Key Issues in the New Knowledge Management

Joseph M. Firestone, Mark W. McElroy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9780750676557
• eBook ISBN: 9781136390586
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

In 'Key Issues in the New Knowledge Management,' Firestone and McElroy, the architects of the New Knowledge Management (TNKM) provide an in-depth analysis of the most important issues in the field of Knowledge Management. The issues the book addresses are central in the field today: * The Knowledge Wars, or the issue of "how you define knowledge determines how you manage it" * The nature of knowledge processing * Information management or knowledge management? * Three views on the evolution of knowledge management * The role of knowledge claim evaluation in knowledge processing, or the difference between opinion, judgements, information, data, and real knowledge in knowledge management systems * Is culture a barrier in knowledge management? * The Open Enterprise and accelerated sustainable innovation * Portals * How should one evaluate KM software? * Intellectual Capital * Measuring the impact of KM initiatives on the organization and the bottom line * KM and terrorism

Chapter 1

THE KNOWLEDGE CONUNDRUM

INTRODUCTION

Since knowledge management became a popular phrase in the mid-1990s, practitioners have labored under the burden of varying and sometimes vague definitions of the field. It is a frequent occurrence at meetings of practitioners discussing KM Metrics, KM Methodology, or KM approaches that someone suddenly asks, “What do we mean by knowledge management?” It’s a still more frequent occurrence that multiple answers are forthcoming in such meetings. Part of the reason for this lack of consensus on a basic definition distinguishing the fundamental process characterizing KM from other business processes is lack of consensus about how to define “knowledge” itself. Most writers about knowledge management apparently believe that they should keep discussion of the nature of knowledge to a minimum and either use the term implicitly, or alternatively, offer the definition they prefer with little or no explanation about why they prefer that specific definition.

This chapter critically surveys alternative definitions of knowledge used in the KM literature, and on the basis of this critique proceeds to offer our own construction of this key term and relates our views to other important questions related to knowledge. The topics we will cover include:

• On definition
• Definitions of knowledge
• World 2 definitions
• World 3 definitions
• World 2 data, information, and knowledge
• Tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge
• Polanyi, implicit knowledge, and Popper
• Individual level World 2 knowledge and motivational hierarchies
• Different types of knowledge

ON DEFINITION

Many in Knowledge Management (KM) prefer to avoid defining it. Their view is that definition is a sterile, time-wasting pastime contributing little or nothing to the real work of KM. Our view is different. It is that definition is an important early step on the road to specifying one’s cognitive map of knowledge processing and KM and to ultimately developing quality models useful for developing KM solutions. We also think that arguments over definition are not fruitless arguments, but important exchanges about what is a good starting point for developing a cognitive map of KM.

The purpose of a definition is not to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for its use. Instead, its purpose is to answer a question like: “What do you mean by knowledge management?” with a short, incomplete answer that:

• allows the questioner to infer something more of the cognitive map (or conceptual map, or semantic network) of the target of the question; and
• facilitates the beginning of further communication and perhaps learning relative to that cognitive map.

A definition, in other words, is the “elevator speech” (the 30-second expression of the idea; see Moore 1991, 159–162) representing, however imperfectly, the cognitive map of the person offering it. That is, when communicating with others about any term, you can:

• Refuse to explain it;
• Define it;
• Specify it;
• Construct a cognitive map of it.

Which would you rather do in response to a basic question from someone either at the beginning of a conversation or at a briefing? Do nothing? Give the “elevator speech?” Give the five-minute overview? Or give the whole briefing?

And if there’s disagreement over a specific definition there are a number of good reasons why that might be the case, other than mere love of philosophical disputation. First, the definition may not provide enough of the definer’s cognitive map to evaluate his or her statements using the concept. Second, the definition may not distinguish the concept from other concepts. Third, the definition may redefine the term beyond common usage in a manner that promotes confusion in communication. (This is a frequent occurrence due to the desire of communicators to acquire the “halo effect” of certain terms for their frequently different concepts.) And fourth, those disagreeing may forecast that a bad model will result (in wasted time and effort) from the starting place for model construction provided by a particular definition.

So, once again, why bother to define? Answer: to save time in responding to a questioner, to create a basis for further communication with others, and last, to specify a cost-effective starting place for further specification, measurement, and modeling.

DEFINITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

There is no consensus on the nature of knowledge. Nor has there ever been in the history of human thought (Jones 1952). Here’s a brief and far from comprehensive survey of definitions offered by writers and researchers in knowledge management.

Knowledge is:

• “Justified true belief”: This is the venerable definition of many philosophers, especially of empiricists who believe knowledge claims can be justified by facts (Goldman 1991). It also is the definition adopted by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, 58).
• “Information in context”: This is a definition that may have its roots in Cartesian rationalist epistemology. In that conceptual framework, its import is that a knowledge claim is valid if it fits without contradiction and adds to the systematic coherence of a larger framework of knowledge (Aune 1970). That is, the rationalist view that knowledge is information in context and that context is what makes it knowledge derives from the more complete idea that information is justified as knowledge when it is coherent with a larger deductive system within which it fits. In this formulation, the validity criterion and the theory of truth are the same. They form a coherence theory of truth and validation, where coherence means that a knowledge claim is consistent with its broader context. In other words, according to the Cartesian rationalist version of the information in context view, information is knowledge when and if (because) it is validated by consistency with its context.
  The rationalist view of knowledge as information in context is only one variant of that view. A second is the pragmatist idea that information that is useful in a situational context of decision and action is knowledge. This view does not focus on logical consistency with other knowledge claims in a system. Instead, it focuses on how instrumental a piece of information is as a tool for action. A further variant of the pragmatist view results from those who do not believe that mere information, our linguistic expressions recorded in documents, information systems, or other cultural products can ever be knowledge. This variant views knowledge as belief and suggests that the utility of information in context is determined by the belief knowledge that exposure to the information produces.
• “Knowledge is understanding based on experience”: This is an idea that is central to modern pragmatism and its associated epistemology (James 1907). It’s also a standard definition found in English language dictionaries. Since it refers to “understanding,” it is clearly a definition of knowledge focused on belief.
• “Knowledge is experience or information that can be communicated or shared” (Allee 1997, 27). Even though Allee refers to experience here, her emphasis is clearly on sharable information and community, not beliefs (27).
• “Knowledge, while made up of data and information, can be thought of as much greater understanding of a situation, relationships, causal phenomena, and the theories and rules (both explicit and implicit) that underlie a given domain or problem.” (Bennet and Bennet 2000, 19). Here Bennet and Bennet refer to knowledge as “understanding” of situations, relationships, and causal phenomena but associate data, information, theories, and rules, and also “understanding” of them with knowledge.
• “Knowledge can be thought of as the body of understandings, generalizations, and abstractions that we carry with us on a permanent or semi-permanent basis and apply to interpret and manage the world around us… we will consider knowledge to be the collection of mental units of all kinds that provides us with understanding and insights.” (Wiig 1998). Wiig clearly defines knowledge as a form of belief.
• “The most essential definition of knowledge is that it is composed of and grounded solely in potential acts and in those signs that refer to them” (Cavaleri and Reed 2000, 114). This is another definition originating in pragmatism and specifically in the work of Charles S. Peirce. A definition offered in the same spirit is “knowledge is social acts,” provided by Ralph Stacey (1996).
• “Knowledge is the capacity for effective action.” This definition is the one favored by the organizational learning community (Argyris 1993, 2–3).
• “Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers. In organizations it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms” (Davenport and Prusak, 1997, 5).

We will discuss these views shortly, but first we want to introduce the framework we prefer for looking at knowledge.

We distinguish three types of knowledge:

• World 1 knowledge—encoded structures in physical systems
• (such as genetic encoding in DNA) that allow those objects to adapt to an environment;
• World 2 knowledge—beliefs and belief predispositions (in minds) about the world, the beautiful, and the right that we believe have survived our tests, evaluations, and experience;
• World 3 knowledge—sharable linguistic formulations, knowledge claims about the world, the beautiful, and the right, that have survived testing and evaluation by the agent (individual, group, community, team, organization, society, etc.) acquiring, formulating, and testing and evaluating the knowledge claims.

All three types of knowledge are about encoded structures in one kind of system or another that arguably help those systems to adapt. The World 1, World 2, and World 3 distinctions were introduced by Karl Popper (1972, 1994, Popper and Eccles 1977). Popper also defined the distinction between World 2 and World 3 knowledge (1972, 106–122, 1994, Chap. 1) (Popper and Eccles, 1977, 36–50). But he did not define either type of knowledge in precisely the terms we have used.

It is comparatively easy to accept Popper’s distinction between the World 1 material and World 2 mental objects that underlies the distinction between World 1 and World 2 knowledge. It is much harder however, to accept the reality of World 3 objects and therefore World 3 knowledge. Following Popper, we propose that there are things that affect our behavior which (1) are not part of World 1 or World 2, (2) are made by intelligent beings, (3) are sharable among us in that they provide sharable content for those exposed to them, and (4) are partly autonomous once created by us. World 3 objects include theories, arguments, problems, works of art, symphonies, constitutions, public policy statements, and all the cultural objects that express content.

While Popper called these objects “World 3,” he was quick to recognize that such objects come in many varieties and indicated that he thought that World 3 had many different regions. He had no strong feelings about whether these regions should all be called World 3 products or whether we should break things out into a number of distinct worlds based on the differences among art, science, music, law, truth, beauty, justice, and other cultural products. We agree with his views and also think that it makes little difference how we label the different World 3 regions as long as we recognize that all are cultural products, that humans create them, and that their function is to help us adapt.

Among World 3 products, we have already named problems and knowledge claims as key objects. Thus, knowledge claims exist within any organization or social system and are among its World 3 products. Among World 2 objects we have distinguished beliefs and belief predispositions of various kinds. Later on we will present a much richer view of the psychology of psychocultural interaction.

So in World 2 we have beliefs and belief predispositions, and in World 3 linguistic expressions in the form of knowledge claims. Where, then, is knowledge? As we indicated earlier, knowledge is found in both World 2 and World 3 in those beliefs, beliefs predispositions, and knowledge claims that have best survived our attempts to test and evaluate them against competitors. Thus, in our view, knowledge is a term applied to the best performing beliefs, belief predispositions, and knowledge claims of an agent—that is, the individual or group that holds the belief or belief predisposition, or expresses the knowledge claims in question—in the course of the agent assessing the performance of t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: What Is the New Knowledge Management (TNKM), and What Are Its Key Issues?
• Chapter 1. The Knowledge Conundrum
• Chapter 2. Origin of the Knowledge Life Cycle
• Chapter 3. Information Management and Knowledge Management
• Chapter 4. Generations of Knowledge Management
• Chapter 5. Knowledge Claim Evaluation: The Forgotten Factor in Knowledge Production
• Chapter 6. Applications of The Knowledge Life Cycle (KLC) Framework
• Chapter 7. Knowledge Management as Best Practices Systems—Where’s the Context?
• Chapter 8. What Comes First: Knowledge Management or Strategy?
• Chapter 9. Knowledge Management and Culture
• Chapter 10. A Note on Intellectual Capital
• Chapter 11. Conclusion
• Glossary of Acronyms
• Index
• About the Authors