This section must begin with a note of caution since we still do not know, with any certainty, what autism is or what causes the condition. However, this is not to imply that we have not learnt a great deal about autism since 1943 when the severe and complex form of autism was first identified and delineated by Leo Kanner, an American paediatrician, and 1944 when the more subtle, high-functioning form of autism was first investigated and named by Hans Asperger, an Austrian Psychiatrist (see box 1.1). The point is that much of what we allegedly āknowā has continually been challenged, refined or revised ever since, with direct implications for perceptions of the condition, the forms of support we provide and the interventions we design.
Box 1.1: Early descriptions of autism
Leo Kanner
Kanner was an American psychiatrist who wrote āAutistic Disturbance of Affective Contactā (1943), based on a five-year study of eleven children whom he described as āoddā and as having an āinability to relate themselves in an ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning of lifeā.
Kanner produced a nine-point scale of the nuclear features of the condition:
- Inability to develop relationships
- Delay in acquisition of language
- Non-communicative use of spoken language
- Delayed echolalia
- Pronominal reversal
- Repetitive, stereotyped play
- Maintenance of sameness
- Good rote memory
- Normal physical appearance
Hans Asperger
Asperger was a Viennese paediatrician who wrote āAutistic Psychopathies in Childhoodā (1944, translated by Wing 1), in which he described a number of boys who found it difficult to āfit inā despite a seemingly good level of ability and fluent speech. The boys had significant difficulties with:
- Social language interaction
- Repetitive steroetypical behaviours
- Intense fixations
- Limited understanding of gesture and facial expression
- Poor motor co-ordination
There is clear overlap between Kannerās and Aspergerās observations. They both borrowed the term āautismā from psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler, who first used it in 1911 to describe the social withdrawal associated with schizophrenia. Literally translated, the word autism means āselfismā.
After the publication of Kannerās work, many other researchers began to develop point-counting systems for the identification of autism (e.g. Rutter et al. 1971, Gillberg & Gillberg 1).
For example, from the 1940s right through to the 1970s, there was considerable support for the theory that autism was a psychogenic disorder caused by poor parenting and associated, in particular, with a cold, unloving ārefrigerator motherā (Bettelheim 1967). However, research accumulating in the field of neurology during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly that associated with the early work of Rimland (1964), gradually overshadowed and superseded this theory, though not before it caused considerable harm to a large number of families. By contrast, the latest research posits that autism is essentially a neurodevelopmental disorder, i.e. a disorder of the developing mind and brain caused by a genetic anomaly that is somehow activated by an environmental trigger as yet unidentified (Lathe 1). There is speculation that the trigger, or triggers, might be linked to trauma during pregnancy or birth, infection, hormonal influences, or to a range of pollutants, such as heavy metals in water or toxic chemicals in food. However, as yet, no clear consensus has emerged on the matter. The idea that the MMR vaccine is a key trigger has now been largely rejected (Gerber & Offit 2012), though some parents continue to insist upon a link (Hilton et al. 1). Whatever the nature of the trigger, it is speculated that this genetic pre-disposition and environmental trigger somehow āact on the susceptible brain to produce ASD [sic]ā (Lathe 1, p. 211). It is these brain changes that are thought to alter the developmental pathway of the child with autism and account for the behavioural manifestations of the condition discussed below.
Though the precise mechanism that underpins this causal sequence is still far from understood, autism āis now firmly established as a disorder of the developing mind and brainā (Frith 2003, p. viii). Indeed, brain research utilising new scanning technologies has lent considerable weight and legitimacy to this claim (Boucher 1). Much of the brain research emerging in this area focuses on the unusually large size of the brain in very young children but the lack of brain growth in middle childhood and thereafter (Courchesne et al. 1). Atypical connectivity also seems to be characteristic of the autistic brain (Courchesne 1, Courchesne & Pierce 1). Neural changes within the following areas have been noted by several different researchers:
- Prefrontal cortex ā responsible for social perception, planning and strategising
- Cerebellum ā linked to motor control and associative learning
- Limbic system ā associated with memory, emotion generation and recognition
- Corpus callosum ā responsible for information sharing across the two hemispheres
(Just et al. 1, Sokolowski & Corbin 1, Allely et al. 1, Broek et al. 1 and Edmonson et al. 1)
It is not within the limits of this book to explore this research in any detail. However, what is interesting about the findings above are the apparent correlations between the areas of the brain that appear to have undergone neural changes, and those responsible for the various functions that operate differently in individuals with autism. Researchers therefore posit a causal connection between the two (Muller 1).
Yet, fascinating and exciting though this research is, it is still in its infancy and raises many questions (Boucher 1). For example, it already seems clear from the research that disconnectivity in autism does not follow a particular and consistent pattern but takes various forms with various effects on different neural circuits within the growing brain ā some impacting on communication, some on memory, others on emotions, and so on (ibid.). It is uncertain how these different forms arise and whether they are related or entirely discrete in terms of their etiology (ibid.). If they are discrete, this suggests that the characteristics they impact upon are independent of each other. If so, why do they appear to be related when expressed in everyday behaviour (ibid.)?
Disconnectivity theory does not, therefore, provide a comprehensive explanation of all of the characteristics of autism and its various forms. However, it provides another tantalising piece of the autism puzzle. A key difficulty for practitioners lies in making sense of, and evaluating, the validity of this highly technical and specialised medical research, and understanding how it should inform our perceptions of the condition. Keeping up with the fast pace of change within the field is also an ongoing challenge.
To complicate matters further, we must remind ourselves that the understanding of autism explored within the British and European research literature is highly āsituatedā in a socio-cultural sense, as well as temporally. Thus, though the manifestations of autism will be the same in any context, the understanding of the condition that prevails in Asian or African cultures may be very different to that which prevails in white European cultures because of the divergent underlying values and beliefs that shape them (Taylor Dyches et al. 1).
For example, in a small-scale study of beliefs relating to autism and causation amongst Asian and white British families, autism was largely understood to be caused by biomedical factors like genetics or birth trauma amongst the European parents, whereas it was largely attributed a divine or magical providence, like Godās will or punishment, amongst Asian parents (Mockett et al. 1). Thus, autism is by no means a unitary phenomenon but is subject to multiple interpretations.
Even within the UK autism research community, definitions and theories advanced by different researchers may vary in their detail, depending on researcher values and beliefs and the particular discipline from which their theories emerge. This adds yet another layer of interpretation and complexity to the issue. Years ago, Williams (1997) summed up the changing concept of autism and her words still hold true today:
Over the years āautismā has been considered a form of spiritual possession, a mental illness, an emotional disturbance, a personality disorder, a communication disorder, a mental handicap, a social communication disorder, a developmental disability and more recently, an information processing problem, a movement disorder, or a sensory or perceptual condition and professionals of different sorts evolved from these camps.
(p. 7)
To add to the complexities above, there is also the problem of how autism is understood in the public sphere ā especially the media. It is almost impossible to pick up a newspaper and not be confronted with a news headline announcing the latest theory of autism. Many of these reports are pure sensationalism. The theories they publicise generally come and go quickly and are never heard of again. This is either because the research they are based upon is never replicated and confirmed and is therefore quickly forgotten ā like the idea that autism is caused by too much television (Waldman et al. 1), or because further analysis shows the research to be insubstantial, misleading or ill conceived in some way ā like the idea that autism is caused by the MMR vaccination (Wakefield et al. 1). A problem for the public is how to distinguish speculative claims from more authoritative research. Unfortunately, exposure in any of the media ensures t...