The Future of Europe

Integration and Enlargement

Fraser Cameron

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781134344642
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In 2004, the European Union's Intergovernmental Conference finalized the historic process of enlarging the EU from fifteen to twenty-five members. This book is the most detailed and up-to-date account of the state of the European Union's biggest enlargement so far, and also considers its future prospects in several key areas. It explains why the ten applicant countries wanted to join the EU and how they succeeded after lengthy negotiations.Each chapter is a cutting-edge overview by a leading figure in the field and subjects covered include: * the enlargement-integration debate
* the politics of the EU's new member states
* the role of the European Convention
* the political economy of an enlarged Europe
* the challenges of developing common European foreign and security policy
* the EU's relations with its neighbours
* EU-American relations.

1 Widening and deepening

Fraser Cameron

Summary

This chapter reviews the widening–deepening debate that has been a permanent feature of the European Union (EU) since its foundation. It discusses how each previous enlargement has been accompanied by a parallel deepening of the EU. There is a brief description and analysis of the impact of the Convention and enlargement on the functioning of the EU institutions in order to highlight the debates over governance, legitimacy, identity and democratic accountability. It concludes by suggesting that there may be different speeds of integration in an enlarged Union.

Introduction

The EU has progressed since its creation in 1958 through a mixture of widening and deepening, in other words it has taken steps towards closer integration at the same time as it has enlarged. There have been four previous enlargements; in 1973 Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined; in 1981 Greece; in 1986 Spain and Portugal; and in 1995 Austria, Sweden and Finland. In the past 30 years the EU has thus grown from six members with a population of 185 million to 15 members with a population of 375 million. It is now on the eve of its fifth enlargement, from 15 to 25 members with 450 million citizens. This enlargement is the most ambitious project the EU has ever undertaken. It is, in effect, the reunification of the European continent, divided in 1945 after the Second World War, and extends to central and eastern Europe the zone of peace, stability and prosperity that west Europeans have enjoyed for over forty years.

Each round of enlargement has been accompanied by moves forward in the process of integration. The first enlargement led to the EU adopting a regional policy and was preceded by a common fisheries policy. The second and third enlargements led to the single market, a stronger social policy, an increased commitment to solidarity with the poorer regions and greater powers for the European Parliament. The fourth enlargement followed moves towards economic and monetary union and new policy areas in foreign policy and justice and home affairs. Prior to its fifth and biggest enlargement, the Union introduced the single currency (the euro) and is poised to adopt a new constitution that would mark a significant step forward in the process of integration.

This latest enlargement takes place at a time when the EU faces major challenges concerning its democratic legitimacy, its internal cohesion and efficiency, its economic performance and its external role. These issues along with questions of identity, governance and legitimacy were at the heart of the Convention on the future of Europe. On the eve of this momentous leap forward, adopting a new constitution and enlargement, it is useful to review how the integration and enlargement debates and decisions have developed over the years.

The early years

The history of the EU is one of constant change and treaty reforms, driven largely by the related needs for deeper integration and institutional adaptation. When the process of European integration began in the 1950s there were just six countries involved. France, Germany (then West Germany), Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and in 1957 the same six countries signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), known more usually as the European Community (EC).

The ‘founding fathers’, statesmen such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Jean Monnet, represented war-torn European countries and had the vision to reject the traditional balance of power politics in favour of a new system of shared sovereignty. Symbolically, the first area chosen for European integration was coal and steel, the traditional heavy industries necessary for any war machine. The ECSC provided for a supranational High Authority that took decisions by qualified majority vote (QMV), the essence of the ‘community’ system of governance. These six founding member states shared a common vision of a European project of integration that would lead to ‘an ever closer union’ between their peoples and states. Although they never agreed on the final goals of integration (the finalité politique), they nevertheless agreed to be bound together in a ‘journey to an unknown destination’ (Shonfield 1974).

The UK had refused to join the ECSC because of its concerns about sharing sovereignty and again spurned the offer to join the EC. The British government was not only concerned about the supranational aspects of the EC but also sceptical as to whether the project would succeed. The original six founding members proceeded to confound the British doubters by moving steadily forward along the integration path. The EC established a customs union and began to develop common policies in fields such as agriculture and trade.

The first enlargement (UK, Ireland and Denmark) 1973

When the UK changed its mind about the EC and applied to join in 1961 there were concerns in the original six member states as to whether the addition of the UK, with its strong ties to the United States and the Commonwealth, would undermine the drive towards ‘an ever closer union’. The French President, Charles de Gaulle, had little sympathy for closer integration, but he had even less sympathy for the UK challenging France’s supremacy in the EC. He twice vetoed British membership in 1963 and 1967, citing the UK’s close relations with the US as one reason why it was not fit to join in the European enterprise.

The departure of General de Gaulle from office in 1968 opened up a new political perspective. Accession negotiations started in 1971 and Britain joined the EEC on 1 January 1973. Denmark and Ireland, two strongly agricultural countries heavily dependent on the British market, also joined on the same date. The British had helped to establish the rival European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1958 with Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein as members. But EFTA lacked the economic clout and the ambitions of the EC to play a political role and the UK soon concluded that its best interests lay in membership of the EC.

There was considerable optimism amongst many in the original six member states that British membership would lead to more democracy, more openness and more common policies. The double French veto and lengthy waiting period, however, had left considerable resentment and ‘Europe’ was to become a recurrent sore that would affect British politics for the next thirty years, splitting parties and causing the downfall of several political leaders (Young 1999). When Edward Heath, prime minister during the accession negotiations, lost the 1974 election, the first priority of the new Labour government was to renegotiate the terms of entry. Some slight modifications were achieved allowing the government under prime minister Harold Wilson to win a referendum (65–35 per cent) on the changed terms in 1975. It was suggested later that the voters in Britain, Denmark and Ireland had not been told that they were joining a Community with political aims. The arguments over this first enlargement from six to nine not only soured the general atmosphere but were also to be replayed many times in the next three decades. The basic problem for the UK was that it had declined to join the original club and was thus unable to help shape the rules before 1973.

The first enlargement of the EC was accompanied by significant deepening. A regional policy was created, which initially comprised just 5 per cent of the EU budget but which grew steadily in later years. A common fisheries policy was established, controversially just before the UK joined. There were increased powers for the European Parliament and in 1979 there were the first direct elections to the EP. A Court of Auditors was also established.

The second and third enlargements (Greece, Spain and Portugal) 1981/1986

Although Greece joined the EC (1981) before Spain and Portugal (1986) it is convenient to place them together, as the motives for all three countries joining the Union were similar and together they represented a ‘southern’ enlargement. They had all thrown off several years of dictatorship and were keen that their new democracies be cemented in the EC. They were all relatively poor countries compared to the EC average and recognised that access to a larger market, combined with generous regional aid, would be powerful spurs to economic reform and growth. The three states also had large agricultural interests and their accession to the Union shifted the balance in favour of those seeking high expenditure in this area. Unlike the central European countries they had basically capitalist-style economic systems, even if there were many areas of protection. In the case of Greece, the European Commission had doubts as to whether it was ready for the rigours of EC membership and proposed a period of preparation before accession but this idea was swept aside by the European Council led by French president Giscard d’Estaing who played an influential role in pushing Greek membership. Political reasons were thus to the fore in the EU taking in these southern new members.

All three states have become very strong proponents of closer integration, albeit on their terms. Greece was an awkward member state for many years because of its troubled relationship with Turkey, now much improved. Spain was a strong champion of regional aid and later, of the structural funds, while Portugal was usually content to hide behind Madrid in fighting these battles. Ireland, a relatively poor and predominantly agricultural country when it joined, often found itself in the ‘southern camp’ when it came to fighting for increased regional subsidies.

This southern enlargement was also accompanied by deepening. The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 was the first major treaty reform since 1957 and prepared the ground for completion of the single market in 1992. The heads of state and government met in the format of an intergovernmental conference to negotiate the new treaty. The SEA introduced the principle of cohesion and included two significant institutional changes: greater use of QMV in order to ensure policy output and greater involvement of the EP in legislative and other decision-making procedures, in order to strengthen the EC’s democratic legitimacy. The SEA also put on a treaty basis the procedures for European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the field of foreign policy. It also agreed new policies with regard to the environment, economic and social cohesion, research, technology and social affairs. In light of subsequent Conservative Party policy, it is worth noting that Mrs Thatcher was quite content to sign up to this highly significant deepening of the integration process.

Prior to the fourth enlargement, there was a further important step forward in the integration process. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht in February 1992, provided for a new name. The member states agreed to establish a European Union (EU) that incorporated the EC and ECSC. The TEU included provisions for Economic and Monetary Union (with a clear timetable for the introduction of the euro), subsidiarity (taking decisions at the lowest possible level), EU citizenship (complementary to national citizenship), the establishment of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and closer cooperation on justice and home affairs (JHA). It also established a Committee of the Regions with an advisory role. The treaty also established a complicated ‘pillar system’ whereby most decisions in the new areas of Union competence were taken by the intergovernmental as opposed to the community system. Furthermore, the TEU marked the first officially sanctioned moves towards a multi-speed Union. The UK negotiated ‘opt outs’ from the provisions on the euro, the Social Charter that set minimum standards for workers’ rights and later refused to join the passport-free area known as Schengen. Prime Minister John Major returned from Maastricht claiming ‘game, set and match’ to the UK. After the failure of the first referendum to ratify the TEU in June 2002, Denmark also obtained a number of opt outs in the defence and JHA areas.

The Danish ‘no’ also effectively ended the debate on institutional reform that the then Commission President, Jacques Delors, sought to promote prior to the EU’s enlargement to a number of EFTA countries. Delors had argued that even enlarging from 12 to 15 would necessitate a far greater use of QMV in order for the Union to function efficiently. Given the deep disagreements over Maastricht, it was decided to hold another IGC in 1996 to review the operation of the TEU and in particular CFSP. It is worth noting that the 1991 IGC that led to the Treaty of Maastricht was preceded by a meeting of national parliamentarians in Rome. This ‘mini Convention’ only lasted a week and failed to produce any agreed recommendations to the IGC.

The fourth enlargement (Sweden, Finland and Austria) 1995

The end of the Cold War introduced a new driver of treaty reform: the prospect of enlargement on an unprecedented scale. The first round of post-Cold War enlargement took place in January 1995 when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. These three states (along with Norway that, for a second time, also negotiated entry but failed to secure ratification in a referendum) had all belonged to EFTA and the new European Economic Area (EEA). Their motives for joining included a lessening of the importance of neutrality after the end of the Cold War and the desire to be at the top table when major political, security and economic issues were being discussed and decided. They were all prosperous states with an average GDP considerably above the EU’s average. They already had much experience of intergovernmental cooperation but the community system was new. Finland proved to be the most favourable to the community system, Sweden the least favourable.

With the accession of three new member states, many thought that the EU’s decision-making procedures were likely to become even more cumbersome. Accordingly, the EP threatened in 1994, during ratification of the accession agreements, to block enlargement (by means of withholding parliamentary assent) unless the member states agreed to negotiate institutional reforms in a new IGC. The submission of membership applications by a host of central and eastern European countries in the mid-1990s strengthened the case for institutional reform before further enlargement. Specifically, the debate about reform covered the size and composition of the European Commission, the extent and modalities of QMV and how to facilitate closer cooperation among more integration-minded member states.

The 1996 IGC was preceded by a Reflection Group under the chairmanship of Carlos Westendorp, a Spanish diplomat. It was given a wide mandate to review institutional issues but its work was severely handicapped by the obstructionist attitude of John Major’s Conservative government in the UK. On issue after issue there were 14 member states in favour and one against. The UK position may, however, have allowed some member states to hide behind the eurosceptic British delegation.

The arrival of the Labour government in the UK in May 1997 was too late to lead to a decisive change in the British approach at the Amsterdam IGC. Tony Blair signed up for the Social Charter but maintained the single currency ‘opt out’. The Treaty of Amsterdam led to a number of important changes. The EP was given additional powers including the right to dismiss the Commission and give its assent to international treaties including enlargement. The new treaty also incorporated ‘Schengen’ and introduced the concept of flexibility. Most attention centred on the measures to strengthen CFSP, especially the establishment of the position of High Representative with a supporting staff. But with the next round of enlargement unlikely to take place for at least another five years, member states were not under immediate pressure to bite the bullet of institutional reform.

The fifth enlargement 2004

The next IGC that prepared the Treaty of Nice in 2001 took place against the background of the negotiations for the fifth enlargement of the Union. This involved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia plus Cyprus and Malta. For the first time in the history of treaty reform substantive policy areas were absent from the Nice agenda. Instead, the IGC focused on the so-called Amsterdam leftovers, i.e. those institutional issues that should have been decided at Amsterdam.

The negotiations over the Treaty of Nice were confused, bad tempered and the result was widely regarded as a shoddy piece of work that won few friends. The member states were reluctant to contemplate a reduced size for the Commission in advance of enlargement and to accept any significant extension of QMV. Although a number of institutional changes were agreed, including a ceiling for the number of Commissioners (27) and MEPs (700), plus a complicated reform of Council votes, the cha...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Figures and Tables
• Contributors
• Foreword
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• 1. Widening and Deepening
• 2. The Convention and the Draft Constitutional Treaty
• 3. The Enlargement Negotiations
• 4. The Newcomers
• 5. The Political Economy of Enlargement
• 6. The Wider Europe
• 7. European Security In Flux
• 8. The Transatlantic Dimension
• 9 Europe’s Future
• Appendix
• Glossary