Anxiety in a 'Risk' Society

Iain Wilkinson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• eBook ISBN: 9781134588596
• Topic: Medicine
• Subtopic: Health Care Delivery

Few would dispute that we are living at a time of high anxiety and uncertainty in which many of us will experience a crisis of identity at some point or another. At the same time, news media provide us with a daily catalogue of disasters from around the globe to remind us that we inhabit a world of crisis, insecurity and hazard. Anxiety in a Risk Society : looks at the problem of contemporary anxiety from a sociological perspective highlights its significance for the ways we make sense of risk and uncertainty argues that the relationship between anxiety and risk hinges on the nature of anxiety. Iain Wilkinson believes that there is much for sociologists to learn from those who have made the condition of anxiety the focus of their life's work. By making anxiety the focus of sociological inquiry, a critical vantage point can be gained from which to attempt an answer to the question: Are we more anxious because we are more risk conscious? This is an original and thought-provoking contribution to the understanding of late modernity as a risk society.

Part I
The problem of anxiety

1
Towards a sociological conception of the problem of anxiety

Anxiety is a complex phenomenon, which both at the level of individual experience and as the subject of academic study, concerns points of uncertainty which inevitably give rise to conflicting interpretations and evaluations of its principal causes, defining characteristics and significance for our lives. While our conceptions of this unpleasant part of being human have become more complexly detailed and subtly nuanced, there is still no consensus among researchers as to how far we should recognise anxiety as a normal or inevitable aspect of life in modern societies. Moreover, where we have achieved a greater understanding of the possible causes of this experience, anxiety seems to retain a sense or appearance of indeterminacy which guarantees that its precise origins will always remain open to debate. Accordingly, from the outset of our discussion the reader should remain alert to the fact that it is only possible to write on this subject by adopting a selective point of view.

Most researchers in the field of clinical and health psychology now understand the condition of anxiety to be comprised of a complex emotional process which involves not only our thoughts, but also our physiology and behaviour. In this context anxiety is held to consist in the interrelationship between affective experiences, bodily reactions and behavioural responses. For the most part, clinicians have focused upon the task of developing therapies for treating specific types of anxiety disorder which are explained with reference to the personal histories, emotional characteristics, psychologies and physiologies of their patients. A vast amount of research has been conducted into the problem of anxiety conceived as a form of ‘neurosis’, ‘abnormality’ or ‘pathology’, which is caused by the extent to which individuals have been made temperamentally vulnerable to develop modes of cognition and adaptive behavioural/physiological responses which are not normally associated with those of healthy members of society (Edelmann 1992; Rachman 1998).

As far as clinical practice is concerned, the social and cultural components of anxiety have been treated as a marginal concern (Smail 1999). Where behaviourists would refer us to the conditioning influence of a social environment, they have remained largely unmotivated to explain anxiety with any reference to the structural dynamics of modern societies, rather, they have focused upon the task of analysing the psychological and biological mechanisms through which individuals learn maladaptive responses to the ‘stimuli’ of their immediate surroundings (Eysenck 1957; 1967; Gray 1987). Similarly, where cognitive approaches may lead us to consider the social reproduction and cultural conditioning of the thoughts which preoccupy their patients, researchers have been predominantly concerned to explain how neurotic individuals are made vulnerable to anxiety as a consequence of their own (mis)interpretations and (mis)appraisals of the situations in which they find themselves (Beck et al. 1985; Brewin 1996). Moreover, while some of the most celebrated figures within the traditions of psychoanalysis have sought to alert their profession to the influence of social forces and cultural factors upon the development of neurotic personalities, for the most part therapists have conceived their task in terms of helping individuals to come to a new way of ‘seeing’ their experience of the world so that their problems do not appear to be so great as to prevent them from living a more ‘normal’ life. Accordingly, rather than looking at the social antagonisms and cultural conflicts which comprise their experience of life in modern societies, clinical psychologists and psychotherapists have been inclined to explain anxiety with an emphasis upon the problems and weaknesses of individuals with neurotic disorders (Smail 1984). On this view, our vulnerability to anxiety is more likely to be understood as a consequence of the developmental trends of our individual personalities rather than those of the cultural conditions and social structures in which we find ourselves.

While I shall make some passing references to this literature, these are selected with the aim of conceiving anxiety not so much as a particular problem for unusual individuals who are perceived as having something ‘wrong’ with them but, rather, for the purpose of developing a more general conception of anxiety as an occasional experience which is common to us all. Moreover, I shall be particularly concerned to emphasise the extent to which the experience of anxiety may be understood as a product of social processes and cultural values. In this context, it is possible to recognise certain individuals and social groups as being made more vulnerable to anxiety as a consequence of their location within the structure of society and the quality of their commitments towards the dominant cultural values of our times; more precisely, one may begin to develop a conception of the social distribution of different occasions for anxiety, as well as the contrasting ways in which people set about coping with the problems it brings to their lives. Accordingly, I am interested to note the extent to which ‘neurotic’ symptoms or excessive states of anxiety may be explained in terms of a process of social and cultural determination. From this perspective, anxiety is conceived not so much as a personality defect but, rather, as a function or consequence of the social predicaments and cultural contradictions in which individuals are made to live out their everyday lives.

It is in accordance with this emphasis upon the social reproduction and cultural conditioning of our experience of the world that I shall explain my interest in a definition of anxiety which stresses the extent to which this is inextricably bound to the problem of establishing a proper meaning for situations of foreboding obscurity. Accordingly, I maintain that the experience of anxiety should not only be recognised as being conditioned by the culture of our times but also as a problem of culture. Following commentators such as Erich Fromm (1942; 1947; 1995) and Karen Horney (1937; 1939; 1946; 1950), I conceive the condition of anxiety to be intimately connected with the extent to which the cultural experience of modern societies may sometimes make us feel deeply insecure about our identity and purpose in a world which appears to be deprived of its proper significance and value. The term ‘anxiety’ is a symbolic form of culture representing a state of mind and emotion by which we are made to be convinced that we are in a situation of threatening uncertainty. However, we should also recognise that being made to think and feel this way takes place in relation to the extent to which we lack, or rather, are denied the cultural resources for conceiving a means of escaping the suspected course of our fate.

For the purpose of maintaining a clear analytical distinction between anxiety and other distressing states of emotion such as fear, shame, and humiliation, I hold to the view that we are only kept in anxiety for so long as we remain overwhelmed by the sense that we lack a sufficient means of knowing how to keep ourselves from harm’s way. Moreover, I understand anxiety to function to alert us to the fact that it is precisely due to our ignorance that we are at risk of being damaged, hurt, and humiliated. Accordingly, insofar as it keeps us traumatised under the conviction that we have yet to find a proper meaning for the threatening situations in which we find ourselves, anxiety forces us to keep searching for a means of knowing how to think and what to do in face of an unknown quantity of danger. With this in mind, I would argue that insofar as we are committed to defining the meaning of the phenomenological experience of anxiety, then we are liable to come across the paradox that it seems to be borne by consciousness as a problem of definition; so long as anxiety remains, we are left frustrated in the knowledge that our culture has yet to provide us with a capacity to understand the ‘true’ significance of our feelings of distress, and further, it has yet to equip us with a sufficient means of overcoming, or avoiding, the sense of being overwhelmed by the threatening uncertainty of the possible futures which await us.

This chapter begins with a more detailed attempt to define the problem of anxiety in terms of the distressing obscurity which dominates the subjective experience of being held captive by this condition. I then go on to discuss the social meaning of anxiety in the context of a theoretical analysis of the distinction between anxiety and fear. Accordingly, I explain my bias towards a definition of anxiety which conceives this to be part of the experience in which individuals struggle to come to terms with the threatening sense of meaninglessness and states of helplessness which comprise their symptoms of social distress. I highlight some of the ways in which psychologists have conceived the social and cultural components of this experience as a means of introducing the basic tenets of a sociological conception of anxiety. At this point, I offer a brief account of some of the major theoretical themes which characterise the sociological discourse on anxiety. In this context, I attempt to explain how a process of ‘individualisation’, the loss of community and tradition, and the modern experience of work and employment are all conceived as having contributed towards the development of a social environment in which we are made vulnerable to the distress of anxiety.

The problem of definition

While few would doubt the importance of anxiety as a defining characteristic of our humanity, there is certainly no agreement as to how one should interpret its significance for the development and well-being of our psychology, interpersonal relations and culture. Indeed, researchers cannot even agree upon how to describe the main components of the experience of anxiety, let alone reach a consensus as to the factors which make us more or less vulnerable to being in this condition. Any attempt to define or explain ‘the problem of anxiety’ is liable to court controversy. However, perhaps this is precisely what we should expect for it appears that the experience of anxiety always leaves us struggling to make sense of its true origins and purposes.

There is a persistent conflict of interpretations as to the proper definition of anxiety. Indeed, William Fischer advises that we should expect to find that ‘there are as many conceptions of anxiety as there are theories of man’ (Fischer 1970: 135). This may be understood not only as the result of the outwardly observable complexity of the phenomena of this condition, but also as a consequence of the fact that the sensible quality of the inner experience of anxiety is borne by consciousness as a problem of meaning which invites, or rather, demands us to engage in a speculative search for its ‘true’ origins and identity. Accordingly, I am inclined to believe that the distressing obscurity which comprises the experience of being the victim of anxiety may be held partly responsible for the ongoing academic debate over its constituent aspects and precise causes.

When held captive by the experience of being in anxiety, individuals commonly express an elevated sense of threatening uncertainty. They appear to have difficulty in establishing a sufficiently clear conception of the causes of their complaint, or the proper identity of an anticipated danger, and thereby are given over to an unpleasant feeling of uneasy suspense. Among other things, when caught by the state of anxiety, individuals are made to be distressed by the extent to which they conceive themselves to be in a dangerous situation yet do not know how to think and what to do in order to protect themselves. Indeed, it appears that it is by so traumatising us with the knowledge of our own ignorance that anxiety functions to alert us to, and prepare us for, the threat of danger (Freud 1979: 324–9). So long as we are in anxiety, we are troubled by the conviction that something important remains to be known so that we can avoid being in harm’s way, and thereby, so long as we do not fall into despair, we are driven to search for ideal and practical solutions to the problems it impresses upon our consciousness.

Accordingly, it appears that where there is anxiety there is always a problem of definition; anxiety always presents us and leaves us with agonising questions as to its precise significance and purpose. We are kept in anxiety so long as we are left struggling to define the threatening situation in which we find ourselves. Anxiety is aroused in social contexts where individuals suspect themselves to be in a threatening situation, but nevertheless, are still deprived of the knowledge which is sufficient to reveal enough about the causes of their complaint so that they can take the necessary steps to avoid the danger. On this basis, following the pioneering accounts of Søren Kierkegaard (1980) and Sigmund Freud (1979), theorists have traditionally held to the view that the problem of definition should occupy the centre of any attempt to define and explain the meaning of anxiety. Moreover, it is also understood that as we acquire a greater knowledge of the proper dimensions of an anticipated danger, then we should also be relieved from the tension of anxiety. However, it is important to add that where knowledge frees us from anxiety, it may only bring us so far as to realise the proper identity of our fears.

As a matter of conceptual analysis, it is suggested that where fears ‘refer to something definite’ (Kierkegaard 1980: 42), by contrast anxiety, has ‘a quality of indefiniteness and lack of object’ (Freud 1979: 325). Fears have a specific focus whereby individuals are held to have a clear understanding of the object which they endeavour to avoid, however, the object of anxiety may be recognised as the paradox that it is ‘the negation of every object’ (Tillich 1952: 45). Where fear always has something in its sights, the distinctiveness of anxiety lies in the fact that, precisely speaking, it appears to be directed towards nothing (Kierkegaard 1980: 43). Consequently, when caught by anxiety, we are distressed by our inability to recognise the causes of our condition for they remain hidden in obscurity. Moreover, anxiety leaves us powerless to deliver ourselves from our fate, since there is nothing upon which we can concentrate our energies.

Nevertheless, insofar as they may be identified as consisting of a relationship of mutual dependency, it is not always easy to maintain a clear distinction between fear and anxiety. Where we are afraid of a definite something such as pain, being a failure, a lack of recognition or losing something of great value or somebody loved, our anxieties arise in connection with the threatening uncertainty of not knowing how we should be, or what we should do in anticipation of these awful events. Anxiety feeds upon the unknown elements of our fears. Moreover, aside from the harms which they bring, what makes our fears so terrible may be due to the fact that they are the route towards anxiety. Indeed, Paul Tillich suggests that the ‘sting of fear is anxiety’ insofar as we may be most tormented by the terrible anticipation of its possible implications for our lives (Tillich 1952: 46).

Accordingly, the key to explaining the difference between fear and anxiety is represented as amounting to a difference in the amount or quality of knowledge we possess as to the objective dimensions of an anticipated danger. At the same time as anxiety anticipates an experience of helplessness, it leaves us helplessly searching to find an object which is sufficient to translate our anxieties into fear (Freud 1979: 326–7). It appears that anxiety thrives upon the tension between our knowledge and ignorance of fearful situations. Moreover, it is understood that as we acquire a fuller understanding of the actual causes of our condition we shall reach a position in which the vague uncertainties of anxiety are transformed into the known objects of fear. Thus, Paul Tillich contends that so long as we are in a state of anxiety our minds become a ‘factory of fear’, because it is only when we have successfully translated our anxieties into fears that we may take the necessary steps to avoid and protect ourselves from an anticipated danger (Tillich: 1952: 47). Similarly, Rollo May emphasises that for those beset by the problem of anxiety, it is the sense of agonising uncertainty which is so traumatically threatening since, ‘one cannot fight what one does not know’ (May 1977: 207). Accordingly, Stanley Rachman notes that psychotherapists have traditionally held to the assumption that it is by converting anxiety into fear that they may help their patients to better manage their symptoms of emotional distress. For example, Freud maintained that it was by acquiring a knowledge of the object of an anticipated danger that he sought to enable his patients to remove themselves from the trauma of neurotic anxiety (Freud 1979: 324–9). Such a motive implies that ‘anxiety is not-fear [sic] simply by reason of default; that is, we have anxiety when the focus of fear is elusive’ (Rachman 1998: 7). By liberating patients from the uncertainty of the causes of their affliction, it is considered a ‘progressive step’ to have helped them to move from the condition of anxiety into the state of fear.

However, at this point in my discussion, the reader should be aware of the fact that I have become embroiled in theoretical commitments which are far removed from any simple or uncontested definition of the problem of anxiety. Indeed, where researchers analyse the problem of anxiety in terms of the activity of our nervous system, a type of expressive behaviour, or the cognitive structuring of our emotions, then the distinction between anxiety and fear tends to be treated as largely irrelevant to the task of explaining how our bodies, minds and behaviour combine to provide us with different kinds of emotional experience (Edelmann 1992: 1–18). Moreover, in the field of experimental psychology there are writers who use these terms interchangeably when analysing the neurophysiological and behavioural components of different types of phobia and anxiety disorder (Mowrer 1939; Fischer 1970: 50–9). Accordingly, I would draw attention to the fact that the tradition of defining anxiety in contradistinction to fear appears most prominently within the works of those concerned to advance a means of interpreting the phenomenological or existential meaning of the overall quality of this experience. It is especially in this context that we are also more likely to find psychologists taking an interest in the cultural components of anxiety and its wider significance for our social experience of day-to-day life.

The social meaning of anxiety

Where psychologists take an interest in the social meaning of anxiety they are usually most committed to upholding the analytical distinction between anxiety and fear. For example, Harry Stack Sullivan recognises anxiety to have a social meaning which is quite different to that of fear. He argues that fear is an adaptive response to dangerous situations which we hold in common with other animals. Fear functions to mobilise our bodies for action whereby we might flee the environmental situation or object which threatens to do harm to our physical existence (Sullivan 1953: 50). Moreover, fears are understood to hold no necessary significance for our sociability. By contrast, Sullivan places a special emphasis upon ‘the interpersonal nature of anxiety’ (Sullivan 1964: 297). He conceives anxiety to be exclusively linked to the social achievement of presenting and knowing oneself as an adequate human being. He maintains that anxiety is aroused exclusively in relation to the experience of social disapproval, and in its most extreme forms, it serves to make us acutely aware of our anticipated ‘embarrassment, shame, humiliation, guilt and chagrin’ before others (ibid.: 318). The distinctive sign of being in anxiety is that individuals are not so much motivated by the drive to escape their environment or any particular object, rather, they have a desperate need to flee from themselves. Thus in this definition, anxiety, unlike fear, has no object insofar as it is understood to be rooted in the unbearable experience of being the subject of social failure (Fischer 1970: 33–4).

Similarly, Rollo May argues that the term ‘anxiety’ should be especially reserved to describe those experiences which threaten the possibility of maintaining oneself as a personality. Accordingly, where the specific focus of fear may cause us harm, it is nevertheless considered to lack the capacity to destroy the basic values which comprise the meaning of our humanity. By contrast, he emphasises that ‘what will always be true in anxiety is that the threat is to a value held by that particular individual to be essential to his existence and, consequently, to his security as a personality’ ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part I: The problem of anxiety
• Part II: Anxiety and risk
• Notes
• References