Bulgaria

The Uneven Transition

Vesselin Dimitrov

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135136772
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de l'Europe de l'Est

The communist regime in Bulgaria was perhaps the most stable in Eastern Europe and its demise was brought about only by the general collapse of the Soviet bloc. In the light of this, what is surprising about the country's transitions to democracy and a market economy is not that it has been uneven but that it has proceeded without fundamental disruptions and is now showing some signs of consolidation. The two-party system that emerged from the round-table negotiations in 1990 has survived remarkably intact although the parties within it have undergone considerable transformations. The institutions of democracy have often been misused but have shown their ability to survive in crisis situations. After a dismal record of macroeconomic mismanagement, the establishment of a currency board has brought stability to the country's economy, and the long-delayed structural reform is finally off the ground. Having survived the trials of transition, Bulgaria is now faced with the more difficult task of adapting its political and economic institutions to the requirements of future EU membership.

Chapter 1

A PRISONER OF ITS PAST? BULGARIA'S HISTORICAL LEGACY

History has played a dominant role in the self-perception of the Bulgarians. This is by no means a rarity in Eastern Europe but in the case of Bulgaria the contrasts between rise and fall have been particularly sharp, giving grounds for both enthusiastic self-congratulation and pathetic self-pity. The sense of living history is reinforced by the fact that certain problems such as state creation, nation-building, and economic development, arise time and time again, obliterating the distinction between past and present and encouraging each new generation to both identify with its predecessors who were seemingly fighting similar battles, but also to despise them for failing so miserably. Each new departure in Bulgaria's development has been accompanied and often preceded by a re-casting of history. The post-1989 political and economic transition is a case in the point. The periodic re-invention of history has undoubtedly been useful to a nation that has had to adapt to dramatic changes in its fortunes and has often been victim to forces beyond its control, but it has also served to sow confusion and lack of confidence, and provide opportunities for cynical manipulation. A more mature understanding of history, based on facts rather than emotions, is an essential prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy.

MEDIEVAL STATEHOOD: GLORIES AND FAILURES

The history of the Bulgarians goes back to the 7th century when the Turkic Proto-Bulgarians conquered the Slav tribes settled between the Danube and the Balkan mountains, to establish the first of the post-Roman successor states in the Balkans.¹ Since the 1970s, there has been an interesting effort in Bulgaria to create an affinity with the pre-Slav inhabitants of Bulgaria, especially the Thracians. This has been prompted by the discovery of a rich and autonomous culture that in many respects rivalled those of ancient Greece and Macedonia. It is also an expression of the fundamental urge to put down the nation's roots as far back in history as possible, of the search for a mythical golden age when the people living on the territory of present-day Bulgaria were at the forefront of European civilization. On a more subtle level, it is part of a reaction against the monotonous and obsessive emphasis on the Slavic nature of the Bulgarians in the first decades of communist rule.

The two medieval Bulgarian states had more than their fair share of glories and failures. The first state emerged as a vigorous and expansionist entity in the 7th–10th century, controlling territories far beyond the present borders of Bulgaria, stretching on occasion to the Carpatian mountains in the north and the vicinity of Constantinople in the south. The legacy of greatness has been both a blessing, sustaining Bulgarians in the darkest hours of their history, but also an impediment, re-inforcing the gap between grand vision and petty reality that has so bedevilled modern Bulgarians. The most important long-term achievements of the first Bulgarian state were the consolidation of a common Bulgarian ethnicity, the adoption of Christianity in 864 and the creation of a vernacular literature. In the 9th century, Bulgarian Slav became one of the few contemporary European languages in addition to Greek and Latin, to be given a literary form, and it went on to serve as the basis for the development of a rich medieval culture not only in Bulgaria but also in Russia, Serbia and Romania.

Medieval Bulgaria had the misfortune to be situated next to what was the richest and best-organised state in Europe at the time, the Byzantine empire. In contrast to the Western Roman empire, the Eastern Roman empire not only survived the onslaught of the barbarians but was able to mount a vigorous counteroffensive. It never reconciled itself to the existence of a Bulgarian state on what it regarded as its imperial territory in the Balkans. Bulgaria had to wage an unremitting struggle for its survival, and did not have the opportunity to develop its institutions in relative security like the post-Roman successor states in Western Europe. The spectacular victories achieved by Bulgarian rulers in the field of battle could not be sustained against an enemy whose potential power far exceeded their own, and in the late 10th and early 11th century the resurgent empire under the skilful and ruthless leadership of Basil II was able to wear the Bulgarian state down in a series of dogged campaigns. Culminating in the blinding of 15,000 thousand captured Bulgarian soldiers, the Byzantine conquest marked the beginning of a deep and traumatic vulnerability Bulgarians have felt towards rapacious neighbouring empires.

The two centuries of Byzantine rule (1018–1185) were the first "lost" period in Bulgarian history. Traditionally, this has been treated as blank spot, notable only for the constant struggles of the Bulgarians for their liberation. The nationalist mythology obscures the varying if diminishing forms of autonomy the Bulgarians enjoyed under the empire, the complex and not always acrimonious interactions between them and the Byzantines, and the thorough going adoption of Byzantine culture by the aristocracy and the higher clergy. It is nevertheless true that the Byzantine rule caused a chasm in Bulgaria's development, reversed many of the gains made in the previous three centuries, and curbed the potential for ever re-establishing Bulgaria as a great power on a European scale and developing a truly autonomous culture.

The second Bulgarian state was created in 1185 as a result of a successful revolt against an empire riven by internal disputes and buffeted by outside enemies. In the hands of capable rulers, the state expanded in the first half-century of its existence to include most of the territories inhabited by ethnic Bulgarians. It was able to contend successfully both with Byzantines and the Latin conquerors of Constantinople (1204) and for a brief period under Ivan Asen II (1218–1241) came close to dominating the Balkans. After the death of Asen, Bulgaria fell pray to attacks from the Tatar Golden Horde, and was forced to acknowledge its supremacy. Royal authority was weakened as feudal notables sought increasingly to assume control over their own lands. This has tended to be seen by Bulgarian historians, fixated with the idea of state unity, as an exclusively negative phenomenon. In fact, it was in many ways a natural development, and had taken place in Western Europe a few centuries earlier. It reduced the prerogatives of the monarchy which in the early medieval period had been considered the owner of all the land, created a balance of power between the nobility and the king, and strengthened property rights. What was from the social and economic point of view a progressive development had, however, the effect of weakening the military power of the state, something Bulgaria could ill-afford when faced with powerful invaders. Similarly, the notables' growing power over the free peasantry was potentially a step forward in terms of social and economic organisation, but could not be easily sustained in a situation where the ruling elite could not guarantee the safety of their subjects against foreign marauders. The potency of the combination of social discontent and external instability was demonstrated in 1277, when a peasant uprising succeed in bringing down the king and placing its visionary leader on the throne—the only such occasion in medieval Europe. The interaction of internal social divisions and external conflicts, and the stalling effect of external threats on internal development, would recur constantly in Bulgarian history.

In the early 14th century, the Bulgarian state experienced a brief revival. Todor Svetoslav (1300–1321) re-established the power of the monarchy, rejected Tatar over-lordship, and reconquered some territories from the Byzantines. The gains proved only temporary, as Bulgaria was overshadowed by the rising Serbian kingdom, the process of feudal de-centralisation continued apace, and heretic religious sects attacked the dominant orthodoxy. Bulgaria was thus in a poor position to resist the Ottoman Turks, and after a prolonged resistance (1372–1396) succumbed to their bloody onslaught.

The fall of the second Bulgarian state has been almost universally regarded by the Bulgarians as the most tragic point in their history, as the beginning of the deviation from the country's natural course of development and its forceful uprooting from its rightful place in Christian Europe. There is indeed evidence that the political decline of the state in the 13th and 14th centuries had been accompanied by social and economic progress, as well as cultural revival. Bulgaria once again fell victim to its geography. Whilst retrospective judgement produces a rather exaggerated view of the potential of medieval Bulgaria, there can be no doubt that the Ottoman conquest did represent a fundamental break in historical continuities.

OTTOMAN RULE

The Ottoman system reversed many of the strides made toward a more mature feudalism under the second Bulgarian state. Ownership of land was concentrated exclusively in the hands of the sultan. A service caste received the right to collect taxes from the population of a given locality in return for clearly defined military duties. There was no concept of private property. The peasants were expected to pay taxes to the sultan and the service caste, but could work their land in relative security. The system did have its advantages. It created a streamlined and efficient administration, enabled central authority to curb the excesses of the local lords, and proved remarkably stable. The complex system of rights over the land placed the peasantry in a relatively better position than had been the case under the second Bulgarian state. On the other hand, the system was designed to support military conquest, and when that was not forthcoming, tended to lose its coherence. The lack of clear property rights reduced the incentives to improve production methods, and inhibited the emergence of market exchange. The Ottoman empire resisted change far longer than contemporary European empires, and proved ultimately incapable of reform. It was the conservatism of the Ottoman system rather than any undue exploitation that was its main negative legacy for the Bulgarians. The four centuries of immobilism (15th–18th) are largely, if not entirely, responsible for the problems of economic, social and political backwardness that have dominated the history of modern Bulgaria.

Whilst it was the general effects of the Ottoman system that were most detrimental, there were a number of features that worked to the particular disadvantage of the Bulgarians. The institutions of the Bulgarian state were destroyed in the course of conquest, and could not be revived in the conditions of extreme centralisation characteristic of the first centuries of Ottoman rule. The Bulgarian aristocracy was annihilated in the course of the conquest, or assimilated into the service caste. The Bulgarians found themselves overwhelmingly in the position of a subject peasantry. The social and institutional continuity with the medieval Bulgarian states was thus severed. The division of the population into separate religious groups (millet) had a similarly depressing effect. The rights of the Christians to maintain their identity and religious institutions, and to run their own affairs were recognised and generally respected, but at the same time they were placed in a clearly subordinate position to the Muslims. For the Bulgarians, the millet system implied a double subordination, as the sultans recognised the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople as the exclusive representative of the Eastern Orthodox millet into which the Bulgarians were incorporated. One of the key achievements of the medieval Bulgarian states, the autonomy of the Bulgarian church, was thus nullified. To the extent that Bulgarian culture was preserved, this occurred in isolated monasteries and on a conservative medieval basis. Bulgarians were thus prevented from building upon their accomplishments and developing their own cultural Renaissance. Their geographical position in the east-central Balkans, at the heart of the empire, with no borders with the outside world, made it far more difficult for them than for Greeks, Serbs and Romanians to interact with and learn from Western and Central Europe.

One of the most contentious aspects of Ottoman rule is its impact on the ethnic composition of Bulgaria. The Christian population appeared to decline drastically in the early centuries, reaching a low point of about one million in the late 15th century. It is debatable whether the decline can be attributed mainly to the destruction wrought by the initial conquest, subsequent forced migrations and systematic discrimination, or was due primarily to natural causes. A still more controversial issue is the emergence of significant Muslim and Turkish groups in southern and north-eastern Bulgaria. Bulgarian historians have generally attributed that to conversion to Islam and the subsequent adoption of the Turkish language and culture, whilst Turkish historians have seen it as primarily the product of migration of Turks from other parts of the empire.² On the question of conversion, Bulgarian scholars have placed the emphasis on the use of coercion and more generally on the subordinate position of Christians within the millet system, whilst their Turkish colleagues have seen it as largely a voluntary process. The debates are not merely academic, and go to the core of Bulgarian national identity. The Christian Bulgarian-speaking majority have traditionally seen the Ottoman period as a time of unmitigated disasters, a point where the very existence of their nation was physically threatened. The sense of martyrdom is one of the strongest driving forces behind the establishment of modern Bulgaria, both in the positive sense, in the form of an urge to revive the nation and wipe out the injustices of the past, and in the negative sense, as an excuse for the failings which the Bulgarians all too clearly perceive in themselves. The presence of Muslims and Turks in Bulgaria, apart from prompting unpleasant associations with the past, raises the fundamental question of who is a Bulgarian. This can be problematic on a number of levels. First, nationality may be defined by common citizenship or in terms of shared characteristics such as language and religion. If the former criterion is used, than all citizens of Bulgaria can be regarded as Bulgarian; if the latter, only those who have the "proper" language and religion. Secondly, language and religion may themselves be given different importance. The confusion stems from the millet system which recognised religion not language as the key characteristic, although the latter more often than not went with the former. If both religion and language are used as defining criteria, then only the Christian Bulgarian-speakers can be regarded as authentic Bulgarians, whereas if language is deemed more important than religion, the Muslim Bulgarian-speakers (Pomaks) can also be included within the boundaries of the Bulgarian nation. Thirdly, present-day characteristics or historical origin may be emphasised. The latter can allow Turks to be considered properly Bulgarian if it could be proved that they have had Bulgarian ancestors before conversion to Islam and the adoption of the Turkish language. The Ottoman period thus laid a number of time bombs that have had to be addressed, with greater or lesser success, during the entire history of modern Bulgaria.

THE NATIONAL REVIVAL

Modern Bulgarians regard the period of what they call their national revival—an all-encompassing term covering economic modernisation, cultural re-assertion on the basis of new Enlightenment values, nation-building and progress towards statehood—as the defining paradigm in their history.³ This has been re-inforced by the collapse of communism which removed the one historical vision which could claim to represent a superior alternative.

The national revival emerged in the 18th century amidst the decay of the Ottoman empire. The once mighty power found itself on the losing side of a series of wars with the better-equipped armies of Austria and Russia. The service caste lost its raison d'êtat, and the centralised system disintegrated as local notables fought for control with both the sultan and each other. The development of trade and the influx of money undermined the old system of largely autarchic production.

The external and internal weakening of the Ottoman empire eased the restrictions under which the Bulgarians had laboured for centuries and created opportunities for a small but critical minority to leave agriculture and engage in trade and manufacturing. Indeed, as a subject Christian group they were better placed to exploit the new conditions created by the growth of capitalist exchange and increased interaction with the West, as they were bound by fewer inhibitions than the ruling Muslims. There is even evidence that in the 18th and 19th centuries there was a spurt in the population growth of Christian Bulgarians, as compared with the stagnant or declining numbers of Muslims.

Paradoxically, the Bulgarians benefited not only from the disintegration of central authority but also from the subsequent attempts of the sultans to win power back from the hands of disobedient governors and strengthen the empire against rebellious Christian nations and encroaching foreign powers. The former process, which reached its peak with the period of kurdjaliistvo in the late 18th and early 19th century, allowed the Bulgarians to improve their position by forming shifting alliances with the various contending factions. The sultans' re-assertion of control in subsequent decades established a large and secure market where Bulgarian traders and manufacturers could expand their activities without fear for their lives and property. The creation of a large standing army led to an insatiable demand for cloth, food, and metal products which the Bulgarians, close to the empire's capital, were in an ideal position to supply. The Greek rebellion of 1821 and the subsequent Ottoman reprisals severely weakened what had hitherto been the dominant commercial group in the empire and opened a space which the Bulgarians could easily exploit. The Crimean War, in which the Ottoman empire defeated Russia with the help of Britain and France and was in return forced to open up its markets yet further, gave a decisive push to Bulgarian economic development.

Economic modernisation produced the conditions for cultural self-assertion. Bulgarians have always prided themselves on the idea that their national revival began not with the gun but with the book. Whilst they were less unique in that respect that they imagine, it is true that the reconstruction of a Bulgarian cultural identity preceded any serious attempts of political liberation. The book that is seen, in Bulgarian nationalist mythology, as the fountainhead of that process, was a history of medieval Bulgaria written in 1762 by Father Paisii, a monk in the Chilendar monastery on Mount Athos, one of the centres of Eastern Orthodoxy. Living side by side with Greek monks and confronted on a daily basis with their claims of cultural superiority based of the glories of ancient Greece and the Byzantine empire, Paisii responded by producing a book that demonstrated that Bulgarians too had had powerful states, victorious rulers and their own culture, and could do so again. He also made use of more modern arguments, pointing to the fact that whilst the Greeks were less advanced that the nations of Western Europe, that did not lead them to abandon their language and culture but rather to learn from them. Whilst the book did not have the overwhelming influence on the national revival subsequently attributed to it by Bulgarian historians (a view highly complimentary of the importance of their own profession), it did contain in a nutshell many of its key characteristics. It was modelled upon, but also a reaction against, the achievements of the more advanced neighbouring nations. It stood at the threshold of the medieval and modern period, on both personal and ideological level. Written by a monk, it promoted largely secular ideas. It invoked the medieval past, but for specific contemporary purposes. It was based on years of scholarly research, but constructed a very romantic version of history. It appealed both to the Bible and the values of the Enlightenment, without any inkling of incongruity. It elevated the status of c...