United Nations in the Contemporary World

David J. Whittaker

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• Print ISBN:
  9781138162785
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134742455
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Fifty years after the creation of the United Nations, there exists a vigorous debate as to its limitations and possibilities. In United Nations in the Contemporary World, David J. Whittaker examines how the UN works and assesses its position as a world organisation.
The author explores the nature of the UN as a regime in contemporary international relations. He considers the changing terms of reference of the UN and includes discussion of:
* UN organisational procedures and principles;
* recent historical case studies, including studies on peacekeeping
* the role of the UN in global urbanisation, arms control and in supplying aid for refugees
* past and future internal reform, goals, achievements
With an annotated bibliography and a helpful glossary United Nations in the Contemporary World provides an interdisciplinary history of the UN and debates the key issues for its future. David J Whittaker gives a cogent analysis of how the UN addresses today's world problems and how it can adapt for the future.

Part I
Infrastructural change

1 The ideas and structures of 1945

In the contemporary world of the 1990s the UN is an important political force. From time to time its efforts and standing are praised; sometimes they are misunderstood and even held in contempt. In order to appraise the UN’s significance today it is important to take a look at the infant organisation at the time of its foundation half a century ago. This chapter will briefly survey the UN’s purpose, principles and structure as its founders established them. The following chapter will then be able to consider the contemporary position of the UN.

The Second World War altered the shape of international relations visibly and irreversibly. As war drew to a close in 1944–5 the most challenging consequences were to be the waning of Europe’s influence (much of the region was prostrate and shattered), the emergence of a US superpower role, the spreading of Soviet and Communist influence, the dawn of a nuclear age (part exciting and part threatening), the growth of bipolar tension and hostility, later to be known as the Cold War, and the beginnings of nationalist agitation in Africa and Asia. Much of Europe was twice devastated – at the preliminary Nazi occupation and subsequently during Allied liberation. There was a vast toll in human lives, half of them civilian, with millions of people uprooted from their homes. Parts of Asia also were in ruins with survivors left forlorn. The task of rehabilitation in country after country was immense.

The hallmarks of feeling among governments and people in 1945 were anguish, hope and determination. Anguish, at six years of carnage wrought by the Axis Powers and at the searing counter-response of the ultimately victorious Allies, was almost overwhelming. There had to be hope that out of the solidarity such as wartime experiences had welded there could be built a postwar world of safety, justice and returning prosperity. Major powers were standing tall in their determination to use their resources and will to lead others in a campaign to reinvigorate civilisation. They had won the war and they would now win the peace. Collaboration, trust, tolerance and international law would replace unilateral selfishness, deceit, violation of human rights and lawlessness.

PRELIMINARY SPADEWORK

Bridgeheads in planning the UN were the Atlantic Charter of 1941 when twenty-six nations supported eight principles for world reconstruction, Allied conferences at Teheran in 1943, and at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945. Much detailed drafting was done in the United States at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944. The shaping of principles and purpose was promoted vigorously by the great Allied leaders, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. These two, advised by committees and working parties of politicians, soldiers and academics, acknowledged that building a more peaceful world would depend upon consensus and resolve, not all that different from what the Western Powers were relying upon to win the war. Strength of purpose and strength of resources would be keys to survival. There were Anglo-American differences in approach. Churchill was largely governed by a realistic wish to finish the war first. Conscious of old political enmities in Europe and the budding perhaps of new ones, his preference was for an international peacekeeping organisation built out of regional blocs. Britain and its Commonwealth would play a leading part. Roosevelt, equally aware of old geopolitical tensions, went for a more global approach encompassing all continents. The will and power of sovereign states would be spearheaded by the custodial role of Four Policemen (the USA, the UK, the USSR and China) seeking to advance peace and progress by maintaining a vigilance over international developments. This knitting together of idealism, realism and responsibility was to be sounded emphatically by Roosevelt’s successor, President Harry Truman, to the opening conference of the UN in San Francisco on 26 June 1945: ‘the powerful nations’, he said, ‘have a duty to assume responsibility for leadership toward a world of peace. . . . By their own example the strong nations of the world should lead the way to international justice.’ Nobody could live in peace unless that peace were defended. And no future United States could afford to stand aside in isolation from that duty.

Aside from the public pronouncements of leaders there was a great deal of intensive backroom work going on in the 1940s to launch a new organisation and to bring it into the fitting-out basin. In the beleaguered Britain of 1942 a Foreign Office Economic and Reconstruction Department regularly despatched memos and blueprints to the War Cabinet. In retrospect some of its recommendations echo the optimism of 1919 when an American President, Woodrow Wilson, had championed the idea of a League of Nations to promote peace through a Covenant of humanitarian principles, democratic discussion, openness, arbitration and equality of status for all members. Then, the visionary Wilson had been checked by the Allied victors of the 1914–18 war who called for a higher executive level of major powers with responsibility for enforcing peace. Yet, the League ideals were to fail because those major powers preferred to win peace (as well as war) through negotiating safeguards for their own narrow security. Not surprisingly, covert agreement, sabre-rattling and bluff put an end to early hopes of transparency of intent and accord. Wilson himself became drained of political credibility in an isolationist United States despite his plea that standing by League principles and helping Europe come together to prevent war would in the end avoid the future loss of American lives. After a second world war hard-headed proposals were to guard against any repetition of the mistakes of a previous generation. A close group of Great Powers, winners of war and guarantors of peace, must exercise control of security issues with smaller powers fulfilling a subsidiary role. Realists saw this as working against the dissension and futility that had crippled the League of Nations and had helped to breed cynicism and complacency. Others, more idealist, began to wonder whether the paramountcy of the Big Four was not a conventional system of power politics thinly disguised. (This surmise, as we shall see later, has gained conviction and strength.)

Across the Atlantic, in Washington, teams of advisers were helped by having a President who proved a better listener than his British counterpart. Roosevelt was convinced that the League of Nations had failed because it tried to deal with situations after they had become faits accomplis. Henceforth there must be anticipatory and unanimous action. More helpfully than in Britain, members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives toured their country from coast to coast airing principles and mobilising public opinion through town meetings and radio talks. It looked as though preliminary spadework was digging deep into fertile soil. People in Europe and in America, chastened by war, were ready to rebuild their world.

Given that there was appreciable unanimity among those working on the rudiments of a new international organisation burning questions were soon being asked as more people were recruited for the drafting process. In the interests of world peace would member states be prepared to give up any of their precious sovereignty? Could the new organisation have sufficient authority to compel members to accept decisions? If Big Power leadership was said to be vital to secure world peace would smaller nations be ready to go along with that? If the strength of a state’s autonomy were acknowledged would this reinforce collective potential or would it weaken it?

The UN Charter, coming off the drawing board, was mainly an Anglo- American product. Western liberal principles were prominently there as they had been in the Covenant of the League of Nations a generation earlier. The definitive version was assembled over sixty-two days by national representatives and ‘consultants’ from forty-two non-governmental organisations (NGOs), working all hours in Californian heat. Fifty-one states, representing four-fifths of the world’s population in those days, came to San Francisco to sign the document on 26 June 1945 and it was finally ratified by those signatories on 24 October, a day ever since known as ‘UN Day’.

THE PURPOSE OF THE UN

Article 1 of the UN Charter enumerates the basic purposes of the UN. In brief, they are to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to achieve international cooperation in solving problems, and to act as a centre for harmonising collective action. These purposes are action loaded. They only bear fruit if ‘collective measures’ are appropriate and effective. The UN is to serve three interrelated functions: namely, to be a forum for discussion and decision, to meet as a syndicate for action, employing non-forcible measures to improve the world, and to be a missionary centre appealing to moral values and standards higher than those generally prevailing in international relations.

PRINCIPLES IN THE UN CHARTER

The authors of the UN Charter certainly recognised that the earlier principles of the League of Nations were neither fully nor consistently observed. This time the new organisation would empower principles. The most important ones are set out below.

The association principle

The fifty-one signatories at San Francisco were to be joined by all other peace-loving states accepting Charter obligations. Each would respect the sovereign equality of all other members. They would never resort to force in settling disputes. They must rally to the assistance of the UN whenever required. Any violation of Charter principles could lead to expulsion.

The hierarchy principle

A General Assembly as the bottom tier would offer all member states a forum for discussion and recommendation. International collaboration in the widest possible field of international relations would be promoted. Executive functions would be the remit of a Security Council, an upper tier, with primary responsibility for maintenance of peace and security and for the regulation of armaments and for dealing effectively with disputes and threats to the peace. Restorative action, so far as possible, would not involve the use of force although ‘appropriate measures’ might ultimately be considered necessary. A Military Staff Committee and standby enforcement contingents were to be provided for. Matters other than procedural would observe a principle of unanimity. In the event of the Security Council having a dispute or situation under consideration the General Assembly must refrain from making any recommendations unless invited to do so.

The principle of collective security

This was implicit in many of the principles rather than the subject of explicit ruling. Generally, members would take ‘effective collective measures’ for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of aggressive acts and breaches of the peace. They were to work for the ‘adjustment or settlement’ of threatening disputes or situations. The Charter allocated this call to action to the province of the executive Security Council and not to the deliberative General Assembly, but the obligation of rallying to the cause was clear enough. Two chapters, Chapters VI and VII, outline procedures to be followed, for dispute reconciliation and the contingency of more forceful measures. There were two important riders to this principle. First, nothing in the Charter authorised the UN to intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or, indeed, required it to submit such matters for settlement (Article 2.7). Further, nothing in the Charter was to impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if one member were to attack another. This was understood as an interim measure at least until the Security Council could intervene (Article 51).

The regional principle

Yet another principle seems at odds with the universalist intentions of an instrument for collective security. Nothing in the Charter was to preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with peace maintenance provided their way of working was consistent with UN purposes and principles. These regional bodies might even be used for enforcement action but only if the Security Council authorised it.

The mediation principle

Peacekeeping, later to become a major UN enterprise, is not mentioned as the implementation of a principle. In the general context of members’ obligation to settle disputes peacefully and to refrain from using force there is an entire chapter, Chapter VI, suggesting ways of talking through solutions. In the event of deadlock the Security Council and possibly an International Court of Justice should work to freeze or contain a dispute which might become a crisis or conflict.

The trusteeship principle

The UN was born at a time of transition and turmoil among perhaps 700 million people either yoked to empires or given nominal autonomy as League of Nations mandated territories. Three chapters in the Charter trace the UN’s concern, by way of a Declaration, to carry out a ‘sacred trust’ to promote the well-being and advance of these people. In principle, an International Trusteeship System and a Trusteeship Council would have this responsibility.

The judicial principle

Conformity with the principles of international law was to be a cardinal principle for the UN as it had been for the former League of Nations. Following on the nineteen chapters of the UN Charter is the Statute of an International Court of Justice. A preliminary chapter in the Charter signals the importance of such a court and the Statute goes on to establish in great detail the Court’s organisation, competence and procedures.

The economic and social principle

Two whole chapters, Chapters IX and X, address the principle of taking on board ‘all international economic, social, cultural, education, health and related matters’. This would be the task of an Economic and Social Council overseeing an array of specialised agencies. In particular, such a council would be expected to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

THE UN’S ORIGINAL STRUCTURE

With the Charter printed, signed and ratified the next step in the autumn of 1945 was to breathe life into a structure to implement purpose and principles. Some of the outline principles had already been threaded into structural schemes, among them those relating to collective security, trusteeship, economic and social promotion, and jurisdiction. A UN Preparatory Commission, split into ten working parties, worked in London during the winter months to establish procedural rules, modalities of voting, procedures for assemblies and committees, and the preparation of preliminary agendas. League of Nations principles and ways of working were examined closely for the sake of continuity. As might be expected there was some fear of arousing latent hostilities or creating doubts by reason of the League’s chequered history. In the end, it was decided to locate the UN in the newer world of the Americas, in New York, rather than in Geneva. Roosevelt, already in February 1945, had his mind made up about this: ‘Not Geneva. Geneva’s unlucky, has an unlucky record . . .’.

Structural elements of the UN were hoisted into place in a rudimentary form in late 1945. At the outset today’s six main components of the UN were there in embryo – the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council and the International Court of Justice.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Each member state was entitled to seat up to five delegates. Regardless of size, each state could have only one vote. The Assembly was no legislating parliament. As a meeting house it was to rely on debate in plenary sessions each autumn and sometimes in Special Sessions. Delegates would meet to adopt resolutions, and Declarations, to encourage their governments to implement these, and to put their whole weight behind any ratified Convention for that would be a mandatory instrument. Committees would commission surveys, consider reports, establish working groups, and frame programmes.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Five permanent members (the USA, the UK, the USSR, China, France) and ten non-permanent members would meet continuously as an executive arm. Prevention and conciliation were to be their approach to maintaining peace and security and they would seek to work forward from common ground rather than from short-term national preoccupations. There would be no progress without the affirmative votes of all permanent members.

THE SECRETARIAT

Administratively the first task was to enlist staff to set up provisional working arrangements. Paramount considerations were to be the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity with due regard to the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Fourteen thousand people from a score of countries were eventually appointed. Their loyalty had to be to the UN and to nobody else. A Secretary-General would head the Secretariat. Apart from day-to-day administrative activities the Secretary-General was to chair meetings and report to the General Assembly on UN activities each year. Serving a five-year term the Secretary-General could be reelected for a second term. At the pinnacle of UN responsibility the Secretary-General would be a critical figure in contemporary world politics, an organiser on a grand scale, an influential reformer, an initiator who might bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which might threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

This body was to be the coordinating group for most UN activities apart from the maintenance of peace and security. (Later to be known as ECOSOC there would be impressive growth here in size and breadth of operation.) Essentially, the first task of this arm of the UN would be to put in hand the mammoth task of reconstruction and resettlement in war-torn regions. It was envisaged that smaller nations would play an important part in a forum of fifty-four state representatives who would formulate policy recommendations, commission research and reports, and convene conferences. Liaison was to be maintained with representatives of governments, with expert advisers, and with research institutes.

Specialised agencies were to be established by intergovernment agreement as separate, independent entities with distinctive mandates and methods of working yet maintaining close links with the UN. This ambitious structure owes much to the prewar principle of ‘functionalism’ as it was enunciated by the sociologist, David Mitrany, working in the United States. His thinking was that collaboration among nations would put an end to laissez-faire and parochialism and would promote better living conditions for the world’s peoples and might encourage and bring about cooperation in the more difficult political arena. Success in the one might ‘spill over’ and ‘ramify’ to bring further success elsewhere. Thinking such as this appealed to the founders of the UN in the late 1940s. Might not irrationality and conflict give way before rational policy sharing and realistic ways of working? Nations united realistically on the ground, as it were, could pragmatically work towards idealistic goals. Specialised agencies (as the name suggests) would be given specific, specialised roles. In 1945 ECOSOC took into the UN fold two existing inter-governmental bodies of venerable age. They were UPU and ITU, both working in postal and communications services since 1874 and 1875. Eventually, there were to be eighteen or so agencies. They work more as a network than a system, initiating programmes and sharing projects in a vast array of enterprises – health, food and agriculture, labour affairs, trade, refugees, international finance, education, meteorology, air and sea transport. Known to the world by their acronyms (see the list of abbreviations) like WHO, FAO, ILO, UNHCR, UNESCO, IBRD, they have headquarters in Geneva, Rome, Paris, Vienna and Nairobi. At the outset in 1945 the responsibility of each agency would be to transmit data from enquiry, inventories, research and field trials back to ECOSOC so that the General Assembly could use the information to put into codes, guidelines and covenants. Mitrany’s notion that peace would come about ‘in pieces’ would surely mean the work of agencies putting meaning into the premise of the UN Charter (as UNESCO proclaimed it) that ‘since wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed’.

THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

This council would exercise a general supervision of ‘trust territories’ to be groomed for self-government or complete independence (eleven of them) and of ‘non-trust territories’ (seventy-two of them) where a lesser degree of autonomy from former colonial powers was to be expected. The Council would compile reports, pay inspection visits, and accept petitions from territorial groups. There would be close liaison with ECOSOC. Very clearly, the UN would take this duty most seriously and there would be an end to the rather limp and not very productive mandatory and protectorate regimes of the old League of Nations.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Here the Court’s Statute was adopted at the same time as the UN Charter but it was to take two years before the Court commenced its work. Basically, this court was seen as an institution to develop and refine the process of international law through rulings on what were termed ‘justiciable cases’ where parties await judgment. There was an expectation that litigants would abide by the Court’s judgment but there was no power of arrest, punishment or enforcement. Indeed, the Charter acknowledged that UN members might go to other tribunals to resolve their differences. The compilers of both Charter and Statute certainly had in mind the usefulness of asking a court to give advisory opinions, for instance as to the interpretation of a treaty, the extent of reparations following legal violations or the obligations of states in regard to regulations and quotas, or nationality and immigration matters.

THE FIRST GENERAL A...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• The Making of the Contemporary World
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• Part I: Infrastructural change
• Part II: The UN in a changing international environment
• Part III: Facing the future
• Guide to further reading