United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era

John Terence O'Neill, Nick Rees

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• eBook ISBN: 9781135754549
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de l'armée et de la marine

This new study questions whether peacekeeping fundamentally changed between the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods.

Focusing on contrasting case studies of the Congo, Cyprus, Somalia and Angola, as well as more recent operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor, it probes new evidence with clarity and rigour.

The authors conclude that most peacekeeping operations - whether in the Cold War or Post-Cold War periods - were flawed due to the failure of the UN member states to agree upon achievable objectives, the precise nature of the operations and provision of the necessary resources, and unrealistic post-1989 expectations that UN peacekeeping operations could be adapted to the changed international circumstances. The study concludes by looking at the Brahimi reforms, questions whether these are realistically achievable and looks at their impact on contemporary peace operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor and elsewhere.

1
INTRODUCTION

The main aim of this study is to examine those activities carried out by the UN in the period 1946 to 2003 employing military and police personnel and coming under the rubric ‘UN Peacekeeping’. In particular, it seeks to ascertain whether those operations which took place in the period following the improvement of relations between East and West in the late 1980s were markedly different in terms of their nature and objectives from those which had gone before, and the impact upon operations of the changes in the international system post-Cold War. Certainly, the late 1980s witnessed a number of successes in peacekeeping, including the successful resolution of conflicts in Central America, Africa and the Middle East, while the early 1990s were marked by a significant increase in the number of authorisations of new missions. The diversity of missions and the range of new requirements seemed to fundamentally change the nature of peacekeeping; yet was this actually the case, or are many commentators guilty of oversimplifying the type of operations undertaken in the past while assuming new operations were of a more complex nature? Did the end of the Cold War explain the transformation of peacekeeping, or are there broader developments associated with globalisation that help to account for the growing demand for peacekeeping.¹

During the Cold War, the UN’s ability to engage in collective action was seen to have been impeded by East-West divisions which effectively limited the possibility of cooperation in the UN Security Council. The end of the Cold War was to have introduced an era of peace with an emphasis on the rights and privileges of human rights.² However, expectations of more effective peacekeeping post-Cold War proved misplaced. As early as 1994, Adam Roberts described UN peacekeeping as ‘in crisis’.³ Tried and tested principles and practices had been modified or abandoned and the distinction between peacekeeping and various enforcement activities had become blurred. UN efforts in Bosnia had exposed the organisation to accusations of weakness and the initially successful UN operation in Angola had been followed by resumption of warfare. The UN role in these states seemed to do little to address the underlying causes of conflict. These problems and failures had arisen at a time when, Roberts claimed, there was a widespread feeling of optimism that the UN could have a more central role in international security and that peacekeeping could tackle a wide range of international problems. ‘The international community now wants the UN to demarcate boundaries, control and eliminate heavy weapons, quell anarchy and guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid. There are increasing demands that the UN now enforce the peace as originally envisaged in the UN Charter.’⁴

John Mackinlay also writing in 1994, presented the situation in starker terms. There were, he maintained, signs that the fashion to promote peacekeeping was now over.⁵ Peacekeeping, a concept that was successful during the Cold War, was now being used in contingencies for which it was not designed. Why was this the case and what led the UN to engage in such a range of new operations? The very visual images of suffering in conflict situations certainly led to a call for ‘international action’ and the CNN factor was undoubtedly important in understanding why there was felt to be a need to act. In Washington and the capitals of Europe, however, there was disenchantment and a growing reluctance to become involved in further peace-supporting activities. The visual failure of the UN in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, as well as the increasing risk of casualties, left the US and many European states reluctant to participate in operations that might be prolonged and likely to lead to loss of life. As an issue this was less prevalent among developing states, who for a mix of motives were still willing to commit forces to such operations, but often found themselves in situations for which they had not been adequately prepared and trained, as seems to have been the case in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, the UN also had its limited successes in the late 1990s, in East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Afghanistan, suggesting that the UN’s approach might be a factor in helping to resolve the immediate conflict and assist the transition to a state of more permanent peace.

As a part of the broader objective of this study we are concerned with looking at whether the UN has adapted as a system to meet the increasing expectations of it as a force for peace in the post-Cold War era. In particular, although our choice of case studies is by necessity selective, we are interested in comparing the cases, as well as looking at all other instances of peacekeeping, with a view to determining to what extent the UN has learnt lessons from its past failures. Again, commentary from two recent Secretaries-General, has tended to suggest that the UN has been slow to learn from its own mistakes, whether made in New York, or at an operational level in the field. Those involved in operations often express the view that much of what they have learnt is seldom listened to in New York and many valuable lessons are not adequately recorded back at UN headquarters. In this context, has much changed in the post-Cold War period, and have the attempts at change and reform in the administrative structure and management of UN peacekeeping in New York addressed these questions?

The impact of September 11, Afghanistan and Iraq on the UN

The events of September 11, the US response in Afghanistan and the American-led coalition attack on Iraq, all seem to suggest that the search for security, and by extension peace, remain core to any attempt to understand global politics and the role of the UN. The nature of the threat, whether it is international terrorism or the defiance of a rogue state, is far from new and in some ways is more normal than it might initially appear. The world did not change after September 11, and the attack on America was reflective of an anti-American feeling in many Islamic states. The US responded to the attacks by launching ‘a war on terrorism’ and tightening its own ‘defence of the homeland’.⁶ In so doing there was an initial rapprochement between the US, Russia and the EU, all of whom were committed to opposing terrorism and adopting tougher new measures to confront terrorist organisations and their activities.

The US response in Afghanistan and Iraq has been predictable and consistent with the increasingly unilateralist and militaristic policy pursued by the Bush Administration (e.g. note US rejection of the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). Such an approach does not bode well for the UN and suggests that the consensus that existed in the Security Council in the early 1990s is over. In Afghanistan the US administration sought to pursue its military objective of defeating the Taliban regime and al-Qaida and replacing it with a government favourable to the US by employing its military might. Following the end of the military phase of the campaign, the American government supported the authorisation by the UN of small, armed force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), for deployment under UK command in Kabul. The US, however, was reluctant to take a leading role in the force. Notably, in July 2002 the US threatened to block all UN-mandated peacekeeping operations if the rules of the International Criminal Court were applied to the US.

The US-led attack on Iraq in 2003, seemed to undermine the role of the UN, again suggesting that the US was willing to take independent action without UN authorisation, with the objective of securing its own security interests. American policy towards Iraq typified the Bush Administration’s militaristic and more unilateral approach to opponents and those seen to be a threat to the US. As the military action in Iraq declined, it became increasingly evident that the US, through its appointment of a former US military commander, Jay Garner, would shape the establishment of a new administration in Iraq. The US sought to keep the UN at arm’s length, preferring instead to pursue it own solutions in Iraq rather than reverting to the UN. Such an approach seems to further undermine the role of the UN, something that the US administration had already done in its initial decision to go to war, but which was further reinforced by its approach in postwar Iraq. The long-term impact of US actions on the UN’s peacekeeping role has yet to be seen, but certainly American policy under Bush is not supportive of the UN, and has once again fragmented consensus in the Security Council.

Collective security, peacekeeping and the UN system

In standing back from recent events, much has been written about the collective security and the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping from a variety of different perspectives involving academics, UN officials and those involved in peacekeeping operations. The present study seeks to examine by means of case studies, as well as by reference to the overall role of the UN in peacekeeping, whether the UN’s role in peacekeeping did change in the post-Cold War environment. The literature on peacekeeping includes case studies of either single operations⁷ or comparisons of different cases, often of successes and failures.⁸ Other studies focus on the history and evolution of peacekeeping.⁹ There are also a range of broader studies that look at the UN as a political and administrative organisation, focusing on UN reform, leadership, and institutional issues, as well as placing the UN in a broader context.¹⁰ A relatively small number of studies have focused on the UN from a theoretical perspective.¹¹ Following the end of the Cold War and the growth in the number of peacekeeping operations, many of the new studies focused on the changing nature of peacekeeping, operational issues and the changing international system.¹²

At a theoretical level the logic of collective security rests on the assumptions that the interest of sovereign nations is in maintaining peace, and that they are willing and able to collectively respond to threats to the peace. In instances where threats to peace occur the states must be willing to respond in an organised and collective way so as to ensure that peace is either maintained or restored. An initial attempt was made to incorporate such an approach into the Covenant of the League of Nations, under Articles 10 and 11.

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

These provisions were supported by the possibility of sanctions, although in practice they were not applied when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, were used with limited effect against Italy following its attack on Ethiopia in 1935–6, and not at all against Germany in 1936. In light of these experiences, the commitment to collective security in the UN Charter was unlikely to provide a particularly good basis for ensuring peace. Article 1 of the UN Charter states that the purposes of the United Nations are:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

The Charter places the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace on the Security Council (Article 24). The Charter offered two possible routes, with Chapter VI focused on the ‘pacific settlement of disputes’, and Chapter VII, ‘action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression’. In practice, the development of peacekeeping in relation to Chapter VI and VII differed considerably from the idea of collective security as envisaged, in so much as the objective has not been to defeat an aggressor, but to prevent violence, maintain a ceasefire and act as a buffer between parties to a conflict.¹³ In many instances the UN has gone beyond Chapter VI, but have stopped short of peace enforcement, leading commentators to dub these operations ‘Chapter Six and One-half’.

The term ‘peacekeeping’ has never been given a fixed and detailed meaning (and is not mentioned in the UN Charter), and many of the terms used by politicians and commentators to describe various UN activities lack a precise and universally accepted definition. It is the word ‘peace’ and the associated plethora of terms such as peacekeeping, peacekeepers, peace-enforcement, peace-making, peace-building, peace-maintenance that demands particular attention. Overall, it is also necessary to examine not only the language and terminology, but the context and years in which they are used. The idea of peacekeeping has changed and definitions in the early twenty-first century differ from those of UN activities undertaken in the 1950s, or even from activities undertaken by the League of Nations.

In the Peacekeepers Handbook the International Peace Academy (1984) defined peacekeeping as:

The prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace. (1984)

One notable commentator uses the term:¹⁴

To refer to any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of long standing disputes. (1993)

Boutros-Ghali defined the term in An Agenda for Peace (1992) in the following manner:

Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities f...

Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
• NOTE ON CONTRIBUTORS
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• 1: INTRODUCTION
• 2: PEACEKEEPING IN THE COLD WAR/POST-COLD WAR
• 3: ONUC AND THE CONGO, 1960–1964
• 4: UNFICYP AND CYPRUS, 1964–
• 5: UNOSOM AND SOMALIA, 1992–1995
• 6: UNAVEM AND ANGOLA, 1988–1997
• 7: UN PEACEKEEPING: LESSONS LEARNT?
• 8: THE FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING
• BIBLIOGRAPHY