China was one of the original contracting parties to the GATT in 1947, but its status was deactivated in 1950 after the formation of the People’s Republic. For the next three decades, China had practically no contact with the GATT. The situation changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, following Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms. Deng first politically transformed China, then liberalized its economy unilaterally through his decision to open the door to China’s participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and, finally, knocked on the door of the GATT itself.
TRANSFORMATION STARTS AT HOME
Deng’s strategy, aptly described by Lardy (2002), Vogel (2011), and Kroeber (2016), consisted of two pillars: reform and opening (gaige kaifang). The phrase he and other reformers used to describe gaige kaifang was “crossing the river by feeling for the stones.” They would embark on this exercise through trial and error, feeling their way partially blind through unfamiliar territory.
Deng was a pragmatist. Vogel notes (2019, 426) that one of his favorite mottoes was Mao’s dictum “seek truth from facts.” He could be blunt when criticizing China’s failures to address basic human needs; he was eager to borrow ideas from others when warranted, if he thought they had something to offer. He did not shy away from bold decisions on sensitive issues as he pursued his goal of gearing the Chinese economy toward efficiency.
Accounts about China’s reforms start from Deng’s chairmanship. And of course, it is only fair to give Deng the lion’s share of credit for China’s reform process. Nevertheless, as Gewirtz (2017) correctly underscores, Hua Guofeng and Hu Yaobang, a Deng protégé, had been promoting reform even before Deng acceded to the chairmanship. But Deng co-opted and expanded their originally hesitant reforms. He buried the hatchet with Japan by signing the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and having appeased his neighbors, he turned to the world.
He looked into Singapore’s and Japan’s experiences in Asia and learned from Western countries as well. He asked for technological assistance, for example, from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), as he did from various Western establishments. Dozens of scientific and technical delegations visited China, and slowly Chinese entrepreneurs and bureaucrats and increasingly even Chinese students visited the West. One thing was clear to him: China could and should work to join the world economy by loosening the iron grip of the state on certain economic sectors.
Farming was the first sector to privatize, as Kroeber explains in his authoritative short history of China’s transformation (2016, 27ff.). This was not a paradox. Speaking in 1979, Chen Yun, the head of the China Development Bank, mentioned that of the 900 million people then living in China, 80 percent were farmers, and they were poor. Change had to start there. Originally, the most common privatized firm was a household enterprise (getihu), which by law could not comprise more than seven employees. This is, of course, a far cry from the size of today’s Chinese behemoths.
In the 1980s, rural reform picked up speed and was implemented by Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). Unlike SOEs, which originally were entirely statist entities, TVEs could adjust to market conditions. They were a huge success and arguably provided the impetus for the gradual transformation of SOEs as well.
The next step was the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs), in which trade and investment were liberalized and a strong emphasis on building infrastructure paved the way for the change. Having collected evidence from eighty-odd countries that had implemented SEZs, China embarked on a similar adventure in 1980—the culmination of Deng’s experiments. The idea was that SEZs would be given enough flexibility to effectively be regulated by the market. They would be free-trade areas, where goods would be imported without being subjected to tariffs and would be reexported following transformation in the SEZ. Guangdong (Canton), Fujian, Shenzen, and Zuhai were the first four SEZs, and their success was phenomenal. The combination of developing country labor costs and rich country infrastructure led unavoidably to the Chinese export-led growth model. Uninhibited access to the world markets was the next logical frontier.
Deng faced criticism from various directions, the economic success of the experiment notwithstanding. In Guangdong and Fujian especially, to bring transaction costs as low as possible, local officials saw the value of establishing “one-stop shops,” where investors and traders alike could procure all the necessary information regarding the transactions they were involved in. It did not take long for the most conservative sections within the party to react, attempting to thwart the opening up of the economy. Guangdong and Fujian officials had to tread very carefully in order to assure foreigners that it was business as usual while not arousing the reactionary forces in Beijing. Was China about to change?
According to Vogel, Deng managed to find a compromise (2011, 420ff.). Although fourteen coastal states received authorization to open their own SEZs, Deng reassured the party that there was no risk that China would become a capitalist country. While his decision to move China toward market liberalization was clear for all to see, Deng was equally clear on another issue: institutions had to be built to support the market opening, and the Chinese Communist Party should manage the process. The party would, in his conception, be the pillar upon which an economic transformation could stand. Deng was apparently convinced that the party could continue to operate as it always had, the transformation notwithstanding. Deng scoffed at the broader transformation happening in the Soviet Union at the same time; in his view, Mikhail Gorbachev had abdicated the necessarily central role of the party in his haste to liberalize. Vogel quotes Deng’s son relaying the Chinese leader’s opinion: “my father thinks Gorbachev is an idiot.”
Deng could not understand the lack of perspective in the Russian leader’s model to call for transformation of the economy without ensuring the central role of the party first. He presciently predicted that the people would remove Gorbachev, which, more or less, eventually happened. Deng wanted to avoid a similar fate. Preserving the role of the party was a priority. We cannot underscore this point enough. It is, in our view, the source of the grievances that many WTO incumbents have raised in recent years against China, and we will be returning to it in various places in this volume. Martin and Bach (1998) explain that China initiated important reforms in the realm of state trading because of the anticipated accession to the WTO. Sixteen foreign trade corporations (FTCs) had practically monopolized import and export trade before Chairman Deng’s reforms. Their number increased substantially as a result of reforms (with exceptions in some farm goods and oil), eventually eliminated exchange rate distortions, and allowed prices to become a decisive factor in resource allocation.
Deng’s commitment to push on with reforms impressed many outsiders. Vogel explains in detail how Robert McNamara, then president of the World Bank, overruled even the pleas of his country of origin, the United States, and accelerated...