Critical Realism and Marxism

Andrew Brown, Steve Fleetwood, John Michael Roberts, Andrew Brown, Steve Fleetwood, John Michael Roberts

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134532667
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory
• Index: Social Sciences

This book examines the relationship between critical realism and Marxism. The authors argue that critical realism and Marxism have much to gain from each other. This is the first book to address the controversial debates between critical realism and Marxism, and it does so from a wide range if disciplines. The authors argue that whilst one book cannot answer all the questions about the relationship between critical realism and Marxism, this book does provide some significant answers. In doing so, Critical Realism and Marxism reveals a potentially fruitful relationship; deepens our understanding of the social world and makes an important contribution towards eliminating the barbarism that accompanies contemporary capitalism.

1 The marriage of critical realism and Marxism

Happy, unhappy or on the rocks?

Andrew Brown, Steve Fleetwood and John Michael Roberts

Introduction

Critical realism is steadily gaining ground in the social sciences and humanities. Critical realist orientated scholars are to be found in many areas such as: sociology and social theory, organisation and management studies, feminism, geography, law and economics. Marxism, despite having been unfashionable for several decades, refuses to go away and remains one of the key intellectual perspectives – a point recognised by many of its opponents. Moreover, many of those caught in the recent upsurge of ‘anti-capitalist’ sentiment are discovering the valuable lessons available from a body of thought that has been staunchly ‘anti-capitalist’ for a century and a half. The purpose of this collection, then, is to explore the relationship between critical realism and Marxism.

Broadly speaking there appear to be three (not entirely mutually exclusive) viewpoints on the nature of this relation: critical realism can add to Marxism without taking anything away; Marxism is in no need of the services of critical realism; and Marxism and critical realism have something to gain from one another. This introductory chapter consists of Steve Fleetwood (SF), John Roberts (JR) and Andrew Brown (AB) elaborating these three viewpoints, in order to give the reader a flavour of the kind of debates that are currently taking place between critical realists and Marxists. It might be added that the very existence of serious, and amicable, scholarly debate of this kind is a fair indication that both critical realism and Marxism are in a good state of intellectual health.

Critical realism: augmenting Marxism (Steve Fleetwood)

Before seeking a possible relationship between two entities, a basis for comparison must be established otherwise the search may end up inadvertently trying to seek a relationship between chalk and cheese – with conceptual confusion following almost inevitably. In this confusion we might conclude either that a relationship exists where actually there is none, or that no relationship exists where actually there is one. The same goes for seeking a possible relationship between Marxism and critical realism. Let us consider Marxism and critical realism in turn to see if we can establish a basis for comparison.

Comparing like with like

Marxism is a body of thought which, at least in the hands of its keenest scholars, has always sought to consistently span three levels: philosophical, theoretical and practical. Dialectical materialism has generally been understood as a philosophy that grounds theoretical pronouncements such as the necessity of the value form, and the emancipatory role of the working class. In turn, these theoretical pronouncements, have been used to inform political practice. What is hardly ever recognised, however, is that a range of political practices are consistent with a range of theoretical pronouncements, and a range of theoretical pronouncements are consistent with dialectical materialism. One might, for example, subscribe to dialectical materialism and to the theory that (a) the working class has been defeated, or (b) the working class is alive and well. Clearly a range of political practices will follow from the theoretical position adopted. Theory (a) leads to political support for things like new social movements whereas theory (b) leads to political support for things like the vanguard party. There is, therefore, no one-to-one mapping between a particular (Marxist) political practice, a particular (Marxist) theory and a particular (dialectical materialist) philosophy. The truth of this proposition lies in the (probably uncontroversial) fact that there are several competing Marxist theories (about various phenomena) and several Marxist political programmes, all perfectly compatible with dialectical materialist philosophy.

Critical realism is located at the level of philosophy and, unlike Marxism, it does not try to span three levels. Precisely because it licenses no particular political programme and particular theory, critical realism often comes in for criticism from Marxists on the ground that it is theoretically and politically sterile, or worse, that it sponsors anti-Marxist theories. If, however, there is no one-to-one mapping between a particular (Marxist) political practice, a particular (Marxist) theory and a particular (dialectical materialist) philosophy, then criticisms based upon critical realism’s alleged sterility apply to any philosophy, including one belonging to Marxism. It is, therefore, erroneous to seek a possible relationship between critical realism and Marxist theory or Marxist political practice, but not between critical realism and Marxism at the level of philosophy. That is to say, if a relationship exists between critical realism and Marxism, it is located at the philosophical level. Let us, therefore, approach philosophy with a little more precision.

Critical realism: a full-blown philosophy of science

Whilst critical realism has many things to teach us about philosophy (and many of those things are elaborated in the chapters of this collection) it is, primarily, a philosophy of science. Moreover, critical realism focuses neither on one, or a small number, of topics in the philosophy of science, but is wide ranging, covering topics such as: ontology, epistemology, modes of inference, nature of causality, nature of laws/tendencies, role of abstraction, distinction between essence and appearance, criterion for theory evaluation, and so on. For brevity, I refer to such an all-encompassing philosophy of science as full-blown. And critical realism is a full-blown philosophy of science. Now, whilst Marxist philosophy is not short of papers and books dedicated to various topics in the philosophy of science, there have been relatively few attempts to elaborate a full-blown philosophy of science compatible with Marxism or, as I will refer to it, a Marxist philosophy of science.

Let me tread with caution here. I am not claiming there has been no work on various topics in Marxist philosophy of science: I am claiming that there has been very little work that attempts to combine these various topics to elaborate a full-blown Marxist philosophy of science. Whilst the likes of Ruben (1979), Murray (1988), Sayer (1983) and Zeleny (1980) spring to mind, even here there seems to be more of an emphasis on repeating and re-interpreting some of Marx’s own scattered ideas than on elaborating a full-blown Marxist philosophy of science. Moreover, there have been very few attempts to elaborate a Marxist philosophy of science that can neutralise attacks from current philosophies of science, especially recent versions of positivism and, more recently, postmodernist and poststructuralist versions. At this point, I wish to make three claims.

Only a full-blown Marxist philosophy of science can be used to place Marxist theories and political practices on a secure footing. This is not, of course, to claim any one-to-one mapping between critical realism, theory and practice. It is merely to recognise that a full-blown Marxist philosophy of science can assist in formulating the kinds of theories deemed appropriate by Marxists.¹

Only a full-blown Marxist philosophy of science can successfully neutralise attacks from current philosophies of science, because many of the latter are full-blown (non-Marxist) philosophies of science. Marxists may not like to think that positivism is a full-blown philosophy of science but, like it or not, positivism does have an inclusive position on topics such as ontology, epistemology, causality, law, mode of inference, and has criteria for theory evaluation. The fact that it may have an inappropriate position on all these topics is beside the point here. The ability to successfully neutralise attacks from current philosophies of science is not merely a matter of scholarly and/or academic interest. The absence of a full-blown Marxist philosophy of science has allowed a vacuum to develop in the Marxist canon, which is often filled by Marxists borrowing topics from non-Marxist philosophies of science – with damaging consequences for Marxism.

Critical realism can supply the full-blown philosophy of science lacking in Marxism. This does not imply critical realism is replacing dialectical materialism, it is simply doing something else, it is adding to it.²

These claims could be established in various ways. For example, I could demonstrate how positivism has encouraged debates on the so-called ‘transformation problem’; the (mis)use of rational choice models; the (mis)use of econometrics to test hypotheses such as the falling rate of profit. Alternatively, I could demonstrate how postmodernism and poststructuralism have encouraged the, arguably, anti-Marxist perspective referred to as post-Marxism. I will, however, try to establish these claims via one example, namely the notion of ‘tendency’.

Laws or tendencies

It is well known that Marx conceives of laws in terms of tendencies. In discussing the tendency for profit rates to equalise, for example, he suggests that this equalisation be ‘viewed as a tendency like all other economic laws’ (1984: 175, emphasis added). Moreover, the conception of law as tendency has permeated much Marxist economics ever since. The problem, however, is that the exact meaning of the term ‘tendency’ within the Marxist canon is ambiguous. Marx himself left few clues and, whilst latter day Marxists have discussed tendencies, most discussions have taken the form of (often not un-illuminating) asides to other issues.³ As MacBride puts it:

These laws [i.e. tendencies] are, presumably, nothing but accurate high-level generalisations concerning a wide range of phenomena (although, to be candid, the failure to say very much about the meaning of the term ‘law’ as he uses it is one of the most gaping lacunae in Marx’s all too brief discussions of methodology.

(1977: 59, see also 123–6)

Whilst it will become clear below that it is misleading to refer to tendencies as ‘high level generalisations’, MacBride’s instinct is essentially correct: there has been a failure to develop a systematic, explicit and unambiguous conception of tendency in Marxism. Ruben sees no future in the critical realist attempt to disentangle law from tendency, being:

genuinely worried that the tendency v. empirical regularity debate, if pushed hard enough, might well collapse into little more than a quibble about the use of the term ‘law’.

(1979: 207)

Far from a mere ‘quibble’, the tendency v. empirical law debate is instructive in illuminating just how critical realism can place the notion of tendency on a more secure footing than it is now, and therefore, demonstrate how critical realism can add to Marxist theory without taking anything away. To do this, I take the following issues as read.

Critical realists reject (a) event regularities, and hence (Humean) laws styled as ‘whenever event x then event y’, as most unlikely features of social reality and (b) the (Humean) notion of causality as event regularity. The critical realist is, therefore, free to (i) seek the cause of an event in something other than the event with which it is (allegedly) conjoined, and (ii) to employ a notion of causation as powers of forces. Attention thus turns away from the flux of perceived and actual events towards the mechanisms, social structures, powers and relations that causally govern these events. Thus is the ontology referred to as stratified: underlying the domain of the empirical are the domains of the actual and the ‘deep’. Because of the openness of socio-economic systems, results, consequences, or outcomes cannot be successfully predicted but the mechanisms, social structures, powers and relations that causally govern the flux of events can, however, be uncovered and explained. Explanation usurps prediction, as the goal of science. Explanatory content provides a criterion for evaluating theories. One can now understand my reason for calling the method ‘causal/explanatory’. To explain a phenomenon is to give an account of its causal history (cf. Lipton 1993: 33). Significantly, this account is not couched in terms of the event(s) that just happens to precede the phenomenon to be explained, but in terms of the underlying, mechanisms, social structures, powers and relations that causally govern the phenomenon. The following section puts these critical realist categories to work to elaborate a sophisticated notion of tendency.

Structures, powers, mechanisms, relations and tendencies

A complex entity possesses an intrinsic structure (or combinations of structures) which makes it the kind of thing it is and not another thing. The structure also endows the entity with dispositions, capacities, potentials, abilities to act in certain ways. In short, the structure endows the entity with powers to do certain things, but not others. And powers may be possessed, exercised or actualised.

a A power is possessed by an entity in virtue of its intrinsic structure, and this power endures whether or not it is exercised or actualised. The power acts transfactually.

b A power exercised is a power that has been triggered, and is generating an effect in an open system. Due to interference from the effects of other exercised powers, however, one can never know a priori, what the outcome of any particular power will be. The exercised power acts transfactually.

c A power actualised is an exercised power generating its effect in an open system. The power is, however, not deflected or counteracted by the effects of other exercised powers. The actualised power does not act transfactually but factually in the sense that the power generates its effect constantly.

Let us consider these distinctions in a little more depth via the simple example of a bicycle.

a Once structures such as wheels, frame, saddle and handlebars are combined to form a bicycle, this entity possesses the power to facilitate transportation. This power endures even if the bicycle remains locked in a garden shed.

b A person may exercise the power by bringing the bicycle out of the shed and mounting it – i.e. a person triggers the power. However, due (say) to excessive alcohol consumption, strong head winds or steep gradients, the effect may not be the transportation of a cyclist from A to B. In this situation, the bicycle’s exercised power is being deflected or counteracted by interference from other exercised powers.

c A person may actualise the (exercised) power and successfully cycle from A to B. The bicycle’s power is not being counteracted by any other powers such as alcohol, strong head winds or steep gradients.

With this understanding of structures and powers, let us move on to the related issue of mechanisms. According to Lawson (1997: 21):

A mechanism is basically the way of acting or working of a structured thing … Mechanisms then exist as the causal powers of things. Structured things … possess causal powers which, when triggered or released, act as generative mechanisms to determine the actual phenomena of the world.

The key to understanding the critical realist conception of a mechanism (and eventually tendency) lies not with the notions of a power possessed or actualised, but with the notion of a power exercised. A possessed power is (relatively) uninteresting because it generates no effects.⁴ An actualised power is (relatively) uninteresting because it is only in special circumstances that an exercised power is not interfered with. A power exercised, however, is one that has been triggered, is generating effects, is acting transfactually and, as will become clear in a moment, is involved in generating tendencies. Being triggered is, typically, a complex process requiring that the entity enters into a web of relations with other relevant entities. A bicycle exists in relations to a shed wall, a road, sky, grass, wind, hills, gravity, cyclists (drunken and sober) and so on. If the bicycle enters into appropriate relations (e.g. with a sober cyclist), its power is triggered, and becomes an exercised power.

It appears that the term mechanism⁵ is a label we apply to the ensemble of structures, powers and relations. Once a specific set of intrinsic structures combine to form an entity with a power, and this ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1 The marriage of critical realism and Marxism: happy, unhappy or on the rocks?
• 2 Five ways in which critical realism can help Marxism
• 3 Critical realist arguments in Marx’s Capital
• 4 What kind of theory is Marx’s labour theory of value? A critical realist inquiry
• 5 Capitalism, the regulation approach, and critical realism
• 6 Critical realism: beyond the Marxism/post-Marxism divide
• 7 Materialism, realism and dialectics
• 8 Dialectic in Marxism and critical realism
• 9 Developing realistic philosophy: from critical realism to materialist dialectics
• 10 From spaces of antagonism to spaces of engagement
• 11 The spectral ontology of value
• 12 Abstracting emancipation: two dialectics on the trail of freedom
• Index