Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia

Joseph Kéchichian

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• eBook ISBN: 9781136172182
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The fractious relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has long been a central concern in Washington. In the aftermath of 9/11 and amongst ongoing wars, the United States confronts an acute dilemma: how to cooperate with Riyadh against terrorism whilst confronting acute anti-Americanism?

Using information gathered from extensive interviews with a plethora of officials, this book aims to analyze Saudi domestic reforms. It addresses the significant deficiency of information on such diverse matters as the judiciary and ongoing national dialogues, but also provides an alternative understanding of what motivates Saudi policy makers. How these reforms may impact on future Saudi decision-making will surely generate a slew of policy concerns for the United States and this study offers a few clarifications and solutions.

This book will be of interest to anyone seeking a new perspective on the motivation behind legal and political reforms in Saudi Arabia, and the effects of these reforms beyond the Middle East.

1 Reforms within the judiciary

To say that Sa‘udi Arabia is undergoing extreme renovation of its vital institutions would be an understatement. With repeated and swift royal decrees after his accession to the throne in 2005, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, has proposed a variety of changes and continues to be more creative than many assume. In 2007, for example, the monarch established an independent Supreme Court and provided bylaws for his 2006 Succession edict. Because Sa‘udis professed that the kingdom followed scriptures, going so far as to claim that their constitution was the Holy Qur’an, and because of the 1744 politico-religious alliance between the Al Sa‘ud and the Al Shaykh, the very idea of reforms within the judiciary was problematic.¹ Inasmuch as most socio-political issues were addressed within fundamental religious parameters, it is legitimate to inquire how the ruler's reforms, which were clearly moving the kingdom's political markers, would dramatically affect the lives of Sa‘udi citizens and expatriate workers toiling in the country.

While the October 2, 2007 announcements — to create an independent Supreme Court as well as a Grievances Board — mandated the two bodies to supervise the implementation of Shari‘ah and laws enacted by the king, they buttressed the authority of judges to reach relatively free decisions. In fact, the new Supreme Court (SC), which replaced the Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC), was empowered to do more than evaluate rulings or uphold verdicts issued by appeals courts. Once fully realized, plainly defined directives required that adjudicators apply fair and uniform measures across the board, precisely to eliminate current fluctuations due to varying and sometimes contradictory interpretations.

This was a major step forward, and while the SJC was authorized to oversee administrative aspects of the judiciary, including the appointment of magistrates, new features within the contemplated SC required that judges — who ruled under Shari‘ah and relied on ijma ‘(consensus) and qiyas (analogy) — undergo periodic training, which was a revolutionary idea indeed. Moreover, the new SC was to sit at the top of a truly independent body, if that was possible to fathom, with appeal benches that reviewed verdicts by first-degree courts that, in turn, retained some distance from criminal, personal affairs, commercial and labor canons. At the time these announcements were made, the Sa‘udi monarch allocated 7 billion Sa‘udi Riyals (approximately US$2.8 billion) to train qualified cadres and to build a sophisticated legal infrastructure, including law schools housed in separate edifices. Equally important, the royal decrees called for a streamlined process to absorb legal findings under Shari‘ah, which necessitated trained and highly capable prosecutors. Yet, with a severe shortage of magistrates — less than 50 throughout the kingdom adjudicating over 80,000 cases per year in 2007 — the challenge was to provide adequate training to judges and attorneys not only in the law itself, but also in the sorely needed accountability process. Nevertheless, the mere fact that significant resources were earmarked for such projects illustrated the ruler's intentions, clearly motivated by the quest for proficiency.

As discussed throughout this study, King ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz recognized that genuine sociopolitical reforms were long overdue and seemed to be working in earnest to address them. In this chapter, an effort is made to address new judiciary laws, along with an investigation as to whether Riyadh managed to keep up with the reformist ruler since the 2007 reorganizations. To be sure, while a society must be equipped to govern itself, and must train legal minds that will look after the interests of both the general public as well as each individual, these are long-term propositions that require persistence. Sa‘udi society is no exception. Indeed, it remains to be determined whether Al Sa‘ud leaders can acculturate themselves to produce successors who can appreciate the limits of power, and whether they can forge ahead with inclusive political institutions that may add value to citizens at large. Likewise, and with respect to the judiciary, it is critical to understand whether the clergy who handled the law in Sa‘udi Arabia were ready to share doctrinal responsibilities with officials appointed by the State to administer justice.

To better address these questions, this chapter is divided into three sections, all focusing on changes in the country's legal framework. It first concentrates on the actual reform mechanisms within the judiciary, emphasizing economic requirements, as well as the establishment of an independent Supreme Court. This is followed by an examination — concentrating on education, including its religious variety, as well as the status of women — of the primary social functions that involve legal authorities in a country where the very idea of separation of powers is still a work in progress. Finally, the context, and the key political repercussions, of judiciary involvements are scrutinized, highlighting the war on terrorism and political violence. An understanding of how Al Sa‘ud leaders have dealt with, and are handling, the kingdom's various judicial affairs will identify and confirm whether proposed reforms are, in fact, genuine.

Reforming the judiciary in Sa‘udi Arabia

While the political reforms of the 1990s, including the adoption of a Basic Law, expanded some of the checks and balances that existed in the kingdom, key royal orders were issued to improve the tacit 1744 Al Sa‘ud-Al Shaykh Alliance.²

If the Al Sa‘ud forged a legitimizing institution by aligning themselves with the Al Shaykh, they nevertheless adhered to a sophisticated constitutional mechanism that rested on Shari‘ah law. Moreover, and beyond founding society on religious precepts, the Al Sa‘ud mixed Islamic law with tribal instruments that guaranteed loyalty. By emphasizing Shurah (consultation) and implementing bay‘ah (allegiance), both of which were backed by Scriptures, the Al Sa‘ud preserved traditions that strengthened kingship. As discussed in some detail in Chapter Four, the 1992 Basic Law introduced provisions regulating the succession process.³ Yet, ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz was not only reforming the critical succession procedures in place, but embarked on extensive reform plans that addressed “key areas of good governance, political reform, women's rights, judicial reform, economic reform and educational reform.”⁴ Of course, such initiatives meant that Riyadh tinkered with the country's constitutional and administrative practices, even going so far as introducing an evolutionary modus operandi that was uncharacteristic and, potentially, challenging if the clergy opposed Al Sa‘ud reforms.

Critics of the kingdom asserted that Sa‘udi Arabia stood at “the forefront of spreading the radical Wahhabi message throughout the Muslim world” through “the Islamic World League (Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami), the World Association of Muslim Youth, and the World Association of Mosques.” Apparently, these institutions were “notorious for their support of radical and terrorist organizations throughout the world, and for spreading texts that indoctrinate Muslims to intolerance of non-Muslims.”⁵ This was, of course, a narrow reading of the kingdom's complex religious institutions and the legitimizing roles they played in fostering harmony. Because all three Sa‘udi monarchies were based on an alliance between two collegial establishments that withstood the test of time, it was imperative for these two conventional poles of authority to act in relative harmony. Doing otherwise would only mean perpetual clashes that, in a tribal environment, presaged bloody conflict even if Makkah was not “a center of Islamic learning” after the ninth century. Still, to claim that Wahhabi ‘Ulamah (Islamic scholars) “were not there before the state,” which is to say that they had not successfully established “old and respected” establishments like al-Azhar in Cairo, was excessively harsh.⁶

Rather, and over the centuries, Al Sa‘ud rulers cultivated religious leaders and attempted to prevail over them long before the kingdom was formally declared in 1932 in its current geographical setting. Moreover, to assert that the importance or value of the religious establishment increased after the 1973–74 oil booms, is also inaccurate. In fact, the founder of the kingdom, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman understood the intrinsic value of clerics for the regime around the turn of the century. He cajoled many to join him during the unification battles that ensued. Throughout history, but especially in times of turmoil, Sa‘udi rulers perceived the clerical establishment as an asset. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Faysal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz relied on, and received, the necessary blessings of senior religious figures to usher in his rule. Khalid bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz needed, and relied on, critical fatwahs to dislodge dissidents who attacked and occupied the Grand Mosque in Makkah in 1979. Fahd bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz sought and received a legal imprimatur to legitimize the deployment of UN-sanctioned and US-led foreign coalition troops in the 1991 War for Kuwait. All of these events and many more enhanced the political power of the religious establishment, even if a variety of opinions, especially dissenting voices, emerged from time to time. Consequently, it would be nearly impossible to separate vested clerical interests in Sa‘udi Arabia from those of the ruling family, even if the Al Sa‘ud enjoy a primus inter pares (first among equals) advantage. In fact, it was remarkable to note the extent to which the Al Sa‘ud shared common perceptions with senior clerics, many of whom held similar perspectives on vital concerns on many global concerns. A few radicalized Shaykhs notwithstanding, the vast majority of clerics did not support the creation of an Islamic government along the Iranian model, not only because most were financially beholden to the Al Sa‘ud, but also because they sincerely believed in the authenticity of their alliance. Likewise, and despite periodic anomalies emanating from Shaykhs with bizarre inclinations, senior ruling family members fully understood that Sa‘udi Arabia without the religious legitimacy of the Wahhabi establishment would not, perhaps even could not, assert its authenticity. Few concerns ranked as high as the putative alternative to the Al Sa‘ud-Al Shaykh alliance, whether a theocracy modeled after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, or a Westernized democracy that would upset the norms of the traditional society.

An evolving alliance

When Shaykh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab, the founder of the Muwahhidun (Unitarian) movement died in 1792, the wali al-amr (political leader), Muhammad Ibn Sa‘ud, assumed the title of imam, too. A precedent was established, whereby Sa‘udi political leaders could also be recognized as imams, which improved their religious authority by granting them judicial and administrative privileges, even if they were not muftis (jurists). In 1924, that is, after the founder conquered the Hijaz and became ruler over Makkah and Madinah, he assumed the title of Khadim al-Haramayn (Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques), which was a title used by Ottoman Sultans.⁷ To his credit, the founder ruler strengthened the alliance through intermarriage, which brought the two families even closer together. In fact, the late King Faysal's mother, Tarfah bint Al Shaykh, the daughter of an Al Shaykh judge who was a direct descendant of Ibn ‘Abdul-Wahhab, “was the critical link that legitimized the military-religious alliance.”⁸ Through such relationships, which continued over the decades, the Al Shaykh confirmed their part of the pact, not only as religious authorities but also from their active participation in the creation of the ruling elite. Ever since ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman, successive Sa‘udi monarchs entrusted the religious ministries and the post of the Grand Mufti to Al Shaykh family members. While learned men from other families occupied key posts, too, the Al Shaykh received preferential treatment, if for no other reason than to maintain the harmony of the alliance. Honoring the terms of the 1744 pact was, consequently, an existential issue that could not be breached, except under extraordinary circumstances. Naturally, as responsibilities increased and non-Al Shaykh clerics stepped forward, many individuals were brought into the system, but almost always under the overarching control of the Al Sa‘uds and the Al Shaykhs acting in unison to preserve and protect core interests as well as the kingdom. Shaykh Salih al-Lahidan, for example, became the chairman of the Higher Council of Qadis and a member of the Hay’at Kibar al-‘Ulamah (Board of Senior ‘Ulamah) (BSU). Shaykh ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Lahidan was put in charge of religious affairs, endowments, and da’wah in the eastern region. Others received equally important posts and titles.

With changing times, Riyadh invested in religious affairs by building theology schools that rekindled Islamic scholarship in Makkah and Madinah that, in turn, tied them to the Sa‘udi regime. In turn, the ‘Ulamah flexed their political muscles as early as 1973, when several officials implored King Faysal to enforce the oil embargo against the United States and The Netherlands, two countries that extended military assistance to Israel during the October Arab-Israeli War. As discussed elsewhere, the first major crisis that threatened to upset the 1744 Al Sa‘ud-Al Shaykh balance of power occurred in November 1979, when Juhayman al-‘Utaybi and his followers occupied the Makkah Mosque.⁹ This epochal event, which followed the February 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, as well as the open rebellion of Shi‘ah communities in the oil-rich eastern province of the kingdom, placed the ruling family in a particularly awkward position. For the first time in contemporary affairs, King Khalid literally asked for, and received, the support of the ‘Ulamah on what was essentially a defining political concern. Few anticipated the actual use of force inside the Holy Haram and, naturally, Riyadh could not act with impunity wit...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• About the author
• Acknowledgements
• A note on transliteration
• Introduction
• 1 Reforms within the judiciary
• 2 National and international dialogues
• 3 Political participation and municipal elections
• 4 Political reforms and the succession dilemma
• 5 Reforms and the petition industry
• 6 Sa‘udi Arabia and the United States
• 7 Conclusion
• Appendix 1: Interviews
• Appendix 2: Consent to Establish the King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Center for National Dialogue
• Appendix 3: King ‘Abdallah’s opening speech in Madrid
• Appendix 4: The Madrid Declaration
• Appendix 5: Sa‘udi Arabia: excerpts from the 1992 Basic Law
• Appendix 6: Sa‘udi Arabia: Allegiance Law of Succession
• Appendix 7: Sa‘udi Arabia: Bylaws of the Allegiance Commission
• Appendix 8: Partners in One Nation
• Appendix 9: “Secular” Petition to King Fahd December 1990
• Appendix 10: “Religious” Petition to King Fahd February 1991
• Appendix 11: A Vision for the Present and Future of the Nation
• Appendix 12: In Defense of the Nation
• Appendix 13: A Deviant Junta has Taken Hold of the Sa‘udi Media and is Endangering Islamic Society and Its Values
• Appendix 14: 2007 Sa‘udi Women Petition for Driving Right
• Appendix 15 Sa‘udi Activists Petition King for Reforms
• Appendix 16: A Declaration of National Reform
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index