book surveys the characteristics and causes of terrorism and governmental responses to it. He also examines the organizational structure of terrorist networks, how they are financed and their ideological agendas. Groups covered include: Islamic fundamentalists, white and black racists, black nationalists, revolutionary communists, neo-Nazis, militant Jewish groups, anti-abortionists and émigré groups. This book is essential reading for students of American politics and terrorism. It also provides a highly readable account for interested readers wishing to know more about a topic which has recently become tragically relevant to world affairs.

1 The latest atrocity

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four planes filled with passengers. At 8:48 a.m. the first plane crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. Fifteen minutes later the second plane flew into the south tower. Both towers burst into flames and later collapsed. Shortly before 10:00 a.m., the third plane crashed into the Pentagon outside Washington DC. The fourth plane crashed in rural Pennsylvania, after passengers attacked the hijackers.¹

The attacks were unprecedented in terms of the number of deaths, and the amount of damage which resulted. In addition to the 226 passengers on the four planes (including the nineteen hijackers), almost 3,000 persons lost their lives at the World Trade Center and 125 people perished at the Pentagon.² Preliminary estimates of the costs of the physical damage alone suggested that they would be over $5 billion. The attacks were certain to be the worst insurance disaster in history, with analysts saying that the total for all claims could run as high as $40 billion (Treastor 2001).

The American response was also unprecedented. All commercial air traffic was grounded for two days. Aircraft carriers and destroyers armed with surface-to-air missiles were stationed in the coastal waters off California and New York. Fighter jets patrolled the skies over Washington and New York, and soldiers stood guard in downtown areas.

The Justice Department launched “the most massive and intensive investigation ever conducted in America,” according to Attorney General Ashcroft, with 4,000 FBI agents assigned to the case. Within a few days, the nineteen hijackers were identified, and linked with the radical Islamic network of Osama bin Laden. They ranged in age from twenty to forty-one, with most being in their mid-twenties. Most were Saudis, but one was Lebanese and two were from the United Arab Emirates, while the apparent leader, Mohammed Atta, was Egyptian. The hijackers did not fit the suicide bomber profile found in previous research on Middle Eastern terrorists (Wilgoren 2001). They were educated; in some cases they had spent years in the United States; at least one was married with children. As Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert with the Rand Corporation, noted:

What is extraordinary about this episode is that these people were preparing for their mission for months, leading normal lives with wives, taking the garbage out, taking their kids to McDonalds, taking flying lessons, living in comparatively pleasant places, all the while knowing that at some future date they were going to kill themselves and thousands of people.³

(DeYoung ez al. 2001: A8)

They lived middle-class lives, and aroused no suspicion among their neighbors. This ability to pass was, of course, helped by the growing diversity within much of America. As a New York Times article (Golden et al. 2001) noted:

Although some of them spoke little English, they barely stood out in a landscape that has grown increasingly diverse.… Florida turned out to be a fine place for a terrorist to train. The polyglot racial mix, the transient culture of rental apartments, the simple procedures for getting a driver’s license.

The terrorists entered the United States legally. Fifteen received business or tourist visas, while one had a vocational education visa - allowing him to train as a pilot.

The Osama bin Laden network, known as al Qaeda (the base), is composed of radical Muslim groups operating in at least thirty-five countries. Apparently an infrastructure of supporters has existed in the United States since the early 1990s, and includes “sleeper cells” that can be activated for specific attacks. Following the September 11 attacks almost 1,200 Muslims were arrested as material witnesses or detained for immigration violations, the largest such operation since World War II. The detentions were apparently intended to thwart potential attacks by al Qaeda, and most of those detained had no obvious links to the hijackers (“Deliberate strategy of disruption” 2001).

Osama bin Laden and his followers see themselves as fighting a jihad (or holy war) against the United States. In 1998 bin Laden said: “To kill Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim.” Previous attacks on American targets attributed to the group include the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1996 bombing of a US military complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the 1998 bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden in 2000. In December 1999, an Algerian linked to the group was arrested at the Canadian border with bomb-making materials in his car.

Social and economic impacts

Almost all major sports and cultural events were canceled in the after-math of the tragedy. The National Football League announced that it would not hold any of the games scheduled for the weekend, and Major League Baseball, the PGA tour, auto racing and other sports followed suit. The three television networks postponed the start of their fall season premieres for a week, while the Emmy Awards, the Latin Grammy Awards, and New York fashion shows were canceled indefinitely. Television and cinema executives quickly replaced films involving explosions and hijackings with patriotic stories, family dramas and escapist comedies. One executive announced that the entertainment being offered would be “much more wholesome with movies reinforcing American values, family and community” (Weinraub 2001).

The indirect economic costs are difficult to calculate precisely but were certainly significant. For days, American business was paralyzed, many stores closed, and sales were down sharply in those that remained open. Hardest hit was the airline industry, which was already in bad financial straits. The major airlines announced layoffs and warned that they might file for bankruptcy protection. As passengers canceled their flight plans a ripple effect was felt throughout other sectors of the travel industry, including hotels, resorts, convention centers, cab and auto rental companies. The insurance industry and financial markets suffered heavy losses. Following fears that terrorists might use crop-duster planes to spread toxic chemicals or deadly diseases, the planes were grounded. Not only did this take away the livelihoods of about 5,000 pilots but farmers feared their crops would suffer (Canedy 2001). The stock market was closed for the rest of the week, but after they reopened the Dow Jones average plunged 1,370 points (14.3 percent) in the week - the worst decline ever. Analysts predicted that the attack would tip the economy into recession as consumer confidence plunged.⁴

The public mood

The public mood went from panic to patriotism. When schools and offices closed there was some initial panic in Washington DC, leading to massive traffic jams as people fled the city, but this was followed by a surge of patriotism. American flags appeared everywhere, outside homes, on cars, on bridges, as did signs saying “God bless America,” “Pray for America,” or “United we stand.” So many Americans donated blood that the nation’s chronic shortage disappeared temporarily, with blood bank inventories tripling in a week (Goldstein 2001). A television fund-raiser for the families of those killed or injured generated more than $150 million in pledges.

Following the attacks, people thought to be Arabs or Muslims were threatened, harassed, and assaulted. The Council on American-Islamic Relations received several hundred reports of anti-Muslim incidents from around the country. In Arizona, a gunman shot to death the Sikh owner of a gas station, then fired at a Lebanese clerk working in a nearby gas station, and at a home owned by an Afghan family. In New York, a man tried to run over a Pakistani woman. Mosques were firebombed in Chicago, Cleveland, Seattle, Denton TX, and Smithtown NY. In Cleveland, a man crashed his car through the doors of the Islamic Center, causing $100,000 damage. Because of their turbans and beards, Sikhs were often targets, with over 200 incidents being reported against them, including three arson attacks against Sikh temples. The violence was condemned by President Bush, and by Attorney General Ashcroft, while the Senate passed a resolution calling for the protection of the civil rights and civil liberties “of all Americans including Arab Americans and American Muslims.” Nevertheless, the violence reflected widespread suspicion towards Arabs and Muslims. One public opinion poll found that 43 percent of those surveyed reported that they were “personally more suspicious of people of Arab descent” (Edsall 2001a). Another poll found that 58 percent backed more intensive security checks for Arabs (including US citizens), while 49 percent favored special identification cards, and 32 percent wanted special surveillance of them (Verhovek 2001).

A New York Times poll found overwhelmingly support for military retaliation against the terrorists, even if “many thousands of innocent people” were killed. A majority were ready to accept some inconvenience in return for increased safety, saying that they would be ready to arrive three hours early for domestic flight security checks, and to pass through metal detectors in public buildings (Berke and Elder 2001). In a survey by USA Today, there was similar strong support for military retaliation, even if it required the use of ground troops, and the death of a thousand soldiers, or if it resulted in increased taxes, and oil and gas shortages. The USA Today poll also found that large majorities favored increased security in airports and public places (Memmott 2001).

The political response

Tuesday’s events were so catastrophic that security considerations dictated that the President should leave Washington until it was determined that he could safely return. Thus it was not until the evening that Bush addressed the nation. In a short four-minute speech he told the American people that “thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror” and vowed that the United States would hunt down and punish those responsible. “These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat but they have failed,” he declared. In the days following, the President visited the site of the attacks, and attended a prayer service at the National Cathedral in Washington. On Thursday 20th, in a speech to a joint session of Congress, Bush demanded that the Taliban government of Afghanistan turn over Osama bin Laden, and close all terrorist training camps in that country. “Our war on terror,” he said “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated,” but he warned that it would be a long campaign. Bush declared that any country that harbored or supported terrorists would be regarded as a hostile regime. He emphasized several times that the enemy was not Islam⁵ or the Arabs. “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.”

In its campaign against terrorism, the Bush administration adopted a multifaceted strategy. On the military side, warships were deployed to the Persian Gulf and Special Force units to Afghanistan. On October 8, American and British planes began bombing Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar, the three largest towns. On the diplomatic front, the United States sought successfully to build a broad coalition against terrorism. The United Arab Emirates severed relations with Afghanistan, and Pakistan and Iran sealed their borders. Russia announced that it would share intelligence with the United States, and allow American planes to overfly its air space. Arguing that “money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations,” President Bush froze the assets of all suspected Islamic terrorist groups in the United States. More important, the Treasury Secretary was given broad powers to impose sanctions on foreign financial institutions if they did not cooperate in sharing information about suspected terrorist accounts and funding (Sanger and Kahn 2001). The anti-Taliban coalition within Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance, was supplied with weapons and supported by American air power. By late December, the Taliban had been overthrown and US special forces were searching caves along the Pakistan border for Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders.

At least initially, the attack produced a show of bipartisanship and cooperation between Democrats and Republicans. By a vote of 98–0 in the Senate and 420–1 in the House, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing President Bush to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those involved in the attack.⁶ Congress also voted $40 billion in emergency spending to cover the cost of rebuilding and increased security. Another $15 billion to bail out the struggling airline industry was approved with large bipartisan majorities. Prior to the terrorist attack, the political scene had been marked by bitter wrangling over social security and disagreement over some of the Bush nominees for federal positions. In the aftermath of the attack, controversial nominations were withdrawn, and debates on such potentially divisive issues as a patients’ bill of rights and the anti-missile defense system were postponed.

The need to display national unity at a time of crisis may have muted political debate, but political divisions did not disappear in Congress or the wider society. Rather the new situation helped some special interests while it disadvantaged others, and led to new alliances between old adversaries. The AFL-CIO and the US Chamber of Commerce jointly announced their support for major public investments to provide a stimulus to the weakened economy. Equally striking was the shared opposition by both conservative and liberal groups to the threat of increased government surveillance and expanded police powers. The conservative Free Congress Foundation and the Gun Owners of America held a news conference together with the liberal American Civil Liberties Union and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to voice their concern that the new initiatives would threaten individual rights and privacy (Edsall 2001b).

The uneasy compromise between national unity and partisan disagreement was most evident in the final form of the anti-terrorism bill. Agreement was reached only after days of tense negotiations between Democrats and the Bush administration (Lancaster 2001). The bill expanded the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to wiretap phones and monitor internet messages. A single court order would authorize “roving wiretaps” under which investigators could tap any phone used by a suspected terrorist. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies were allowed to share grand jury and wiretap transcripts. However, an administration proposal under which non-citizens suspected of terrorist offences could be jailed indefinitely was dropped. Instead suspects could be detained for only seven days, after which they would have to be charged or released. The bill passed the Senate unanimously, and the House by a vote of 357 to 66.

The fact that the attacks had been perpetrated by foreigners led to calls for tighter immigration controls. Rep. Lamar Smith, a member of the House immigration subcommittee, declared that “We’re going to have to do a better job of making sure we know who comes into the country, how long they’re supposed to be here, and whether they’ve left or not.” The new concerns appear to have stopped, at least temporarily, proposals by the Bush administration to grant amnesty to millions of illegal immigrants (Sheridan 2001).

The media: interpreting the atrocity

The terrorist attacks dominated the media for weeks, as viewers watched the traumatic events unfold in horrifying detail. The round-the-clock television coverage broke the previous record set after the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963, when CBS and NBC stayed on the air with continuous news reports for four days. Certain themes - such as the appalling death toll, and the heroism of firefighters, police, and emergency workers - were emphasized again and again. It was once cynically claimed that “ten deaths is a tragedy, a thousand is a statistic,” but in their reporting the media personalized the tragedy, as the dead and missing were identified. Photographs of the victims, often with detailed descriptions, were published in local newspapers, showing them as mothers and fathers, co-workers, friends and neighbors. Accounts of those who had escaped reinforced the message that this horror could have happened to any of the readers. A typical story in the New York Times (Walsh 2001) described the experiences of “two ordinary people among the thousands caught in the World Trade Center on Tuesday morning.”

But who was responsible, and why had they done this terrible thing? How should we respond, and what could be done to stop other attacks? The editorials and opinion writers offered a variety of responses to these questions. Initially, most expressed anger and incomprehension. The day after the attack, the lead editorial in the New York Times was headed “An Unfathomable Attack.” Before the attack Americans had believed “that there were some things that no human being would want to do … consider the intensity of the hatred it took to bring it off. It is a hatred that exceeds the conventions of warfare, that knows no limits, abides by no agreements.”

Suspicion quickly fell on Osama bin Laden and his network, usually described as “Islamic fundamentalists” or “Muslim radicals,” although a number voiced suspicions that one or more Arab governments were responsible. William Safire (2001a) asked, “What well-financed terrorist organization under what country’s secret protection slaughtered so many Americans?” There were, however, conflicting interpretations of why they had carried out the attack. Several writers noted that bin Laden himself had explained his grievances against America in a fatwa issued in February 1998. The United States was occupying Saudi Arabia and its holy places (Mecca and Medina), was enforcing sanctions against Iraq, and was supporting Israel in its oppression of the Palestinian people. As one writer pointed out: “These complaints require no elaboration in the fatwa; they are immediately understood by the statement’s intended Muslim audience” (Hashmi 2001).

Most commentators preferred a more general expla...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Understanding Terrorism in America
• Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Tables
• Illustrations
• Series editors’ preface
• Preface
• 1 The latest atrocity
• 2 Before September 11 American terrorism since the 1950s
• 3 The political context of American terrorism
• 4 The organizational dynamics of terrorism
• 5 The terrorists
• 6 Dealing with terrorists
• 7 Impacts and consequences
• 8 The future of American terrorism
• Appendix Data sources and coding procedures
• Bibliography