Belorussia 1944

The Soviet General Staff Study

David Glantz, Harold Orenstein

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781134266739
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

A new edited translation of the Soviet Staff study of the Red Army's Belorussian operation in the summer of 1944, which was unprecedented in terms of its scale, scope and strategic consequences.

The Soviet Stavka had planned a campaign consisting of a series of massive operations spanning the entire Soviet-German front. Four powerful fronts (army groups) operated under close Stavka (high command) control. Over 1.8 million troops acomplished a feat unique in the history of the Red Army: the defeat and dismemberment of an entire German army group. This book is a translation of the Soviet General Staff Study No 18, a work originally classified as 'secret' and intended to educate Soviet commanders and staff officers. The operation is presented from the Soviet perspective, in the words of the individuals who planned and orchestrated the plans. A map supplement, including terrain maps, is provided to illustrate the flow of the operation in greater detail.

1 The Situation in Belorussia at the Beginning of June 1944: Plan of the Red Army’s Belorussian Operation

As a result of the Red Army’s brilliant victories during the winter campaign of 1943–44, Soviet forces advanced along the entire length of the Soviet-German front from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea. The advance was especially great in the south. By the summer of 1944, the front-line ran in the general direction from Narva to Pskov and further south; near Polotsk it turned to the southeast, skirted Vitebsk, proceeded east of Orsha and Mogilev, then turned to the southwest to Zhlobin and Mozyr, and continued further westward to Kovel’. At Kovel’ the front-line turned sharply south, ran west of Chernovitsy, and proceeded further southeast to the lower course of the Dnestr (see Map 1 in the map supplement).

Thus, two vast salients were formed, as it were, on the Soviet-German front: one in the Ukraine, south of the Pripiat’ River, where our forces had advanced deeply; and the second in Belorussia, north of the Pripiat’, where German forces were holding a frontline that was jutting into our disposition.

The operational initiative belonged to the Soviet forces, and the Red Army command was free to choose the axes for its attacks. The German command was forced to shift to a defensive strategy on the Soviet-German front, and counted on prolonging the war, so as to delay in every way possible the ultimate defeat of the German-fascist forces.

In its proposals for military operations in the summer of 1944, the German High Command considered it most likely that the Red Army would deliver its main attack in the south. It expected only secondary, local operations of a holding nature in Belorussia, and the Germans anticipated repelling these by employing available forces from Army Group Center within the bounds of the main defensive belt.

The Germans considered that the front in Belorussia had been stabilized. Of the 22 panzer (tank) divisions that they possessed in the east, 20 were deployed south of Pripiat’ and only two were to its north.

This time too, the Hitlerite command was mistaken.

Discussions held in the Stavka of the Red Army’s Supreme High Command concerning the operational-strategic situation on the front in the summer of 1944 recognized that it would be expedient first to eliminate the enemy’s Belorussian salient and defeat his forces in the Vitebsk, Orsha, Bobruisk, and Minsk region. Unless this was done, an offensive in the Ukraine could not be guaranteed.

The defeat of German Army Group Center in Belorussia and the liberation of Belorussian territory (across which ran the shortest and most important routes to Germany’s largest political administrative centers) had great strategic and political significance. The situation in the entire theater of war would fundamentally change to our benefit. In addition, a successful offensive in Belorussia would best ensure our subsequent offensive operations in the Ukraine and Poland.

The situation of the two sides in Belorussia by 1 June 1944 is shown on Map 2. The 1st Baltic Front’s forces, consisting of three armies (the 6th Guards, 4th Shock, and 43d) were in the north in a terrain sector between the Nevel’, Idritsa line and the Velizh, Vitebsk line. The 3d Belorussian Front’s three armies (the 39th, 5th, and 31st) were deployed on the Vitebsk and Orsha axes. The 2d Belorussian Front’s forces, also including three armies (the 33d, 49th, and 50th), were grouped on the Mogilev axis in the center. The 1st Belorussian Front’s forces were operating to the south along a vast front running past Rogachev and Zhlobin to the mouth of the Ptich River, and further west along the Pripiat’ River to Kovel’; its 3d, 48th, and 65th Armies were located north of the Pripiat’ River.

German Army Group Center’s forces (the Ninth, Fourth, and Third Panzer Armies) and a portion (in the north) of the German Sixteenth Army’s forces, which had become part of Army Group North, opposed them in the terrain sector north of the Pripiat’ River.

By the commencement of our offensive, the enemy had occupied a prepared and well-organized defense. The Third Panzer Army was located along the Vitebsk axis, the German Fourth Army’s divisions were grouped on the Orsha and Mogilev axes, and the Ninth Army was covering the Bobruisk axis. The Second Army’s front ran further along the Pripiat’ River. The enemy defense was anchored on a well-developed system of trench-type field fortifications, exploiting natural lines. The depth and outfitting of the defensive belts varied depending on the importance of the axis and the nature of the terrain.

In Army Group Center’s belt, the German command had begun the construction of defensive positions in 1942–43. The current front-line, with its developed system of fortifications, took its final form during stubborn battles during the spring of 1944.

The German Eastern Front’s Army Group Center, under the command of General-Field Marshal Busch, was assigned the mission of protecting the crucial East Prussian and Warsaw axes. Army Group Center’s main defensive line was an arc, whose convex side was turned to the east (the ‘Belorussian balcony’, as the Germans called it). The northern end of this arc was in Polotsk and Vitebsk, while its southern end was in the Pripiat’ River basin. During the first half of March 1944, Hitler ordered the creation of fortified regions at the most important centers along these routes to hold off the Soviet offensive. Thus, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, and Bobruisk were declared fortified regions.

Work was also carried out in rear areas to construct defensive positions along the Dnepr, Drut’, and Berezina Rivers, along the Minsk, Slutsk line, and further to the west. However, these rear positions had not been completed by the commencement of our offensive.

Simultaneously with engineering measures to fortify the front-line, the Germans regrouped their forces to cover the most important axes, that is, Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, and Bobruisk. The German command focused serious attention on replenishing their operating formations with men and equipment, striving to bring them up to authorized strength. The enemy succeeded in accomplishing this to a considerable degree. Manning and refitting also concerned tank and assault units, artillery units of the Reserve of the High Command, and other combat arms. The operational density on Army Group Center’s defensive front amounted to 14 kilometers of frontage per division. On average, there were 450 men, 32 machine-guns, ten guns and mortars, and one tank and assault gun per kilometer in the first line. These data, however, are only orientational in nature. In fact, the defense varied in strength in different sectors, depending on their importance. Thus, for example, along the Orsha and Rogachev-Bobruisk axes the defense was well developed and saturated with forces. Here the tactical density was high. In a number of other sectors, which the Germans considered less important, the defense was structured along an extensive front and was characterized by a lower troop density.

By the beginning of June 1944, the German force grouping with respect to armies and principal operational axes was as follows:

(a) The Third Panzer Army was defending a 150-km front along a line from east of Polotsk to Bogushevsk (40 kilometers south of Vitebsk).

The army consisted of ten divisions (the 24th, 252d, 56th, 246th, 206th, 197th, 299th, and 256th Infantry Divisions, and the 4th and 6th Luftwaffe Field Divisions), twelve separately operating regiments (security, police, etc.), and several assault-gun brigades.

All of these divisions, as well as two regiments (a regiment of the 201st Security Division and the ‘Copenhagen’ Regiment) were defending in the first line.

There were ten separate regiments in the army reserve, mainly operating against partisans and securing army lines of communications.

The Third Army’s principal force grouping was located in the Vitebsk region.

The overall strength of this army’s forces on 22 June 1944 was 165,450 men, 1,345 field guns, 680 antiaircraft guns, 80 tanks, and 80 assault guns.

(b) The Fourth Army was defending a 225-km wide sector extending from (but excluding) Bogushevsk to Bykhov.

This army consisted of ten divisions, of which eight were infantry (the 78th, 260th, 57th, 110th, 337th, 12th, 31st, and 267th), and two were motorized (the 25th and 18th). In addition, it had eight separately operating regiments of varied designation, and several assault-gun brigades.

There were eight separately operating regiments in the army reserve, used simultaneously to fight against partisans and to protect army rear areas and lines of communications.

The Orsha and Mogilev axes were most solidly protected.

By 22 June, the army consisted of 168,320 men, 1,376 field guns, 320 antiaircraft guns, 130 tanks, and 246 assault guns.

(c) The Ninth Army was defending in a 220-km wide sector extending from south of Bykhov to the Pripiat’ River. It consisted of 11 divisions, of which ten were infantry (the 134th, 296th, 6th, 383d, 45th, 36th, 35th, 129th, 292d, and 102d) and one was security (the 707th). In addition, it had three separately operating regiments and nine security, construction, and combat engineer [sapper] battalions.

All infantry divisions, the security division, the separate ‘Brandenburg’ Regiment, and the nine security, construction, and sapper battalions were defending in the first line.

Two separately operating regiments were in the army reserve.

The principal force grouping was created on the Bobruisk axis.

By the beginning of our offensive, the army consisted of 175,730 men, 1,630 field guns, 600 antiaircraft guns, 80 tanks, and 60 assault guns.

In addition, the following reserves were deployed behind the German front-line and in front of our forces operating north of the Pripiat’ River: the 14th and 95th Infantry Divisions, the 60th Panzer Grenadier Division [termed by the Soviets ‘motorized’], the 20th Panzer Division, six security divisions, two training-field divisions, and two reserve divisions.

The overall combat and numerical strength of Army Group Center’s forces on 22 June 1944 (taking into account the Second German Army, which was deployed along the Pripiat’ River and on the Kovel’ axis) was 1,036,760 men, 7,760 field guns, 2,320 antiaircraft guns, 800 tanks, 530 assault guns, and 1,000–1,300 airplanes.

Operational initiative, the favorable relief of the front-line of Soviet forces in Belorussia, and the ability to concentrate large forces and means here created favorable conditions for delivering deep, concentric blows against the German dispositions in the general direction of Minsk. If the offensive was successful, it could lead to a splintering of enemy forces and their encirclement and defeat unit by unit.

The Stavka’s operational plan envisioned the delivery of main attacks on both of our flanks: in the north by the 3d Belorussian Front and the 1st Baltic Front’s left wing to destroy the German Vitebsk-Orsha-Lepel’ grouping; and in the south by the 1st Belorussian Front’s right wing to defeat the enemy’s Bobruisk grouping. In the center, the 2d Belorussian Front was to conduct a secondary offensive along the Mogilev axis (see Map 3).

After destroying the German Vitebsk-Orsha-Lepel’ grouping, the 1st Baltic Front was to advance with its main forces in the direction of Lepel’ and S’ventsiany, supporting from the north our forces advancing toward Minsk. The 3d Belorussian Front was to develop its main attack on Minsk and its right flank was to advance toward Molodechno. After destroying the Bobruisk grouping, the 1st Belorussian Front’s right-wing main forces were to reach the Pukhovichi, Osipovichi, and Slutsk region, keeping in mind a subsequent advance toward Minsk, while part of the forces were to reach Baranovichi. Operating in the center, the 2d Belorussian Front was to defeat the German Mogilev grouping and reach the Berezina River. A subsequent offensive toward Smilovichi and Minsk was planned.

Thus, the general operational plan envisioned the conduct of a large strategic operation involving the close cooperation of four fronts, with the aim of destroying German Army Group Center’s main forces in Belorussia and liberating Minsk, the capital of the Belorussian SSR. During the first stage of the offensive, [we] planned to smash the enemy defense on six axes, encircle and destroy his groupings on the flanks (at Vitebsk and Bobruisk), and penetrate his front in the center (along the Bogushevsk, Orsha, and Mogilev axes). During the second stage, our forces were to exploit achieved success quickly, pursue the enemy along the entire front, and, while overwhelming his central grouping on the Mogilev-Minsk axis with our wings, encircle and destroy it. The most important mission of the third stage of the operation was untiring pursuit of the remnants of the defeated enemy forces to our western borders.

The operational plan of the Red Army’s Supreme High Command established decisive aims for destroying the Germans in Belorussia, envisioning a splintering of their front and the encirclement and destruction of enemy forces piecemeal. The plan was wisely thought out, carefully worked out, and well supported in all respects.

In accordance with this plan, preparations were carried out for the great summer offensive in Belorussia.

MILITARY-GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF AREA OF OPERATIONS (SEE MAPS 4–16)

Force operations along the Belorussian strategic axis in June-July 1944 developed in a vast region whose borders were as follows: in the north, the pre-arranged Nevel’, Dvinsk (Daugavpils), and Shauliai line; in the south, the Gomel’, Mozyr’, Pripiat’ River, and Brest line; in the east, the Nevel’, Smolensk, and Gomel’ line; and in the west, the Shauliai, Kaunas, Belostok, and Brest line. This terrain belt, which extends 450–550 kilometers from east to west and 400–450 kilometers from north to south, basically encompassed the territory of the Belorussian SSR and a considerable portion of the Lithuanian SSR.

The military-strategic significance of this region was conditioned, first and foremost, by the fact that the principal routes from Moscow and Smolensk to Poland’s and Germany’s most important industrial and political-administrative centers—Warsaw and Berlin—and to Germany’s food bases—East Prussia and Pomerania—ran through this area. Capturing this region would have an exceptionally great effect on the outcome of the war.

The region’s surface was a vast plain cut by many rivers and lakes, and covered, to a large degree, by forests. It included a number of elevations with gentle slopes, as well as low-lying expanses, the latter mainly located along river valleys and having, in large part, a wooded and swampy character. The largest of these, the Poles’e Lowlands, covered the region’s entire southern part.

Elevations in the Belorussian theater consisted of low hills or plateaux with modest absolute and relative height and gentle slopes. These elevations not only failed to complicate movement and troop operations but even facilitated them. The most developed network of routes with the best roads was here, and soil properties (loamy or sandy-metalled) were such that even after heavy rains the roads dried quickly and became completely trafficable. In general, the elevated regions were favorable for troop maneuver and the conduct of operations by large formations using great masses of equipment.

Of the region’s elevated areas, the Belorussian Ridge, which bordered Poles’e to the north, was the largest and most important. This ridge was a continuation of the Smolensk-Moscow Hills, and extended from Orsha through Minsk and Baranovichi to Grodno. It served as a watershed for the large rivers flowing into the Baltic and Black Seas.

The broad valleys of the upper rivers divided the ridge into a series of hills with their own names: the Katarsy Mountains (in the Lepel’ region), the Minsk Hills, the Novogrudok Heights, the Volkovysk Heights, and the Grodno Heights. The Oshmiany Hills ran from the Belorussian Ridge to Vilnius in the Minsk region, and the Nesvizh Heights stretched between the towns of Slutsk and Baranovichi. The highest elevations were in the range of 200–300 meters.

As already mentioned, the relief of these elevations consisted of low, circular hills and spurs; broad, flat depressions; and broad upper-river valleys. The Grodno, Volkovysk, and Novogrudok Heights were the most hilly and cut the most with ravines and rivers. Here, however, the sectors that were considerably cut with steep slopes did not extend very far, and were not a continuous obstacle, but more like a mass of boulders.

The relief of the Minsk and Oshmiany Hills was rolling, with gentle slopes and fewer ravines. Unstratified sand with small stones was deposited in loamy soil, while in places boulders could be encountered.

The river valleys emerging from the Belorussian Ridge were, for the most part, uniform plains with very minor gradients. The river’s banks were predominantly low and swampy. Ground water was close to the surface.

The least convenient regions for conducting large-scale offensive operations were the lowlands, encountered throughout the entire theater, especially in the southern part. The following lowlands having more importance could be noted in the north-south direction.

The Polotsk Lowland, which was formed by the Drissa and Obol’ River valleys, occupied an area of 50×75 kilometers. A forest and shrubbery covered this lowland, and part of it was swampy and intersected by a large number of lakes.

West of the Polotsk Lowland was the Disna River Lowland. This terrain sector, directly adjacent to the river itself, was more convenient for movement. Here, there were two or three parallel roads that ran along both of the river’s banks. North and south of the river the terrain had a wooded and swampy character, and was less accessible, especially in the eastern part.

A vast lowland ran along the course of the Berezina (Dneprovskaia) River. Its length from north to south was around 300 kilometers, and its width in the southern part reached 100 kilometers. The general character of the terrain was wooded and swampy. The lowland was not very populated, had a limited number of roads, and it was therefore difficult to move large troop masses from east to west and back again. The most accessible sector was located north of Lake Palik. The Borisov region and south of it, the Berezino, Cherven’, and Smilovichi region, and the Bobruisk region were more convenient for operations by large formations.

The Naroch’ Lowland was formed by the Naroch’, Servech’, and Usha River valleys, and the upper Viliia River. This lowland was divided into two sections of hill ridges, approaching Vileika from the east. The general nature of the terrain was wooded and swampy.

The lowland between the Berezina (Nemanskaia) River and the upper Neman River (the so-called Naliboka Forest) was also wooded and swampy, with a poorly developed road network.

The lowlands at the upper Shara River (especially the Lake Vygonov region), the upper Merechanka River (southwest of Vilnius), the Grodno Forest, etc. should also be mentioned.

The vast Poles’e Lowland, which was formed by the Pripiat’ River basin, ran along the entire southern part of the theater. It was cut by a large number of rivers, streams, and channels. The character of the terrain was wooded and swampy; a vast area of swamp covered up to 50 per cent of the total. Populated areas were rare, and the road network was poorly developed. Elevations were in the form of low hills, along which ran more convenient roads, facilitating troop movement in this wooded and swampy b...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Cass Series on Soviet (Russian) Military Experience
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of Illustrations
• List of Maps
• Editor’s Foreword
• Introduction
• 1 The Situation in Belorussia at the Beginning of June 1944: Plan of the Red Army’s Belorussian Operation
• 2 Preparations for the Operation
• 3 Beginning of the Soviet Offensive: Penetration of the German Defense (First Stage of the Operation, 23–28 June)
• 4 The Red Army Offensive along the Polotsk-S’ventsiany, Minsk, and Slutsk-Baranovichi Axes: Seizure of Minsk and Encirclement of German Forces (Second Stage of the Operation, 29 June–4 July)
• 5 Liquidation of Encircled German Forces at Minsk: Offensive Against Dvinsk and Westward Pursuit of Enemy (Third Stage of the Operation, 5–16 July)
• 6 Brief Overview of Combat Operations to the End of July: Restoration of Railroads and Change in Transport Conditions
• General Conclusions
• Appendix 1: Soviet order of battle, and unit and formation command cadre, 23 June 1944
• Appendix 2: Soviet personnel losses during the Belorussian operation (includes entire 1st Belorussian Front)
• Appendix 3: Maps