Art and Knowledge

James O. Young

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• eBook ISBN: 9781134519293
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Aesthetics in Philosophy

Almost all of us would agree that the experience of art is deeply rewarding. Why this is the case remains a puzzle; nor does it explain why many of us find works of art much more important than other sources of pleasure. Art and Knowledge argues that the experience of art is so rewarding because it can be an important source of knowledge about ourselves and our relation to each other and to the world. The view that art is a source of knowledge can be traced as far back as Aristotle and Horace. Artists as various as Tasso, Sidney, Henry James and Mendelssohn have believed that art contributes to knowledge. As attractive as this view may be, it has never been satisfactorily defended, either by artists or philosophers. Art and Knowledge reflects on the essence of art and argues that it ought to provide insight as well as pleasure. It argues that all the arts, including music, are importantly representational. This kind of representation is fundamentally different from that found in the sciences, but it can provide insights as important and profound as available from the sciences. Once we recognise that works of art can contribute to knowledge we can avoid thorough relativism about aesthetic value and we can be in a position to evaluate the avant-garde art of the past 100 years. Art and Knowledge is an exceptionally clear and interesting, as well as controversial, exploration of what art is and why it is valuable. It will be of interest to all philosophers of art, artists and art critics.

1: WHAT IS ART?

Definitions of art

I believe that every item properly classified as a work of art can contribute to human knowledge. In other words, I maintain that all artworks possess cognitive value. One might dispute this thesis in two ways. Some people will hold that no works of art have cognitive value. On their view, an artwork, unlike a work of history or science, is not the sort of thing from which one can learn. Alternatively, one might hold that, although some artworks have cognitive value, not all of them do. This second objection states that a satisfactory definition of art will not make reference to cognitive value. The bulk of this essay is designed to show that the first sort of objection is mistaken. This first chapter has the more modest goal of replying to the second objection. In this chapter, I assume that one can learn from at least some of the things which have been classified as works of art. I then argue that art ought to be defined in such a way that only items with cognitive value count as artworks.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section contains general reflections on how art is to be defined. I adopt the view that art is whatever is accepted as art by an artworld. In the second section I argue that art can be defined only relative to an artworld. Something never possesses arthood tout court. Rather it is an artwork for some artworld or other. The third section argues that an artworld can be given reasons for accepting only certain items as works of art. The fourth section reveals that these reasons indicate that an artworld ought to accept as art only works with cognitive value. The conclusions of this chapter are, in large part, independent of the general position adopted in the rest of this essay. Readers can deny that a definition of art ought to make reference to cognitive value. At the same time, they can accept that I give, in subsequent chapters, a sound argument for the conclusion that some artworks have cognitive value and that I explain how this is possible.

A few generations ago, writers on the epistemology of art typically began with the bald assertion that a genuine work of art is a source of knowledge. According to such authors, a work which is merely a source of delight or sensuous pleasure is not a work of art. Sometimes these writers implied that only decadent cultures and individuals have thought otherwise. I would like to be able to make such statements with impunity, but I cannot. Consequently, I am forced to begin this essay with a discussion of the definition of art. I will then be in a position to say that only works with cognitive value are works of art. I may even hint that anyone who disagrees is decadent.

A basic question often arises when we ask for the definition of a particular concept. A long time ago, Plato asked whether something is pious because the gods love it or whether the gods love something because it is pious. Similarly, we can ask whether something is art because the artworld accepts it, or whether the artworld accepts an object because it is art. (When the question is put in this way, another question arises: who counts as a member of the artworld? My answer is elegantly democratic. I count as an artworld member anyone who uses the word ‘art’.) In other words, a question about the property of arthood needs to be addressed. It could be either a relational property or an intrinsic property. A relational property is a property an object possesses only in relation to another object. The property of being a father, for example, is a relational property. Someone possesses it only in relation to his children. The property of being beloved is another. An intrinsic property is a property an object possesses independently of any other. So, for example, the property of being spherical is an intrinsic property. If something is art because the artworld accepts it as such, then arthood is a relational property. If, on the other hand, the artworld accepts things as artworks because of properties they possess, then arthood is an intrinsic property.

Some philosophers have believed that arthood is an intrinsic property, others that it is relational. Some philosophers have believed that arthood is essentially the capacity to express or convey emotion. This capacity is an intrinsic property. Other philosophers have thought that artworks all possess certain formal properties, such as uniformity amid variety. These philosophers also believe that arthood is an intrinsic property. Still others hold that all arthood is the intrinsic property of being able to contribute to knowledge in some characteristic manner. (This last clause is important since many items with cognitive value are not works of art. The principal task of this essay is to identify the manner in which art contributes to knowledge.) Arthood has also been held to be a variety of relational properties. Some have held that arthood is the property of standing in some relation to the theories of an artworld. Another view, a version of the institutional definition of art, is that something possesses the property of arthood if and only if it is accepted as art by the artworld. On this view, something possesses the property of arthood in relation to the artworld which accepts it as art.

The examples in the previous paragraph illustrate that the intrinsic properties artworks are thought to possess are usually taken to be functional properties. Arthood is often held, that is, to be the property of being able to perform some function. Works with the property of arthood may, for example, function to evoke emotion in an audience. Consequently, to say that arthood is an intrinsic property is not necessarily to say that it is a property completely independent of relations to an audience. Here an analogy to secondary qualities is helpful. Advocates of the view that arthood is an intrinsic property could hold that arthood is similar to secondary properties such as redness. Redness is never in objects in the same way that, say, rectangularity is. Nevertheless, redness is an intrinsic property in objects: a power to affect viewers. One might similarly hold that arthood is in objects as a power to affect audiences.

Given that I believe that all artworks possess cognitive value, I might be thought to hold that arthood is an intrinsic property. In particular, I might be expected to hold that arthood is a capacity to provide knowledge. Certainly, I can be expected to hold that not just anything the artworld accepts as a work of art is one. After all, it seems obvious that audiences have accepted as works of art items which have no cognitive value. Giving an example of such an item might prove controversial, but a huge variety of objects have been accepted as works of art. The suggestion that all of these objects have cognitive value is implausible. Nevertheless, I see no way to avoid the conclusion that arthood is a relational property.

Euthyphro was right: things are pious because loved by the gods. Piety is a relational property. In particular, it is an example of what might be called a perspectival property. A perspectival property is a relational property that does not exist independently of the perception of its existence. The nature of such properties is best appreciated by contrast with a non-perspectival property such as cubicalness. Something is cubical even if no one believes that it is. Even if every sentient being in the world disappeared, dice would continue to be cubical. Contrast this with piety. If no gods existed to love things, nothing could possess the property of being pious. In this way, piety depends on beings who perceive its existence. Similarly, a world without people who conceive of art is a world without art. Michelangelo’s David would possess the property of being made from marble even if no one thought it was. It would not possess the property of arthood if people did not employ the concept of art. Arthood consequently depends on the perspective of an artworld. It is a perspectival property. As we shall see, if arthood depends on the perception of its existence, arthood is whatever an artworld conceives it to be. Should an artworld’s conception change, so does arthood.

I seem, then, to be committed to a hopelessly inconsistent position. I accept that artworks are works accepted by an artworld and that items without cognitive value have been accepted as art. Apparently, I cannot consistently maintain that all artworks have cognitive value. The apparent inconsistency disappears once the relativity of arthood is recognised. Many writers have mistakenly assumed that only one artworld exists and that art is whatever this artworld accepts as art. In fact, as many artworlds exist as there are groups of people who are in general agreement about the membership of the class of artworks. The members of some artworld may accept as a work of art something without cognitive value. From this we cannot draw the unqualified conclusion that cognitive value is not a feature of all artworks. In other artworlds, only items with cognitive value are accepted as artworks. In these artworlds, the view that arthood is a perspectival property is not inconsistent with the view that all works of art have cognitive value. I am a member of an artworld which accepts as art only works with cognitive value. Consequently, I can consistently hold that arthood is a perspectival property and that all artworks have cognitive value.

The argument of the previous paragraph is plausible only if I can establish the existence of a multiplicity of artworlds and that arthood is relative to these worlds. As I have noted, virtually everyone who has employed the concept of an artworld in defining art has spoken of the artworld. The conjunction of the proposition that only a single artworld exists and the view that arthood depends on acceptance by an artworld quickly leads, however, to an absurdity. One way to avoid the absurdity is to reject the view that arthood is the perspectival property I have suggested it is. Since I believe that this would be misguided, I conclude that belief in a single artworld is mistaken. The relativity of arthood soon follows.

The relativity of arthood

It is helpful to begin the case for the relativity of arthood by returning to Plato’s attempt to define piety. My definition of art, which I will call the perspectival definition, is parallel to Euthyphro’s initial definition of piety. Early in their dialogue, Euthyphro tells Socrates that piety is what is agreeable to the gods. By Euthyphro’s own admission, however, the gods quarrel among themselves. When they quarrel, they differ about what is good and what is bad. Since they love the good and abhor the bad, some things are loved by some of the gods, but hated by others. Socrates notes that Euthyphro is apparently committed to the conclusion that one thing can be both pious and impious, which is impossible. A similar argument can be advanced against the view that artworks are the items accepted as such by the artworld. Just as the gods disagree among themselves, so the members of the artworld have their differences. Consequently, it may seem that the perspectival definition of art, like Euthyphro’s initial definition of piety, is reduced to absurdity. Since arthood is relative to an audience, however, this conclusion can be avoided.

It is easy to formulate the Socratic argument against the perspectival definition of art. We can imagine a situation where some people, all indisputably members of the artworld, disagree about whether some item is an artwork. Let us call these people Andy, Arthur, Clement and Peggy. Clement and Peggy, say, deny that some item is a work of art. Andy and Arthur, on the other hand, accept it as an artwork. Under these circumstances, it seems that the item in question both is and is not a work of art, which is impossible. Apparently, the perspectival definition is reduced to absurdity. Consequently, the perspectival definition must be rejected unless something is wrong with the Socratic argument.

A simple way to avoid this reductio, without accepting the relativity of arthood, immediately suggests itself. This response to the problem may be called the simple response. Defenders of the perspectival definition could hold that the arthood of any item does not depend on the unanimity of the artworld. Instead, they can maintain, some item is an artwork if even one member of the artworld accepts it as such. Imagine that an item is presented to Andy, Clement and Peggy, and none of them accepts it as a work of art. Subsequently, the item is presented to Arthur and he accepts it as an artwork. The simple response states that, given that Arthur is a member of the artworld, as soon as Arthur confers arthood upon the controversial item, it is an artwork. It is so whether or not the other members of the artworld recognise it as such. (They may not know that Arthur has accepted the item as an artwork.) According to the simple response, this is irrelevant. Even if some members of the artworld continue to believe that the work is not an artwork, it is. It may seem, then, that the simple response saves the perspectival definition from reduction to absurdity.

The simple response is unsatisfactory. The trouble is that when some members of the artworld decline to accept an item as an artwork, they thereby confer upon it non-arthood. That is, when someone has the power to confer arthood upon some item, but declines to do so, he thereby confers non-arthood upon it. So, when our controversial item is presented to Peggy, and she declines to accept it as an artwork, she ipso facto confers non-arthood on it. Arthur may try to persuade Peggy to accept the item as a work of art on the grounds that he has done so. Equally, however, Peggy can attempt to change Arthur’s mind. Peggy might give in and admit that the item is an artwork, but she might continue to deny that the object is an artwork. In this situation, where the artworld is divided, the perspectival definition leads to the conclusion that something both is and is not a work of art. The reductio is as threatening as ever.

A move made by Euthyphro suggests another way to avoid the reductio without adopting relativism about arthood. This move may be called the critical mass response. According to the critical mass response, something possesses arthood only when some critical mass of the artworld accepts it as an artwork. Faced with Socrates’ objection to his initial definition of piety, Euthyphro maintains that piety is what is loved by all of the gods. One could similarly suggest that art is what all of the members of the artworld accept as art. Euthyphro thus states that all of the Olympian world is the critical mass required to confer piety on something. The problem with this suggestion is that it is quite rare for the gods to agree. It is equally rare for an item to be unanimously accepted as a work of art. If unanimous acceptance by the artworld were a necessary condition of arthood, the class of artworks would be small. It might even be the empty set. It would be difficult to find a work whose arthood has not been denied by someone. Tolstoy by himself would decimate the class of artworks. Given that some objects are artworks, the critical mass needed for arthood cannot be the entire artworld.

One could maintain that something is a work of art when accepted as such by a sufficiently large segment of the artworld. Perhaps arthood is dependent on acceptance by a minimum percentage of the artworld. Alternatively, perhaps some minimum number of artworld members must accept something as a work of art. (Perhaps some of this number must come from each of the three estates: curators, critics and artists.) According to the critical mass response, whatever formula is adopted, once a specified critical mass of the artworld accepts something as an artwork, it is an artwork. Suppose that this is the case. We are still owed an account of the critical mass needed to confer arthood on an object.

Giving such an account will prove difficult. On some accounts of the critical mass necessary for arthood, the critical mass response fails for precisely the same reason that the simple response fails. Suppose that the critical mass necessary for arthood is set at a percentage of the artworld lower than 50 per cent. Suppose, moreover, that a similarly low percentage of the artworld can confer non-arthood on an item. In such a case, the critical mass needed to establish the arthood of some item and the critical mass needed to confer non-arthood could both be satisfied. Once again we would be left with a situation where an item could both be and not be a work of art.

This problem can be avoided by setting the critical mass for arthood in such a way that, if it is reached, the critical mass for non-arthood cannot be reached, and vice versa. Suppose that the critical mass required for arthood is set at 50 per cent plus one of the artworld, and the critical mass for non-arthood is set at the same percentage. In this case, a perspectival definition of art would never lead to the conclusion that some item both is and is not an artwork. Alternatively, the critical mass needed for arthood could be set at 10 per cent plus one of the artworld, and the critical mass required for non-arthood fixed at 90 per cent. In a limiting case, the critical mass necessary for arthood could be set as low as one member of the artworld, so long as the critical mass required for non-arthood is the entire artworld. In any of these cases, a work can never both be and not be an artwork.

The problems we face do not disappear when critical masses are judiciously set. We are still owed a defence of the settings. After all, it is not obvious that something is a work of art when accepted by 50 per cent of the artworld, but not when approved by only 40 per cent. More importantly, we need a defence of the suggestion that some segment of the artworld can override another segment. Without such a defence, we are back to the situation where Peggy sees no reason to accept some item as a work of art simply because Arthur does. Unfortunately, problems arise in attempting to argue for both high and low critical masses. The view that a small segment of the artworld can confer either arthood or non-arthood, and override a large segment of the artworld, cannot avoid the reductio. On the other hand, a new sort of problem arises if arthood requires the agreement of a large percentage of the artworld.

On the view to which I subscribe, the only justification for saying that something is an artwork is that members of the artworld classify it as an artwork. Similarly, the only justification for saying that something is not an artwork is that the members of the artworld decline to categorise it as art. Consequently, the only justification for setting the critical mass required for arthood is provided by the use members of the artworld make of the concept of art. Suppose now that someone says that a small critical mass is sufficient to establish the arthood of an item. The only way to assess this proposal is to examine the practice of the artworld. We need to ask whether members of the artworld accept that a novel item is an artwork when a small percentage of the artworld believes that it is. I suggest that this is not the practice of the artworld. Frequently, a small avant-garde will accept the arthood of some item. Equally frequently, the bulk of the artworld nevertheless refuses to recognise the item as an artwork. This was the case, for example, when Duchamp first began to exhibit his works. Although his readymades are now commonly accepted as works of art, we would do well to remember that this was not always the case. In the early twentieth century, influential but conservative critics such as Royal Cortissoz probably held the consensus opinion about the avant-garde art of the day. It is hard to know what to say in such a situation. If anything, it seems more reasonable to say that a small segment of the artworld cannot confer arthood. We could, however, say that the practice of a minority of the artworld is sufficient to establish the arthood of a controversial item. If we do so, a problem ensues: we apparently lack a principled reason for saying that a minority of the artworld cannot confer non-arthood. If a minority can confer arthood, the reductio then rears its ugly head.

Perhaps relativism can be avoided by saying that a large percentage of the artworld establishes the arthood of an object. When the acceptance of some item as an artwork is widespread, it is uncontroversially a work of art. When the segment of the artworld which accepts an object as art is sufficiently large, one is inclined to say that people who dissent are mistaken about the use of the concept of art. Such people may be said to have lost their franchise as members of the artworld. That is, they have lost the power to confer arthood. If widespread agreement about whether something is an artwork always existed, a reductio would not be a threat. Suppose that Andy, Clement, Peggy and a large number of other members of their artworld agree that some item is not an artwork. In the face of this consensus, Arthur must fail in his attempt to confer arthood upon the same item. There is no danger that the item both is and is not an artwork. The trouble is that widespread agreement does not always exist. When the artworld is roughly equally divided, the reductio remains a worry. Adopting a high critical mass faces, however, even more worrisome trouble.

The trouble is that, if a large percentage of the artworld must confer arthood on an item for it to be an artwork, avant-garde works would not be artworks, at least not at first. As a matter of historical fact, some of the controversial works of the early twentieth century were not widely accepted as artworks for many years. I would not be surprised to learn that a majority of artworld members still do not accept that Duchamp’s readymades are artworks. After all, stodgy academicians, hidebound critics, conservative collectors and informed but fusty audience members are still members of the artworld. Consequently, the conditions for arthood were not met in the cases of many works, if these conditions involve widespread agreement in the artworld. Nevertheless, many people have the intuition that many avant-garde works became works of art either at, or very soon after, the time of their creation. We need, then, to choose between two incompatible claims. The first states that a controversial avant-garde work can have arthood conferred upon it immediately, or almost immediately. If this is the case, a small segment of the artworld can confer arthood on an object. The second is the proposition that if a small percentage of the artworld can confer arthood, a reductio cannot be avoided.

Once we recognise the existence of a plurality of artworlds, the puzzles about arthood disappear. Up to this point, I have spoken of the artworld, as if only one exists. This assumption must be rejected. A variety of artworlds exist and items are artworks in relation to some and not artworks in relation to others. Reflection on Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain makes this clear. (This sculpture is, perhaps, the most influential artwork of the past century. It consists of a urinal, laid on its back and signed ‘R. Mutt, 1917’.) Fountain did not exist in the sixteenth century, but it is fair to say that, if it had, it would not have been a work of art. The artworld of the Renaissance would have been completely unwilling to accept it a...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Art and Knowledge
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Preface
• 1: What is Art?
• 2: On Representation
• 3: Art as Inquiry
• 4: Evaluation of Art
• 5: Avant-Garde Art and Knowledge
• Notes
• Bibliography