The Values of Change in Social Work

Steven Shardlow

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• eBook ISBN: 9781134978281
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Medicine
• Subtopic: Health Care Delivery

Examining the major developments in social work from moral, philosophical and political perspectives, the highly respected and experienced contributors to this text analyse social work values and place them firmly in a modern, practical context.

Chapter One
CHANGING SOCIAL WORK VALUES: AN INTRODUCTION

STEVEN SHARDLOW

We may believe in an intuitive way that values are a vital component of social work, yet give little thought to why they are important or to the characteristics of the relationship between values and social work practice, or indeed to the nature of values themselves. As R. Huws Jones wrote in 1970, ‘A man’s values are like his kidneys: he rarely knows he has any until they are upset’ (Timms 1983:16). In the hurly-burly of current social work practice it is all too possible to respond to immediate pressures without giving much thought to the values implicit in our actions.

Why then are values so important? At least part of the answer may be sought in the complex network of relationships between the social worker and the public. They are first and foremost fellow human beings and citizens of a common state. These two sets of relationships imply the existence of mutual rights and duties. (For example, members of a given state have a mutual obligation, in most circumstances, to obey the law of the land.) The very existence of society and the state is predicated upon such a reciprocal system. In common with other groups, e.g. lawyers, doctors, and teachers, social workers have additional sets of rights and duties. At least three such sets can be identified: those relating to people served by social workers, those relating to their employers, and those relating to the wider profession. Two broad issues arise. First, any additional rights and duties accruing to social workers need to be exercised or carried out according to some widely accepted set of principles. Second, these rights and duties open the very real possibility of conflict between social workers and members of the public, or indeed their employers or the wider profession. Even where such conflict is absent and a social worker’s actions are sanctioned by the client’s permission, there is need for some guidance about how to act: just because an act is sanctioned by a client it is not necessarily right to perform that act. Social workers are morally accountable for any reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions, and in that respect they are no different from anyone else, but there are additional responsibilities imposed on them by virtue of their being social workers, and so they must exercise additional caution when performing professional duties.

There is a direct link between values and action. When we perform an action we, and the act itself, may be judged according to values expressed through that action. Questions of value run through all our actions as social workers. Guidance is necessary because of the very nature of social work, involving as it does work with people: ‘competence in the art of working with values is competence in an art [the social worker] will practise for the length of his working days’ (Leighton, Stalley, and Watson 1982: 2).

We cannot escape dealing in the stuff of values because of the very nature of social work practice. The very fact of undertaking work with people involves complex decisions and dilemmas of a moral nature which are not reducible to technocratic solutions. That is why the Central Council for the Education and Training of Social Workers (CCETSW) has stated that an essential minimum requirement of social workers at the point of qualification should be the ‘capacity to apply a system of professional values’ (CCETSW 1988:15). Similarly the British Association of Social Workers (BASW) states as the first item in its code of ethics: ‘Social work is a professional activity. Implicit in its practice are ethical principles which prescribe the professional responsibility of the social worker’ (BASW 1975). Similar statements expressing the idea that social work practice is based on values of one sort or another are to be found in ethical codes adopted by other social work bodies (SCA 1986; NASW 1980). There is then considerable agreement that social work needs a value system, and there is evidence of attempts to formulate this in the various codes of practice.

Questions about values do not only affect individual relation ships between social workers and their clients, they permeate the whole context of social work practice. We can identify with some confidence the loci of potential disputes about values. Downie and Loudfoot (1978) have attempted this, enumerating the following areas:

In the first place, the very idea of having some form of social work system embodies value judgements, for it presupposes that there are certain categories of people who ought to be given help of certain kinds, and that there ought to be special occupations to provide this kind of help. How best to provide this help, in terms of both general policy and specific instance, poses a second set of value-problems. Third, complex value judgements are generated by the questions of whether there are special skills which it is possible for a social worker to acquire, and if so, in what manner it is permissible or desirable for him to exercise them. Finally, there are questions of value raised by the direction in which social work is or ought to be evolving, and, in particular, whether it ought to become more or less ‘professionalized’ or ‘institutionalized’.

(Downie and Loudfoot 1978:111)

Now all of these questions are susceptible to answers of a sort, based upon value judgements. Following the work of Hare (1981), any value judgement as an answer to any of these questions should have the quality of being prescriptive and universalizable and should have the quality of ‘overridingness’. In other words, it should tell us what to do, it must apply in all similar sets of circumstances, and it should override other sorts of answers precisely because it is a value judgement. It tells us what ought to be the case. Even so, the answer given by any one individual is quite likely to be different from that given by another. There are at least two reasons for this. First, any answer will be grounded in belief and will rest upon the ethical and political views of the individual. Beliefs about fundamental principles vary according to personal taste or professional opinion. Second, there may be agreement about fundamental principles but disagreement over their application to a particular case. It is important to come to some understanding about the reasons for such disagreements.

This is no small point. We need to understand the grounds on which different individuals make their value judgements: it is not so much the answers but more the process by which those answers are derived that will further our understanding about ‘values’ in social work. For Leighton, Stalley, and Watson (1982) this is the hallmark of philosophical discussion. It requires that two tasks be undertaken: ‘discussion aimed at clarification of the value judgement …critical evaluation of the logical relation between grounds offered and the judgement made’ (Leighton et al. 1982:3). How then are we to go about such tasks in order to increase our understanding of values in social work? By so doing we shall not discover definitive answers, but we may understand the questions a little better.

But we are rushing ahead. In our haste to establish a method of approach we have omitted to ask what we mean by the term ‘values’. Much to do with values is obscure or confusing, not least the very concept of ‘values’. When we see calm, reassuring phrases written about social work values we should be on our mettle immediately. Take the expression ‘the value base of social work’, often bandied about by practitioner and academic alike. This comforting phrase seems to imply that there is something solid and firm upon which the enterprise of social work is erected. The inclusion of the definite article implies the existence of one such solid support for the whole of social work practice. Yet on closer examination we find something of a paradox: the lack of a clear consensus about the nature of social work values, yet an apparent belief that such a consensus exists. As we have seen, there is wide-scale, although not universal, assent for the notion that social work needs a value system. There is much less agreement about the content of any such system. Indeed, the CCETSW (1976) working party set up to examine values in social work abandoned any attempt to define simply and succinctly the concept of ‘values’. The reason for so doing is not hard to find; it was admirably summed up by Noel Timms:

Almost any kind of belief and obligation, anything preferred for any reason or for no apparent reason at all, any objective in the short or long run, any ideal or rule, is heaped into a large pantechnicon carrying the device ‘Social Work Values—will travel anywhere’.

(Timms 1983:2)

We expect much of the word ‘value’: it has become a ubiquitous synonym for a variety of other concepts—inter alia, professional ethics, political beliefs, and personal morality. It is difficult to reach agreement about the content of social work values when the notion of values is itself so extensive and vague; erecting such a complex activity as social work on such a weak foundation seems well-nigh impossible.

It is hardly surprising that many social workers would prefer to ignore the difficulties and to take refuge in old certainties. It is far easier to subscribe to the idea that there is indeed a finite number of values specific to social work, such as is found in Biestek’s list of seven ‘principles’: individualization, purposeful expression of feelings, controlled emotional involvement, acceptance, non-judgemental attitude, client self-determination, and confidentiality (Biestek 1961:17). Those who adopt this viewpoint only delude themselves by reducing the complex to the simple. However, recognizing the lack of agreement about the constituents of ‘values’ in social work, or reaffirming their importance, does little enough to advance our real understanding, except perhaps in so far as it makes us aware of the complexity of value questions in social work, and for that matter generally.

We can now return to our question ‘How ought we to broaden our understanding of value questions in social work?’. For the busy practitioner or student, abstract discussions about values at a theoretical level can be both dry and uninformative. Rather than try to develop an understanding about the place of values in contemporary social work by applying abstract concepts to practice, this book examines areas of social work where change is a significant element, and it considers value problems that daily confront practitioners. An analysis of values taking as its startingpoint current areas of practice in social work should make debates more accessible to, and more relevant to the needs of, the practitioner. By examining a series of current changes it is possible to identify current themes across a range of normally discrete and diverse elements of practice. Are there, for example, common and current moral dilemmas that arise out of new forms of practice? Are social workers in these various fields facing similar value problems?

This book, then, adopts a distinctive approach in an attempt to illuminate value questions through the medium of change. By analysing values in relation to changes in practice we are able to reveal a rich seam. Change is often a challenge to existing structures and traditions. Changing practice sharpens our naturally somewhat blunted concern for value questions. In the process of change we are more likely to seek to ensure that existing values are preserved, and therefore more able to describe and recognize what these are and how they operate. Alternatively, as change in social work practice may be generated for a variety of reasons—managerial fiat, worker initiative, or public pressure—it is possible that new or evolving values may themselves be the engine of change. We are most likely to see present ‘values’ changing, adapting, being transmuted into different forms, or indeed we may even see the emergence of new ‘values’. Where change is taking place it is likely that discussion about value issues will be at its sharpest. For some, innovation may be a source of challenge and refreshment; for others it may be the cause of stress and disaffection; for all it will be a source of debate.

In recent years there have been substantial changes both in the nature of social work practice and in the broader context in which social work operates. These two factors must be related: social work does not operate in a vacuum, isolated from society. It is not the purpose of this book to provide a detailed analysis of changes in social work practice or of the relationship of social change to developments in social work; it is rather to enable us better to understand some aspects of social work values in order to aid the development of ethically sound practice. Obviously, it is not possible in one volume to examine more than a few changes taking place in social work practice. Those selected are intended to represent significant developments which will have, and indeed are having, an important effect on the way social work is practised. Of course with the benefit of hindsight other developments may come to be seen to have more significance or be more durable.

In the last twenty-five years many major developments in social work have occurred: new models of practice have emerged, a host of organizational structures have evolved, and child sexual abuse has been ‘discovered’, to mention but a few. Moreover, social work is being conducted against a backcloth of social change of increasing ferocity for many service uses (Wicks 1987). The post-war consensus about the nature and function of the state has broken down. An enterprise culture is being vigorously promoted by government, fostered by the growth in dominance of the ‘New Right’ ideology. There is no longer broad agreement about the scope of the welfare state, as those at the margins of society increase in number and compassion seems to falter. This has tremendous implications for the future of social work practice. An increasingly important debate for social workers will be the extent to which social work can fit into the enterprise culture—indeed how far it should attempt to do so; and how does ethically competent practice relate to these wider changes?

A persistent theme for social workers has been the nature of their relationship to the people who receive social work help. New practice models are being developed which attempt to relate social work more to the needs of people in local communities, whether the help comes from neighbourhood offices, resource centres, or health centres. These models challenge traditional concepts of health care and social work. We need to understand the ethical implications of some of these developments to enable us to work better with people in local communities and create effective working relationships with colleagues, especially as part of multidisciplinary teams. Without an understanding of the values implicit in these developments we shall be unable to translate them into effective models of service delivery.

Another important theme has been the demand for the greater involvement and participation of clients in the social work process, both through access to records about themselves and for greater control over the decisions made by public bodies which affect the lives of individuals. Social work has attempted to respond to this pressure, which reflects a growth of consumerism in society as a whole. These developments cannot be seen in isolation. The trends towards making social work more relevant to local communities and towards involving people in decisions about their lives interact with each other and lead to the need to examine changes which have taken place in the relationships between social workers and their clients.

Equally, it should not be forgotten that social workers are usually part of large organizations, and undertake their practice in that context. The challenge to managers and social workers alike is to define models of professional practice which allow managers to manage and social workers to conduct their practice effectively and ethically, yet which can accommodate changes which are evident in practice. Also, there is now considerable media pressure on social workers, especially in child abuse cases. Often the social worker is put into an untenable position, criticized for over-hasty action when children are removed from their parents, yet pilloried if abused children are left at home and subsequently killed or seriously injured by parents. We need to understand more about the values involved when social workers remove people from the community—not just children but other groups as well.

This book examines these themes through consideration of particular changes with a view to:-

• understanding the philosophical principles and the moral or political values implicit in these developments
• identifying recurring moral dilemmas and value questions that arise as a result of new forms of practice, to explore the implications for practitioners
• discovering whether there are common themes emerging across the range of new developments.

The book is divided into two parts. The first section describes some current value difficulties facing social workers, both from a theoretical examination of some difficulties in the way we think and talk about values and through an account of value problems of the type which regularly occur in practice and of the ways in which social workers attempt to deal with these difficulties. The second part of the book examines particular changes in detail.

© Steven Shardlow

Part One
SETTING THE SCENE

Chapter Two
SOCIAL WORK VALUES CONTEXT AND CONTRIBUTION

NOEL TIMMS

INTRODUCTION

This book focuses on particular difficulties, those described as moral dilemmas, in the contemporary practice of social work, and on specific value issues implicit in new forms or particular aspects of that practice. It centres on the work of social workers, on facing and resolving problems at the level of the individual practitioner, the team, and the agency. This chapter contributes indirectly to the particular consideration and the concrete instance through a critical discussion of value-talk in social work. Such talk has to be set in a context wider than that provided by social work and its practice. This produces difficulty, since the notion of values in general use, as well as in sociology, philosophy, and so on, supplies no ready-made nostrums or even rules that can be applied to social work. In other words, if simple and quick solutions are envisaged (what the original Lady Bountiful in Farquhar’s play called ‘receipts’), the news of this chapter is not good. Social work has for too long blessed itself, as it were, with values, without enquiring at all closely into their ingredients. The enquiry which I am proposing is no curtsey in the direction of academic respectability. It is a necessary requirement for making more intelligible the project of this book.

A sample from what is already contained in this chapter may help to illustrate the general approach to be adopted. Take the sentence at the start of this introduction. Those familiar with social work writing probably glanced over it without pausing. A re-consideration suggests certain problems requiring attention before we can be sure that the point of the sentence has been grasped. Not all difficulties may be described as moral, nor are all moral difficulties dilemmas. What relationship, if any, can be discerned between moral dilemmas and ‘value issues’? How is ‘moral’ to be understood? These may appear obfuscating questions, particularly in view of the ease and frequency with which the adjective ‘moral’ appears in social work writings. We seem satisfied with ‘moral panic’ and ‘moral career’ as explanations of some kind, no matter what. We are pleased to detect signs of (regrettable) life in the ‘moral’ categories of deserving and undeserving; we praise the avoidance of moral judgement, failing to distinguish it from judgements of a moralistic kind. Yet the force and function of ‘moral’ in these and other instances remains blandly unclear. Is it, for instance, the same aspect or aspects of careers, panics, categories, and judgements that make them ‘moral’? Finally, the idea of the explicit expression of a value-position may be relatively easily grasped, particularly in the case of social work. Social work, to judge from its literature, engages in self-conscious refrains around ‘values’ more than any other profession. Yet the notion of values implied in a practice requires unravelling. By what means, for example, can we come to an agreement with another practitioner or outside observer that such and such are indeed the values inescapably caught up in the practice under consideration?

Questions...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TAVISTOCK LIBRARY OF SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• GENERAL EDITOR’S FOREWORD
• CONTRIBUTORS
• CHAPTER ONE: CHANGING SOCIAL WORK VALUES: AN INTRODUCTION
• PART ONE: SETTING THE SCENE
• PART TWO: CHANGING VALUES
• REFERENCES